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PREFACE
What is a nation? A question asked by many a theoretician as well asby individuals who persist in recognizing some form of commu-
nity, recognizable relational identities and political will to declare
sovereignty over geopolitical spaces, cultural and social environments.
Where a nation is defined in terms of nationalism a paradox appears. Since
the definition of a nation can have the elite influence and insist on
‘standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading
entire populations and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which
well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very
nearly the only kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently
identify. The cultures now seem to be the natural repositories of political
legitimacy’ (Gellner, 1983: 55). The paradox of this is that 
under these conditions only, nations can indeed be defined in terms
both of will and of culture, and indeed in terms of the convergence
of them both with political units. In these conditions, men will to
be politically united with all those, and only those, who share their
culture. Polities then will to extend their boundaries to the limits of
their cultures, and to protect and impose their culture within the
boundaries of their power. The fusion of will, culture and polity
becomes the norm, and one not easily or frequently defied (Gellner,
1983: 55). 
Though the argument presented here is more relevant to nations within
the European context, the definition might not be too appropriate for the
postcolonial world where nationalism has a different flavor. 
Since the beginning of nationalism in Papua New Guinea, the
persistent attempts by Papua New Guineans to define themselves within
its boundaries, cultures and society as a nation, challenges Gellner’s
arguments. Indeed, attempts to define nation has often eluded any defini-
tional concerns in Papua New Guinea. Why? Simply because of the
historical conditions from which it emerged as a consequence of
colonialism, nationalism, prior to political independence in 1975, was the
channel in which Papua New Guineans vented and resisted European
colonialism. Since political independence was achieved, nationalism began
to undergo a transformation, paradoxically in disguise, so as to achieve a
desired result such as reinvention of a nation, and reclaiming cultural and
social values deemed inherently Papua New Guinean. 
Nationalism has, however, lost its fervent political fire. It has
transformed itself to embody a nation, by nurturing a divergent cultural,
social, philosophical, political outlook of people within a nationally
defined frame of reference. The success of this was that as a nation, the
manifestation of nationalism was only operative at the ideological level,
while the insistence at the provincial and local level was for the recognition
of governance directly affecting those who do not necessarily, understand
the nature and goals of a nation. That is to say, nationalism was sound at
the national level, whereas provincialism was ideally sound at the provin-
cial level. These are two different sets of praxis, in terms of their desired
goals and expectations.
The suggestion here is that at the provincial level a nation exists
only as an idea that correlates the representation manifest in the general
elections, from which a political leader is elected to represent the voters in
the nation. What exists for most people at the provincial level is the affilia-
tion they make of themselves within various cultures, languages, and social
groups, economic and educational units. The political experience is
defined in very specific and culturally instituted frameworks. The political
expression here often precludes the nation, since it operates outside the
immediate social, cultural and political conditions. Indeed, one may argue
there is a sense of resistance to nationalism, which is imbued with decep-
tions, empty promises and sentiments directly stemming from an elite
conception of a nation. Papua New Guinea has and still experiences this
tension with provincial government autonomies and regional premiers
groupings: the possible threat to nationalism and its demise. This is
perhaps, where we agree with Gellner: 
Nationalism usually conquers in the name of a putative folk
culture. Its symbolism is drawn from the healthy, pristine, vigorous
life of peasants, of the Volk, the narod. There is a certain element of
truth in the nationalist self-representation when the narod or Volk
is ruled by officials of another, an alien high culture, whose oppres-
sion must be resisted first by a cultural revival and reaffirmation,
and eventually by a war of national liberation. If nationalism
prospers it eliminates the alien high culture, but it does not then
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replace it by the old local low culture; it revives, or invents, a local
high (literate, specialist-transmitted) culture of its own, though
admittedly one which will have some links with the earlier local folk
styles and dialects (Gellner 1983: 57).
This perhaps is the root of contradictions, confusion, tension and delusion
experienced in Papua New Guinea. The obverse may also be given some
thought: that the imagined culture of the nation is also the process by
which provincialism is denied of its culture and identity, as opposed to
others, for the sake of an imagined culture made of differences drawn from
across the plain of social and cultural norms at various strata of the nation.
That is the requirement of a nation.
The attempts to define nationalism then falls on the selected
and educated Papua New Guineans who respond more to a social political
influence outside the folk culture from which they began their journeys
outward to secure a place in a nation. Whereas those who stayed back or
live within the boundaries defined by tribal, cultural, linguistic and all
other contingencies, respond only to the continuity of such boundaries
through practice and praxis known to them for centuries. The conse-
quence of these two tensions, between nationalism and what is labelled as
provincialism, or better still tribalism, is the violent, and often demeaning
result of differences between individuals who have to struggle between the
two levels under which a nation is imagined. 
Out of this tension a need for rethinking nationalism, nation,
independence, selfhood, governance, post colonialism, and citizenry is
necessary. Asked by the editors to write a preface to this timely publication,
the task seems rather ominous, in that the preface itself has already 
presupposed and imagined, a shape and content that is an endorsement of
nationalism’s ideals: definitions of nationalism and what a nation is. The
paradox is that again this book is an echo of the earlier remarks that the
definition comes from those who are educated, leading a social and
economic class above their own kind, and who are its nation’s intellectual
leaders. This paradox cannot be underwritten, or be overemphasized. One
is reminded that such paradoxes exist as necessary preconditions for self-
definitions as well as for discursive practices that are productive and valuable
to understanding depths of knowledge produced from such a collection of
essays. Within such spaces of competing ideals and discourses the promise of
a collective identity is realized, irrespective of one’s positionality. 
It is this angle that allows a dialogic process to emerge in this
book. The editors have the daunting task of assembling papers from a
wide section of the society. The task of organizing and presenting a book
that commemorates the 25 years of Papua New Guinea’s independence is
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as cumbersome as attempts to reevaluate what hasbeen achieved and what
has not been achieved since 1975. In other words, the editors have
provided a stage in which Papua New Guineans in all walks of life are now
asking: Which way Papua New Guinea? Where did they come from and
where are they going? Have we done this or that? What are we going to do
next? The answers to these questions remain with Papua New Guineans
themselves. Perhaps this collection will serve to answer some of these
questions. 
The answers to these questions are so varied and complex that
even the contributors to this collection of essays may not be able to answer
them succinctly. The suggestion here is that even those who claim to
answer such questions have not sufficiently answered them. In truth
answering these questions is a lifelong continuous effort in the chain of
movement between those who are governed and those who govern,
between the subsistence farmers of villagers and the captains of industry,
between the illiterate and the educated, between the older generations and
the future generations. The answers, it seems, are only realized as rather
sentimental nationalistic utterances or as written narratives informed by a
configuration of various discourses that shaped, formulated and trans-
formed the political unconscious of a nation.
What undercuts all these papers is that Papua New Guinea as a
nation is being reimagined. The various categories of the book and the
various contributions serve the purpose of reinvention, rethinking and
structuring of our mental precepts and collective experiences of a nation.
Since the contributors to the book are the post-independence generation
of Papua New Guineans, it is a gesture toward realization of the answer to
the question: who should define and speak for Papua New Guineans? Such
privilege engages the political unconscious upon which a nation looks for
its purveyors of a desired goal and vision. 
As it is, the book engages in the issues of development and
planning, culture, identity and nation making, aspects of good governance,
economic development and social development. Each contribution in this
book has achieved one goal and that is the author’s views and experiences
encompass the state in which Papua New Guinea finds itself. It is not too
difficult to imagine a nation; but to make a nation all views, actions, plans,
visions and perspectives need to be taken into account. 
It is with such a view that this preface opens the book of a
modern nation’s development since 1975. Earlier platforms upon which
this nation is built should be revisited as well, in order to map out a clear
sense of direction. Here is Somare’s experience as Chief Minister:
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What was I to do? Papua New Guinea could not go into self-
government without a constitution. I thought about this for a long
time and talked to many of my ministers. I did not want to lose the
opportunity the House had given me to declare Papua New Guinea
self-government on 1 December 1973. Then an idea came to us.
Perhaps it would be possible to have a two-stage self-government,
involving full transfer of powers except for defense and foreign
relations but continuing with all the basic institutions and constitu-
tional rules. The second stage could be after the C.P. C. had made
its recommendation. Then we could enact our own home grown
constitution. I put this to the House and the C.P. C. and gained
acceptance for the idea (Somare, 1975: 101).
I hope these essays will stimulate discussions and fulfill the
visions of the editors. It is a rare publication that will become an impor-
tant one in the lives of Papua New Guineans as well as those learning
about Papua New Guinea.
Steven Edmund Winduo
University of Papua New Guinea
REFERENCES
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David Kavanamur, Charles Yala and Quinton Clements
‘To understand where we are going, we must understand what has
happened and what is happening to us.’
Michael Somare (1985: 5)
PAPUA NEW GUINEA: WHICH WAY?
At the beginning of the new century, 25 years after political independence
from Australia in 1975, Papua New Guinea has lost its way. Media
headlines, editorial pieces, letters to the editor, talkback radio shows and
casual conversations all point to numerous crises and lament the state of
the nation. The common theme is that the nation-state is on the edge of a
precipice, facing a complete breakdown. The perception of crisis has taken
on a life of its own, with most people, both Papua New Guineans and
interested foreigners, accepting perception as reality.
Between the 1950s and 1970s nation building was the central
preoccupation of the recently independent former colonies in Asia, Africa
and the Pacific. Nation building referred to the ‘policies and projects by
which newly independent governments would purposively effect the
transition from tradition to modernity’ (Foster, 1995: 3). These govern-
ments in effect embarked upon a quest that ‘entailed a total and massive
effort of social engineering in which all the elements of the modern state
were assembled’ (Foster, 1995: 3). They were led by the departing colonial
powers and prevailing political thought to conceive of the state they were
building in Weberian terms — that is, the state is made up of administra-
tive, legal, extractive and coercive elements.
The path to independence lacked what Geertz (1973: 236) so
eloquently described as the ‘consciousness of massive, univocal, irresistible
movement, the stirring to action of an entire people, that the attack upon
colonialism almost everywhere induced’. Stephen Pokawin (1982: 57)
states that:
Independence for PNG on 16 September 1975 was not the result
of national consensus. The majority of Papua New Guineans were
either not concerned, against, or not committed. It was the doing of
a small group of people led by the Pangu Party and its sympathizers
in the House of Assembly. Many people were not sure of what
independence would bring for them and the country.
In the period prior to independence, political struggle tended to
be confined to the jockeying amongst various groups for advantageous
positions, rather than against the colonial state. The introduction of a dual
wage system for public servants in 1964 is often cited by some Papua New
Guineans as the beginning of a political consciousness amongst urban,
tertiary educated Papua New Guineans that eventually led to independ-
ence (Wanek, 1996: 49). Related to this was the absence of what Apter
(1963) refers to as a ‘political religion’, a populist nationalism celebrating
either the rise of a new nation or the rebirth of ancient glories. Given that
there was no national struggle, it follows that there were no charismatic
leaders in the vein of Gandhi, Sukarno and Nkrumah. Political deliverance
in the context of colonial Papua New Guinea did not require such
‘prophet-liberators’ (Geertz, 1973: 235).
THE GENERATIONAL TRANSITION
Judging from events in former colonies throughout the developing world,
25 years after independence marks the beginning of the transition of
power and leadership from the independence to post-independence 
generations. Two forms of transition have emerged. Firstly, the post-
independence generation struggles, often through violent conflict, to gain
control from the independence generation. Secondly, there is an accom-
modating to and facilitation of the transition by the independence
generation. Independence generation political leaders have taken one of
two paths to power — being groomed for leadership by the departing
colonial power such as Fiji’s first Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamasese Mara,
or seizing power by driving out the colonial order like Zimbabwe’s Robert
Mugabe. But whether as favoured son or independence fighter, the period
of their leadership is generally marked by the accumulation of status,
domestically and internationally, power and often considerable wealth that
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they are reluctant to give up. They may, therefore, resist the transition to
the next generation of leaders.
Papua New Guinea’s political leadership at independence was a
mixture of a young, western educated elite and more traditional big-men
with little or no formal education. Don Woolford (1976: 237) observed
that ‘power was uneasily shared between the politicians and senior public
servants’. For several years following independence there was a shift in
favour of the latter with the public service run by a cadre of ambitious
young graduates who, by virtue of their education, were better equipped
to handle the task of government than most parliamentarians and minis-
ters. By 2002, however, politics has become the only game in town, the
public service a shadow of its independence self, and ambitious graduates
competing alongside disillusioned public servants to enter parliament. In
the 1972 general elections for the House of Assembly that voted in
independence, 605 candidates contested 100 seats and few public servants
resigned to stand. In 2002, the sixth national elections had 3150 candi-
dates contesting 109 seats, with an exodus of public servants resigning to
stand (The National newspaper, 19 April 2002: 6).
The post-independence generation has been educated under the
leadership of the pre-independence generation. It is now more than
25 years after independence and the post-independence generation is
beginning to transit into the realm of the political, administrative and
economic decision making structures of the country. The management of
the transition is important. If poorly managed, the country could easily
follow ‘the Somali road to development’ as its neighbour, the Solomon
Islands, increasingly has (Bayart et al., 1999: xiv).
In his novel Gutsini Posa (Rough Seas) Regis Stella (1999: 14)
describes an unfolding crisis in contemporary Papua New Guinea and the
sense of frustration gripping ordinary people:
The country was in imminent danger of total chaos, controlled only
by gangs of thugs. The financial crisis deepened daily; workers were
laid off; vital services scaled down. The government urged people to
make sacrifices, yet the MPs had voted themselves pay increases and
an increase in the slush fund allowance. For the last several weeks
the newspapers had been frontpaging the crisis. The former
colonizers were reluctant to come to the rescue and now the nation
was at the mercy of the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund.
Stella’s central character, Penagi, believes the only solution is
revolution!
INTRODUCTION 3
THE PURPOSE OF THE BOOK
Many changes have occurred in Papua New Guinea’s political and socio-
economic environment since September 1975. Globalisation and other
international forces, uneven development, the Bougainville civil war, polit-
ical crises and socio-political changes have brought new challenges for
Papua New Guinea. In some quarters, especially amongst aid donors,
resource companies and foreign policy makers and analysts, there has been
ongoing interest in the nation building project in Papua New Guinea.
This interest is underpinned by Papua New Guinea’s status as the third
largest nation-state in the South Pacific and second most populous, and its
unique geopolitical and cultural position between Asia and the south-west
Pacific.
Despite the historical, personal and geographical ties between
the two countries, Papua New Guinea has drifted off the public radar
screen in Australia, a Conradian nightmare and byword for failure within
the Australian popular imagination. Few Australian tourists venture to
Papua New Guinea, and for most Australians working there it is a
hardship posting and primarily regarded as a career stepping stone rather
than as an end in itself. The generations of Australians who lived and
worked in Papua New Guinea and retained a powerful emotional attach-
ment to it upon their return home, constituting a powerful Papua New
Guinea lobby underpinning Australia’s post-independence commitment to
PNG, is ageing and unlikely to be replaced.
In the lead-up to Papua New Guinea’s 25th anniversary of
independence on 16th September 2000 we found very little interest in
Australia in acknowledging this milestone. In Papua New Guinea itself the
anniversary celebrations were rather muted, reflecting the sense of popular
despair the country found itself in. However, from our discussions with
colleagues throughout Papua New Guinea and abroad, there was identified
a clear need for a book about the state-of-the-nation 25 years after
independence and, more importantly, written by a new generation of
Papua New Guineans.
This book, therefore, is a collection of essays by the post-
independence generation after 25 years of independence. This generation
have come into their own since independence and their views reflect the
experiences of being part of an independent Papua New Guinea. Moreover
this is a generation that is beginning to move into the mainstream of
leadership across various fields in modern Papua New Guinean society.
This generation is passionate about discussing the problems and achieve-
ments of the first decades of independence. Letters to the editors, talkback
radio and national forums are evidence of the extent of these discussions.
4 BUILDING A NATION IN  PAPUA NEW GUINEA
It reflects a strong nation-building ethos amongst this generation and their
concerns about the state of the nation.
This book has sought to capture their thoughts and views. Papua
New Guinean societies have a strong oral tradition. Therefore many of the
views expressed by Papua New Guineans are lost to future generations. This
book provides an avenue for expressing their views in writing, to structure
the ideas being talked about and preserve these. It reflects the views of the
post-independence generation who are articulating a vision for the future
and who will be the next leaders who realise this vision.
There is a long tradition of publications on Papua New Guinea
that were wholly or dominated by foreigners — the first in 1928, The
Australian Mandate for New Guinea: Record of Round Table Discussion. In
March 1974 the first edition of Yagl-Ambu: Papua New Guinea Journal of
the Social Sciences and Humanities was published. Until its demise in the
late 1980s, this quarterly from the University of Papua New Guinea
attracted a mixture of Papua New Guinean and non-Papua New Guinean
contributors. Some of the inspiration for our edited collection is derived
from the March 1985 special issue of Yagl-Ambu ‘How Far Have We
Come: Ten Years of Independence’. Other publications on Papua New
Guinea and with Papua New Guinean contributors include Administration
for Development, the journal of the Administrative College of Papua New
Guinea, and the annual Waigani seminar series. Both had stopped being
published by the early 1990s. Attempts have been made by some Papua
New Guineans to revive this tradition with occasional publications being
produced by the National Research Institute, the Institute of National
Affairs (both in Port Moresby), and the new tertiary institutions, the
University of Goroka and Divine Word University in Madang. The most
recent edited collections, combining contributions from Papua New
Guineans and foreigners, include Papua New Guinea: A 20/20 Vision
edited by Ila Temu and Modern Papua New Guinea edited by Laura
Zimmer-Tamakoshi.
Our book represents not only another attempt to revive a rich
publication history, but more importantly, a shift in focus away from
established and well known commentators, both foreign and Papua New
Guinean, to an exclusively Papua New Guinean authorship. These are the
views of the post-independence generation — that is, the younger, up-
and-coming members of Papua New Guinean society who will be the
leaders of the future and who will be the ones who answer the question
‘where to from here?’ In this respect this book is the most comprehensive
and exclusive Papua New Guinean engagement with major contemporary
issues. It provides an overview of the history of the past 25 years and
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frankly assesses the state-of-the-nation in terms of its formation and
continued development from the perspective of a new group of commen-
tators. Whilst the views of the pre-independence/independence generation
are important, in many ways they have had their day and it is the next
generation, the post-independence generation whose views have not been
shaped by the colonial experience but by the nation building experience
following independence, whose voice should now be heard.
THE CHAPTERS IN BRIEF
The chapters of this volume offer divergent perspectives, rather than a
common approach, on the nation building process across a wide variety of
areas. Each contributor has sought to assess developments in his or her
field. Common to all, however, is the theme of nation building. All see
themselves as part of a process that will ultimately produce a tangible
Papua New Guinean nation.
Many issues are not covered in this collection. This is, in some
cases, an indication of the absence of suitable Papua New Guinean
authors, itself an indication of the level of development in many fields.
The absence of some issues also reflects the challenge to open up ideas on
contemporary issues in Papua New Guinea. The majority of the authors
are junior academics, their views are neither official nor grassroots but tend
towards a middle path reflecting their education and status within Papua
New Guinean society.
The book is divided into four sections. The first section sets the
scene on the state of the nation and thinking about the nation building
process. The novelist, Regis Stella, examines the relationship between
tradition and modernity, sometimes portrayed as antagonistic. He argues
writers and artists in contemporary Papua New Guinea have been silent on
the many challenges the country faces.
The second section on aspects of good governance confronts the
dilemma Papua New Guinea faces after two and half decades of independ-
ence. Having adopted a Weberian system of government, Papua New
Guinea has had difficulty fitting such a system into the local context.
Questions of governance have therefore been predominant since
independence. The chapters in this section review this ongoing debate and
propose some solutions. Alphonse Gelu argues that although constitution-
ally Papua New Guinea has adopted the core elements of liberal
democracy, it still has a long way to go to make this work. Henry Okole
aims to provoke debate on the role of the provincial government system
and examines ways to enhance the system. Three specific case studies are
provided to highlight the governance challenges confronting PNG —
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James Laki on the role of the troubled Defence Force; Hengene Payani on
the causes, consequences and strategies for combating corruption; and Joe
Kanekane on the obstacles faced by the media in reporting corruption.
The third section focuses on the progress and challenges of
economic development. Overall the economic development of Papua New
Guinea has been disappointing, a story of great promise squandered.
Modowa Gumoi provides a sobering appraisal of the economy. His conclu-
sion is that, despite the rich natural resource base and substantial external
financial assistance, overall economic performance has been dismal.
Gumoi’s chapter is followed by four chapters on specific sectoral issues.
Christopher Hnanguie asks how effective foreign aid has been in Papua
New Guinea and what its future is. Benedict Imbun examines the develop-
ment of industrial relations institutions. Enaha Peri Kwa argues that
development has come at the expense of the environment. Ruth Turia
discusses the controversial issue of the management of forest resources.
The seven chapters in the fourth section focus on aspects of
social development. The social sector is a barometer for developments in
governance and the economy. Francis Hombhanje provides an overview of
the disease pattern in Papua New Guinea, in particular the emergence of
lifestyle diseases such as HIV/AIDS and diabetes that have placed an
additional burden on a health system struggling to cope with existing
tropical diseases. Samuel Haihuie looks at the state of the vital, but
neglected education system. Only half of Papua New Guinea’s eligible
school age children are currently engaged in some type of formal educa-
tion. Anne Dickson-Waiko analyses the emergence of civil society
organisations within Papua New Guinea and argues that this has been a
promising development. Margaret Vatnabar addresses the development of
women since independence. She notes that progress has proven slow.
Daniel Leke examines the important role of the churches in nation-
building through the provision of vital services such as health and
education. Julienne Kaman focuses on peace studies as a means to
countering an emerging culture of violence and proposes a curriculum for
a tertiary level peace studies course. In the final chapter Elizabeth Kopel
provides a study in the gap between policy development and implementa-
tion. She outlines the main policy developments in the housing sector and
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As early as 1979, the novelist Russell Soaba in his novel Maibaportrayed Papua New Guinea as ‘a society caught in the tension
between greed and materialism, cultural betrayal and historical nostalgia’
(Ashcroft, 1987: 86). Indeed the diagnosis of the sociopolitical and
economic landscape of PNG has deteriorated so much that in recent times
critics have compared Papua New Guinea to a fast sinking ship caught in
an ocean of corruption, economic chaos, political turmoil and social
inferno. The culture of corruption that Papua New Guinea faces today is
to a large extent of our own creation. Despite numerous warnings that the
country needs to take stringent measures to keep afloat, our leaders have
not taken heed but continue to maintain political improbity. Therefore to
some extent how outsiders perceive Papua New Guinea is ostensibly based
on well-founded inferences and observations.
In a paper ‘Framing the Islands: Knowledge and Power in
Changing Australian Images of “the South Pacific”’ (1997), Greg Fry of
the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at The Australian
National University in Canberra discusses the different images of the
South Pacific, including Papua New Guinea. In his analysis the contempo-
rary Australian view of the South Pacific countries has shifted (though not
exclusively) from the earlier depiction as either paradise or hell to what he
calls a new ‘doomsdayism’. This new doomsdayism imagery has its prove-
nance in ‘the heartland of “rational” thinking’. The representers include
bureaucrats, academics, economists, and journalists, among others. This
‘new’ representation is saturated with a conflation of western social, polit-
ical, cultural and economic meanings that expand its signified far beyond
its immediate localized meaning. The significance of this delineation is
that it expresses and influences national predilections and national
character at the same time as it plays a cardinal and salient part in the
Australian aesthetics of perception. Fry notes that, ‘in the dramatic
imagery associated with this conception, the South Pacific is the “hole in
the Asia–Pacific doughnut”, or “the eye in the Asia–Pacific cyclone”’
(1997: 305). This essentially means that the South Pacific has become an
economic, political and strategic backwater in the New World Order. The
new ‘negative’ depiction of the region draws attention to what is seen as ‘a
series of grim trends: a history of failure in development as measured by
gross domestic product; “soaring” population; unsustainable exploitation
of resources’ among other factors (1997: 305–6). These representations are
grounded essentially in economic rationalism. According to Fry, ‘the
images are embedded in a forthright salvationist message that describes a
region in danger of “falling off the map”’(1997: 305). This contemporary
portrayal of Pacific Islands is mainly dictated to and grounded in western
economic notions and practices. On the other hand, the traditional repre-
sentation that is still embraced by the Australian popular culture is
grounded and influenced mainly by cultural practices and variables.
There is another cardinal dimension about these recent
portrayals. They both provide intriguing insights into the Australian
imagination at the same time as they affect the lives of the people they
portray (1997: 306). To put it differently, the kinds of ‘knowledge’ that
these representations evoke and embed in the minds of Australians,
especially those who have never had any or very little experience of Papua
New Guinea, play a significant role in shaping Australian attitudes and
behaviors towards Pacific peoples and the way they are perceived and how
they are treated. The primary creation of such images is essentially to force
an economic discipline upon the governments of the region because of the
Australian government’s role and position as the major aid donor. Indeed
in recent times, outside aid and financial institutions have reproached
Papua New Guinea (and other Pacific Island states) on the failure of
sustainable development because of its lack of policy shift towards one that
is development and economically orientated.
In essence there is this ongoing collusion between outsider and
insider perceptions of the Pacific including Papua New Guinea. The
point then is that we must also be cognizant of the fact that many of
these depictions and views are (un)consciously reinforced, and encour-
aged by our own doings: the media has been a very powerful medium in
shaping the perceptions which define the country. While it performs an
important role in exposing and externalizing deep-seated corruption, it
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has simultaneously created images that are sometimes ‘fallacious’, and are
socially and politically damaging and at times pernicious. 
Concomitant with the media, tourism is another agency that has
often insensitively, and relentlessly, encouraged representations that are not
only ‘negative’ but which espouse the ambivalent perception of Papua New
Guinea and encourage the voyeuristic nature of European attitude toward
the Pacific in general. Tourism agencies are largely purveyors of exoticism.
In their endeavour to attract tourists into the country, they continue to
depict and project Papua New Guinea as a pristine wonderland. This
gesture of primitivity and exoticism has been at the forefront of many
tourism expositions domestically and abroad. Indeed the PNG Tourist
Promotion Authority depicts Papua New Guinea as both nation and desti-
nation through the fantasies of ‘collective expenditure — in this case the
expenditure of (tourists) passing through’ and their voyeuristic narratives
(Sissons, 1997: 187). These ‘insider’ representations act in concert and
help reinforce Greg Fry’s assertion. Indeed the need for progress and devel-
opment has ‘coerced’ countries in the South Pacific to be dependent on
tourism as well as aid and resource exploitation. One of the significant
consequences of this is the tendency of local people to produce images
(often superficial) of their cultures for consumption by tourists. It has led
to the commodification of culture and indeed national identity. As Sissons
(1997: 3) argues, ‘new constructions of nationhood are engendered as a
result of the consumption practices of foreigners rather than citizens …’
The point here is the fact that people are ‘forced’ to represent themselves
in the guise of their pristine cultures in order to make money. In indige-
nous societies, the Eurocentric incubus and discourse have employed
tourism as an extension of the European gaze and the general voyeuristic
attitudes of Europeans. Through tourism, the knowledge of indigenous
cultures as exotic, primitive or inferior is advanced covertly. This is the
ultimate dialectic of alienation. 
The point is that twenty-six years on Papua New Guinea is
sailing in uncharted waters. The unstable political climate, irresponsible
governance and the general lack of accountability and management of the
country’s economy and resources further kindle and nourish this. Mr.
Mekere Morauta (current Prime Minister), then the governor of the Bank
of Papua New Guinea, for instance stated at the launching of The
Australian National University’s Pacific 2010 project that ‘the doomsday
scenario … is not surrealistic. The seeds and signs of that scenario have
been planted in every Melanesian state, and are growing daily’ (1994: 1).
This reinforces Greg Fry’s assertion. It attests to a monster that is both of
our creation and that of outsiders. The production of images locally
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therefore collude with the outside ‘theological’ collaboration in this orgy
of ‘negative’ imagery and bestialization. While mindful of the preceding
thesis and scenario, my point is that this dire and adverse diagnosis and
assessment should be alarming and requires our immediate attention as
concerned citizens. Greg Fry has raised important concerns and issues
and I want to engage some of the issues as scaffolding for this paper. My
particular orbit is Papua New Guinea. This paper addresses in a general
way the lack of critical response and the role of artists and the elite in the
increasingly unquiet waters of Papua New Guinea post-colonial politics.
It also addresses the issue of traditional culture and development and
argues that traditional culture and development are not necessarily
diametrically opposed but can perform complementary roles.
A number of questions arise from the foregoing contentions:
why should an outsider provide the diagnosis when we have equally quali-
fied people on the ground to provide such assessment and help liberate us
from the prevailing, generated definitions of our past, present and future?
If it were true, why are Papua New Guineans silent about such a frightful
malignancy which intrudes and invades the fabric of our society? If, as
many people like to argue, conscience and morals are higher than politics,
why haven’t we begun a process of recovery and rehabilitation to steer out
of this social and political nightmare?
One of the problematic issues in post-colonial Papua New
Guinea (and indeed the South Pacific) has been the role of tradition in
national development. All of a sudden the mass appeal of traditional
culture which birthed the scaffolding and framework for the nationalist
idea, and helped combat colonialism is disavowed. In other words, its
principal and eminent role as an agency in nationhood and national
formation has now taken a subordinate role to the promotion of private
enterprise and economic development. While this is unavoidable, it seems
development is affirmed at the expense of traditional culture, the very soul
of the nation. This philosophy is not only peccable but also inchoate. It
demonstrates a blithe indifference to the significance of traditional culture
in development. Policy makers castigate traditional culture as smothering
development and progress. Traditional culture has been viewed as the
major cause of the failure in progress and other related problems like
population increases, unsustainable development, among others.
However, experience demonstrates that the two (traditional
culture and modernity) are not necessarily diametrically antagonistic. In
fact in many significant ways they perform complementary roles. The
prejudiced view amongst people (policy makers and entrepreneurs
especially) that traditional culture and development are antithetical is
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predicated on a binarism in which a dichotomy is drawn between develop-
ment and progress as the way forward on one hand, and traditional culture
(kastom) as constricting and impeding the former. The point is that devel-
opment and traditional culture seem to be incompatible because policy
makers deliberately want them to be.
The proposition that traditional culture is inhibiting and delete-
rious to development is not only parochial but lacks depth. This view is
derived from a common fallacy, which conceives of traditional culture as
static. The point, however, is that traditional culture is not static at all.
Culture exists as a living organism, expanding and recreating itself,
metamorphosing. Culture automatically succumbs to the wheels of devel-
opment and progress in its endeavour to be operative and to stay alive.
When development meets resistance from indigenous people it is not
always impelled by traditional culture. Sometimes it is because develop-
ment callously tries to ignore ethical, cultural and social blind spots.
For too long we have misconceived the meaning of progress and
development. Most often we only conceptualize development in economic
and monetary terms, thereby relegating and neglecting the other significant
constituents and meanings of the concept. For me at least, development
means improving the condition of mankind so that people are able to enjoy
freedom and democracy. This is actualized through evolving ways and
strategies for total and integral human improvement and progression. In
order for this to be established, the minimum conditions are equitable
distribution of services and resources for the benefit of everyone, ensuring
that citizens have adequate opportunities for education, social and
economic services, and spiritual development. In Papua New Guinea, this
is enshrined in the country’s constitution and pronounced aptly in the
Eight-Year Plan. By conceiving and viewing the concept in these terms, we
embrace all the different aspects of development.
Apart from the yoking together of aspects of traditional culture
and modernity, the commodification of culture is perhaps another
example of how development and culture can concur and coexist. In this
country, we have seen how culture is commodified through marketing of
‘tradition’. There are however pockets of culture which vigorously refuse to
yield to the developmental progress. For instance, customary land tenure.
In general, by commodifying aspects of traditional culture, cultural values
and practices survive the onslaught of change and globalization. I am not
saying whether this is good or bad. However, this new configuration
(commodification of culture), while adverse to many of our cultural values
and heritage, is inevitable given the global shift towards monetarist
economic ideology and the notion of economic rationalism. My argument
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is that traditional culture must not be subservient to economic ration-
alism. Policy makers must ensure that culture is a significant element in
any ideology of development. Traditional culture must play an important
role in the country, because it is one of the main constituents defining
national identity and the formation of nationhood. The point is that post-
colonial Papua New Guinea is a hybridized society. This is because as
Helen Tiffin (1987: 17) asserts, it involves ‘a dialectical relationship
between European ontology and epistemology and the impulse to create or
recreate independent local identity’. And culture, especially the arts, must
inevitably mould into the praxis of progress and globalization. In this
instance, traditional culture and economic development are integral and
consequential in the developmental process of any nation. We must be
conscious that the function and part played by traditional culture in the
pre-independence period is different from its perceived contemporary
function and role. In contemporary Papua New Guinea, our quest is to
locate ways in which traditional culture can continue to recreate and
metamorphose itself. Our role is to accommodate and nurture such a
transformation. 
THE ROLE OF THE ARTIST IN POST-COLONIAL PNG
We have seen how traditional culture as an important oasis of national
identity played a paramount role in nationhood in the early years of Papua
New Guinea’s ‘struggle’ for political independence. This is conspicuous and
evident among the artists and writers of the pre-independence period.
Traditional culture is utilized to irrigate and sustain national formation and
notions of nationhood by flows of nationalist sentiments. Through the
narrativizing and projection of a Papua New Guinean social consciousness
and vision within the larger disabling narrative of the oppressor, a new
sociopolitical reality and national psyche was forged and established. While
this is somewhat currently absent in Papua New Guinea, I am not
advocating or implying a return to that past. The pre-independence era
existed in both a different time frame and matrix. While common culture
and language are crucial to unity, they are not the essential ingredients for
nationhood, but that collective will to nationhood is. What our artists need
to do is create a ‘new’ vision, nationalism and nation for themselves through
blending and appropriating the cultural diversity that comprises the country.
While the cultural diversity of Papua New Guinea is often received and
understood as an impediment to national formation and nationhood, the
arts have established and demonstrate how cultural variance could become a
common denominator, a springboard for the harnessing and revival of
nationhood and the appreciation of our cultural heritage.
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Artists (indeed writers) have always played a pivotal role in
society. In recent times however, they have ‘failed’ to interrogate and
challenge the social injustices and evil, to free society of historical or other
superstitions. In Papua New Guinea, we are witnessing a somewhat
deafening (political) silence. The once pulsating voices have been reduced
to sporadic lone laments in the wilderness of a raging bush fire. In 1998
during the PNG writers’ conference at the University of Papua New
Guinea, Bernard Kaspou, President of the Writers’ and Artists’ Association,
proudly informed the local media that ‘a third wave of writing in PNG is
now beginning to emerge and this is going to be more radical than the
previous ones’ (cited in Post Courier, 1998). His florid words have not
borne fruit as yet; at least to my knowledge. While the statement made by
Bernard Kaspou is ambitious (at least in the short term) nevertheless he
meant well. What is required is the translation of his words into actual
writing.
The question that needs to be asked is where are these artists
and writers today? Why aren’t they challenging the Eurocentric incubus
who has dominated the country for a long time? On the domestic front,
why haven’t they unmasked this country’s love affair with corruption?
Perhaps the creative muse and energy has been exhausted without even
much attempt at penning thoughts and dreams? At the time when Papua
New Guinea’s reality is clotted up with an avalanche and the debris of
political, social and economic greed, selfishness and dishonesty, it is neces-
sary for artists to develop a sixth sense, that shamanistic vision. Papua New
Guinea today is quickly becoming a social, political and economic waste-
land. Yet, many of us are maintaining that public no care attitude. At the
moment there is a lack of social and political conscience and responsibility
among artists and writers in the increasingly unquiet waters of Papua New
Guinea post-colonial politics. Artists and writers are not executing their
roles as barometers of progress and development. Of course this is not
their only ideological preoccupation. But still the silence and quietude is
discomfiting and frightens me profoundly.
Right now Papua New Guinea is going through the most
contemptible period in our history. The political leadership and apparatus
is dominated by infantile politicking with a propensity for greed and
improbity. Many of these leaders engross themselves with defrauding and
embezzling from state institutions and the national coffers. In the process
they prevent equitable prosperity for all. In order to consolidate and
strengthen their positions, politicians and the leadership hierarchy are
involved in nepotism and cronyism in the bureaucracy. The politicians in
this country continue to harvest where they have not planted. It is
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common knowledge that many politicians and their cohorts are deceiving
their own people through misappropriation of the national wealth and the
mismanagement of the economy. The manipulation of government insti-
tutions/polity and the legal processes to cling onto or gain power at the
expense of deteriorating economic, political and social indicators and
spiralling internal and external debt is a classic example.
The question then is what are we supposed to do as artists?
Should we play the fool and remain non-committed to this malignant
illness? One contingency would be to show blithe indifference. Another is
silence and cunning. Unquestionably, some of us will do precisely that. As
Satendra Nandan writes, but in a different context: ‘the treachery of the
few won’t go away unless the artist can transform and transcend the nature
of immediate reality’ (1994: 43). This, however, is only possible if the
artists and writers are able to recognize reality itself. Artists and writers
demonstrate this recognition through the capture and recording of the
Papua New Guinean political and social condition. Through literature and
the arts, artists and writers engage the present and concurrently envisage
what Wole Soyinka refers to as ‘the social harvest of struggle’ (1976: 74). 
Artists must be committed to their work, social vision and egali-
tarian discipline. Non-committal attitudes asphyxiate the creative process.
They must view art as a normal, but a sine qua non, social activity of man.
This means that art is not only for aesthetic fulfilment but also a means to
reflect and mirror the reality and condition of their communities and
society. They must concern themselves with a visionary projection of society.
The frustration that I have with our artists and elite is the recon-
dite and obscure shallowness of the level of response to a Papua New
Guinea tragedy — a tragedy (as Nandan puts it) ‘not so much of telling
lies, rather of knowing the truth and keeping silent’ (1994: 43). Papua
New Guinea has many artists with blunt carving knives, broken pens,
brushes and untuned guitars. The early years of the country’s political
development was the most profitable and visible period in artistic and
literary production. This period was a time of heightened activity because
as many people in the industry have said again and again, there was a
subject to write or sing about.
Nevertheless, this view while generally true is parochially
constricted. There is as much to sing about, write, paint and narrate today
as in the past. I can vividly recall in the early 1980s, the New Irelander
Philip Lamasisi, who released an album which contained songs that dealt
with the social ills of society. Or that flamboyant character of Cowboy
whose songs of self-pity vibrated through the shopping centre of Boroko.
In recent times, the satirical plays of Nora Vagi Brash poke fun at
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unscrupulous and insensitive politicians and Pati ‘Potts’ Doi’s song,
‘Lukautim Mama Graun’, demonstrate the countless possibilities that
await artists and writers. These are instances of some of the isolated
attempts by Papua New Guineans to express and condemn the nefarious
evil that embraces and suffocates this country. 
Perhaps one of the main reasons why the creative energy has not
had a constant flow is because of a lack of social and political consciousness,
commitment and duty towards the country. The point to bear in mind is
that it is precisely this ‘lack’ that could suffocate and drain the creative
process. One of the discernible reasons that contributes to this rather selfish
and egotistical reason on the part of artists and writers is the ‘dependence-
syndrome’ perpetuated by patronizing expatriates. For example, Ulli Beier,
whom many have referred to as the mid-wife of Papua New Guinean
contemporary literature, did too much ‘spoon feeding’ in aiding the birth
and provenance of our literature. This is essentially why, when he departed,
many writers have found it difficult to be ‘independent’. This led many to
argue that ‘if the years between 1968 and 1974 produced all the excited
energy of the birth of a literature, perhaps the recent silence is the stunned
realization that the infant is a bastard’ (Mcgaw, 1984: 9). This is a veneer
proposition. The ‘infant’ is not a bastard at all. The crux of the matter is
that the creative impulse of indigenous writers lacks sustainability and
independence. Indeed, sustainability not only means the continued and
constant engagement and flow of creativity but also corporate and govern-
ment patronage and support of the arts.
Papua New Guinea today is sailing in uncharted waters and it is
more a concern for artists to provide advice before it sinks. At the same
time they must be able to capture the ‘territoriality of the authentic’ and
articulate the essence of the PNG psyche. There are a lot of talented
people out there. But their creative potentials need to be tapped and
supported. The lack of patronage and sociopolitical consciousness is
perhaps one reason why there seems to be a great difficulty maintaining an
equilibrium between simple narratives and a more serious literature with a
questioning attitude. 
The post-colonial Papua New Guinea scenario has changed
much: the developing political culture has been brutalized, coerced and
deception stalks the land (Nandan, 1994). Our world has been full of
intellectual improbity, hypocrisy and political treachery. These ills have
been integral to our political landscape. Therefore one of the fundamental
responsibilities of the Papua New Guinean artist is as a visionary who is
able to perform the task of a shaman at the same time, as his/her work is
aesthetically fulfilling. Wole Soyinka once stated that ‘I have a special
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responsibility because I can smell the reactionary sperm years before the
rape of the nation takes place’ (cited in Hunt, 1991: 87). Soyinka sees
himself as a shaman, an ombudsman of society. He makes the point that
the artist must be conscious and committed and be a watchdog for the
politics that defines his/her country. He/she must keep abreast with the
social and political realities and developments that are taking place.
If artists and writers sharpen their vision and write about the
many issues that confront ourselves, our country, our women, we can
bring some sense to those who are in positions of power and those who are
not able to tell and see the trouble the country is heading towards. Artists
are never alone; they have a collective responsibility in their communities.
They are seers and visionaries. There are of course a few that go astray like
the character of Doboro Thomas in Russell Soaba’s novel Maiba (1985). 
In these unquiet waters, artists must dynamically resist the
temptation to be silenced by buy-offs and bribery. They must not only be
concerned with local realities but simultaneously with the long heresy of
Eurocentric belittlement of indigenous people. They must challenge the
‘negative’ imagery and the propagation of untruths that has been dissemi-
nated by outsiders. Indigenous artists must evolve strategies which will
expose these biases. They have a constructive role in educating our people.
The arts move the heart, broaden the mind and venerate the soul. Artists
have a paramount role not only in alerting us to the political and social
pandemonium but also to the education of the young in the growth and
development of an emerging society. There are other roles, indirect roles
that are equally consequential. They revolve around a nation’s search for
national identity, an almost impossible task given the cultural diversity of
the country and the problematic nature of identity itself. One cardinal role
of the writer is as an educator and teacher. Chinua Achebe (1988: 143)
once stated, ‘the writer cannot expect to be excused from the task of reedu-
cation and regeneration that must be done. In fact he should march right
in front.’ Artists must not be trapped in a cocoon of sociopolitical under-
nourishment. They have a duty to defend the country from unscrupulous
and ruthless politicians and leaders.
The artist/writer in PNG is slightly fortunate, unlike others in
the developing world. The government is not intent on locking up those
who oppose and speak against it. At least, not yet. As Satendra Nandan
once again points out, ‘The writer, or artist, must have the integrity and
the daring to recognize wolves. Suddenly to see us so much part of a
universal evil is wisdom to make our people see that a challenge to the
protean power of the artistic imagination’ (1994: 45).
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CONCLUSION
At the beginning of the paper I concerned myself with the new Australian
representation of the South Pacific, including Papua New Guinea. This
new imagery is grounded in the view that Pacific Island governments must
shift their policies towards one that embraces sustainable development. Fry
argues that in order to do this, Pacific Islands governments must jettison
‘inappropriate traditions, and connect to the dynamism of Asia’ (Fry,
1997: 306). While I generally acquiesce, the fact is that entrenched
meaning of the new imagery remains connected to the early portrayal of
Pacific Islanders and underlines the ‘Manichean deep structure’ in which
Pacific Islanders and their cultures are subordinated and delineated as
inferior. Therefore, Papua New Guinean artists and writers have both an
international and a domestic challenge. Artists and writers must be forth-
coming. While their writings, songs, carvings, paintings must be freighted
with important lessons and advice for those who lack political and social
accountability towards their own citizens, they must also interrogate and
expose the Eurocentric biases and misrepresentations of themselves and
their cultures.
The Papua New Guinea artistic (literary) soil is very fertile. It is
a conflation of legends, songs, myths, facts, imagination, and works of art.
Like seeds, therefore, all that is needed are cultivators who will nurture and
irrigate them. Very soon they will germinate in a ceaseless organic recre-
ation. Henry James once wrote: ‘the flower of art blooms only where the
soil is deep’ (Lombard, 1993: 94). But it’s up to the artists to suckle and
nurture it.
There are however, other important seers and visionaries who
have been marginalised and neglected. These are the community elders,
together with the ancestors and spirits whom one of the characters in Leo
Hannet’s play, The Ungrateful Daughter, refers to as the ‘cave of know-
ledge’. The elders and old people must not be neglected and artists must
always consult them and open a line of dialogue with them. Let us be
mindful of an old Banoni proverb, ‘Clouds are swept away by the full
moon’. This refers to the advice of old people in times of trouble. Artists
and writers must seek and take heed of the wise counsel of our elders,
ancestors and spirits. They have lived life and seen it all.
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FOR PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Alphonse Gelu
INTRODUCTION
Papua New Guinea inherited a democratic system of government after it
attained its independence on 16 September 1975. The transition to a
democratic system of government emerged shortly after the Pacific War
with the establishment of the Local Government Councils in 1950. Since
then, beginning with the Legislative Council in 1960 and later the House
of Assembly in 1964, democratic practices have flourished simultaneously
with the establishment of representative institutions. The institution of
representative democracy, which is the norm of democratic governments
in the twentieth century, provided the opportunity for Papua New
Guineans to elect their own representatives to the legislature. This saw, for
the first time, the extension of universal suffrage to all adults over the
voting age in the first election to the House of Assembly that took place in
1964. The conduct of this election was based on the democratic ideal of
free and fair election, a core tenet of modern liberal democracies. The
subsequent elections were all based on that ideal with the objective of
sustaining the practical workings of a democratic system.
The 1968 election was conducted with the participation of
political parties in the electoral process of democratic regimes. Pangu
party, which was established in 1967, emerged with strong nationalist
platforms and its success in the 1968 election enabled it to advance calls
for early self-government. Despite it being characterised as radical, it never
advocated an alternative system to democracy (Woolford, 1976). In fact its
leader Michael Somare (now Sir Michael) was content to make overall
changes in putting the interests of the indigenous people first without
destroying the democratic framework that had emerged. Pangu’s commit-
ment to democracy can be revealed in the disagreements between the
members of the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC), especially
John Momis and John Kaputin, who tended to favour a socialist system
and its ideals. Somare produced a counter document that mellowed down
the socialist aspirations of Momis and Kaputin and maintained the
democratic ideals (Hegarty 1998) that now shape the democratic system of
our government.
The constitution of Papua New Guinea that was formally
promulgated on 16 September 1975 made specific references to the
democratic framework of government and society. This follows the tradi-
tion of other great democracies such as that of the United States and
France (Goldring, 1978). The United States constitution and especially
the declaration of independence follow the tradition of John Locke, a
leading proponent of liberal democracy in the seventeenth century.
The preamble of the Papua New Guinea constitution states that:
WE, THE PEOPLE, do now establish this sovereign nation and
declare ourselves, under the guiding hand of God, to be the
Independent State of Papua New Guinea. AND WE ASSERT, by
virtue of that authority
• that all power belongs to the people-acting through their duly
elected representatives
• that respect for the dignity of the individual and community
interdependence are basic principles of our society
• that we guard with our lives our national identity, integrity and
self respect
• that we reject violence and seek consensus as a means of solving
our common problems
• that our national wealth, won by honest, hard work be equitably
shared by all
The above points encompass the core elements of liberal democ-
racy, namely representative democracy, individualism, respect for others,
order and stability, and equality. These elements are enforced through the
various sections of the constitution as well as other related laws. Despite
their not being legally holistic in nature, their political underpinnings are
important in framing the democratic nature of our society. Any acts of
government that are unconstitutional are also commonly referred to as
undemocratic and this further highlights the collaboration between the
constitution and democratic system of government.
Another important part of the constitution that outlined the
democratic nature of the political system is the section on basic rights.
This section in the preamble states that:
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WE HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE that, subject to any restrictions
imposed by law on non-citizens, all persons in our country are
entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual,
that is to say, the right, whatever their race, tribe, places of origin,
political opinion, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the
rights and freedoms of others and for the legitimate public interest,
to each of the following: 
(a) life, liberty, security of the person and protection of the law; and
(b) the right to take part in political activities; and
(c) freedom from inhuman treatment and forced labour; and
(d) freedom of conscience, of expression, of information and
assembly and association; and
(e) freedom of employment and freedom of movement; and
(f ) protection for the privacy of their homes and other property and
from unjust deprivation of property,
and have accordingly included in this constitution provisions
designed to afford protection to those rights and freedoms, subject
to such limitations on that protection as are contained in those
provisions, being limitations primarily designed to ensure that the
enjoyment of the acknowledged rights and freedoms by an
individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or
the legitimate public interest.
These rights promote the liberal democratic nature of the polit-
ical system and make it part of the great tradition of the constitution of
leading democracies such as the United States.
The chapter is divided into three sections: in Section 1, I discuss
the activity of measuring democracy, which has become a prominent task
undertaken by political scientists throughout the world. Section 2
examines the practice of the democratic audit as a method of measuring
democracy. Section 3 briefly reviews key aspects of democracy in Papua
New Guinea’s democratic process and Section 4 concludes the chapter.
The purpose of this chapter is not to provide answers to specific
questions of the democratic audit, but to highlight major issues and concerns
that are central to democracy in Papua New Guinea. A detailed democratic
audit by interested Papua New Guinean scholars may be able to do this.
MEASURING DEMOCRACY
The art of measuring democracy is as old as the idea itself. Plato and
Aristotle in their great works provided a philosophical interpretation of it,
while the Scholastics or the Church Fathers presented a theological inter-
pretation of democracy. St Thomas Aquinas and St Augustine were the
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leading writers in the scholastic tradition. Despite the conflicting interpre-
tation of democracy and what it represents, there was a common tone of it
being an ideal system during the different stages in human civilisation.
The Greeks who invented democracy enabled it to flourish in the city-state
of Athens, and many centuries later the American founding fathers
embraced it. An inevitable outcome of the different forms of democracy
stipulates its evolving nature. That is, democracy and its principles are not
static but evolutionary; therefore over many centuries, democracy has
evolved from its beginnings in Athens through to the Industrial
Revolution of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
The American War of Independence and French Revolution
provided an impetus to seek new meaning and direction for democracy
together with its new partner known as ‘liberalism’. Liberalism was the
product of the Industrial Revolution and the Social Contract School took
it upon themselves to clarify the assumptions of the new idea. Political
theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau
were prominent in highlighting the central tenets of these new ideas. The
ideas of these individuals added new dimensions to democracy; not only
to what Plato and Aristotle had interpreted it to be, but what they foresaw
once liberalism was incorporated. Thus this brought into place liberal
democracy, a new version of democracy that not only upholds the popular
will of the majority but also guarantees individual liberty.
The new face of democracy therefore has given rise to numerous
debates about its appropriateness to civil society both in theory and
practice. Its major elements, which included principles such as good
government, free and fair elections, individual rights and political equality,
and rule of law, have gone through constant scrutiny to determine whether
they have been protected or abused by legitimate authorities. Most
recently the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have seen political scien-
tists arguing among themselves over the proper operations of the principles
of democracy. The result has been the numerous methods of measuring
democracy within individual states, or comparative studies of different
democratic states to determine how democratic they are. The measure-
ments have resulted in numerical indices being allocated to different
countries as well as certain benchmarks being set to measure individual
countries against. Those that met the benchmarks are said to be
democratic and those that failed are classified as undemocratic.
According to David Beetham (1999), measuring democracy
began with identifying the social and economic conditions that are
conducive to democratic consolidation or stability, and in particular with
testing hypotheses about the relationship between levels of economic
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development and democracy. Lipset’s work (1959) on ‘some social requi-
sites of democracy’ was the beginning of serious study to correlate levels or
stages of democracy with indices of economic development (the more
telephones, the more democracy). This line of measuring democracy
culminated in the famous work by W. Rostow on his different stages of
development that came under the development school of modernisation.
Rostow targeted mostly non-western societies that were not democratic or
partly democratic. Concentrating on economic development and less on
political development, Rostow’s analysis was similar to Lipset’s.
Serious consideration of measuring political development or
more specifically democracy was made by Robert Dahl (1956). In his
famous work, A Preface to Democratic Theory, he outlined the definitional
characteristics of polyarchy. Polyarchy means rule by the many and it
denotes a representative democracy with substantial interest-group influ-
ence on government (McLean, 1996: 392). The characteristics of
democracy come under four stages that are all related to an election:
during the pre-voting period, during the voting period, during the post-
voting period and during the inter-election stage. Each stage incorporates
different elements which must be fulfilled in order to make the system
democratic or become a polyarchy.
The work by Dahl led to other attempts by political scientists to
provide a systematic measurement of democracy. Some of the famous
work was done by Downs (1957), Lipset (1960), Neubauer (1967), Olsen
(1968), Flaningan and Fogelman (1971), Vanhanen (1997), May (1978)
and Bollen (1979). Besides the contribution of these individuals, various
groups have also contributed to the task. Groups such as the Freedom
House, the Inter-Parliamentary Council and International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) have been prominent in
offering their own methods of measurement on specific principles of
democracy.
Even the measurement of democracy has become more practical
and oriented towards policy-making. This has come about as part of the
calls by governments in western democracies in their efforts to bring about
good government (Beetham 1999). Initially it was the World Bank that
decided to add an element of political conditionality to its structural
adjustment programmes, as it concluded that the transparency of govern-
ment procedures was important to the effective management of economic
loans. Even donor countries have been highly sceptical about giving aid
that might be used to assist authoritarian regimes that engage in serious
violation of human rights. The goal of promoting democracy has become
part and parcel of the aid packages that have been given to recipient
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countries. This new agenda has required donor governments to be able to
assess the level of a given country’s democracy and human rights, as well as
its progress over time, whether as a basis for targeting aid in the first place
or to monitor the effectiveness of its programmes in practice.
DEMOCRATIC AUDIT
The idea of a democratic audit originated with Trevor Smith and the
Democracy Committee of the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. It was
seen to be a viable method for providing a systematic outline on the state
of democracy in the United Kingdom. How democratic were we actually?
Providing an authoritative answer to this question, through a systematic
audit of democracy, could serve to demonstrate if, and how far, these
concerns were justified and help identify where reform might most be
needed. Such an audit could also provide a benchmark against which any
future reforms could be evaluated (Beetham, 1999: 568).
There are significant differences between the democratic audit
and the other forms of democracy assessment mentioned. Firstly, in the
previous assessments of democracy, outsiders make judgements on a
country’s democracy. When looking at the existing scholarly works on
comparative politics, it is obvious to see that western scholars are
dominant in determining the degree of democratisation in non-western
societies, most of which are Third World countries. The democratic audit
is different as it is undertaken by citizens of the country being assessed as
part of an internal debate about the character of its political institutions
and public life (Beetham, 1999). However, there still is a need for refer-
ence to be made to international benchmarks as well as the employment of
external auditors and consultants, but the final version of the audit is the
responsibility of the local auditors.
The second difference is that in the previous assessments of democ-
racy, established democracies were used against developing ones on the
assumption that the former do not lack in their democratic capabilities. The
democratic audit does not make any such assumption. According to Beetham
(1999), ‘adopting such a standard uncritically simply creates an air of
smugness: we here, who are unblemished, find you over there to be
thoroughly deficient’. To assume perfection is to cast serious doubt on the
conception of democracy and the assessment criteria being employed. This
means that the work of democratisation is never finished and that established
democracies are as much in need of critical assessment as developing ones.
Thirdly, the conception of democracy undertaken by the
democratic audit is more comprehensive and the assessment criteria more
rigorous than those used in other democratic assessments:
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We have not limited democracy to the two areas of electoral compe-
tition and inclusiveness and civil and political freedoms that have
become standards since Dahl’s polyarchy. We have extended the
analysis of political institutions to issues of government openness,
accountability and responsiveness; and we have also included
criteria to assess aspects of civil society and its relationship to govern-
ment. In addition, we have used the principle of political equality as
a key index of democratic attainment throughout our assessment of
political rights and institutions (Beetham, 1999: 569).
Finally, the democratic audit resists aggregating the assessment
of the different aspects of democracy into a single index or numerical
score, as so many other democratic assessments have done. The numerical
scores of democracy may not only cast doubts on the objectivity of democ-
racy but also the judgements that have been made of different indicators of
democracy. This approach is inappropriate to the democratic audit because
it does not differentiate those aspects of a country’s political life, which are
more satisfactory from a democratic point of view and those which give
cause for concern. For this purpose, keeping the different aspects separate,
and making a discursive assessment of each in turn, is both more appro-
priate and a more defensible procedure (Beetham, 1999).
The starting point of a democratic audit is to find a defensible
conception of democracy from which specific criteria for assessment can
be derived. Beetham notes:
We started from the simple proposition that democracy is to be
defined in the first instance as a set of principles or regulative ideals
and secondarily in terms of the institutions and practices through
which these principles are realised to a greater or lesser degree.
These principles we took to be those of popular control over public
decision-making and decision-makers, and equality of status and
consideration in respect of those decisions. Popular control and
political equality comprise our two key democratic principles and
provide the litmus test for how far a country’s political life can be
regarded as democratic (Beetham, 1999: 570).
The different components of democracy provide four sections to
be audited: the first section on free and fair elections looks at the process of
election and how democratic they are; the second section assesses the
degree of openness, accountability and responsiveness of government; the
third section assesses the quality of protection for civil and political rights
and the fourth section looks at the democratic society and how groups are
formed and interact, the accountability of economic institutions, the role
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of the media and the tolerance of diversity. And because democracy is not
an all-or-nothing affair, the questions were phrased in comparative terms,
how far is appointment to legislative and government office determined by
popular election? How far is the executive subject to the rule of law? How
equal are citizens in the enjoyment of their civil and political rights and
liberties? How strong and independent of government control are the
associations of civil society (Beetham, 1999).
The following are some examples of the questions for the
democratic audit as provided by David Beetham (1994) under each main
aspect of democracy:1 the first set of questions concerns the electoral process,
its reach, inclusiveness, independence, integrity and impartiality, as well as
how equally it treats its citizens, how much effective choice it offers them,
and how far governmental outcomes actually reflect the choices made. Thus:
1. How far is appointment to legislative and governmental office
determined by popular election, on the basis of open competi-
tion, universal suffrage and secret ballot?
2. How independent of government and party control are the
election and procedures of voter registration, and how free from
intimidation and bribery is the process of election itself?
3. How effective a range of choice and information does the electoral
and party system allow the voters, and is there fair and equal
access for all parties and candidates to the media and other means
of communication with them, and an overall balance in the treat-
ment of the various parties and candidates by the media?
4. What proportion of the electorate actually votes, and how closely
does the composition of parliament and the programme of
government reflect the choice actually made by the electorate?
The second set of questions involves the area of open and accountable
government:
5. How accessible are elected politicians to approach by their electors,
and how effectively do they represent constituents’ interests?
6. How effective and open to scrutiny is the control exercised by elected
politicians over the non-elected personnel and organs of the state?
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1 The questions are grouped according to the four areas or dimensions of
democracy. The boundaries between the areas are not watertight, and some
questions relate to more than one area. Some questions are also much bigger
than others. Thus single questions on the powers of parliament in relation to
the executive, or on the civil liberties of citizens could well be broken down
into a sub-set of further questions. The exact balance between them must be a
matter of judgement and emphasis.
7. How extensive are the powers of parliament to oversee legislation
and public expenditure and to scrutinise the executive; and how
effectively are they exercised in practice?
8. How publicly accountable are elected representatives for their
private interests and sources of income that are relevant to the
performance of their public office, and the process of election to it?
9. How far are the courts able to ensure that the executive obeys the
rule of law; and how effective are their procedures of ensuring that
all public institutions and officials are subject to the rule of law in
the performance of their functions?
10. How independent is the judiciary from the executive, and from all
forms of interference; and how far is the administration of law
subject to effective public scrutiny?
11. How readily can a citizen gain access to the courts, ombudsman
or tribunals for redress in the event of maladministration or the
failure of government or public bodies to meet their legal respon-
sibilities; and how effective are the means of redress available?
Questions in the third section address issues of civil and political rights:
12. How clearly does the law define the civil and political rights and
liberties of the citizens, and how effectively are they defended?
13. How secure are citizens in the exercise of their civil and political
rights and liberties; and how far is their equal enjoyment of them
constrained by social, economic or other factors?
The final set of questions is premised on the assumption that the quality
and vitality of a country’s democracy will be revealed in the character of its
civil society as well as in its formal institutions:
14. How widespread is political participation in all its forms; how
representative of different sections of society is it; and how far is it
limited by social, economic or other factors?
15. How open are the media to access from all sections of opinion
and social groups, and how effectively do they operate as a
balanced forum for informed political debate?
16. How far do the traditions and culture of the society support the
basic democratic principles of popular control and political equality?
17. To what extent do people have confidence in the ability of the
political system to solve the main problems confronting society,
and in their ability to influence it?
Since these questions were drawn up, additional audit questions
have been posed covering new areas such as the civil-military relationship,
political parties, and so on.
A DEMOCRATIC AUDIT FOR PAPUA NEW GUINEA 33
After 25 years of independence, how democratic is Papua New
Guinea? This is the central question asked by the democratic audit. In
carrying out an audit for PNG, the four sections of the criteria will be
looked at. They are:
• free and fair elections
• open and accountable government
• civil and political rights
• a democratic society.
Each section carries a series of questions (examples provided)
and data need to be collected to answer the questions.
FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS
The first area that a democratic audit for Papua New Guinea should
analyse is the aspect of free and fair elections. The conduct of free and fair
election is one element of democracy that separates itself from elections
that are not free and fair. For Papua New Guinea, five elections have been
conducted since independence, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997. The
conduct and features of these elections have been analysed in various
studies carried out by the Electoral Commission and the Department of
Political Science, University of Papua New Guinea, as well as by scholars
from mainly The Australia National University who have had a long
association with the politics of the country. From these studies a number
of important trends can be identified for our purposes.
First, on the issue of open competition between political parties,
there was clearly competition between the various parties in government
and those in the opposition. The elections have not been the only means in
determining the change of governments. This is despite the fact that new
groups formed the government after the 1992 and 1997 elections. The
ineffectiveness of the elections however was substituted by the numerous
votes of no confidence. After the 1977 election, the coalition government
of the Pangu Pati and the People’s Progress Party (PPP) maintained their
position in government. However, the coalition was removed by a vote of
no confidence in 1980 that saw the PPP ejected from its marriage to the
Pangu. After the 1982 election, Pangu regained control of the government,
but was once again removed from office through a vote of no confidence in
1986 by the People’s Democratic Movement (PDM) which comprised
former Pangu members led by its former Deputy Prime Minister, Pius
Wingti. After the 1987 election the PDM remained in government, but
was voted out of office in 1988 by a vote of no confidence initiated by the
Pangu. After the 1992 election, the PDM regained control of the govern-
ment but was removed through a vote of no confidence in 1994 (after Pius
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Wingti resigned as Prime Minister) by its former ally, the PPP that had
switched in time to team up with the Pangu. After the 1997 election, the
People’s National Congress (PNC) led by Bill Skate took control of the
government with the Pangu and the PPP as coalition partners. Both were
later sacked resulting in Skate losing the government (Skate resigned as
Prime Minister) in a vote of no confidence on 14 July 1999. Sir Mekere
Morauta who headed the PDM became the Prime Minister. This method
of changing governments is obviously a key source of political instability.
The political system would be more stable if elections determined the
change in government as a result of open competition between the various
political parties.
Second, the use of the secret ballot, which is the principal means
by which voters cast their choices, is another emerging trend. This process
has been severely abused in Papua New Guinea turning the secret ballot
into an open or public ballot. The freedom of choice, which individuals
have, has been hampered by undemocratic means employed by different
individuals at polling stations. The gross abuse of the secret ballot has been
well documented by the media as well as the various election studies (see
Saffu, 1989; Moore and Kooyman, 1998).
A principal area of abuse is the use of scrutineers. Scrutinisers
are employed by various candidates to ensure that the voting is conducted
in a fair manner, but have gone further by inducing and coercing voters to
vote for their candidates. Severe penalties are imposed on individuals who
vote against the choice of the scrutineers and this practice has made a total
mockery of the use of the secret ballot. There have also been instances
where ballot boxes have been stolen and marks illegally made on the ballot
papers before returning them to electoral officials for counting. The case in
Kagua-Erave in the 1997 election is typical of this practice. Another
example is the attack on a helicopter carrying ballot boxes in Okapa for
the by-election of the Eastern Highlands provincial seat in 1999.
Gross abuse of the secret ballot experienced in past elections is
related to the third trend, an increase in electoral violence. Electoral
officials have been the main targets of violence as well as supporters of
opposing candidates. The 1997 election saw an increase in violence after
counting ended. The Electoral Commission in its 1997 election report
noted that the election witnessed the highest level of violence since 1977.
Electoral violence occurs before polling, during polling and after polling
(Dinnen, 1996; Standish, 1996). Physical abuse of electoral officials in
New Ireland and parts of the Highlands and the involvement of a rebel
faction of the military in the election in the Highlands are just some cases
of violence witnessed during the 1997 election. The increased use of police
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and military personnel during polling indicates increasing violence where
electoral officials and ballot boxes are key targets.
Fourth, the insignificant role of the parties in elections is indica-
tive of another trend. As discovered by various studies, political parties
mean very little to voters (Turner and Hegarty 1987; Saffu 1989). As such,
political parties in Papua New Guinea do not provide an effective range of
choice and information to the voters. Most political parties are weak and
their source of revenue is non-existent, which explains their poor perform-
ances in capturing votes in all parts of the country. Parties have not
explored effective means through which they can sell their ideas to the
people, the bulk of whom live in rural areas.
The practice of ‘concentrated campaigning’ that has been seen
in past elections is still the norm today. It is a fact that no party in the
current parliament can boast of representing the entire country in terms of
its electoral support and representation. The lack of providing alternatives
to the voters in party platforms makes it even harder for voters. More
interestingly, party-endorsed candidates prefer presenting their own
platforms to their voters rather than using their party’s platforms. Thus, a
culture which has been cultivated in the minds of voters is that party
platforms are irrelevant to them and therefore candidates have to sell what
they think would secure them votes rather than what their respective party
think is best for the people. As correctly stated by Hegarty and Turner
(1987), parties in Papua New Guinea are weak institutions with few links
to the grassroots and limited organisational capacity. They are parliamen-
tary factions whose electoral machines spring into action only during
election years. All the parties in the current parliament are parliamentary
factions with the exception of a few. A few parties have been merely
stitched together on the floor of parliament such as the PDM, the People’s
National Congress and the National Alliance. Of all parties, the Pangu has
been the main victim as its membership has dwindled since the 1980s due
to poaching and splinter factions.
The electoral votes that parties acquired since the 1977 election
has declined over time. This scenario further exemplifies the decline in the
strength and significance of parties in PNG’s political system. Thus, the
overall decline of parties in the electoral process can be seen in Tables 1
and 2 in which the Pangu is used as an example to show its decline. With
the current trend, the Pangu might go into oblivion along the path of the
United Party and the National Party.2
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2 Paul Pora, the Open Member for Hagen, is the only surviving member of the
party.
Table 1: Split in Pangu Pati’s Mmembership since 1977 and Change of Leadership
Date of Split New Party Party Leader Change in  the 
Pangu’s Leadership
20 March 1985 People’s Democratic Pius Wingti —
Movement
April 1986 League of National Tony Siaguru —
Advancement
22 May 1988 — — Rabbie Namaliu
replaced Michael
Somare as party leader
July 1992 — — Jack Genia took over
from Namaliu
1994 — — Chris Haiveta assumed
leadership after the
sudden death of Genia
March 1997 National Alliance Michael Somare Chris Haiveta
November 1997 Further split which saw Chris Haiveta
prominent members 
leaving the party: 
Namaliu (independent),*
Kilroy Genia (Advance 
Party), Ian Ling Stuckey 
(PNC)† and Nakikus 
Konga (resigned from
parliament)
* Namaliu has since re-joined the Pangu.
† Stuckey has also re-joined the Pangu.
Table 2: Total Number of Seats and % of Votes Won by Pangu since 1977






A fifth trend that can be identified is the increase in the number
of candidates who contested the elections independently rather than being
affiliated to a party. The number of these candidates has not only increased,
but their votes received have been higher than any political party contesting
(see Table 3).
A DEMOCRATIC AUDIT FOR PAPUA NEW GUINEA 37
The huge increase in the number of independent candidates
winning seats has presented a major problem to the functioning of parlia-
mentary democracy in Papua New Guinea. The norm after every election is
that the independent candidates eventually join a party and the party
preferences would be made based on the likely rewards or gains in terms of
a ministerial appointment or other unconventional inducements offered to
the candidate before the election. The political environment created by the
independent candidates is that of instability rather than stability due to
their loose allegiance to parties. The longevity of holding a government
together is secondary to the parochial interests of independent candidates.
A classic example of this can be seen in the 1997 election when Skate’s
PNC won only 6 seats, but later increased its numerical strength to about
40, courtesy of many independent candidates joining his party. Just before
the vote of no confidence on 14 July 1999, a majority of these independent
candidates deserted Skate and joined the other group resulting in Skate
losing office to Mekere Morauta. Soon after the vote, Skate was left with
only 9 members and by October 2000, the number has further decreased to
4. After the adjournment of the Bill on the Integrity of Political Parties in
November 2000, some of the members of the government (mostly minis-
ters) were sacked for not supporting the bill and are now back with Skate.
Skate was reported to refer to these deserters as his ‘prodigal sons’ who were
bound to return to his camp once the going got tough. Most of these
members were independent candidates who were once members of Skate’s
party then joined the PDM but are now back with Skate.
A final trend that needs careful consideration is the electoral roll
or common roll, which has a direct bearing on the voter turn-out. Voter
turn-out in Papua New Guinea remained high (see Table 4).
Table 3: Independent Candidates in the 1987, 1992 and 1997 Elections
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Table 4: Voter Turn-Out







The voter turn-out in Papua New Guinea in terms of figures is
grossly over represented and exaggerated due to a number of exorbitant
practices such as multiple voting; and even, in some parts of the country,
names of dogs and pigs have been used by people to secure the right to vote
more than once; children under the voting age also vote; and even more
bizarre, deceased people’s names have been resurrected to vote at election
time. Problems associated with the common roll have also contributed to
the figures not representing the actual turn-out rate. The Electoral
Commission who is responsible for updating the common roll has
expressed openly the problems and hardships it faces in doing this. In the
1997 election alone, for instance, a large number of eligible voters were
turned away because their names did not appear on the common roll. The
voter registration that the Electoral Commission embarked on before
polling did not alleviate the problem. The updating of the common roll is
usually done after the conduct of a national census, but a census was never
conducted due to financial problems. The Commonwealth Observatory
Report of the 1997 election also reported major problems with the roll
especially in getting the voters to register and updating the roll.
OPEN AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT
The ideas of open and accountable government have become part and
parcel of the democratic ideal in the twentieth century. As political ideals,
open government and accountability are two distinct ideals that are
committed to maintaining democracy through the government’s decision-
making processes.
Open government is based on the principle that what happens
in government should be open to public scrutiny and criticism on the
basis of a free flow of information from public bodies to representative
institutions, the mass media and the general public (Heywood 1997). This
principle favours the public’s right to know. The advantage of open
government includes checking on incompetency, corruption and tyranny.
It also promotes political argument and debate, as in a market of ideas,
resulting in improved policy outcomes and a better-informed electorate.
Accountability on the other hand is based on the requirement for
representatives to answer to the represented on the disposal of their powers
and duties, act upon criticisms or requirements made of them, and accept
(some) responsibility for failure, incompetence, or deceit (McLean 1996).
In applying the ideal of open government to PNG, a question
that can be asked is how open is the government to the public in its
decisions? With the exception of the need to withhold certain information
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relating to national security, all other processes of government must be made
available to avoid instances of corruption, which is a major problem in
Papua New Guinea. The successive governments seriously face a dilemma of
withholding information from the public and the current government of
Morauta is no exception. This can be a result of mere arrogance or a delib-
erate attempt by governments to keep the public in the dark. The Sandline
deal is one such example. Another is the current debate on privatisation.
Despite the government’s commitment to the exercise, there are still un-
answered questions demanding answers. In other words, the government has
to convince the public that the exercise will benefit them and that there are
no hidden agendas. The argument by Ben Micah, Chairman of the
Privatisation Commission that the exercise will create more jobs is a step in
the right direction but it would be more convincing if statistics were given to
support such claim (The National, 20 November 2000).
The inquiry into the affairs of the National Provident Fund
(NPF) has revealed numerous instances of incompetence and corruption by
public officials responsible for managing the finances of the contributors,
who are mostly private-sector low-income earners. Without the inquiry,
much of the information relating to corruption that is now before the
public would have never been revealed. Inquiries into the affairs of many of
the now insolvent state-enterprises should likewise be encouraged.
There is an urgent need to expose government dealings and
decisions that would demystify the government black box. Transparency
International (TI) led by Sir Anthony Siaguru is leading the way in its
crusade for ensuring that there is transparency in key areas of government.
Currently the drive to privatise statutory bodies by the Morauta govern-
ment has come under the microscope of the TI and the recent
announcement by the Privatisation Commission, that every aspect of
privatisation would be transparent (Post Courier, 21 November 2000), is a
good sign for open government. Even TI is calling on the government to
prosecute officials responsible for defrauding the NPF, including its former
managing director and chairman who fled to Australia.
An area that has a negative effect on the ideal of open govern-
ment is the process of making appointments to senior positions within the
public sector. A demonic culture has been cultivated and institutionalised
by successive governments that allows for the appointment of unqualified
and inexperienced officers. Most of these officers are either political associ-
ates of the governing coalition government or are just friends and wantoks
of power wielders. This culture is such that ministers and their cronies
think that they can make any appointment they wish without due regard
to the established procedures.
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One such piece of legislation, the Public Services (Management)
Act (1986), stipulates that for any appointment to be lawful, the Public
Services Commission (PSC) must be consulted on all appointments to
senior positions in the public service before the National Executive
Council (NEC) makes its final endorsement. The endorsement by the
NEC must be based on the recommendations of the PSC. That is, it is not
the prerogative of a Minister or Prime Minister or some ill-informed
adviser to have the final say, but an independent body with quasi-judicial
functions. The rationality of this procedure is quite simple; PSC is an
independent body (constitutional office) that is free from all forms of
influence and whatever recommendation it makes is based on merit rather
than on political convenience. The current practice of pushing an appoint-
ment through without any consultation made with the PSC makes the
whole process invalid. The process of consultation is just a mechanism that
was put in place to make the process more open and transparent.
Unfortunately even the PSC itself has fallen victim to the politicisation
process of the appointments of its commissioners. The case of Peter Peipul
appointing his brother as a commissioner exemplifies this point. The PSC
was once a respected organisation filled with senior bureaucrats such as
Rabbie Namaliu, Ekeroma Age, Paul Songo, Henry Veratau, Winifred
Kamit and Joe Wal among others. It was in the early 1990s that the PSC
became highly politicised under Pius Wingti’s regime.
To look at some specific cases, how many individuals trained in
the field of international relations are now acting as our diplomats
overseas? The Department of Political Science at the University of Papua
New Guinea is the only institution in the country that trains students in
this field however, how many of these students are offered jobs within the
Department of Foreign Affairs? Many such students earned high academic
grades and would fit in well in any division within the department, but the
system has denied them their chance to contribute meaningfully to their
country after going through four years of training in international
relations. The current practice of posting people overseas as diplomats
without any knowledge in international affairs makes a mockery of not
only the diplomatic posts, but also belittles having tertiary institutions that
should be providing skilled manpower for the public service. How could
these people talk intelligently on international issues if, before their
appointments, they were policemen, lawyers, patrol officers, bank clerks,
school teachers, tax collectors and finance officers?
How many Deputy Police Commissioners have become Police
Commissioners? The trend in the police force is another example of
incompetence on the part of the government where junior officers are
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appointed to senior positions ahead of their senior counterparts.
Appointing individuals from outside government departments affects the
procedure of open and transparent government, and is demoralising to the
rank and file.
How many individuals appointed to boards of statutory bodies
have experience in business management and have specific industry knowl-
edge? The current problem facing the NPF is a classic example that
demonstrates how individuals with limited knowledge of the superannua-
tion industry were given the responsibility to make decisions concerning
the proper management of the fund. In the first place, who appointed these
individuals and why were they appointed? It was the government and the
current inquiry has revealed how politicians have been making appoint-
ments despite the fact that they have no legal basis for doing so. Under Bill
Skate’s regime a commercial airline pilot was appointed as the Chairman of
the Telikom Board. What skills does this pilot possess to make him a quali-
fied person to make decisions regarding the telecommunications industry?
In discussing accountability, there is a growing concern among
the people that their representatives have not performed as expected of
them. It is a common feature in the media of concerned citizens asking of
the whereabouts of their elected representatives. Citizens have also raised
concerns regarding the failure of the government to deliver basic goods
and services to the people. Bernard Narokobi, the current Speaker of the
Parliament, raised some important issues on the accountability of politi-
cians. Under the heading of ‘They sin against the people’, he defined sin as
something politicians are not supposed to do, or not doing something they
are required to do by virtue of their oath of office. He listed several areas
that are problematic with regard to the performance and responsibilities of
the leaders (Narokobi, 1983):
• lack of interest shown in parliamentary sittings;
• parliamentarians concentrating in running their businesses rather than
serving the people who elected them;
• failure to present the views of the electorate and finding out the needs
of the people;
• ministers neglecting the wishes of their people;
• ministers not attending cabinet meetings.
I don’t know whether the massive pay rise awarded to Members
of Parliament (2001) by the Salaries Remuneration Commission (SRC)3
of which Narokobi is the Chairman can be referred to as a ‘sin’. This is
contradictory to his statement that the people in Papua New Guinea are
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3 The establishment of the SRC was controversial. It was a body established to
determine the salaries of the very people who are its members, which include
politicians and senior civil servants. The chairman is the Speaker of Parliament.
poorer than before (Post Courier, 4 January 2002) while politicians are
well off.
The former Chief Ombudsman, Simon Pentanu, has also raised
similar concerns. He stated that at the heart of our democracy is the
principle that people place trust in their leaders and in return demand
accountability (The National, 17 January 2000). Leaders are urged to ask,
‘How may I serve?’ and not ‘What’s in it for me?’ The country and the
people are searching for outstanding leadership and accountability from
our elected leaders. The challenge is to find leaders who will create, not
destroy; will lead, not follow; who will believe, not doubt; and who will be
forces for the greater good, and not just for themselves. Leaders have
enriched themselves at the expense of citizens. How many politicians
owned businesses or properties overseas before entering parliament?
Obviously, only a few, but if we look around today it would be equally
obvious that many have become rich overnight after their entering parlia-
ment — all at the expense of an increasingly impoverished society.
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
A democratic system of government clearly recognises the rights and
freedoms of its citizens. Papua New Guinea, following the traditions of
other democracies, has a profound outline of the various rights and
freedoms of its citizens. The framers of the constitution in its formulation
stages took the rights of citizens very seriously. The framers knew that for
Papua New Guinea to be truly democratic, the rights of the citizens must
be protected by providing for an environment of political equality for all
citizens.
Civil rights or liberty refers to a private sphere of existence that
belongs to the citizen not the state. According to Heywood (1997: 365):
Civil liberty therefore encompasses a range of negative rights usually
rooted in the doctrine of human rights which demand non-interfer-
ence on the part of government. The classic civil liberties that are
usually thought to include the right to freedom of speech, freedom of
the press, freedom of religion and conscience, freedom of movement
and freedom of association. These key freedoms are generally seen as
vital to the functioning of liberal-democratic societies, since they
provide the individual with protection against arbitrary government.
In many cases, the principle of civil liberty is given constitutional
expression through documents such as a bill of rights.
The classic civil liberties mentioned by Heywood are all guaran-
teed in the constitution of Papua New Guinea under the ‘Rights of All
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Persons’. They include the liberty of the person (S42), freedom from
forced labour (S43), freedom from arbitrary search and entry (S44),
freedom of conscience, thought and religion (S45), freedom of expression
(S46), freedom of assembly and association (S47), freedom of employment
(S48) and right to privacy (S49). All these rights are upheld and enforced
by the constitution.
However, since independence there are growing concerns
regarding the abuse of these rights by the state and society in Papua New
Guinea. The Police Force has been the main perpetrator of the abuse of
some of these rights. This is usually seen in the due process of the law
being ignored by members of the police force. Over the years, the state has
been forced to pay compensation to parties whose rights have been
violated by the use of excessive force by members of the police. The
Highlands region of the country is the worst hit area that has experienced
destruction to properties such as houses, gardens, tree crops and domesti-
cated animals. The principle that someone is not guilty unless proven
otherwise does not hold in many instances. It is a common scene on the
streets of Port Moresby and other centres where members of the police
force are seen beating up individuals who have committed petty crimes
such as shoplifting or street vending. The procedure of reading someone
his/her rights is not the method that is usually followed. The old west
saying of ‘shoot first and talk later’ is the norm.
The killing of two University of Papua New Guinea students
and two members of the public by the police in 2001 reinforces the
dilemma that Papua New Guinea faces with regard to political and civil
rights. Never before had citizens been killed in a protest against the
government and the Morauta government and the police have a lot of
explaining to do. The students from the University of Papua New Guinea
have acted as a voice for the silent majority over the years and the killing of
the two students marked a departure from the right of citizens to protest
against the government. In this case it is a democratic government that has
committed the crime against its citizens.
Another important freedom that is causing controversy in the
country is the freedom of conscience, thought and religion. The building
of a Moslem mosque in Port Moresby has raised a wide range of opinions.
The wider opinion was that because Papua New Guinea is a Christian
country, other religious groups must not be allowed to practise their beliefs
in the country. This view is not only undemocratic, but also violates the
constitution that allows for freedom of religion. The constitution does not
make Christianity the state religion because this would place Papua New
Guinea in the same category as those fanatic Moslem states and would
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greatly undermined the basic right of individuals to choose what is best for
them rather than the state dictating to them. From an ethical point of
view, the majority view cannot be used as a guide to deny individuals the
right to enjoy what he/she thinks is best for him/her. This is because
religion is an area of liberty in which the individual must be free to choose.
This case heralds the beginning of increased debates and contro-
versies likely to emerge in the future concerning individual rights relating
to lifestyles, behaviours and tastes of individuals. An important factor that
allows for the exercise of individual pursuit without interference from
anyone is the level of toleration that society allows. That is, how far can
society accept certain individual pursuits such as abortion, homosexuality,
pornography, and prostitution that are accepted in other democracies like
Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Britain? There are bound to
be clashes between the tradition and customs of the people and these new
practices which have fallen under the category of basic rights. If the
popular perception is that these practices are immoral and unacceptable
then the constitution has to be changed to make these practices illegal
because, as it now stands, individuals are free to pursue what they think is
best for them and the majority cannot deny them the right to do so.
A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
How does society in PNG help sustain democracy? Long before the
coming of western influence, Papua New Guinea society was highly egali-
tarian with the exception of a few communities. Consensus was the major
means in which disputes and conflicts were resolved. The introduction of
democracy further enhanced this principle, which is part of deliberative
democracy, that involves all parties reaching an agreement that is accepted
by all disputing parties. This form of solving disputes has been commonly
used apart from settling disputes within the judicial system.
Democratically, the people are aware of their status and roles in
society and know what is expected of them. This can be seen in many
community projects in which people have co-operated to achieve certain
collective goals such as building roads, schools, and airstrips with little
assistance from the government. The people can embrace any changes
whether social, economic or political but, over the years, experience has
shown that there have been no motivation or incentives from the centre,
that is from the national government to assist the people and get them
involved in community oriented projects. As such there are times in which
people do feel neglected and powerless. They do not see themselves as
having any power to influence public policy, except where they have to be
mobilised together with other civil society partners. Mass protests against
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the Sandline deal in 1997 and land registration and the privatisation
process in 2001 are cases in point.
An emerging trend that is adversely impacting the democratic
process is PNG’s high level of violence in both urban and rural areas.
Regard for human lives as well as respect for other human beings and
property is on the wane. Innocent people (nationals and expatriates) have
fallen victim to the encroachment of serious social disorder that threatens
to displace the moral fabric of society. Business houses have fallen prey to
the whims of violence, while innocent and powerless females have been
violently raped. The government as well as churches are working tirelessly
to address this problem, but no measures seem to be working. Even 
the harsh retributive justice employed by the police force is counter-
productive. This creates a dilemma for the police as to how it should
appropriately respond to crime and violence. The public have had no
choice but to endorse the harsh tactics that police use in combating the
escalating crime level. In many cases in rural stations, police are often over-
powered by gangs and often police have to decide between protecting their
lives or that of criminals.
The law and order problem is so widespread that in some
provinces services have been greatly affected. The Southern Highlands
province is an example where basic services such as hospitals, banks and
schools, communication and so forth have been shut due to a never-
ending spiral of violence. The Western Highlands and Enga (Post Courier,
23 November 2000) have also faced similar problems, where hospital
workers have been abused and properties destroyed resulting in the closure
of health services in these two provinces. The mass rape of schoolgirls in
the Eastern Highlands province in 1997 and also in the Western
Highlands in 1998 are only some examples of how society is being invaded
by these sickening acts.
Another dilemma facing the country that stems from the law
and order problem is the manner in which the Defence Force personnel
have continuously protested against government decisions and shown
open rebellion against the state. Violent acts by members of the force have
resulted in destruction of properties both public and private. The Defence
Force was once an institution that the citizens were proud of but its undis-
ciplined character has turned it into an entity that has no worth to the
state and society. The Sandline Affair in 1997 was destructive to the disci-
pline within the force and its members. Various attempts by the Defence
Force hierarchy and government to instil stability in its command struc-
ture have failed. The recent clashes (2001) between the police and the
military after the shooting of an officer suspected of armed robbery in Port
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Moresby shows how the members for the force have very little regard for
the due process of the law. The involvement of a rebel faction of the
military in the 1997 election is troublesome to our democracy as well as
the alleged infiltration of the military by some politicians. This has caused
divisions, thus affecting the sense of loyalty and allegiance to the state.
Finally, one area that needs attention is the dissemination of
information to the public. It is important to democracy for citizens to be
well informed about issues affecting them so that they can develop their
personal opinions on matters of national importance. The media is the
major means through which this can be effected. However, it has not been
effective, not because it is not playing its part, but through the failure of
successive governments to ensure that this medium is available and is effec-
tive in its role. The major newspapers that are well read by educated Papua
New Guineans are only available in urban areas as is television. The use of
radio is and was the only effective means since the 1960s. It was through
the radio that the people learnt about the first election in 1964, about the
existence of political parties and became aware of the appointment of
Somare as the Chief Minister in 1973 during self-government. It was a
common sight even in very remote areas for villagers to sit around the
radio and listen to programmes such as education news, church news and
the popular tok-save programme. However, since independence this
medium has been completely neglected by the government. Many provin-
cial radio stations are off air, some for years because of run-down facilities.
The National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) has been under-funded
and the current equipment is out-of-date. Many members of parliament
failed to see the importance of the radio and few have used their rural
development funds to support their respective provincial radio stations.
How would their voters know what they are doing for them and also
whether they are in the province for consultation or not? It makes one
wonder how members of parliament travel to all the villagers in their
electorates to visit as many of the villages where there are no road links and
the terrain is difficult to cross by any form of modern transportation.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented a new method of measuring democracy that
can determine and assess the degree of democratisation in Papua New
Guinea. This method has been used in Britain and will soon be applied to
other democracies like Australia and New Zealand. The chapter has identi-
fied four major aspects of democracy that a democratic audit should focus
on. First, elections and the manner in which they have been conducted in
PNG are unfair and in most instances not totally free. The high number of
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electoral disputes after each election is testimony to this dangerous trend.
Secondly, the ideals of open government and accountability are also
problematic. Governments over the years have failed to allow their policies
to be scrutinised by the public. Decision-making processes are also closed
processes and the public is usually taken by surprise when radical decisions
are made which at most times are highly questionable.
On the ideal of accountability, successive governments have not
done well in fulfilling their roles as representatives of their people. The
continuous infighting between members of political parties and coalition
partners has been counter-productive for the country as a whole. It is a
common scene in Papua New Guinea politics that when there is a forma-
tion of a new government after an election or a motion on a vote of no
confidence is moved, the country’s legislative process comes to a standstill
because of the manoeuvring of the members of various parties.
On the third aspect of democracy, despite the guarantee of basic
rights to the citizens, there is gross abuse and violation of these rights in
Papua New Guinea. The ‘Rodney King’ case is predominant in the
country and it is usually the state that is accused of using sometimes
excessive violence against its citizens.
The final aspect of democracy is the democratic society and as
briefly discussed, there are limitations to the realisation of democracy in
society due to a number of factors such as the increasing level of violence,
problems with disciplinary institutions such as the Defence Force and the
lack of informed citizenry due to the ineffective use of the media by the
government. All these factors have contributed to a waning democracy.
Violence and total disregard of the law are the norms in Papua New Guinea.
Despite all the shortfalls towards the full realisation of democ-
racy, Papua New Guinea has done well compared to other developing
democracies. Comparing Papua New Guinea with countries within the
Melanesian group, it is the only one that has not faced any fundamental
changes to its governmental structure. The structures and institutions of
democracy are intact especially the continued role played by Parliament,
the existence of a strong judiciary and most importantly the continued
survival of the Constitution. The people and the successive governments
know which areas need improvement and this requires a total commit-
ment from everyone to maintain the democratic processes in the country.
The government must take the lead and the people will follow.
Finally, PNG still has a long way to go in terms of embracing
the important elements of democracy. An atmosphere must be cultivated
to sustain the working of democratic principles. It is the duty of the
government as well as the people that this is realised. Democracy is an
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ideology that does not exist only within the government system but within
society as a whole. It is society that gives the democratic impression to the
political system within which government operates. The ‘date with destiny’
by the Morauta government in 1999 is the starting point in achieving
confidence in the government system that has been impaired by past
regimes. It is quite a simple commitment by a government that is trying to
make itself more responsible not only to itself, but also to the larger
society. We must aspire to create a society in the next 25 years where the
different aspects of democracy discussed in this chapter are realised and
sustained at a level that is truly progressive in bringing about a strong
democratic political system. Liberal democracy is the only appropriate
political framework for a country as diverse as PNG and it must be made
to continue to work for us all.
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Papua New Guinea (PNG) has now achieved its first 25 years of independ-
ence. The founding fathers of the country were never oblivious to the task
that lay ahead as they manoeuvered what was then a colonial territory of
Australia to self-government (1973) and eventually independence (1975) in
a comparatively short period of time. For a country that was literally a state-
less society — comprising hundreds of semi-autonomous tribal and
linguistic groups — a sense of nationalism among the people had to be
cultivated at the dawn of and even after independence. Just how an
independent PNG was to be transposed after the political transition was
never a comfortable scenario to ponder. Nevertheless, the country has
progressed well and heralds a democratic history that is quite remarkable by
Third World standards (see Lijphart, 1999).
This chapter seeks to provoke meaningful debate and discussion
on the status of PNG’s provincial government system. It is considered here to
be the nexus for furthering nation building in PNG. Therefore, much needed
change to governance in PNG is beholden to its supposed integrative role.
Indeed, the provincial government system has performed its decentralization
responsibilities and its structure has allowed a resemblance of formal adminis-
tration in rural areas. However, is there nothing else to it in substance than
token demonstration of ‘participative’ democracy? In short, the provincial
government system has not been a successful enterprise, even in the wake of
the changes made to it in the mid-1990s. A lot more can be achieved through
provincial governments by supplementing their current functions. How to
increase their role is what this chapter seeks to address. Even though a federal
system is idealized, it is discussed briefly toward the end for the reason that
there is still a lot more to be done in terms of provincial institutionalization
before federalism becomes more viable. At the outset, institutionalization is
the process whereby practices, routines, or organizations become ingrained in
the established and recognized ways in how a group would do things. And in
relation to political systems, it is illustrated through ‘adaptability, complexity,
autonomy, and coherence’ (Huntington, 1968: 12). 
THE AUTONOMY DEBATE IN PNG
Papua New Guinea currently comes under a unitary political system.
Theoretically, this is where a supreme central government is given the
ultimate power and authority to rule. Second-tier governments can be
created, but subordinated to the central government. The governing
system was deemed the most suitable model that would have allowed more
control from Port Moresby (Waddell, 1998: 114). Threats by segments of
the national population, as demonstrated by secessionist and political
movements at the eve of independence (see May, 1982), meant that a
strong central government was the best option. This was needed not only
to withstand these simultaneous political developments, but also to
strengthen a state infrastructure that was vital to summon attention and
loyalty from all regions of the country. The provincial government system
was then introduced immediately after independence primarily to recon-
cile unity and the diversity of the country. By 1980 nineteen provincial
governments and the National Capital District had been created.
Currently, there are compelling questions regarding the intrinsic
worth of the provincial government system. Is it still useful for integrative
purposes, or has it outlived its original purpose? Has the system played a
positive role in the development and administration of the country, or has it
been a hindrance? Given its lacklustre record, is there hope for improvement
in the system any time soon? Therein lies the debate between proponents
and opponents of increased autonomy for provincial governments.1
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1 Paucity of relevant sources has necessitated an attempt to see what hypotheti-
cally may have been the main tenets of the debate. However, that exposes me
to the charge of destroying my self-created straw man. That aside, the
arguments are general and plausible.
A Case against More Provincial Autonomy
For deeply fragmented countries, there is weight to the argument that a
political system that guarantees more power to peripheral governments can
potentially perpetuate the disintegration of the country. This point is
relevant and befits the contemporary times where there is still an adherent
propensity for existing states to break up, especially based on historical and
ethnic grounds (see Kegley and Wittkopt, 2001: 62). In the past, Papua
New Guinea has had regional groups that have flirted with both secession
and the idea of having regional governments. National unity cannot be
readily ascertained in present times, even though on hindsight, one can
make the argument that PNG has jelled over the last 25 years. Amidst the
smouldering Bougainville conflict, however, the climate may still not be
suitable for talks of more autonomy for the other provinces. Bougainville
currently is about to be legally granted a full autonomy status and some
observers, including Daniel Aloi (in this volume), are circumspect about
the wider repercussions for the rest of the country.
Of the wide South-West Pacific region, there is reason for
countries such as Australia and Indonesia to be more watchful if more
autonomy were to allow provinces of Papua New Guinea to become more
self-assertive vis-à-vis the national government. Ethnic-induced political
autonomy, whether possessed or desired, is a powerful force and its effects
cannot be comfortably predicted.2 Territorial PNG is very important to
Australia’s strategic interests. Likewise, Indonesia — especially in the recent
past — has been working to contain the fallouts of East Timor’s refer-
endum in support of independence, and there is no let up in either Aceh or
West Irian. Therefore, there is no room for complacency regarding local
politics of communities along the Indonesia–PNG and the PNG–Solomon
Islands borders. The recent events in the Solomon Islands and Fiji, and the
lingering activities of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) in West Irian, are
reminders of possible geopolitical scenarios in the Melanesian region. 
Another argument against more autonomy would be that the
provincial government system is not at fault. Rather, the public servants
and politicians generally have made it unworkable. Perhaps the quality of
public servants at the provincial level is inadequate to sustain performance
at an acceptable standard. Therefore, it would be counter-intuitive to give
more autonomy and expect a better performance from provincial govern-
ments. The number of provincial governments that have been suspended
for various reasons since the early 1980s may illuminate this point (e.g.
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2 I use ethnicity loosely here to mean the manner in which groups see
commonness or likeness in themselves (very often along racial, religious, and
linguistic lines) and then act prejudicially on them vis-à-vis other groups.
Dorney, 1990: 178). Conversely, the renowned exceptional performances
of the North Solomons before the crisis and East New Britain, to give but
two examples, demonstrates that the system can work if respective
management teams are up to the task.
A third argument to oppose the push for more provincial
autonomy would be that it might seriously weaken the authority of the
national government. Evidently, it is already weak as it is under the unitary
system where the national government is supposed to have pre-eminence
(May, 1998a: 66). How strong would the national government be if provin-
cial governments were to usurp more power? And what guarantee is there
that provincial governments would pick up the slack if the national govern-
ment were to become weaker? Such questions are important to consider,
especially at a time when the central government appears to be faltering in
its efforts to govern well and address social problems such as lawlessness,
unemployment, and corruption (see Kavanamur, this volume).
Also, the state has been struggling to command undivided
loyalty. There is the tendency for people to identify more with localized
social groups and their issues as opposed to the state and its issues. The
danger here is twofold. First, competition for public loyalty may develop
between the national and provincial governments under a new system.
Any conflict between the levels of government may truncate the much
needed coordination process. Unresolved or blown-out differences would
then negate the very purpose why a more decentralized system was needed
at the first place. Second, individuals can find themselves in awkward
positions where they have to show allegiance to one level of government
over another. The dilemmas in allegiance showed by Bougainville parlia-
mentarians, Paul Lapun and John Momis, in the early 1970s, are cases in
point. Lapun was a cabinet minister under Somare’s government, but was
also the patron of the separatist Napidakoe Navitu movement of his island
province. Momis was a staunch supporter of Bougainville’s cause, but was
the chairman of the powerful Constitutional Planning Commission
(CPC). In recent years, another Bougainvillean — Sam Kauona — has
epitomized this loyalty impasse with unfortunate telling consequences. He
deserted the PNG Defence Force and became a high-ranking officer in the
Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) (see Liria, 1993: 182). In a
country where traditional social cleavages are still very much unperturbed,
keeping the provincial government system in its present form, especially if
it is to be improved, would go some distance in building a much-delayed
identity of the state.
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A Case for More Provincial Autonomy
The decentralized powers under the current provincial government system
are partly federal. One scholar has categorized Papua New Guinea under a
federal system type called ‘constitutionally decentralized unions’. Such
countries — including neighboring Indonesia, Solomon Islands and
Vanuatu — have unitary systems (Watts, 1999: 8–12). Therefore, to grant
more autonomy to provinces in PNG would only add additional responsi-
bilities to the provincial governments’ repertoire, based on a system that is
already quasi-federal. Giving provincial governments more autonomy, or
eventually a federal status, does not necessarily connote household
changes. If and when more power is granted, the national and provincial
governments can jointly dictate a gradual pace for the transfer of responsi-
bilities to the latter. To recap, Papua New Guinea made a quantum leap to
full statehood in a very short period of time amidst an aura of cynicism
and scepticism. If that is to be any indication, the country can surely allow
concessions to slow political change in this day and age, especially with
some maturity to show for it.
Would granting more autonomy to provincial governments
cause the disintegration of PNG? First of all, those who make the assump-
tion that there is a causal association between the integration of the
country so far and the provincial government system are presupposing that
the system has actually worked. However, there is no concrete evidence to
confirm that proposition. If anything, abundant evidence shows problems
that clearly distort a clear view of any objective assessment. The contin-
uous suspension of provincial governments (especially in the 1980s) and
gross corruption in provincial governments are signs of political decay, and
they hardly constitute litmus tests for any process of national integration.
Corruption in many provincial governments is widespread and Bui Mana
(1999) has suggested the adoption of an anti-corruption mechanism at
this level of government to curb the festering problem. Interestingly, a
prominent political scientist says that the impact of institutional designs
(of which PNG’s provincial government system is an example) is often
devoid of empirically generated knowledge. What carries the day, when it
really matters, is assessment based on intuition (Przeworski, 1991: 35). For
proponents of the present provincial setting, one then wonders as to where
this intuition is sourced, given evidence thus far to the contrary. 
Second, the imminence of disintegration may have been
overplayed (see Dinnen, 1998). If there were a time when the country
could have easily succumbed to disintegration, it would have to be the
transitional period of the mid-1970s. Time has certainly allowed the people
to acquire a national identity, even if only symbolic in most instances.
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It suffices to say that it would have to take something substantially deeper
than mere political autonomy to cause people to desire outright independ-
ence and zealously stand by it. Whether it is religious, cultural or other
sources of ethnic affiliation, the desire to stand alone would have to endure
more forcefully and independently over time and transcend whatever polit-
ical system is in existence. In that respect, the type of political system
becomes immaterial. Thus, the fact that Bougainville wanted to secede
under Papua New Guinea’s unitary arrangement does not permit a case that
it would have succeeded under a federal system.
Indeed, there is also an argument to deter those who would
want to use more provincial autonomy as a stepping stone to secede from
PNG. People who would appreciate the reality of the current configura-
tion of the international system are likely to realize that that there is little
to gain by existing as small independent states. The current globalization
process in the post-Cold War world has accentuated a more competitive
pecking order where new countries have to struggle with established
countries for a niche within the international system. Only irrational and
ill-informed leaders would want to leave the comfort zone offered by an
independent PNG and be subjected to the relentless anarchy of the global
environment. And more frankly, such small states practically would have
to give up a substantial degree of autonomy, anyway, through ‘neocolonial’
arrangements, by engaging foreign firms or governments to harvest
whatever resources they may have.3 An advantage with more autonomy
for provinces, or ultimately a federal system, is that it would be an in-
house arrangement that can guarantee and protect semi-autonomous
provinces of PNG under a proven structure that has existed since the late
1970s. 
The geopolitical and security interests of the region have also
been alluded to above. Throughout the Bougainville crisis many countries
adopted hands-off policies. For them, this was a domestic matter for Papua
New Guinea. That political stance can be interpreted as a modest gesture
toward the maintenance of the status quo, in case a chain reaction were to
eventuate should Bougainville be granted self-determination. For that
reason, it is reasonable to say that for any area or region of the country
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3 Neocolonialism, which also goes by the term ‘neoimperialism’, simply means
that there is an economic rather than military domination by foreign countries
and/or multinational corporations (MNCs). Another concept also used above
is the globalization process. It is essentially the integrative networks among
states in contemporary times where there are increased communication and
trading activities which have caused people to be bound together in a holistic
international system. What is often expressed is that everyone has a common
fate (see Kegley and Wittkopf 2001).
wishing to attain independence, there is more to it than the initial step of
breaking away from PNG. Regional countries have the power to either
grant or refuse recognition to aspiring states. And if regional stability were
their priority, it would inversely affect the independence inspirations of
would-be new states.4 East Timor’s new political status — which was
supported by Australia and the international community — was an excep-
tional case, lest one starts calculating parallels.
The second argument by advocates against more autonomy
stipulates that the fault lies with people occupying political and public
service positions. Therefore, what requires change is the personnel rather
than the political system. That is not disputed. Papua New Guinea did not
have skilled manpower in its formative years. However, a major part in the
argument for more autonomy to provincial governments is the search for
ways to reinvigorate and engineer good governance through channels that
the current provincial government system does not offer. For instance, the
present distribution of governing power has to some degree allowed Port
Moresby to become the predominant city. It is the centre of business,
government, and therefore employment. Initially, provincial governments
were supposed to ‘shrink’ the central bureaucracy with the hope that better
qualified people would transfer to provinces (Dorney, 1990: 177). That has
not taken place, and may not for at least some time. Granting more
governing power to provincial governments hopefully may reverse the brain
drain to the betterment of provinces. After all, the people who rightfully
need services live in provinces — not in the national capital.5
Regarding the weak support that the modern state commands,
the reality is that nothing may change the situation as it is for now. Much
of the rural-level politics is still hamstrung by what Clifford Geertz (1963:
109) called ‘primordial attachments’, or given ties through birth. The least
one can hope for, arguably, is for the state to utilize existing traditional
cleavages in ways that may empower the people to transform their loyalty
bases to ways that may contribute toward their own development and
nationbuilding in a big way. The disintegration of the former USSR, the
Balkan Wars and the increasing racial tensions in the US should be noted
when designing a new PNG federal arrangement.
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4 Some countries such as Eritrea fought protracted and costly wars for their
independence. But even with that, there is no guarantee of success. And even
if a state does succeed, there is the long process of rehabilitating the people,
land, economic avenues and infrastructure. For PNG, the Bougainville
conflict should serve as a deterrent case. Unnecessary suffering should never be
visited on innocent civilians.
5 Maintaining the present system is not going to assist in minimizing problems
such rural-urban drift and squatter settlements and, for that matter, the
concentration of manpower and resources away from provinces. 
ENDURING ISSUES THAT DEMAND CHANGE 
It has been established above that the push for more autonomy and
eventually a federal system needs to go above and beyond current thinking
about the supposed critical role that the provincial government system
plays in serving to unite PNG. There are big problems that we will
continue to live with for as long as the current system remains unaltered.
Fearing that the country might disintegrate is not going to improve, much
less eradicate, these problems. A structural change is long overdue. What
follows are three broad topics arbitrarily chosen to represent areas that can
be improved by granting more autonomy and hence political space to
provinces.
Bridging Dependency and Self-Reliance
Local people developed a sense of dependence in the erstwhile colonial
administration of Australia and then currently the PNG national govern-
ment. While Australia may have played a part in augmenting dependency in
certain regions specifically for administrative purposes (see Woolford, 1976:
4), a mentality descended upon much of the territory when the government
was expected to purvey what it took to develop a locality, or even generate
business opportunities for individuals (Nelson, 1974: 131–2). Transactions as
such were to pass through local representatives in parliament and conduits
within the public service. With time, and especially since independence, pork
barrel politics (government exchanges benefits for votes) and other tit-for-tat
relationships were to develop between politicians and members of their
constituencies. Consequently, the national government has become
something akin to a one-stop shop at the behest of private beneficiaries, well
outside the interests of the country. That corruption has become endemic and
debilitating to good governance is hardly surprising (Okole and Kavanamur
forthcoming).
A state of dependency and the handout mentality cannot be
adequately addressed as long as the national government, through its
disproportionate share of governing power, disallows provinces to take part
more meaningfully. In fact, the very act of decentralizing mundane respon-
sibilities to provinces serves to build and sustain dependent subservience of
the people on the national government. Any notions of self-fulfilment and
aggrandizement by provinces are then squashed or stagnated. For provin-
cial governments and their people who have attempted to do well for
themselves, it becomes bothersome that their efforts are somewhat
overshadowed by how a political system allows the national government to
lead them from the front. That the government currently is submerged in
its pervasively rotten political and administrative culture is hardly an 
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inspiration to provincial governments. Neither are provincial governments
nor the public at large surprised by the lack of leadership credentials of the
recent crop of parliamentarians who enter the House of Parliament with
ulterior and private motives. How often do we hear or read about public
complaints regarding lack of infrastructure maintenance in rural areas?
Who speaks out about the perpetual shortages of basic supplies to schools
and aid posts? Needless to say, many of these responsibilities either belong
exclusively to provincial governments or are under concurrent arrange-
ments. But to think that the bulk of the annual funding that comes from
Port Moresby originally came from provinces is almost as absurd as insti-
tuting lame governments close to the very people who, in the first place,
contributed a significant proportion of that revenue. Why not break the
cycle and allow the people to use their own revenue? Why should the
people be impoverished and denied their right to a good life by misguided
government policies? And why should productive and law-abiding
provinces suffer the trauma of bailing out rogue provinces?
The dependency syndrome has its inherent tentacles. One of
them is what may be called the ‘compensation disease’.6 What requires
compensation depends on the situation at hand and the ‘assets’ that draw
value. Therefore, it is really an open market where people can make
overnight financial windfalls. To give an example, it has become a diabol-
ical habit that for every policy initiative being suggested for development,
landowners are to be compensated. That is understandable, especially in
cases where productive or sacred land is to be interfered with. However, it
becomes counter-productive, for all sanguine reasons, when some
landowners demand exuberant payments from the national government or
other parties as a condition for the actual commencement of work. 
If responsibilities as such were given to provincial governments,
especially where they deal with landowner groups, then two things would
happen. First, it would distance the national government from direct
responsibility. Therefore, the rest of the country would be let off the hook.
This is necessary since the national government often finds itself in a
precarious and often no-win situation since traditional ownership takes up
97 per cent of the country’s total land area. Second, compensation demand
is a problem that should be kept at the local level. The provincial govern-
ment would then be in a better position to handle it. The country should
not be held to ransom by actions of minorities. Localizing compensation
issues would mean that repercussions emanating from such cases would 
be confined to where they would be felt the most. That would deter 
the people who would want to capitalize on compensation in lieu of the
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6 I am inclined to call it a disease for the basic reason that it is contagious and it
has what it takes to ravage the body politic. 
necessity and importance of projects. Groups would then be forced to start
thinking strategically in terms of give-and-take scenarios. Hopefully,
dependency would then be replaced by self-emancipation from one’s own
mental siege and this would be followed through by self-reliance.
Cultivating Social Capital in Social Dilemmas
Under the present system, perhaps many provincial governments think
that their very existence, first and foremost, is to serve as conveyor belts in
the delivery of goods and services from the national government to the
people. The amendments to the Organic Law on Provincial Governments in
1995 may have further strengthened this feeling. What is conspicuously
undermined is any proclivity to do one’s best at this level. It is on that note
that self-reliance would have to be prioritized under a new provincial
government arrangement. 
What is called ‘social capital’ can be encouraged under a more
autonomous provincial government system. Collectively, it means ‘the
features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that
can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.’
(Putnam, 1993: 167). The antithesis of social capital is social dilemma.
Such dilemmas come in the form of shirking or free-riding conditions and
practices where people avoid work, duty or responsibility. Individuals with
independent choices confront social dilemmas when they find themselves
in interdependent situations. For some time now, experiments and
theorizing in some social science fields have come to conclude that it is
possible for human cooperation to overcome social dilemmas. What it
takes is ‘trust’ and coordinated endeavours within and among given groups
that guarantee reciprocal benefits. Motives and incentives are then self-
perpetuated (see Ostrom, 1998). 
Papua New Guinea is well endowed with traits that can
encourage and sustain social capital. In fact, kinship-based reciprocity was
once the ‘basis of Melanesian morality’ (Dinnen, 1998: 41). For a society
today that is still very traditional in many ways, goodwill and reciprocal
relations are still used extensively in provinces. These efforts can be trans-
formed under a more autonomous provincial system toward the well-being
of the people concerned. The wantok system, perhaps the most easily
recognized social capital in the country, points toward potential social
networks that can be utilized. However, and admittedly, its tendencies are
still very delicate and fluid so that it may espouse more problems than
benefits (de Renzio and Kavanamur, 1999). That is where provincial
governments need to step into the gaps and do what it would take to
overcome social dilemmas. The negative side of wantokism is nothing
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more than social dilemmas that feeds the appetite of those who stand to
benefit from each transaction, which very often is at the expense of others
or the bigger society. We see such practices in nepotism, cronyism, misuse
of public facilities and so forth. 
How can social dilemmas be addressed in a PNG provincial
setting? Empowered provincial governments, given the latitude to
manoeuvre, can do many things. Once a provincial government becomes
more institutionalized, an array of related things can happen, of which a
couple are stressed here. A government can campaign vigorously to
promote ideas depicting a sense of esprit de corps within the province for the
betterment of all and future generations.7 Social capital that generates
benefits can transcend social barriers. Not only are overtures toward self-
reliance strengthened here, but also it reduces dependency on a distant
government in Port Moresby. Confining their efforts to enhance their
respective province’s capacity comes out as a more comfortable trajectory,
especially if one acknowledges how the national government appears to
have become indifferent to the plight of rural dwellers in more recent years.
An institutionalized autonomous provincial system could also
exert some sort of learning process among the provinces themselves. For
instance, if New Ireland province was doing exceptionally well in a small
fisheries industry, Milne Bay province may do well to learn from the former
to improve the operations of its own industry. By extension, these learning
processes can also be transformed into a healthy inter-provincial competi-
tion.8 This would be beneficial in areas such as tourism and small industries.
What appears to be the existing practice is that the national government
gives operational guidelines through pieces of legislation and directives
through departments and expects conformity at the provincial level.
(Re)-inventing Provincial Development
Of all the rhetoric surrounding self-government in the early 1970s, devel-
opment was held in high esteem. The ultimate goal was that development
in its many facets was to promote self-reliance (Woolford, 1976: 219).
Over the years efforts to fulfil that goal have become haphazard. Some 
of the parliamentarians who rigorously campaigned for the idea of 
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7 For example, East New Britain is very prone to natural disasters. The provin-
cial government can set up some kind of relief fund in preparation for
tumultuous times. It can then encourage the citizens of the province to
contribute to it as a form of mortgage on their part for the future. 
8 If the game were being played in a capitalist court, then everyone would have
to play by capitalist rules. In a general way, innovative methods as such place
the onus on provinces to do well for themselves. Competition can then allow
self-reliance to develop.
self-reliance before independence lost track of it later when they became
increasingly sedated by the glamour of power and wealth (Hegarty, 1983b:
1–3; Standish, 1999). Today, everything resembles a shattered dream of
the mythical Don Quixote. In spite of the efforts of the current Morauta
government, the economic structure is still in shambles, while the govern-
ment and its institutions have been compromised so much by greed,
naivety and mismanagement at the top. The economic growth rate since
independence has hovered barely above zero, while social problems have
swirled out of control (see May, 1998b; Kavanamur, 1998). The United
Nations Development Programme’s human development index depicts a
grimmer reality of how the 85 per cent of the country’s population are
surviving in rural areas (UNDP 1999). The burning questions become. Is
it reasonable to wait on the national government to eventually lead the
country out of the abyss of despair? Or should the central government
grant itself a favour, in offloading the burden, by allowing provinces to be
more self-assertive and self-reliant? And how much longer should
provinces wait to see some changes for the better? 
Genuine development through the current provincial govern-
ment system may be a long way off, a point implied by Prime Minister
Morauta: ‘… the still unclear role of lower levels of government under the
New Organic Law, and the poor linkages between them, provincial
governments and the national government, are among the main obstacles
to development’ (quoted in The National, 29 November 1999). Pokawin
contends that the present provincial government arrangement is hindering
development initiatives. He says that a centralized system of government
cannot effectively administer development in PNG. Furthermore:
The emergent sociopolitical culture has imposed new parameters
that must be organised and managed. The provinces provide the
basic functional units for development of the country … People
identify themselves with the provinces that they come from. The
issue of equal participation takes provincial representation into
account (Pokawin, 1999: 42–3).
Pokawin also goes on to say that human development should
start at the village level. Since provincial governments are situated closer to
the people than the national government, it is logical that the former
should be empowered to assist the villagers in appropriate ways. Also a
more intimate interaction between the people and their provincial govern-
ments would reaffirm — among other things — the popular democratic
cliché that political power comes from the people (Pokawin, 1999: 43). 
The rationale behind the top-down administrative approach has
amounted to nothing less than a political fantasy. Many parliamentarians
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continuously put on a façade that they are aware of the people’s needs.
Half of the listed parties that contested the 1997 national election
included the word ‘people’ in their names, as if they were parties by the
people.9 Nothing can be more deceitful, conniving, and contemptuous to
the trust that simple unassuming villagers place on their government! The
irony of it all is that politicians within the existing system appear to have
distanced themselves from their people in significant ways by failing to
address the issue of development in more meaningful ways. 
For a start, many politicians even lack a vision on how to go about
promoting development. This is hardly surprising, given the fact that politi-
cians do not get elected on the strength of salient issues, ideologies, and even
defined national interests. Rather than assisting middle persons in business
cycles and rural agriculturalists through self-help schemes and related
avenues, governments see it in their interest to introduce pragmatic policies,
such as the populist free education, which undoubtedly are needed to avail
certain people with specific difficulties. However, they do not contribute
directly to economic growth and may even be fermenting dependency on
the national government. It is for such reasons that an attempt to balance
out government handouts and economic policies are to be handled by
provincial governments. Provinces, when allowed to use their own revenue,
could make a better effort in fostering development if they were to work in
small closely-knit networks. The national government can be a general
overseer. The manner in which the Bank of PNG oversees the activities of
the East New Britain Savings and Loans Society is a good illustration.
A FEDERAL SYSTEM IN PNG
The configuration of federalism comes in many forms. Normatively, it
invariably refers to a league of sorts comprising semi-autonomous political
units that come under a central governing authority. In terms of institu-
tions, a federal political system is a generic term that encompasses political
systems in which ‘there are two (or more) levels of government thus
combining elements of shared-rule through common institutions and
regional self-rule for the governments of the constituent units’ (Watts,
1999: 6–7, original emphasis). 
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9 The parties were: People’s Progress Party; People’s Democratic Movement;
People’s National Congress; People’s Action Party; People’s Resources
Awareness Party; People’s Unity Party; and People’s Solidarity Party. This is a
misnomer since PNG parties come under a category invariably known as
‘cadre’. Such parties are organized and run by political elites and other influen-
tial people purely for electoral purposes, as indeed is the case in PNG. They
also lack any mass (or ‘people’) bases. Therefore, it is deceptive to regard them
as people’s parties in spite of what the names imply. 
In democratic settings, it is misleading to readily assume that
one system of government is better than another. The power to effect a
difference and change lie with the subjects: the people themselves.
A system merely reflects their collective choice, based on how they perceive
it to suit their needs and circumstances. An elevation of a federal system in
Papua New Guinea should not be mistaken for a panacea for the country’s
impediments to governing. Rather, it is to be appreciated as a framework
that offers a more pervasive institutionalization opportunity for provinces.
Where the emphasis of federalism is skewed toward coordination, the
unitary model epitomizes subordination.
Federalism is often regarded as the best ‘fit’ for countries typically
with heterogeneous populations and far-flung territories. Therefore, the
principal intention of the model is to enhance and/or maintain unity
through the distribution of central governing power to lower governments.
Traditionally, the central government possesses only the responsibilities
that do not belong to peripheral governments. These include foreign
affairs, national security and the central bank. Just before independence,
Hank Nelson observed that federalism might not belong in Papua New
Guinea. He pointed to a trend where newly independent states did not
have much success with federal systems of government. He also perceived
that it would have been problematic to demarcate the fragmented PNG
into states (Nelson, 1974: 166). A lot, however, has happened since those
formative years. Dinnen (1998) makes an interesting case that the current
national society has gone through waves of changes since the colonial era,
featuring continuities and discontinuities, that it may be resilient enough
to withstand even the forces of disintegration. Perhaps this is attested to by
the enduring unity of the country. 
Federalism in Papua New Guinea would resemble a leap into
the dark. Assuming that it is desired throughout the country, many things
need to be taken into consideration. Would all provinces have the capacity
to perform independently as states, or would it be more sensible for some
provinces to stand together to increase their respective capacities? Would
regions of the country become susceptible to secession, or would the
national temperament of PNG that has been developed so far be sufficient
to rise above citizens’ differences? These queries are to be considered when
the time is appropriate for them. As for now, the issue of more provincial
autonomy should be salient. If some provinces were to perform exception-
ally well under a new provincial system, which would not be that far
removed from a federal system, then a federal status could be granted only
to legitimate and authenticate their successful transitions. Also, provinces
being granted more autonomy can serve as inspirations and a beacon of
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hope to other provincial governments who may be moribund and direc-
tionless at some point. 
CONCLUSION
What has been presented here resembles a one-sided brainstorming session
of sorts. The fundamental argument is that the current provincial govern-
ment system can be reinvigorated to perform responsibilities that, with
time, can contribute immensely toward nationbuilding. The tendency for
people to rely on the national government for goods and services has to be
drastically reduced. The government has only limited capacity to cater for
so much. Therefore, it would make more sense for the national govern-
ment to give more autonomy to provinces and play a more supportive role
rather than lead from the front.
For a highly fragmented country like Papua New Guinea, it
would seem unwise to even consider giving more autonomy to provinces,
let alone suggest the adoption of a federal system. However, it makes for a
sound, argument, too, to say that provinces restricted within a unitary
system can breed a double-pronged problem of dependency on and resent-
ment against the national government. In line with the latter, some
provinces are being seen as liabilities and that is a potential flashpoint too.
A line needs to be drawn between provinces that labour to make a differ-
ence and others that shirk and are blind to the need for a difference.
Finally, some of the points presented here are likely to be viewed with
scepticism. Who would believe that social capital could be encouraged in
provinces where there are factions that harbour animosity among
themselves? Or that the problems in Port Moresby would ease once more
manpower and resources are committed to provinces under a new provin-
cial arrangement? To respond to such judgments, one should consider the
permanency of problems, as we know them today — which are bound to
exacerbate with time. Are we going to accept the current system with its
inherent shortcomings? And generally, are we going to allow paranoia
emanating from the disintegration myth and a general lethargy from a
rigid, expensive, and unworkable provincial government system to cloud
our rational endeavors to do what is best for us? Without a doubt, Papua
New Guinea is better off innovating ways to climb out of its ‘backwardness’
pit rather than living up to the status quo as if it was destined by fate to be
inevitable. 
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PNG DEFENCE FORCE:
An Analysis of Its Past, Present
and Future Roles
James S. Laki
‘The military way is marked by a primary concentration of men




Servicemen have resorted to indiscipline to show grievance because of
years of neglect by successive governments of the military. Conditions of
services have deteriorated to an extent that the Defence Force has become
a liability and its discipline deteriorating as attitudes amongst all
servicemen changed over time. In 1989 the rank and file members
marched to parliament house to demand an increase in pay, whilst in 1994
the maritime element boycotted duties in protest over lack of maintenance
and non-serviceability of ships. The frustration of Sandline contracts in
1997, that is said to be a blessing in disguise, was really a rebellion against
acceptable standards by western principles, yet tolerable in Melanesia.
Members of the Force were paid pay increases as a result of illegal demon-
strations and fear of further repercussions.
As a result of many of these issues a ministerial committee was
set up followed by the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (CEPG).
Both groups — the Taranupi Ministerial Committee and the CEPG —
identified the problems that have existed in the Defence Force, the latter
put forward a ‘definite proposal’ — massive reduction in manpower.
Unlike the Taranupi Report, the CEPG Report did not give many options
which the government could choose from, hence another confrontation
with servicemen that has since stalled the reforms in the PNG Defence
Force. Many are of the opinion that the country does not require a
standing military force while others believe that the force should combine
with the Police Force. Some believe that the military could continue and
be more outward looking, addressing transnational crime issues and
performing peace keeping duties in the region and the world.
This chapter discusses the various roles of the PNG Defence
Force as an institution for defence and security as well as a facilitator for
unity and nation building. It explores and explains many of the perceptions
for the continued existence of the Defence Force, while at the same time
determines what other role could be played in the future. These discussions
highlight the various perceptions, which the wider PNG community has, at
a time when government services to rural areas have been lacking. State
institutions are continually being asked to validate their purpose and be
more accountable and transparent. What could the Defence Force offer
given the government’s commitment to public sector reforms?
BACKGROUND
Papua New Guinea is relatively young and, as yet, it has no institutions of
advocacy to turn to when deciding on roles and objectives for an existing
military force. Even during the Second World War, PNG remained ignorant
and innocent but was drawn in by both the Allied Forces and the invasion
forces. Men were recruited as carriers, guides, informers, and coast-watchers
in a war that meant nothing to them. At the peak of the war, as many as 
55 000 villagers worked as labourers or carriers for the Allied Forces
(Sinclair, 1992: 43). 
Formal military units were formed specifically to help out
during the war. The men in the New Guinea Infantry Battalion (NGIB)
and the Papuan Infantry Battalion (PIB) served with distinction, enduring
battle stress and general hardship. Later, they combined to become the
Pacific Island Regiment (PIR). Its role was to, ‘provide medium range
reconnaissance patrols, garrison for local defences, guides and advisers, and
reconnaissance detachments for Australian Army units’ (Sinclair, 1992:1).
The PIR was disbanded in 1946, leaving only a company of three New
Guinea Infantry Battalions, when the question of military effectiveness,
discipline, and reliability arose among Australian settlers and certain
government officials who could not trust natives with firearms (Sinclair,
1992: 44–5).
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Combined with their reputation during the Second World War
and the looming threat of war from the Indonesian–Dutch conflict in
West New Guinea, Australia decided to resurrect the PIR units. The
recovery of the PIR units in 1958 had the strong support of the Returned
Servicemen’s League (RSL), which vowed to assist troops in any way
possible. It was rather quick, especially the formation of 1RPIR, 2RPIR,
and the establishment of Igam Barracks in Lae. Australia at that time was
almost sure of going to war with the Indonesians, in support of the Dutch,
but submitted to the idea when the US abandoned its policy of ‘passive
neutrality’ in fear of a communist domino effect in South-East Asia.
Thompson (1994: 89) argues that:
Australia was forced to agree to the idea of capitulation. Its
Government was unwilling to join the Dutch in a war with
Indonesia, without US or British support.
The re-establishment of the PIR was the beginning of an era
that culminated in human development. Understanding changes in social,
economic, and political development had already been experienced by
many war veterans, carriers, and guides because of their exposure to the
Australians, Americans, and Japanese. By independence, the PIR units and
other services became what is now the PNG Defence Force, intended to
be a small unified, effective force, based around low-level conflicts, and
comprising three elements — land, maritime, and air.
The infantry troops in the Pacific Island Regiment became a
symbol of national sovereignty and unity at independence. The PIR was
regarded as the ceremonial force, attending to formal government
occasions, receiving foreign dignitaries, and displaying weapons skills at
open days or cultural shows. The pipes and drums of the PIR added
further attraction, and boosted the image of the army. Other components,
such as the maritime element remained as a relic of the Australian Navy
with a few patrol boats and two landing crafts. Further additions were
made later with the incorporation of the air element, with two DC3
aircraft, followed by Nomad aircraft, which were donated by Australia.1
THE COMMONWEALTH EMINENT PERSONS GROUP
(CEPG) REPORT
It was the force of the 1970s that the CEPG referred to in its report, with
no additional responsibilities, such as the need to be present at the sea
borders and to patrol the 200 miles of the EEZ (Exclusive Economic
Zone) limit. That force was generally supported by elements of the
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1 See O’Connor (1994: 13–15) for the Order of Battle for the PNGDF.
Australian Defence Forces as reflected in the Book of Reference, BR1000.
As at 1 May 1976, there were 350 Australian loan personnel. Not counting
the number of personnel in Defence Headquarters and elements such as
the Defence Supply Agency (DSA), and those training at Goldie, there
was a strength of 2152. This total included 50 officer cadets at the
Advance Defence Training Wing (ADTW) at the Joint Services College
(JSC) in Igam, as at November 1976.
The outcome and the recommendations of the CEPG report
have several explanations. First, the government wanted an independent
and uncompromising view, with no national sentiments as an obstacle
towards these reforms. This meant that strategic military considerations
were not to hinder the decisions based on financial constraints. Hence,
one of the requirements was affordability.
Second, the government wanted immediate savings on the
Defence Force’s payroll bill. By engaging outside resources to determine
the reforms, especially the Commonwealth, external funding assistance
could be expected. The CEPG Report’s estimate of K70 million was to
have come from the World Bank to execute the Voluntary Release Scheme.
This was to be in line with the public service retrenchment rules, with an
additional ten per cent for service in Bougainville.
Third, the Defence Force has been on the verge of collapse.
Frequent acts of indiscipline, mainly to show grievance at the government’s
negligence over the years, appear to be less when compared with the
frustrations to which servicemen were subjected. Unexplained missing
weapons and break and enters into the Defence Force’s armoury would
not build confidence in the community at large. The reforms were neces-
sary, but through a negotiation approach.
The CEPG report recommended a wholesale cut in manpower
that led to intense feelings — some of which touched nationalistic senti-
ments. This occurred when the nation’s ‘pride’ was assessed by non-citizens,
and some functions of the Defence Force were considered irrelevant and
costly. Soldiers, in their roles as servicemen, have more nationalistic
feelings than the state authorities may think. Furthermore, their senti-
ments touched ones similar to those of concerned Papua New Guineans
about the way the country was debt ridden when conditions were imposed
under the Structural Adjustments Programs. Such conditions have made it
impossible for the state to agree on a minimum wages package. Yet, it was
possible to raise the salaries of the Members of Parliament and constitu-
tional office-holders.
The events at Murray Barracks — breaking into armoury by
troops — would seem to aim at just such sentiments, but with some
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bargaining power. The reasons were that state authorities have diminished,
and there were lots of high-powered guns held by undesirable people
throughout the country. The question posed was what would the
outcomes be if there was another Bougainville type crisis, especially when
mob rule, terrorist rule, and intimidation, in some areas seemed to be the
way? Government officials trying to conduct state businesses have been
attacked, and had to be escorted by police to avoid further violence. It
appeared that there was no new-look Defence structure for negotiation by
the Defence management. Therefore, the soldiers took this task of negotia-
tion upon themselves.
Contradictions appeared to emanate from the report. The
proposed reform bodies that were set up — the Defence Reforms Steering
Group (DRSG) and the Defence Reform Implementation Team (DRIT)
— would have sorted these out. However, the appointment of these two
groups had also left some doubt with many people, including the soldiers.
The appointment of foreigners in exchange for their funding, and those
who were recently disengaged by the Defence organisation appeared to be
antagonistic and created opinions that they had, with no regard for the
affected servicemen.
Areas of concern were the need to have revitalised core capabili-
ties in communications, intelligence and surveillance, air support,
maritime surveillance, and maintaining a presence at the land border.
These proposals were manpower intensive that may demand a technolog-
ical edge, and would require skilled manpower. While the intention may
be to outsource many of the functions, operational experience has shown
that facilities or resources may not be available as required. In most
instances, services or resources could be held against the Defence Force for
outstanding bills, or generally as bargaining tools as has happened for the
Bougainville operations. This was another situation for which the earlier
Defence Force of the 1970s was not designed. Alternating two battalions
on a six-monthly basis disturbed and frustrated the initiatives of one, and
resulted in further violence and killings.
PAST ROLES OF THE PNG DEFENCE FORCE
The fundamental role of the PNG Defence Force has been to defend the
country from external, armed invasion, as enshrined in the National
Constitution. This is followed by the secondary task of assisting the civil
police in quelling internal law and order problems, as stipulated in Section
204 (1) of the National Constitution, and Sections 6 and 11 of the
Defence (Aid to Civil Power) Regulation 1974. The former role has
become remote, as the world is heading towards ‘global governance’ and
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good neighbourly relations at the end of bipolar polarisation and an end to
the Cold War.
The latter role has been the biggest challenge and has dominated
the activities of the Defence Force in recent times. These activities have
ranged from simple ‘shows-of-force’, to conducting curfew operations
(O’Connor, 1994: 11)2. The most active participation has been the
attempt to crush the rebellion in Bougainville. It was in these operations
that some critics accused the Defence Force of being politically entangled.
This entanglement could be seen from two perspectives — one of being
manipulated to achieve a political solution, and the other of being the
victim of a disastrous outcome.
Seeing a greater role for the PNGDF, the Government intro-
duced the nation building concept, which established the Engineer
Battalion. Its roles were to be accomplished in two ways — a combat role
in support of the infantry battalions, and field engineering and construc-
tion. Under the construction role, the Engineer Battalion has been able to
build bridges and access roads into some of the most remote areas. The
support of the people came in the form of financing the construction,
while the Defence Force provided the manpower and equipment.
In supporting the Engineer Battalion, other elements came into
play. The maritime element, using its landing craft, was able to transport large
engineering equipment to project sites. One other role was in surveillance of
the maritime waters, using the patrol boats, and included the boarding and
apprehending of illegal fishing vessels within the 200 nautical mile EEZ.
Other emergency services such as medical evacuations from remote islands to
the nearest hospitals also involved the maritime elements. Its presence in the
local waters has prevented the large-scale smuggling of illicit drugs and other
illegal activities.
While patrol boats have been used by the maritime element on
the surface, the air element has had the task of carrying out a similar
airborne role using the Nomad aircraft. These tasks have been assisted by,
and continue to receive the support of, the P3 Orion services from the
RAAF and RNZAF, under the respective Defence Corporation Programs.3
In addition to the surveillance task, the air element, which is primarily
regarded as the Air Transport Squadron (ATS), operated its DC3 aircraft as
transport planes. Their fleet had increased to five by the mid-1980s. Not
only did they transport defence equipment and personnel but also catered
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for the dependants. For example, the ATS flew servicemen and their depen-
dants to their places of origin for recreational leave when funding for such
travel could not be obtained from the Defence Force budget.
ACTIVE ROLES OF THE PNG DEFENCE FORCE
Apart from the quelling of rebel activities against the newly elected
Vanuatu Government of Fr Walter Lini in 1980, the PNG Defence Force’s
other active involvement has been on Bougainville. The initial ‘call out’ of
the Defence Force had been to assist the police force in restoring what had
appeared to be the ‘Paguna crisis’. Dissatisfied with the negative outcome
of the proposal to negotiate with Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL),
Francis Ona resorted to militant activities by blowing up a power pylon
and assaulting mine workers. Police were called in, but they exacerbated
the situation when their brutality prompted the rest of Bougainville to be
sympathetic towards the landowners’ cause. An all-out war was assumed
on the rebel movement by the national government.
The situation warranted a full-scale military operation that
required a decision declaring a state of emergency. The Defence Force was
on a call out to assist civil authorities to restore law and order and not to
enforce martial law. The security forces believed that they had the mandate
to kill, because they conducted military operations as they saw fit. Also,
little did Cabinet know of the consequences of involving the Defence
Force, without declaring martial law on the island. The Defence Force was
compromising its role on Bougainville as militants got killed. The role of
the Defence Force remained in limbo, as the central government became
indecisive.
This political indecisiveness led to the Defence Force not
achieving its objectives. Therefore, the soldiers became frustrated and
resorted to intimidation, sometimes holding people in captivity for brutal
interrogation that resulted in death. These actions caused widespread
outcry for humanitarian intervention. Retired Brigadier General Leo Nuia,
then a colonel in charge of the operations, further revealed these actions
on a Four Corners ABC Program (Douglas, 1991: 267). The PNGDF
became more unpopular on all fronts, as it suffered from a lack of political
support from an indecisive Government. Without further word, the
Defence Force withdrew to Nissan Island to the north, enabling the first
so-called cease-fire for the BRA (Bougainville Revolutionary Army). This
gave the BRA the opportunity to bring in more arms across the Solomon
Islands border, and to regroup themselves for a long guerrilla war as atroci-
ties against their own kind also continued.
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The withdrawal of the security forces, together with a sea
blockade, heralded the darkest days for Bougainville. The BRA ran riot,
coercing and killing those who they believed to be supporters of the
National Government, including many of the former national and provin-
cial government officials (Dorney, 1979: 46–7). Out of fear, many
undecided youths took up arms against the security forces. Genuine tradi-
tional border crossing was prevented by the sea blockade and this led to a
general mistrust of the national government for abandoning the people,
mostly from North West and South Bougainville.
However, the sea blockade by the PNGDF was not only ill-
conceived, the Government was mistakenly led to believe that a blockade
would be effective. The military forces thought that financial and resource
support by way of logistics and equipment would be free-flowing to
maintain that blockade. But the national government was facing real
economic hardships which were brought about by the closure of the
Panguna Mine. Budget estimates of income for 1990 were expected to be
K1.2 billion, but they fell well short. Consequently, the government could
not effectively support the military operations in Bougainville.
Actual Defence Budget spending in 1990 rose by 35 per cent,
and averaged 31 per cent for eight years to 1997 when operations slowed
down in Bougainville. The budget figures have a direct relationship to the
Government’s attempt to increase the PNGDF manpower to 5200 by
1995, following the internal security review in 1991, and the recurrent cost
of operations in Bougainville (see Table 1). This cost was not separated
until 1995 after the government had spent unbudgeted funds in 1994 that
amounted to K23.21 million. There was also additional allocation in 1995
of K2.05 million for a ‘Mopping up Exercise’ in Bougainville, details of
which could be another discussion point. Thereafter, actual appropriation
for Bougainville declined gradually to its lowest level of K700,000 in 2002.
In 1997, after almost three years of on and off negotiations
surrounding the signing of the Honiara Declaration of Peace that took
place in the Solomons capital in 1994, some headway for peace was made.
But the Honiara Declarations allowed for demilitarised zones, and the
establishment of South Pacific Regional Peacekeeping Forces (SPRPF),
made up of the small Pacific Island countries, Australia and New Zealand.
The Declaration also recognised the constitutional role of the Defence
Force, and enabled its presence on Bougainville. Further, peace initiatives
were taken with the assistance of the New Zealand government when it
offered Burnham Camp in Christchurch for talks to be held amongst
more than 200 delegates comprising women, BRA factions, church groups
and the National Government representatives.
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Table 1: PNG Defence Force Budget (thousands of kina)
Year Allocation Appropriation Actual Revised Manpower Remarks
1988 35,284.40 38,411.57 3,515
1989 40,859.50 40,859.50 47,667.80 40,819.50
1990 43, 176.70 45,036.70 66,768.40 3,392
1991 50,789.30 50,789.30 92,042.80 4,040
1992 56,528.10 56,528.10 82,898.60
1993 54,400.00 54,400.00 77,124.00 5,075
1994 54,300.00 54,300.00 83,342.60
1995 60,013.30 57,043.00 73,909.10 5,200
1996 68,000.00 90,644.40 103,073.80
1997 92,553.70 92,553.70 114,412.00 4,475 Retire 600
1998 86,035.60 86,035.60 87,097.60
1999 80,000.00 80,000.00 91,720.70
2000 85,109.00 85,109.00 96,761.60
2001 90,433.80 90,433.80 4,173
2002 53,724.00 700,000.00 54,624.00 2,870 Retrench
1,300
Source: PNG National Budget Revenue and Estimates since 1990.
In the lead up however, the military endeavoured to use its
initiative, and was able to regain control of some 80 per cent of the island
by 1993. These initiatives eventually were too demanding of the military,
but the government remained confident that the military maintained
control, despite scant support. The lines of communications were
extended against all odds and against any principles of war. The military
was caught up in a dilemma, where it got the support of the public when
soldiers were killed, but received criticism when a military operation was
conducted and members of the BRA were killed. The BRA media
campaign worked very well, while, on the other hand, the military sought
other means to win the hearts and minds of other Bougainvilleans, as well
as the wider PNG and international communities.
A new and challenging role for the Defence Force came into
being. This required a psychological operation, which was aimed at
winning the confidence of the people — the military meant peace for
those not engaged in the war. It was also a public relations campaign
against the negative portrayal of the Defence Force, which was branded as
being insensitive, arrogant, and heavy-handed, without addressing the root
cause of the crisis. These operations saw many soldiers risk their lives in
contacting rebel leaders to broker peace, through the understanding of
many local chiefs who, at times, became the ‘meat’ in the sandwich.
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Undermining the use of the military and, at other times, overuse of the
military for the purposes not intended could be troublesome. The
Sandline Crisis is one empirical occurrence that has now been documented
to date.
THE SANDLINE SAGA
The Prime Minister obviously did not suspect that the Defence Force was
disillusioned and was being undermined. What the mercenary forces
proposed equated with the real requirements for capability enhancement
that had been requested over the years. What seemed impossible was
approved to be available, at the stroke of a pen, within a few months. The
military leadership, headed by General Jerry Singirok, interpreted the
situation as suspicious and sinister, and therefore as needing to be exposed.
The Contravene Contract with Sandline International was subsequently
exposed, and evoked public outcry and street demonstrations aimed at
forcing the government to stamp out corruption, and back the military for
its stance.
Unknown to the public were the intricacies of international
negotiations, betrayals, persuasions, commissions and corrupt deals that
contributed to this outcome. General Singirok was said to be part and
parcel of the whole deal, having had earlier discussions with officials of
Executive Outcome. These were revealed from evidence presented at the
Andrew Commission (Andrew, 1997: chapter 6), and were also inconsis-
tent. It would appear that Sydney Franklin, from Franklin J. & S.,
international arms dealers, may have influenced the way Singirok behaved.
Franklin was also known to have had a run in with the Sandline Group,
Executive Outcome in Sierra Leone.
Singirok had been the guest of the arms dealer at the Royal
Horse Guards Hotel in London (O’Callaghan, 1999: 278), and was to be
given a total of £31,000 sterling (PNGK193,508), beginning with a Visa
account that would be difficult to trace, by the time the crisis occurred.
When Singirok was a junior officer living with the troops in the field, he
complained bitterly about the poor state of field equipment procured from
the same arms dealer, Franklin. Within just two years he was not just being
more than friendly with the principal but ensured that outstanding bills
from Franklin were settled without further queries.
As the news broke about PNG engaging the mercenary forces
assembled by Sandline (Weekend Australian, 22 February 1997; see also
Donrey, 2001: 225), Singirok was haunted by his commitment to
Franklin, who also proposed much of the arsenal that Sandline had on
their inventory. Given the exposure Sandline was also going to deviate
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from earlier plans, and could even fight the war for the PNG government
while its troops were to be mere spectators. There were also fears that
Franklin could expose Singirok should the Sandline became involved in
Bougainville, while at the same time the Prime Minister proposed different
command arrangements for the Special Forces Unit (SFU) at Goldie
Barracks. There was no evidence though to suggest that Singirok would
have benefited in any way by engaging Sandline, but it was thought highly
likely that the Minister for Defence and his associates would have some
benefits.
Meanwhile, the years of neglect and misconception in the
military finally took their toll when rebel elements of the PNG Defence
Force held several politicians captive in Parliament House on the pretext of
ensuring their safety from the public. However, it is arguable as to whether
the soldiers’ actions were intentional, based on the fact that there was some
thought amongst the troops the parliamentarians should be allowed to go.
Furthermore, the public had overstayed outside the bounds of a curfew
requirement that was in effect from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. the next morning. By
leaving the public in the precincts of the National Parliament, the police
did not apply the curfew provision, and hence ended up with more chaos.
The public was convinced that the political leadership was
corrupt and should be removed from office. Those who believed in that
notion remained vigilant outside Parliament House during its session. The
non-governmental organisations that were concerned about the dormant
Internal Security Act displayed placards stating that Sandline would target
the general public after Bougainville. Even the Governor General who
should normally remain politically unaligned took out full-page advertise-
ments in the daily newspapers. Public demonstrations ensued for several
days, mainly in Port Moresby. The unemployed and petty criminals took
advantage of the situation, damaging public property, and looting shops
and supermarkets.
Despite what appeared to be intimidation by the public demon-
strations and the military involvement, the democratic process prevailed
when Parliament voted in favour of not ousting the Prime Minister.
Instead, the Prime Minister agreed to step aside so that a public inquiry
could proceed in light of mass demonstrations that were to take place if he
did not do so voluntarily. However, the military was not yet rid of
mischief. The 1997 National Elections reported intimidation by military
personnel attached to the Electoral Commission, which resulted in the
prosecution of twelve soldiers. A good civil–military relationship that had
a good consultative network would have prevented many of the frustra-
tions and expectations of the military.
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CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS
Establishing an effective civil military relation partnership is important
because, far too often, civilians who are not leaders, and are not members
of the security forces, have caused problems. Civilian officials and military
officers both have the important responsibilities of preserving democratic
effectiveness and maintaining the security of the state. Also, open discus-
sions between officers and civilians are vital in resolving operational
challenges in civil–military relations and defence decision making.
The military forces are the basic component of a national
security policy. This policy is aimed at protecting Papua New Guinea’s
national interests — be they environmental or physical — as well as the
lives of the citizens of the state and their interests. Civilians must decide
what form of national security policy Papua New Guinea should have.
A national security policy is not necessarily centred on the defence of a
nation. It comes in three forms of policy, and at two levels — military
security, internal security and situational security.
Before discussing the need for military security so that its roles
and objectives promote confidence in, and have approval from the people,
it is important to discuss other security issues that make up the national
policies. First, the internal security of a country must be in order so that
other developments such as economic, infrastructural, social cohesion, and
political processes are not hindered. If these issues are affected and become
a major source of concern, then the situational security of the country is at
risk. Factors such as poor living conditions, reduction in primary produc-
tion, deteriorating road conditions, and abuses of political power reduce
the relative power of a country.
Papua New Guinea has no real or perceived external threats to
its status and survival as an independent state. It is in a strategic location,
astride air and sea lines of communications that are constantly used by
most of its regional neighbours; several of those have fought each other in
past wars. Most of these neighbours are also working in bilateral or multi-
lateral forums, confidence building, or comprehensive and cooperative
security measures for peaceful coexistence in both track one and track two
organisations or institutes.
Papua New Guinea participates in most of these forums, but is
faced with many internal challenges. Poverty and crime are becoming
increasing problems, as people move to urban areas in search of a better
life. They carry with them their tribal feuds, loyalties and patterns of
behaviour, which are then being imposed on others within their new
surroundings. Economic infrastructure is very fragile and there appears to
be a lack of socio-economic development, as well as an absence of physical
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and environmental security. Government services are lacking in rural areas.
There is a tendency to return to ‘Taim Blong Bipo’ (the past) in these
areas, while in the cities there is no discipline, no respect for others, and
generally, people have no standard of behaviour and practice, from the
homeless to the senior leaders and politicians. PNG is walking a tightrope
as far as its survival is concerned.
For military security to be effective and perform its designated
roles there should be an effective civil–military relation (CMR). Like the
other two components of the National Security Policy there are opera-
tional concepts, which are institutionalised, so that the ultimate goals are
achieved. Examples of these in the military are characterised by military
customs, tradition, prestige and doctrine, and most of the military’s
interest. Other considerations include quantity (size), quality, and when
and where to use military force. The military way is where the major stake-
holder is the Defence Force (see Janowitz, 1968: 22). The Defence Force
then provides the technical advice in pursuing and maintaining the roles
and objectives of the military, in association with the civilian community.
It is also important that civilians and military officials have open
and transparent discussions in civil–military relations and defence decision
making. Huntington (1957: 2) argues that:
Nations which develop a properly balanced pattern of civil-military
relations have a great advantage in search of security.
Solutions in a properly balanced society are easily presented,
while those nations that do not have a balanced structure end up with
instability. For example, such problems have reached the quiet Pacific,
with the events in Fiji, beginning on 19 May 2000, and those in the
Solomon Islands a month later (The National, May, June 2000; Post-
Courier, May, June 2000).
Furthermore, differences between civil and the military groups
have led to power struggles, and created different governance and political
systems. Examples of such political systems are the authoritarian system,
which is based on a warlord concept and was commonly found during the
feudal system in western Europe, and in some parts of Africa where
personal autocracy was developed over tribal systems. In African Uganda,
the Baganda Kingdom was short-lived because the Ugandan Military
destroyed it for a greater united Uganda (Randall and Theobald, 1985: 75).
Others in the list include the civilian mass party system, the
democratic model, the civil–military coalition, and a military junta system.
A civilian mass party system was witnessed in Indonesia, led by Sukarno,
prior to the military coup of 1965 (Randall and Theobald, 1985: 77–8).
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Following the coup, Indonesia adopted a civil–military coalition, with 75
military personnel (reduced from 100) in the Cabinet. Most western
Nations have enjoyed the democratic competitive system. In contrast, some
developing countries, for example Somalia, experienced a military junta
when Siade Barre governed that country until its collapse. It required a UN
humanitarian intervention, led by the United States, through ‘Operation
Restore Hope’, in 1992 to bring some order (Makinda, 1999: 61).
The importance of having good, effective civil–military relations
should be understood and institutionalised. The PNG Defence Force
(PNGDF), and the country as a whole, have adopted the democratic
model of governance. The military, just like any other government bureau-
cracy, competes for its appropriation in the national budget, and it is the
government’s prerogative to prioritise according to its goals and objectives.
The key player is the Minister for Defence who heads the Defence
Council of three men; the other members being the Secretary for Defence
and the Commander of the Defence Force. As Defence Council decisions
are not independent of committee systems in other national portfolios,
some decisions may get overturned or renegotiated in preference to other
national interests.
One way in which the Defence Force was able to assert itself was
through the production of a Defence White Paper in 1999. This
document outlines the defence policy, the expected roles and functions,
and the level of threat perceived by PNG (Papua New Guinea Defence
Force, 1999: 12–14). While the normal expected democratic principles are
inherent in the PNG constitution there have been many variations. It
becomes so inconsistent and problematic that predicting and analysing
developments is difficult, if not impossible. Patterns of behaviour for many
politicians or organisational executives are just as unpredictable, because
there appear to be no norms and standards, as each attempt to personalise
a mission-oriented function or institution.
FUTURE ROLES OF THE PNG DEFENCE FORCE
While there are no real threats to Papua New Guinea’s sovereignty, as
indicated in the 1999 Defence White Paper, skirmishes along the land
border with Indonesia seem to be the major security concern. The likely
contentious issues relating to the border arise from several observations.
The first problem could arise, if, or when, PNG joins other Melanesian
countries in seeking independence for West Papua. West Papua, together
with other provinces that are already seeking autonomy in Indonesia,
could flaw this proposition, as the present administration in Jakarta
appears to be willing to accept calls for independence, or the seeking of
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greater autonomy. This stand is an indication that the Indonesian
Government has begun to dismantle its constitution at the expense of
these small power bases. However, strategic and military considerations in
Indonesia may have a very different perception of these phenomena, at
this early stage of the new era.
The second scenario results from the pressure, on PNG soil, of
the rebel group, Operasi Papua Merdeka (OPM). There have been cases of
cross-border ‘hot pursuits’ in the past, but such situations have usually
been resolved diplomatically. In most cases, these incidents have occurred
in the absence of PNG officials, or military troops who should be
patrolling the border regularly. Although confrontations between the
OPM rebels and Indonesian troops are usually isolated incidents, they
could become frustrating, and the possibility of heavy-handed treatment
of PNG personnel at the border cannot be ruled out. The Independent
State of Papua New Guinea has a duty to protect its citizens under any
circumstances.
The third possibility stems from the continued frustration of
Indonesian troops at not being able to ‘weed out’ the OPM. This could
possibly lead to the Indonesian Government applying pressure on the
PNG Government, to conduct joint operations to seek out and engage the
OPM. This scenario seems a possibility, if our troops do not patrol the
border regularly, and deter the OPM from crossing onto PNG soil.
Further complicity could arise if the OPM chooses to arrange ‘outside’
military assistance, like the ‘dogs of war’, to assist in creating the State of
West Papua. Although the scenario may seem remote, opportunities for
the acquisition of mineral concessions, as part of the provision of ‘merce-
nary security services’, could be a promising ‘business’ proposition.
Any request for ‘hot pursuit’ of the OPM by Indonesian troops
could be unfounded if PNG is seen to carry out its share of preventing
illegal activities by having a presence at the border. Unfortunately, this
presence has been curtailed in recent times by the events on Bougainville.
It will be some time, if at all, before the Defence Force recovers from the
Bougainville crisis.
Assurance for many countries is provided by the security forces
— civil police for internal matters and military forces for external relations,
including the formation of alliances, while diplomacy is played by Foreign
affairs. In PNG for instance, civil police and the military are lumped
together under the functions of Law and Order for budgetary purposes.
If there were an increased budget allocation for Law and Order then Justice,
Correction and Police would get some form of increases, while Defence
may be left in a dilemma and to ponder on what role to play.
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It is only in crisis that the military is called upon and has been
seen to be acting against their own people from within and abroad when,
in their untrained roles, these military personnel make errors and the state
could not even defend them. This has led to the loss of confidence and
raises the question of the role of the military that eventually undermines
the integrity of the sovereign state of PNG and its capacity to prosper. It
further raises the question of strategic importance, and working in
partnership with other military allies in common interest, which could be
harmful and embarrassing when small countries like Fiji, Vanuatu and
Tonga could contribute towards collective security in the region or even
further afield.
The discussion on military and security consideration empha-
sises the importance of acquiring respect for sovereignty, which would
ultimately command the power to bargain and induce the drive to engage
other military allies for common good in the push for harmony and
prosperity. Transnational issues such as terrorism, poaching and gun
running have made the military more outward looking while most
intending allied countries await the anticipated level of commitment by
PNG or any other small country for that matter. Tangible results could be
foreseen were the military to be used as a vehicle for economic prosperity.
On the domestic front, restoring and strengthening state
authority could be another additional role for the Defence Force. This
requires enforcing peace whereby a military force conducts offensive
operations against armed individuals and groups. Such operations are
possible although some will argue that the military should not be used
against one’s own people. The people involved are in remote areas, are
well-armed, and use their natural environment as a defence. It is absurd to
ask the police to search out and disarm such lawless thugs, when their role
is to maintain peace and order.
In some areas, tribal disorder has reached critical proportions
and many lives have been lost. The only means to survive has seen people
being just as violent as the aggressors in order to protect what they can
salvage. Rather than declaring a state of emergency, the Government
should, first of all, redefine the role of the Defence Force. This should
include an element of peace enforcement, re-equipping, and reassessing its
supply and demand arrangements, and addressing the issue of maintaining
state authority and a state presence in those areas which need it.
In other areas of reforms, the emergency provisions could be
reassessed to give greater powers to the Defence Force to act alone, rather
than to assist the civil powers. This could include the powers to arrest,
detain, and prosecute in declared emergency areas, until peace is restored
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and the declared area is returned to the civil police. Many of the provisions
could be extracted from the code of military discipline that would apply to
members of the Defence Force and other people in authority in the
emergency area.
LAND FORCES
The challenge for the Defence Force is to determine how to continue to
play its peacetime role and assist with global peace enforcement. With its
manpower reduced to a bare minimum, a ‘new look’ Defence Force will
have a peacetime role in nation building, and will carry out regular patrols
on the border to show the state’s presence. Such a structure could free up
many of the logistical shortfalls currently being experienced. One
battalion, with the support of two helicopters and the necessary ancillary
staff, may seem satisfactory, considering the pressing developmental needs
elsewhere. The other battalions could be regarded as restricted establish-
ments until enough resources were mastered. The involvement of
helicopters would mean that the Air Transport Squadron — the rotary
wing capability — would become an integral part of an infantry battalion.
As well as patrolling the border, the land troops, with helicopter
support, could be used in search and rescue operations, medical evacua-
tions and natural disasters. With the inclusion of an air capability for the
infantry group, it would be possible for the Defence Force to adopt new
characteristics, such as the rapid deployment of troops and better logistical
disbursement. The rapid deployment capability would also become a
valuable asset in the support of internal security requirements and in
assisting police, so that movement into declared areas is effected.
The Engineer Battalion could carry out many of the building
and construction activities in small-scale, community-based projects as
opposed to large ones. First, however, the combat skills of the engineers
should not be compromised by having these troops heavily engaged in
construction projects.
Second, to allow the large-scale involvement of troops would
imply that the state institution which is responsible for works and imple-
mentation — the Department of Works — should be dismantled, and its
role taken over by the Defence Force. This would appear to be making
savings and reducing overheads at the expense of another vital government
agency. However, it would be contrary to streamlining the Defence Force,
which would inevitably pick up those assumed savings in the central
revenue.
Third, the Defence Force should not be seen to be competing
with those small contractors that carry out construction work, thus
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preventing the employment of other citizens. Instead of moving a great
deal of equipment and personnel, and in accordance with fair business
principles, the Defence Force should utilise machinery and equipment
from these small construction companies. This would ensure a win-win
situation with the business fraternity, as well as the communities whose
projects are being constructed.
The Defence White Paper has also introduced the concept of a
military cadet scheme. Its primary aim is to instil discipline and a sense of
duty and responsibility in the youths. Although some schools have been
identified, the scheme should be introduced in consultation with the
Youth Council so that youth organisations, which are run by various
governmental and non-governmental organisations, take part in the
scheme. The scheme could also provide the basis for a National Defence
Concept, which the White Paper discusses. It would involve citizens in
other paid jobs on a part-time basis or a Reserve Force that could be
mobilised during complex national emergencies, such as the Rabaul
volcano eruption or the Aitape tsunami disaster.
MARITIME FORCES
Another important peacetime role for the Defence Force is its presence
along maritime borders. The continuous poaching of marine resources has
denied the country its optimum revenue. The prevention of poaching
activities has been limited by the capabilities of the maritime forces. Also,
there have been increases in the illegal passage of boats involved in illicit
drug deals, contraband, people smuggling and piracy.
A revitalised maritime force should be equipped to counter these
activities, in addition to providing a support base for an integrated surveil-
lance concept. It would operate on a similar principle to the coast watcher
system that was employed in the Second World War. It could be enhanced
with the commissioning of an Operational Support Ship (OSS) that
would have the capability of carrying and launching a helicopter.4 This
ship would also provide the logistics and supplies for the smaller patrol
boats, which could extend their patrol periods, as opposed to the early
returns that they currently must do. Elements of the air units could be
devoted to maritime support, and in doing so, share the airport base. This
would overcome the problem of lack of identity and unit cohesion of the
Landing Craft Base, which is located on the waterfront, in Port Moresby.
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4 While the concept is for troop mobilisation and movement of stores, a helicopter based on the
ship could investigate reports of illegal fishing and other activities, within range.
AIR FORCES
Being technically sophisticated, and having one of the most expensive
maintenance programs, this capability would be the most affected in any
rationalisation process. The helicopter units could be redeployed to
become part of the infantry and maritime support groups. This would
leave the air transport capability — specifically the fixed wing component
of the Air Transport Squadron — at odds with the only possible option to
let that function operate under a commercial support concept. This
function could revert back to the squadron, when the government
reassesses the security implications or at the end of the contract, whichever
is considered appropriate.
Attempts are being made to free up other resources so that they
can be effectively utilised in other deficient areas. The outsourcing of some
of the functions has been realised through the Commercial Support
Program (CSP), which involves the use of private contractors to carry out
some specific functions. The CSP exercise would not necessarily save on
costs but it is believed to be a cost-effective concept. It may also free up
military personnel so that they can be utilised elsewhere. In other
countries’ armed forces, the aim has been to have fewer men in uniform,
and to be ‘lean and mean’. An example of this is the outsourcing or
contracting of catering facilities to private firms, such as Eurest, for a
period of time, to feed service personnel in a base environment. Other
areas such as warehousing, logistical supplies, and maintenance of vehicles
are currently being investigated.
CONCLUSION
The Defence requirements are set out by the Defence White Paper of
1999, which ‘maps’ future defence initiatives, and further defines the
strategic outlook. Many critics have also pointed out that no threat
scenarios were painted in the White Paper, while some continue to
maintain that a Defence Force in PNG has been a luxury and a burden to
national development. Others have said that we have created an institution
that has turned against its own people.
Internal squabbling within Defence is very clearly observed by
the community at large. Many of the recommendations by the CEPG
confirmed this view. In the Defence organisation there has been the ‘us
versus them’ relation existing for sometimes now, and this has affected
working relations between the civil bureaucracy and the military chiefs.
Their credibility to function as a respectable military institution has a very
slim chance. It does not help either when the attrition rate of senior
Defence management becomes very high. The position of Commander
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has not been substantive for quite sometime, therefore certain policy
initiatives have been retarded, hence management issues compounded.
It is the duty of the military executives to maintain some co-
operative, and credible PNG Defence Force despite what many may think
and say. There are many people out there who stand to gain from the
military instability and internal squabbles, hence the reform ‘ball’ in their
court has to be played with great skill. There are also some people who
have gained directly from the absence of formal security institutions, and
there are others who would like to see state democratic institutions desta-
bilised for their personal gains.
Defence approach to the reforms and future planning should be
regarded as a ‘mobilisation period’ to launch a battle against the unknown.
It is similar to fighting a battle against terrorism. There are lots of
unknowns. Until they are addressed, which may have been already
implanted within them and may have further camouflaged their ability to
segregate or dissect in an elimination process, the Defence Force will
continue to struggle in carrying out its roles and objectives as stipulated in
the constitution of PNG.
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Corruption was not a serious concern and was incidental during the
colonial period in Papua New Guinea (PNG). However, national concerns
about corruption arose in the newly independent State of PNG, especially
during the late 1970s and in the early 1980s (Kalinoe and Leka, 1998: 1).
Since then, corruption has become a way of life in PNG. It is so pervasive
and ingrained at all levels of government and in many private sector opera-
tions, that it is now fast becoming a cancerous disease, which is
threatening the very fabric of Papua New Guinean society.
Corruption is destroying people’s faith in democracy, under-
mining confidence in democratic governments, creating political instability,
discouraging foreign investment, and encouraging capital flight. Moreover,
corruption has led to the misallocation of resources, and retarded private
sector development. Intimidation, violence, and even murder suppress
many of those people who dare to act in an honourable way and raise their
voices against corruption. In short, corruption fosters criminal elements,
feasts on public resources, slows economic development and distorts trade.
As in the rest of society, corruption is rampant at all levels of the
public service in PNG. At independence in 1975, the Government
expected the public service to play a vanguard role in the task of nation-
building and national development. As an integral part of the
decision-making structure of government and a major link between the
citizens and government, the public service was expected to effectively
carry out and implement government policies and be responsive to the
needs and aspirations of all Papua New Guineans.
However, the performance of the public service since independ-
ence has been very disappointing. Over the years, the public service has
grown in size, roles and activities, and consumed a large portion of the
national budget. However, its productivity and output continues to be
minimal (Kavanamur and Kinkin, 2000). Papua New Guineans from all
walks of life, as well as politicians and donor countries, have expressed
concern over the widespread corruption and its effect on bureaucratic
performance and development. There are many problems that have
contributed to the poor performance of the public service, but it is beyond
the scope of this chapter to discuss all of them.
After defining the term ‘bureaucratic corruption’ the chapter
outlines the various forms of corruption in the public service, examines
causes of corruption, analyses the effects of bureaucratic corruption on the
bureaucracy itself and the society at large, and suggests some remedial
strategies for combating bureaucratic corruption.
BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION
Bureaucratic corruption is defined as a deviant behaviour exhibited by
public servant(s) in order to acquire some socially, administratively or legally
prohibited favours for oneself or for friends. A bureaucrat is personally
corrupt if he or she sacrifices the interest of those for whom he or she works
for to his or her own benefit, or that of his or her friends. Being personally
corrupt, he or she may not necessarily violate a rule, but is corrupt because
he or she has betrayed a professional trust. A bureaucrat is officially corrupt
if, in serving the interest of those for whom he or she works, he or she
violates a rule or law (codified or by convention), and acts illegally albeit in
the interest of those for whom he or she works (Sause, 1992).
Bureaucratic corruption in PNG covers a variety of illegal activi-
ties and manifests itself in various forms. Some of the most commonly
recognised forms of bureaucratic corruption are (Caiden, 1988: 5):
• bribery, graft, extortion, illegal levies, and kickbacks;
• nepotism and favouritism;
• misappropriation, forgery, embezzlement; padding of accounts, 
diversion of funds, misuse of funds, unaudited revenues and skimming;
• absenteeism, non-performance of duties, desertion and parasitism;
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• deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, cheating and swindling;
• use and abuse of official confidential information for private purposes,
and falsification of records;
• misuse of inside knowledge in awarding contracts and arranging loans
and subsidies; and misuse of official seals, stationery, residences, and
requisites;
• illegal surveillance, and misuse of mails and telecommunications.
These activities are so widespread in the public service that they
are often considered as ‘business as usual’. They range from the miscon-
duct of heads of public sector institutions and departments and leading
politicians, to low-level government employees. These practices produce
many costs for a society such as inefficiency, mistrust of the government
and its employees, distortion of program achievements, waste of public
resources, encouragement of black market operations, and eventual
national instability (see Jain, 1995).
Commenting on the widespread corrupt practices in the public
service, Sir Julius Chan, a former Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea
stated:
There is a very visible lack of discipline, initiative and pride at all
levels of the public service. Occasions of carelessness and outright
misappropriation in handling public money are increasing at a
disastrous rate. I would hate to know the total figure of money
stolen over the years from the public by the public’s servants. It
must now run into the millions. But there is a more subtle form of
decay, of corruption, which does not involve theft or misuse of
money. It involves the misuse of power and position, and the
cynical disregard for ethics. Simple examples spring easily to mind,
such as the public official who will destroy a letter or deliberately
lose a file because the job involved is too hard for him to handle;
the senior public servant or minister who will blatantly misuse
government assets at his or her disposal — all are simple and
common examples, but deadly in the corrosive cumulative effect
they have on collective morality (Chan, 1984: 38).
Almost sixteen years later, a former departmental head observed
that:
In Papua New Guinea, corruption is evident in the national
planning and budgetary processes where resources are allocated
along political, regional or ethnic inclinations and affiliations. In
certain resource sectors like forestry, coffee or copra, evidence of
malpractices such as transfer pricing, grant facilitation and rebate
payments have surfaced as an area of concern in the last decade.
BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION 93
Financial misappropriation in tendering, contract approval and
procurement of goods and services is gradually taking prominence
in the construction sector and major resource development projects.
Major reports of politicians and public servants in the country
abusing their positions for personal gain are a common phenom-
enon (Bengo, 1999: 3).
Paul Bengo (1999: 1) further notes that:
Empirical evidence suggests that bribery, back room deals, excessive
payoffs, and widespread theft are rampant and threaten to cripple
investment in the country … this cancer cell is eating away the
richness of a country blessed with vast resources at the expense of
others.
Two years earlier, PNG’s Governor General warned that
innuendos, manipulations, undercover deals, greed, and corruption are
becoming deeply rooted in this society (The Australian, 14 June 1995: 17;
Lamour, 1997: 1).
CAUSES OF BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION
Why do public servants engage in corrupt activities? What causes or
prompts people to become entangled in corrupt practices? Jabbra (1979:
674), an expert on bureaucratic corruption in the Third World, contended
that ‘bureaucratic corruption is created by attitudes and patterns of behav-
iour interwoven not only throughout the bureaucratic structures of
merging nations, but also throughout the whole of their social fabric’. In
other words, cultural attitudes and behavioural patterns shape and condi-
tion bureaucratic corruption. Elaborating on this point, Caiden and
Caiden (1977: 303) asserted that bureaucrats in the Third World countries
‘are faced with a choice of adhering to the standards of modern develop-
ment administration or to the accepted traditional standards. The latter is
usually chosen.’ In PNG society where kinship and other parochial loyal-
ties are a well-established system, doing favours to one’s kinsmen, relatives,
or friends is usually viewed as normal, especially by those who are involved
in such practices. This has a significant influence on the behaviour of
many public servants, and leads them to indulge in corrupt practices in
order to satisfy their clients’ demands.
The situation in PNG is very similar to most developing
countries where the practice of using public office for private gain is the
result of a predominant belief that there is nothing wrong with such
conduct. This kind of belief is reinforced by a widely held benevolent
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attitude towards the abuse of the public, resulting in its acceptance as a
normal pattern of administrative behaviour (see Kpundeh, 1995: 54).
The abuse of power thrives in developing countries such as
PNG for a number of reasons. Five primary factors contribute to, and
even protect, corrupt practices (see Hoppe, 1995). The first argument is
the general absence of a work ethic in the public service. Public servants in
PNG seem to lack a sense of purpose and commitment to their duties and
responsibilities.1 They believe that they own their jobs and only feel
obligated to themselves. Hence, they should exploit their positions for
personal gain. The following example illustrates this assertion.
Having had two vacation jobs with two separate departments in my
undergraduate days I know what lack of work ethics is. In one
department nearly the entire staff of the section where I was
employed would not turn up after having lunch on the Friday
fortnight week (this is not to mention turning up late after
lunchtime every weekday). I soon found out that one of the reasons
why they had to leave early was because there was little to do … in
the other department, staff of my section would regularly come out
for 10–15 minutes and buy buai (betel nut) and chew because the
street market was on the other side of the road (Sause, 1992: 10).
Such an attitude is prevalent in the public service. Some public
servants seem to consider their public jobs as their property. This kind of
proprietary attitude, according to Jabbra (1979), personally furthers the
institutionalisation of a pattern of bureaucratic behaviour, which is charac-
terised by goals of self-aggrandisement, usurpation of power, and the
conception of public office as an avenue for wealth.
Second, a lack of economic development in PNG creates a bi-
polar type of income distribution that consists of the ‘haves’ and the
‘have-nots’. The consequence of this is that public servants, who strive for
high social status so that they can be counted among the ‘haves’, resort to
the instrument of ‘demonstration effect’ — a conspicuous consumption of
luxury goods which cannot be afforded given low salaries (Hoppe, 1995).
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1 For criticisms directed at the public service for poor work ethics and general lack
of commitment to work, see ‘Public Servants told to improve’, Editorial, Post-
Courier, Friday, 3 August 1990, p. 10; ‘Public Servants must try harder’, Post-
Courier, 3 August 1990, p. 5; ‘If they don’t work, get rid of them’, Post-Courier,
20 January 1995, p. 10; ‘Sack lazy public servants’, Editorial, Post-Courier, 16
June 1994; ‘The Mess at Waigani’, Editorial, Post-Courier, 25 June 1990, p. 10;
‘Public Service must work’, Editorial, Post-Courier, 4 January 1993, p. 10; ‘Copy
NZ public service system’, The Times, 4 May 1995, p. 9; ‘Motivating the public
service’, Commentary, The Times, 19 August 1993, p. 11.
It would seem that officials have an unlimited desire for power, wealth and
the good life, which would be necessary to confirm their status as
members of the elite in government and society.
In recent years, there has been the propagation of the ‘pajero
culture’, whereby most public servants (and politicians, too) own a
Mitsubishi Jeep. The desire to be seen as ‘somebody’ or ‘a big man’ in
society has been one of the factors responsible for public officeholders
engaging in corrupt acts to acquire luxury goods.
Third, politicians and political parties in Papua New Guinea lack
appropriate leadership and discipline. Widespread corruption among politi-
cians and weak national interests are contributing factors towards
widespread corruption among public servants. The misuse of public funds,
misconduct in office, deliberate negligence of public duty (such as lack of
attending parliamentary sittings), vote buying during elections, and misuse
of state property are widespread among politicians in PNG. The laws have
often been violated and loopholes in the legislation have been taken advan-
tage of to pursue self-interest. If the political leadership is corrupt, chances
are that the public service is also corrupt. As Sir Julius Chan (1984: 35)
contended, ‘political leadership is interlocked with the bureaucracy. The
performance of one depends on the other, and the quality of both must be
of an equal standard. Corruption among leaders can only result in equal
corruption in the public service.’ Similarly, Bautista (1982) correctly
observed that the public service not only facilitates corruption but also
supports it when leaders fail to emulate proper behaviour. Raul de Guzman
(cited in Bautista, 1982: 256) further notes that ‘an organisation can be
corrupt only if its leadership is corrupt. The behaviour of the lower echelon
officials is strongly influenced by the example set by the leadership.’
Fourth, as in other developing countries, state activity in PNG
has grown since independence. The growth of state activities has undoubt-
edly resulted in the growth of a bureaucracy with increasing discretionary
power to regulate its economy and social affairs. This contributes to
bureaucratic corruption. Johnston (1995) notes that government actions
and decisions are shaped by pressures, demands and influence placed upon
them by individuals and groups in society. The origin lies in the interac-
tion between the government and its people. Planned development has
enabled the state to intervene in the socioeconomic sphere, and this has
led to an increase in regulations.
According to Dwivedi (1984: 4), this ‘increased regulatory
authority creates various opportunities for money-making, for example, in
connection with development of planning permits, contracts for construc-
tion, granting import-export licenses, collecting customs and other duties,
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and strict accounting for foreign exchange’. In PNG, where the
Government is the main employer, its interaction with the private sector
has led to rampant abuse by public officials ranging from bribery,
kickbacks, discretionary laws made in order to let public officials collect
bribes, and underinvoicing. The rules and regulations have often been
interpreted and enforced essentially to facilitate personal gain.
Fifth, because of the highly centralised administrative structure,
effective communication channels are almost absent, and the management
of national development tends to become paralysed. The ultimate result of
these manifestations is that there is a lack of coordination of policies
among departments, as well as a lack of dissemination of information
necessary for effective decision-making. This leads to decision-making
powers being concentrated with those at the apex of the decision-making
pyramid, who are often hard pressed to cope with the range of decisions
they must make. According to Hoppe (1995), the effect of this is either
procrastination or inadequate and inept policies.
A weak moral fibre among public servants also presents a strong
case for them to be corrupt; that is, a bureaucrat with low moral standards
and values is susceptible to graft and corruption when the opportunities are
present. Quah (1989: 842) contends that:
[a person’s] incentive to be corrupt will be great if his or her personal
virtue is low, if his or her colleagues are corrupt, if his or her familial
loyalties override his or her loyalty to his or her organisation and
country, if his or her monthly salary is low or insufficient to meet his
or her needs, and if his or her society tolerates corrupt behavior.
Conversely, a persons incentive to become corrupt will be minimal or
absent if ‘he or she is of strong moral character, if his or her colleagues
are not corrupt, if he or she is more loyal to his or her organization
and country than to his or her family, if his or her wages are adequate,
and if corruption is not condoned in his or her society.
Quah (1989) further states that one’s incentive to be corrupt
does not, by itself, result in the person’s corrupt behaviour. There must be
opportunities that facilitate or allow that person to indulge in corruption.
This, in turn, depends very much on the ‘extent his or her official activities
are controlled by others, the frequency of his or her contacts with the
public, and his or her position in his or her organization’
Other factors that may cause public servants to resort to corruption
are job scarcity, insufficient salary, a dual salary system, and lack of or poor
accommodation and office facilities. The difficult economic realities of the
country may also force public servants to resort to corrupt practices.
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EFFECTS OF BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION ON THE
PUBLIC SERVICE
Bureaucratic corruption has a serious adverse effect on the performance
and productivity of the public service. Like a blockage in a pipe which
thwarts the free flow of water, these problems hinder the effective imple-
mentation of government policies for socioeconomic development and
nationbuilding. Further, the problems seriously affect the provision of the
government’s goods and services to the people.
Bureaucratic corruption may be beneficial to those bureaucrats
who engage in corrupt practices, as long as they are not caught and
penalised. To them, corruption is profitable, and they can live exception-
ally privileged, sheltered lives, and accumulate wealth without much work.
On the contrary, all corruption, as Caiden (1988) states, is a deceit, a lie,
that sacrifices the common good or the public interest for something
much less. It detracts from the search for the good of the society.
Therefore, they gain at the expense of someone else or the society,
although the losers may never realise that they have been denied what
should have been theirs (Caiden, 1988).
Bureaucratic corruption contributes to inefficiency, laziness,
slackness, and low work ethics in the public service. The public service
lacks suitably qualified personnel because of wantokism and other forms of
corrupt practices. The recruitment of poorly educated wantoks who are not
trained in work ethics, and the culture of a modern bureaucracy, hardly do
justice to the machinery of the government. It only produces inefficiency
and waste.
Moreover, the widespread abuse of power, misuse of public
properties, and negligence of duties and responsibilities seriously affect and
demoralise the public service. Also, it is not uncommon to find some
departments and agencies operating without telephones because the
telephone lines have been disconnected for non-payment of bills. It is a
common practice for officials and their friends to use government
telephones for long-distance private calls. Photocopying machines and
other stationery are also used for private purposes, and in some cases,
private holidays are paid for as if they were official trips.
These practices are so widespread that few Papua New Guineans
recognise them as a form of corruption. In this way, a department (and the
country) loses millions of kina, or is deprived of much needed revenue.
Over the years, many government departments and agencies have run out
of money either because of lack of funds, mismanagement or overspending
of allocated funds. This has seriously affected departmental performance
and eventually has had negative repercussions on the nation.
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According to Dwivedi (1984: 12), the abuse of power in the
public service ‘undermines the public confidence and trust in government,
reduces the capacity of government to fulfil its functions effectively,
subverts ethical responsiveness to the citizenry, and imposes unnecessary
financial burdens on the public’. The citizenry will then begin to have a low
opinion of the public service. They have a negative view of the public
service as corrupt, slack, unresponsive and inefficient. Such perceptions can
directly or indirectly affect the self-esteem and morale of capable officers.
This, in turn, affects their performance and lowers their effectiveness.
Likewise, the politicisation of the bureaucracy has some serious
adverse effects on the public service. The frequent changes in government
and constant political interference in administrative affairs create insta-
bility and uncertainty in the service. As Dwivedi (1984: 3) warned, ‘an
environment of administrative malaise may develop if politicians appear to
be less scrupulous, unduly interfering in the normal functioning of the
administrative machinery, and unnecessarily exercising their power to
achieve certain political or personal goals which are not articulated and
sanctioned through the established public decision-making process’.
Furthermore, one cannot expect consistency and continuity in
policies and priorities of government when there is a frequent change of
government and the constant reshuffling of top bureaucrats. Removing
competent officers and replacing them with wantoks or political cronies
(whether competent or not) definitely demoralises the public service. Other
capable officers in the department may feel reluctant to work with those
who won have positions through corrupt practices, rather than on merit.
Additionally, it creates a feeling of insecurity, cynicism, and apathy in many
senior public servants. This further creates confusion in political and
administrative accountability as well as attitudinal friction between politi-
cians and public servants (Public Service Rationalisation Task Force, 1993).
It has been noted that problems such as wantokism, especially in
recruitment and promotion, have led to the ethnicisation of some depart-
ments and agencies. How do minority officers in the department feel about
working in a department that is dominated by people from a particular
region or province? Will the concept of ‘one-nation-one-public-service’ be
promoted in this kind of department? Will the sense of belonging to one
public service be there? Unfortunately, the recent study by the
Rationalisation Task Force reports that this sense of belonging to one
public service is weakening in the public service.
Minority officers feel alienated and uneasy working in an
environment that is dominated by people from a particular province or
region. To some, these organisations look more like tribal enterprises than
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government departments. There have been complaints that, in such
departments, there is a complete lack of work ethic: instead there is slack-
ness, absenteeism and laziness. The poor representation and participation
of women and other ethnic minorities in the public service is also a
complete waste of human resources. This means that their unique talents,
abilities, and capabilities are not being fully utilised in the public service.
Furthermore, the ethnicisation of departments or agencies could
cause anger, frustration, and resentment among minority officers, and this
could discourage them from performing their duties effectively.
EFFECTS OF BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION ON SOCIETY
Bureaucratic corruption also has seriously affected the socio-economic
development of the country. What happens if the bureaucracy that is
supposed to effectively carry out and implement the government policies
for modernisation, economic development and the extension of social
services is failing to implement these tasks?
Several indicators suggest that there has been serious deteriora-
tion in the quality of many essential services provided by the public service
(World Bank, 1995). In January 1995, for example, the Ministry of
Health called an urgent conference on the national health crisis. Recently,
studies have shown an alarming spread of familiar diseases as well as a
sharp decline in health services and central supervisory activities (World
Bank, 1995). Health facilities and equipment have deteriorated. Many
buildings are in a sad state of disrepair, are unhygienic, and need remedial
maintenance. Also, there is a lack of standard treatment manuals,
medicine, cleaning materials, syringes, reliable water supplies, electricity,
refrigerators and sterilising equipment. The major hospitals in the country
are faced with serious staff shortages, drug and equipment shortages,
unhygienic patient accommodation, delays in obtaining laboratory results,
and so on. People have increasingly expressed dissatisfaction with
erroneous treatments, absenteeism, lack of discipline, and poor commit-
ment among health workers (World Bank, 1995: 49).
PNG’s nutritional indicators are among the worst in the Pacific
region. A Department of Health Review in 1994 found that in the 1980s
and the 1990s there was a significant increase in malnutrition among
children, especially in the Highlands Region. Additionally, there was an
increase in diseases such as measles, tetanus, pneumonia, heart disease,
diabetes, hypertension, and chronic infectious diseases, such as tubercu-
losis and yaws. Moreover, malaria, sexually transmitted diseases, and
AIDS/HIV are emerging as significant health problems (Department of
Health Review, 1994).
100 BUILDING A NATION IN  PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Performance in the education sector is no better. Despite high
costs per student, by international standards, the education system in
PNG yields disappointing results, and has low enrolment and high
dropout rates (Department of Health Review, 1994). Moreover, despite
the high level of expenditure, the educated manpower remains low.
According to the 1990 Census results (provisional) (National Statistical
Office, 1991) approximately 52.3 per cent of citizens aged 10 and over
(excluding those at school) had no education, 18.5 per cent had grades 1 to
5 education, 16.4 per cent had completed grade 6, 5 per cent had grades
7 to 9 education, 3.8 per cent had grades 10 and 11 education, and 0.6 per
cent had grade 12 education. Moreover, only 0.2 per cent had completed a
university degree and 1.8 per cent had completed certificate or diploma
level education (UNDP/ILO, 1993: 133). In absolute terms, there were
only 13,921 upper secondary graduates, 4,499 degree-holders, and 45,914
certificate/diploma graduates in the country in 1990.
The overall quality and standard of the education system is
increasingly deteriorating. Much has been said and reported about the
deteriorating condition of school buildings, budgetary constraints, school
overcrowding, lack of basic furniture, shortage of teachers, teacher absen-
teeism, poor housing conditions for teachers, inadequate teaching
materials and support facilities and underutilisation of existing facilities
(Turner, 1990: 76–81).
In relation to infrastructure, the situation is no better. There are
approximately 25,000 kilometres of roads in the country, of which
national and provincial roads account for 16,934 kilometers. Only a little
more than 20 per cent of all roads are sealed, but most are in poor condi-
tion (Haiveta, 1995: 100). According to a 1994 World Bank study,
expenditure on the maintenance of national roads has declined by 70 per
cent in less than a decade. As a result, poor roads are common, even in
major cities such as Port Moresby and Lae. Additionally, more than 50 per
cent of its rural airfields have been shut down in recent years because of
lack of maintenance. In terms of water supplies, only 15 per cent of urban
residents have access to piped water. In the capital, Port Moresby, water
shortages are a frequent problem. Many village clusters have the popula-
tion agglomeration of a city, but remain without basic amenities such as
piped water and sewerage systems (World Bank, 1995).
In urban centres, the unemployment rate is high. Many
unemployed urban dwellers lived in overcrowded and unsafe squatter
settlements while some urban residents live in makeshift or low-cost
housing. Most of these urban houses often lack piped water systems and
electricity. Approximately, one-third of urban households still rely on
BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION 101
firewood for cooking (World Bank, 1995). In the rural areas, where most
Papua New Guineans live, the provision of government services has been
minimal, or almost non-existent in some of the remotest areas.
High dropout rates in schools and high unemployment rates are
some of the factors contributing to the worsening law and order situation
in the country. This indicates that the law and order enforcement agencies
have not been very successful in controlling that situation. Therefore,
crime is on the rise.
According to the Police Department statistics, the number of
serious crimes that have been reported has risen sharply, from 6,200 in
1980 to 13,100 in 1990 (World Bank, 1994). In the second half of 1994,
the crime rate soared to an unprecedented level as a consequence of
funding shortages for public services such as the police. Murder, armed
robbery, break and enter, drug trafficking, rape, riots, tribal fights, and
corruption have been on the rise since independence. These problems
create and instil fear amongst the people, and restrict their movement,
especially in the urban centres. Most visitors to PNG, as well as potential
investors, are bombarded with the impression that crime in PNG is out of
control.
The deterioration of health, education, infrastructure, and other
essential services reflects a lack of direction, and the feeble efforts by the
national and provincial government departments that are responsible for
the provision of these services. Moreover, it reflects the ineffectiveness and
poor performance of the public service. This poor performance has led to
much criticism by Papua New Guineans from all walks of life. People have
often likened the public service to a huge monster eating up most of the
nation’s budget in salaries and benefits, but with low productivity. As
Turner (1990: 124) notes, the public service ‘is perhaps the greatest recip-
ient of criticism in PNG’. It is not uncommon to find daily newspapers in
PNG carrying rebukes and criticism directed at the public service for
being inefficient, too bureaucratic, incompetent, and unresponsive to the
needs and aspirations of the people. Former Prime Ministers such as Sir
Michael Somare, Sir Julius Chan, Sir Rabbie Namaliu, Paias Wingti, and
many other leaders have all criticised the public service for not imple-
menting the government’s policies effectively.
Since independence, there have been numerous calls for a
massive clean up in the public service following widespread dissatisfaction
with the performance of its officers. When new governments come into
power, they promise to eradicate bribery and corruption in the public
service. However, in reality, nothing effective has been done. Therefore,
the evils of bribery, corruption, and other administrative malaise have
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compounded over the years. These problems definitely have adverse effects
on the overall performance and productivity of the public service.
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO CURB BUREAUCRATIC
CORRUPTION?
Having discussed bureaucratic corruption, its causes and its consequences,
the question is, what can be done to curb, or at least minimise the
widespread corruption in the public service? As already stated, corruption
is so widespread in both the public and private sectors that, over the last
25 years, there have been concerns expressed about these problems by
politicians, the general citizenry, and donor countries alike.
In response to these challenges, actions have included ‘campaigns’
to clean up public life and fight against corruption, reviews of the rules
and regulations applying to public officials, attempts to redefine public
service ‘values’ and new ‘codes of conduct’, and so on (Bengo, 1999: 1).
However, despite these efforts, the problem is fast becoming endemic and
threatens to become systematic in public and private sector operations.
Part of the reason for the existence of the problem is that we lack the
technical and financial resources and the institutional capacity to combat
this cancerous disease (Bengo, 1999: 1).
One tends to find corruption when someone has a monopoly
over a good or service, has discretionary powers to decide whether you
receive it and how much you get, and is not accountable. Combating
corruption must begin with a better system. Systems must be put in place
to ensure that monopolies are reduced or carefully regulated. Official
discretion must be clarified. Transparency and accountability must be
enhanced and strengthened, and the probability of being caught must be
increased. Penalties for corruption (for both givers and takers) must be
increased. The introduction of new laws, more controls, a change in
mentality, ethics, and so on may prove insufficient when systems are not in
place to implement them. The systems that breed corruption must be
fixed (Klitgaard, 1997: 2). Strategies for fixing the systems include
convicting and punishing highly corrupt people, paying competitive
salaries or wages to public servants, and educating the people about the
pros and cons of corruption.
It will not be easy to eradicate corruption from our society. The
introduction of new laws and ethics, or punishing the offenders will not
be sufficient because these are not the root causes of corruption. The
Government needs to get to the root cause of the problem and try to fix it.
Greed is the root cause of corruption, as it causes those with money and
power to offer bribes to win unfair advantage, thus abusing power and
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wealth. People should be taught to live within their means and share with
others. Thinking of oneself more than others often, or always, leads one to
engage in corrupt dealings.
The fight against corruption and bribery at all levels of society,
as well as in the public sector, is every citizen’s responsibility. As discussed,
corruption is eating away at our society and public institutions throughout
the country, and is responsible for most of the injustices that occur. It is
destroying our country, and unless all of the citizens cooperate and do
something about it, this nation will collapse. Every citizen has the respon-
sibility to fight this calamity. This requires the government, the private
sector, and civil society to work together to combat corruption. As Pope
(1999: 1) stated, ‘we will fail to prevent such injustices unless we attack
corruption. We must use every fibre of our energy to wage this fight if we
are to contribute to a more humane world that ensures dignity and oppor-
tunity for all’.
In our democratic society, civil society, in particular, has to play
a vanguard role as ‘governments are often part of the problem and lack
credibility even when promoting anti-corruption strategies and business is
often as much the perpetrator of corrupt practices, as it is the victim’
(Pope, 1991: 4) Therefore, civil society should be encouraged to mobilise
efforts to fight fraud, bribery, and corruption.
In the bureaucracy, the top management and their subordinates
must accept the fact that corruption is a serious problem in the public
service. Top management should be available at all times to deal with the
causes of such crimes in their respective departments, in a firm and a
decisive way — without fear or favour.
In summary, corruption is prevalent in the public service.
However, this problem can exist only if someone is willing to be
corrupted, and someone is capable of bringing about that corruption. In
the current age, where a materialistic way of life supersedes moral and
ethical values and standards, the former has a tendency to subvert the
integrity of those who are in the public service. However, the onus to weed
out corruption lies with those at the top of political and administrative
hierarchies. Their total commitment and direction is required to weed out
corruption. After all, corruption in PNG starts at the top and seeps
downward.
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In the matter of factual reporting, judgment and opinion, only the
most diverse and competitive press can sustain democracy.
John Stuart Mill
INTRODUCTION
The demise of the late Prime Minister Bill Skate’s regime in July 1999 was
largely the work of the media. From March to July 1999 Papua New
Guinea newspapers were at the helm of predicting the downfall of the
Skate regime. What started as a ‘wishful prediction’ came into fruition and
the media’s sin was that of propagating the downfall of an otherwise
populist regime. The debate was carried right through into the height of
horse-trading up until the very last night of July 13, being the last darkest
night of the Skate regime. The next day brought to light a new chapter in
PNG’s political history as Sir Mekere Morauta was elected in an unprece-
dented 99–6 overwhelming majority, including Bill Skate himself. The
future of a country that was near tatters was suddenly bestowed upon Sir
Mekere as he was expected, given his credentials as a former secretary of
finance, managing director of a commercial bank and central bank
governor, to pull back the country from the edge of chaos, and hence
oblivion.
Is the media a catalyst for democracy and a reflection of society’s
views of issues and developments? Countless demarcations abound that
circumscribe the role of the media, but the best one is succinctly summed
up by David Robie (1994) who, writing for the Nius Bilong Pacific, asserts
that, ‘A vital function of the press in a democracy is performing the role of
a public watch dog, protecting the people’s right to know and protecting
them against bad governments’. The same observation is also made by
Nash (1997), particularly in the context of PNG and the Pacific Islands.
A more refined description of the role of the media is propa-
gated by award winning American journalist Bob Woodward, who notes
that ‘Our job simply and happily is to find out what is going on and
publish it’. Woodward is best known for exposing the Watergate scandal in
the United States in the 1970s which subsequently led to the resignation
of President Richard Nixon. The media today is one of the pivotal mecha-
nisms in the democratic world and will continue to be so.
REPORTING CORRUPTION IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Indian scholar Sekar (1981) highlights an interesting perspective into the
way investigative journalism, especially reporting on corruption in India, is
received. Coming from an environmental background and from the
world’s second most populous country, he gives three reasons for the indif-
ference of recipients towards reports of corruption. Firstly, people are so
preoccupied with their daily chores that they hardly have time to read, but
if they did read, it would be about something that concerns their
immediate well-being. Secondly, although India’s literacy level is among
the world’s highest, very little impact is registered by corruption levels.
Finally, reporting on environmental issues is regarded as global and there-
fore does not concern the local populace.
These are the stark realities that investigative journalists like
myself confront every day. The question that often faces us is, if a report
comes out how will it make an impact? Obviously pressured by deadlines,
most reporters simply treat news items as just another piece of news needed
to quickly fill the pages and therefore to meet strict deadlines. Some of us,
however, often think long and hard over what is likely to become of a story
in the final analysis. The type of work involved, the risks taken and the man
hours of pouring over documents, doing searches, seeking legal advice and
meticulous writing absorbs a significant proportion of a reporter’s energy
and stamina. And after publication the question arises again as to what
mileage has been gained or otherwise in either bringing the culprits to
justice or in how the reading society is reacting to a story.
But that is the ultimate price for those of us in the investigative
journalism game. It is not so much the sacrifices that investigative journalists
make in a developing country like PNG, but the passion of reporting and
satisfaction that this style of reporting brings us and seeing the beneficial
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effects brought to bear on the society we live, breathe and work in. Our
passion follows the desires of our hearts and conscience to see that trans-
parency is prevalent and some degree of accountability is recorded.
Investigative journalism in PNG has always been the yearning of the learned
public because corruption is rampant and people accept the principles of an
open society rather than an enclosed corrupt one. There is always the
argument that the country lacks this style of reporting and that journalists
are not really doing enough to ensure that what is not visible to the public at
large actually gets reported.
It is too easy for lay people to demand more from newspapers.
The tedious, painstaking and laborious effort being put into a piece of
corruption news by a journalist is not usually acknowledged. Our hard
work, the very high stakes involved and sometimes costly mistakes can
have fatal ramifications for a journalist. When one sees the type of demand
that exists for this kind of reporting in the PNG context where violence is
prevalent (see Kaman, this volume), one can easily be tempted to just walk
away and turn a blind eye on the rot eating away at our society. But then
the probing question that will haunt our conscience is who is going to do
the dirty work of exposing corrupt and rent-seeking behaviour if we decide
not to do it? The cost of being an investigative reporter, particularly in
PNG, is, to say the least, already a burdensome task on reporters and their
families. The following are some of the predicaments that I myself have
had to face and deal with in the line of duty.
CONTEMPT
Wherever you are, irrespective of the event and location, the public always
looks at you with contempt. They know your character and what you are
capable of doing and often mix with you freely. They know that they can
get into trouble and risk their careers by simply talking to you or being
seen mingling with you. It can also be implied that this is ‘polite respect’
from loyal readers when you are in pursuit of a story. Often valuable and
reliable sources do not come easy because informants may fear you or are
against you.
THREATS
Many of my colleagues have been on one occasion or another the subject
of threats. Some have been assaulted, others have been victimised,
ridiculed and often such experiences tend to restrict their movements.
Phone calls are often popular where anonymous callers ring up and
threaten a reporter to abandon a story potentially damaging to those
involved. Wantok editor Yakam Kelo was confronted by supporters of
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former Finshafen MP Yaip Avini when he wrote a story on the MP’s
humiliating dismissal. The former MP and his supporters stormed the
Word Publishing premises and demanded an audience with the reporter
who apparently made himself available. According to Kelo, ‘They wanted
me to know that I should not play around with them. I suppose they had
the impression that I had no respect for their deposed leader.’
In another case, EMTV’s senior reporter Jerry Ginua was threat-
ened by rogue gang members believed to be associated with the December
1999 infamous ‘Port Moresby Millennium PNGBC Robbery’, where
notorious criminals used a chopper for the first time in the history of PNG
to attempt robbery on a commercial bank. He requested police to be
present at his premises and was forced to abort the story. Another case
involving EMTV reporters happened when former Madang Governor Jim
Kas and his wife strenuously attempted to assault EMTV reporter Ilan
Amo when she covered the dismissal of the Madang MP from parliament.
As a result she could not get the footage and had to make do with script
minus footage.
A final case that comes to mind is one that involved the
National newspaper reporter Thomas Kilala, who was forced out of
writing a story about a rift between PNG Defence Force soldiers and
rogue police personnel when personnel from the latter threatened him. He
has since not written a story relating to the alleged tensions between the
two disciplinary forces.
LEGAL SUITS
Court injunctions have been in my experience one of the successful ways
in which alleged offenders have prevented the publication of stories. The
potential danger of huge costs arising from libel cases has often hampered
the publication of good investigative stories. I remember a court injunc-
tion against me for a report I did on Concord Pacific Ltd. The company is
responsible for the Kiunga–Ambiak project in the Western province. They
served an injunction on me and that was the last I did on their alleged
illegal activities.
RELIABILITY OF SOURCES
Reliability of sources is the biggest challenge which I have pondered over
long and hard. The reliability and authenticity of documents, tips and
leads have been very difficult to put together. While there is an influx
of information, it is very hard sometimes to see the real agendas or real-
politik behind the sources supplying the stories. I share with Lichtenburg
(1993) the point that ‘journalists have to make important choices about
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whether a statement is controversial enough to warrant balancing it with
an opposing view. News sources have vested interests in the issues they are
promoting and can exert different levels of powers on the media and wider
policy making machinery’.
While researching a story on the National Provident Fund
(NPF) sale of its shares in Steamships I was led into a pool of information
by an internal source. I was led to believe that a certain staff member in
the company had been diverting its shares into other areas. It was only
when I sat with the staff member that I realised that the source had misled
me into believing that he was innocent and had used the staff as a decoy.
Such malice and concealed agendas act to marginalise our efforts and
reinforce our suspicions of the unreliability of news sources. Because of
one bad episode we may inadvertently stigmatise all sources as unreliable
hence jeopardising future news sources. Often a journalist unsuspectingly
gets news, writes it and then people use him/her to air their grievances,
only to find herself/himself being caught later in a personal tussle between
two people with different agendas.
COMPROMISE
Sweet-talking subjects or news sources are often very difficult to get away
from. They use invitations such as luncheons, dinners and receptions in
places where the top elite of society dwells. Once one is treated to such a
luxurious reception it is often difficult to write negatively about a person
who has done something bad. Often these are people who fall under the
category described by David Lea (1998) as leaders whose supposed
mandate is to source goods and resources for clansmen and relatives. Such
people throw every trick and gimmick they know at journalists to prevent
publication of their illegal activities and thereby hoodwink society. Hans-
Martin Scholl (1997) refers to such illegal sourcing of goods and services
for clansmen as part of a broader cargo cult mentality embedded in society
(see also de Renzio and Kavanamur, 1999). Multinational companies are
not innocent as they also tend to invite reporters to visit their projects and
show them the areas they prefer coverage on rather than letting reporters
find out for themselves what is newsworthy. The issue of favour then
becomes a contested issue because on the one hand a reporter goes there
because (s)he feels it is part of his/her job, while on the other hand the
host uses the chance to get a reporter away from the issue being pursued.
For example, in November 2000, I was in Vanimo with officers
of the National Forest Authority. I had heard that a certain species of
monkeys were found in the logged area which apparently would require a
sanctuary. I was visited by a representative of the timber company there
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who, after offering me lunch, proceeded to give me a handful of money.
I refused and walked away. I later learnt that a certain article about the
company was doing the rounds with the media and the ‘token’ was
intended to get me on their side.
CONCLUSION
Reporters are vulnerable to confrontations and dilemmas whether they like
it or not. Often their working conditions may have a bearing on them, i.e.
low pay, lack of proper accommodation, long working hours without
commensurate remuneration, and so on. They may then resort to other
moneymaking areas such as failing to report issues which relate to corrup-
tion in return for bribes. They may have friends in high places or relatives
in these areas which make it difficult for them to report objectively. Thus,
following a recent call by the International Chamber of Commerce,
NGOs like Transparency International are expected to create ethical
standards of conduct for companies to abide by. The media in PNG
should also set up an Independent Centre for Journalism so that it can
render independent assessments of issues and identify areas where
reporters can report freely. It should also complement the work of govern-
ment agencies such as the Police Fraud Squad, the Parliamentary
Committee on Public Accounts, the Auditor General’s office, financial
inspectors from the Treasury Department, the Bank of PNG, and others.
This would allow the media to be at the helm of exposing corruption
without fear or favour, using the network it has.
112 BUILDING A NATION IN  PAPUA NEW GUINEA
REFERENCES
Amo, I., 2000. Telephone interview, Port Moresby.
de Renzio, P. and D. Kavanamur, 1999. ‘Tradition, Society and Development: Social
Capital in Papua New Guinea’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 14(2):37–47.
Ginua, J., 2000. Telephone interview, Port Moresby.
Kelo, Y., 2000. Telephone interview, Port Moresby.
Korimbao, D., 2000. Telephone interview on reporter Thomas Kilala’s threats, Port Moresby.
Lichtenburg, J., 1993. ‘In Defense of Objectivity’, in J. Curran and M. Gurevitch (eds),
Mass Media and Society, London, Arnold, pp. 216–31.
Lea, D. 1998. ‘The Ethics of Corruption in Papua New Guinea and Elsewhere in the
Developing World’, South Pacific Journal of Philosophy and Culture, 3.
Mill, J.S.
Nash, G.S., 1997. Democracy and Accountability: The Changing Trends in Pacific Media.
A Case Study of PNG and Its Neighbours, unpublished MA thesis, University
of Wales, Cardiff, UK.
Robie, D., 1994. Nius Bilong Pacific, Port Moresby, UPNG Press.
Scholl, H.M., 1997. ‘Influence of Cargo Mentality and Cargo Thinking on the Political
and Administrative Structure in PNG’, Goroka (unpublished manuscript).
Sekar,T., 1981, ‘Role of Newspapers in Creating Mass Concern with Environmental Issues













Modowa T. Gumoi 
INTRODUCTION
Papua New Guinea (PNG) gained political independence on 16 September
1975. The transition from the clutches of colonialism to self-rule was
smooth. A snapshot of time, from independence to the present, portrays
an economy that has undergone change. Change has been of various types
and magnitude. Some changes have been adverse while others have been
positive. But both the adverse and positive changes have been shaped and
determined by both domestic and international events. While the influ-
ence of international events on PNG has at times been inevitable, the
changes in the domestic arena have been shaped by internal forces such as
natural phenomena and self-infliction. The vehicle for self-infliction has
been policy formulation and application and lack of self-discipline.
External forces have also shaped domestic policy.
This chapter gives a synopsis of the PNG economy in transition
since independence to the present. It also surveys the prospects beyond the
new millennium. Specifically, it discusses the peculiar characteristics of the
economy, the paradoxical development experience and the problems
encountered, and the macroeconomic policy framework. An outline of the
major challenges is also presented. 
STRUCTURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ECONOMY
PNG is still very much a small open developing economy susceptible to
the vagaries of international market forces. The general structure of the
economy can be described in terms of productive and consumption activi-
ties and the formal and informal sectors. Agriculture forms the backbone
of the economy. Over 80 per cent of the population are rural-based subsis-
tence farmers who constitute a large portion of the informal sector,
although the rapid monetisation of the economy has seen the transition to
semi-subsistence agriculture where rural household production is not only
consumed but the surplus marketed.
PNG is predominantly a primary producing nation with a high
degree of dependence on exports and imports. The exports consist of
primary products such as mineral and petroleum products and export tree
crops such as coffee, cocoa, copra and palm oil. In general, the export
sector has performed well due to mine developments, aid and investment
projects, high commodity prices, producer efforts and government incen-
tives. At the end of 1999, a total of 472,500 tonnes of these tree crops
were exported, earning some K930.3 million kina. About 40,400 tonnes
of copper ore, 16,400 tonnes of gold, and 7.8 million barrels of crude oil
were exported. They earned K574.3 million, K1529.3 million, and
K1397.6 million, respectively (Bank of Papua New Guinea, various).
PNG still depends heavily on the import of a wide range of
consumer, intermediate and capital goods and services. The immediate
danger with such a heavy dependence is that given the openness of the
economy, transmission of imported inflation is highly likely. At the end of
1975, the total import bill was K471 million. By 1993 the import bill was
valued at K1920 million. Much of this import bill consisted of capital
goods and services essential for developmental purposes. The government
forecast the import bill at the end of 2001 to be well above the 1993 level
(BPNG, various). The longevity of import dependence can be attributed
to the rather slow development of export promotion and import substitu-
tion industries and inadequate downstream processing brought about by
development constraints (Gumoi, 1993).
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
EXPERIENCE
When compared to South East Asian countries, PNG’s overall economic
growth performance and development between 1976 and 1999 has been
relatively erratic, sluggish and falls short of its potential.1 This is rather
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1 However, this growth performance is reasonable when compared to most African
countries.
paradoxical given its rich and diverse agricultural and natural resource base
and the external financial assistance PNG has received, particularly from
Australia, and other donor agencies.
Levantis (2000) argues that the report card for PNG after
25 years of independence is one of increased poverty and wealth disparity,
decline in economic and social development, and a slow disintegration of
civil society. The economic and social indicators seem to reflect this assess-
ment. For example, the human development index (HDI) for PNG fell
four consecutive years in a row between the years 1997 to 2000. In 1999
PNG was ranked 127 out of 177 countries. By 2000 the ranking fell to
133, which places PNG third last in the Pacific and South Asia (UNDP,
2000). PNG has a high per capita income (USD 1130 in 1993) compared
to other South Pacific island countries. However, the social indicators are
not commensurate with the high per capita income level. The adult
literacy rates, the infant mortality rate, and life expectancy, although
improved over time are much lower compared to the small South Pacific
and developing South-East Asian nations. In 1993 the adult literacy rate
was 52 per cent compared to 92 per cent for South Pacific countries. The
infant mortality rate was 67 per thousand births compared to 25 per
thousand births, and life expectancy was 56 years compared to 70 years for
all small South Pacific nations (AIDAB, 1993).
It can also be argued that the failure of development in PNG is
manifest in the high level of subsistence and the generally poor perform-
ance of export crops, poor state of rural infrastructure, rural education and
health facilities, and a collapse of the agricultural research system. The
government, with assistance from donor agencies and non-government
organisations (NGOs), is doing its best to address these problems. 
The GDP growth rate between the years 1976 and 1983 was a
dismal 1.4 per cent (Goodman et al., 1988: 34). This was envisaged because
the objective of macroeconomic policy then was that of economic stability
and not economic growth. The GDP growth rate then declined to an average
of 2 per cent over the 1980–90 period. The period between 1991 and 1993
witnessed an average of 9.3 per cent positive growth rate, largely attributable
to the rapid growth of the mining and petroleum sectors: in particular,
mineral production from Misima and Porgera mines, followed by oil produc-
tion from the Kutubu operation. In 1994 there was a macroeconomic crisis.
The impact of this crisis was felt in the following year. The GDP growth rate
declined in 1995 but stabilised by 1996. However, in 1997 there were a series
of economic shocks. This included the Asian economic crisis, a severe
drought, the Aitape tsunami disaster and the Rabaul volcanic eruptions. This
resulted in the GDP growth rate in 1997 declining by 5.3 per cent. But at the
end of 1999, the GDP grew by about 2.4 per cent.
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The traditional agriculture and manufacturing sectors also
experienced erratic growth over the 1975–1999 period. In the seventies
and eighties, agriculture (including fisheries and forestry products) made a
substantial contribution to GDP. Towards the latter part of the 1990s, this
contribution declined. For example, by 1991 the contribution was only
14 per cent and between the 1992–1996 period the overall growth of the
sector averaged to around 6 per cent (Goodman et al., 1988). At the end
of 2000 the overall growth of the agricultural sector did not show much
improvement. The decline in the contribution of the agricultural sector to
the GDP can be linked to, among other factors, the reduction in govern-
ment budgetary allocations to the sector, unfavourable trade conditions
(e.g., a downturn in commodity prices), inappropriate economic policy
and the persistence of domestic structural problems.
The manufacturing sector also showed erratic but more stable
growth than the agriculture sector. In general, the relative share of
manufacture in the GDP increased in the late seventies, peaked in the
early eighties, but followed a downward trend in the nineties. High
positive growth was recorded for the years 1984, 1989, 1991–1992, 1994
and 1996. The growth rate in all the other years between 1976 and 1999
was negligible. In particular, there was a 20 per cent decline in the sector’s
contribution to GDP in 1990. This sharp decline may have been due to
the closure of Bougainville mine in the preceding year and the exchange
rate policy (BPNG, various; Mawuli, 1999). Much of the manufacturing
sector consists of processing and assembly-type industries. Such industries
are heavily dependent on imported capital used as inputs for fixed
domestic capital formation.
Despite dismal economic growth, some progress has been made
since independence as indicated by development indicators. For example,
there have been increases in per capita income from the 1970 figure of
US$245. However, despite the high growth years of 1991–93, per capita
income growth between 1989 and 1999 averaged about 0.9 per cent per
annum. Formal education enrolment (especially at the primary school
level) has increased due to the introduction of compulsory education and
increased government expenditure and donor assistance to the sector. Life
expectancy levels have increased from 40 in 1970 to about 56 in 2001 and
infant mortality per thousand births has decreased from 112 in 1970 to
about 67 in 2001. However, as argued earlier, these development achieve-
ments are low compared to other South Pacific and developing South-East
Asian nations. Other achievements include diversification of goods and
services, commercialisation of indigenous enterprises, and improvements
in education, health, transport and communication facilities. 
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Mawuli (1999) categorises the development process in PNG
into seven phases. The first phase (1976–1980) was characterised by
macroeconomic stability. Growth and development were satisfactory. The
second phase was a period in the first part of the 1980s when macroeco-
nomic stability was undermined, resulting in unsatisfactory growth. The
third phase commencing in the latter part of the 1980s witnessed the
restoration of macroeconomic stability, revival of investor confidence, a
strong currency, low budget deficits but high interest rates and employ-
ment growth. The fourth phase was the period 1989–1990. There was an
economic downturn. Fiscal and exchange rate instability was prevalent and
there was negative growth. This was a period when the Bougainville crisis
surfaced in May 1989. The fifth phase (1991–1993) witnessed rapid
economic growth, courtesy of the commencement of major mineral and
petroleum projects. The sixth phase saw financial instability due to
economic mismanagement, in particular, fiscal indiscipline. This was a
period when the Skate government was in power. The seventh phase
(1997–1998) was a period of economic, political and natural calamity.
An additional phase should be added. This phase is the period
1999 to 2001. The current Mekere government was voted into office on
14 July 1999. In his maiden speech Sir Mekere outlined five objectives.
They included the restoration of the credibility of institutions of the state,
stabilisation of the kina, restoration of the credibility of the 1999 budget,
removal of impediments to investment and growth, and continuation of
the Bougainville peace process. The general consensus is that there has
been a return to fiscal discipline and restoration of investor confidence.
However, exchange rate instability, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the
government, is still prevalent and there is very little improvement in
employment levels. Inflation and interest rates are at high levels. Prices of
consumables and public utilities are still on the increase, welfare levels are
negligible and the endemic structural problems are very much intact.
The overall assessment of the dismal economic growth perform-
ance since independence and to 2001, reveals that it has been narrowly
based. For almost two decades following independence, it was dependent
on cash crops. In the 1990s it was dependent on the mining and petro-
leum sectors. There is therefore the need for broad-based growth. An
assessment of government policy shows that it worked well during the first
fifteen years of independence. There were lower inflation and interest rates
than Australia, reasonable economic stability, and real annual economic
growth of about 1 per cent was moderate compared to South-East Asian
countries, but high compared to African countries. However, in the 1980s
high-level corruption emerged together with a decline in government
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services. By the 1990s the situation had become much more difficult. The
turning point was the Bougainville crisis in 1989 that resulted in loss of 10
per cent of GDP and 30 per cent of export earnings. Other problems
during the 1990s included volcanic eruptions in Rabaul, the Aitape
tsunami disaster, and the Asian economic crisis. There was a brief period
of resources growth in 1991–1993 with the commencement of the
Kutubu, Porgera, and Lihir projects. The fiscal indiscipline that followed
this period of growth may have resulted in the change in Australian
government aid policy from budgetary support to project aid. In many
respects, this change in aid policy stance resulted in unplanned govern-
ment spending that provided a sufficient condition for the fiscal crisis that
surfaced in 1994. This crisis resulted in poor economic growth and a
decline in living standards. 
PROBLEMS
The relatively dismal overall growth performance between the time of
independence and now attest to the fact that there are and have been
problems encountered and that development constraints exist (Gumoi,
1999). Moreover, it can be argued that the development process has
resulted in some social problems. Some of these problems are endemic
while others are not.
The entrenched problems include inadequate physical infra-
structure (health and educational facilities, transport and communications);
paucity of skilled local labour and inappropriate skill mix (human capital);
rising levels of unemployment and underemployment; some degree of
dominance, dependence, and vulnerability in international relations; low
levels of living; a relatively underdeveloped financial market; market disin-
tegration (small and fragmented domestic markets); a high cost structure
economy; low savings and investment rates; heavy public debt burden; an
expensive bureaucracy whose service delivery has been poor; lack of
efficient entrepreneurship; protectionist and inward-looking policies; lack
of technological advancement; inadequate investment in research and
development; lack of appropriate legal institutions; excessive government
regulation and economic controls; corruption; capital flight; misuse of
public funds; wide income disparity; land constraints; law and order
problems; political instability; lack of modern work ethics; and some
deficiencies in prudent economic management.
In recent times, beginning in 1994 and in particular in 1997,
these entrenched problems have been compounded by both natural and
man-made disasters. They include (as mentioned) the severe drought, the
tsunami disaster, volcanic eruptions, the Asian economic crisis, and fiscal
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indiscipline. The problems PNG is currently experiencing that have
gained prominence include the falling value of the kina against major
currencies, rising inflation and interest rates, spiralling prices of consum-
ables and public utilities, rising cost of living, rising unemployment and
underemployment levels, increase in external debt, unacceptable levels of
foreign reserves, and some decline in business and investor confidence.
MACROECONOMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK
The problems PNG has encountered over time can also be attributed to the
macroeconomic policy framework. Specifically, it can be blamed on the
design and implementation of economic policy. The 1973 Improvement
Plan, which stipulated the infamous eight aims, is often considered by
many policy analysts as the origin of the macroeconomic policy framework.
However, the origins of PNG’s macroeconomic policy framework can be
traced back to the 1948 report of the Economic Development Committee.
This document outlined a detailed strategy for the economic development
of PNG. Subsequently, the IBRD-sanctioned Iverson Report (1965) and
the Faber Report (1972) were produced. The former report outlined the
programs and policies for economic development of the then Territory of
Papua and New Guinea. The latter report identified the social, political and
economic priorities for the Territory, including the type of investment and
growth patterns that would facilitate their implementation. It recom-
mended that economic growth should not be an objective economic policy.
Economic stability was preferred instead (O’Faircheallaigh, 1983).
PNG achieved self-government in 1973. Prior to this, the
Improvement Plan was devised. In fact, the recommendations of the Faber
Report were adopted and contained in the Plan. The primary objective of the
Plan was self-reliance and social justice. Economic growth was not an objec-
tive. This was a deliberate action. Policy makers opted for economic stability
rather than economic growth (Mannur, 1986). Hence, PNG adopted a
macroeconomic policy framework (1973–1982) that aimed at neutral growth
but was geared to achieve stability. Policy makers at that time envisaged that
macroeconomic stability could be achieved through price stability, which
would translate into both domestic demand and import price stability.
Domestic demand stability aimed at internal balance and was aided by
income and government expenditure stabilisation policy and restrictive
monetary policy. Import price stability aimed at external balance which was
aided by a currency revaluation policy. In fact the kina was revalued five times
between 1976 and 1979. This basic policy framework formed the basis for
the adoption of different development strategies that produced different
outcomes. These strategies and outcomes are outlined below.
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At the time of independence the first indigenous government
(Somare government) simply adopted the 1973 Plan. In particular, the
Plan was encompassed in the development of the National Development
Strategy (NDS), in 1976, that also emphasised economic stability
(Ganguli, 1982; Fernando and Shiota, 1992). The NDS formed the basis
of National Public Expenditure Plan (NPEP), and the Public Investment
Programme (PIP).
It can be argued that a policy of economic stabilisation led to
economic stagnation. For example, Mannur (1986) points out that PNG’s
macroeconomic policy between 1973 and 1982 was successful in achieving
price stability and maintaining low inflation levels. For example, he
observes that in 1976 the percentage increase in CPI was 5.6 per cent. By
1982, it was only 5.9 per cent. However, he argues that economic stability
is more than price stability. Economic stability has also to do with stability
of total and per capita GDP, employment, international reserves and many
more economic variables. It can be observed that stability in these areas was
not achieved. For example, during the period 1973–1980, the average
annual real GDP growth rate was about 1 per cent. The percentage change
in real GDP in 1976 was negative 1.4 per cent. By 1981 it was negative 3.7
per cent. The BOP (current account) recorded negative figures from 1979
onwards and foreign investment was negligible. In 1972 foreign investment
was K64 million. By 1980 it dropped to K46 million. The formal sector
employment index between 1980 and 1984 was negative 4.2 per cent.
By 1982 the then second Somare government recognised the
problem of economic stagnation brought about by pursuing the objective
of economic stability. It changed the focus of macroeconomic policy from
macroeconomic stability to economic growth. Successive governments
have since adopted this basic policy framework, although strategies
employed to achieve this new objective have varied. The change in focus of
economic policy meant the eight aims were brushed aside. Instead, the
policy objectives were GDP expansion, import replacement and export
promotion, improvement of trade balance and international reserves, and
wage reduction. With the exception of the objective of wage reduction,
these new objectives were achieved through industrialisation and
economic diversification. Wage reductions were achieved through succes-
sive Minimum Wages Boards (MWBs) that have always prescribed a
policy of downward minimum wage adjustment (Mannur and Gumoi,
1994; Gumoi, 1995). The 2000 MWB is an exception as it has recom-
mended the opposite policy.
The 1982–1988 period saw the objective of economic growth
pursued more vigorously. The development of the Medium Term
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Development Strategy (MTDS) in 1985 facilitated the new objective. The
MTDS aimed at economic growth and productive employment creation.
The MTDS was revised in 1997 by the Skate government. The 1986
Budgetary and Planning Strategy facilitated the MTDS. It defined the
development plans, programmes, and expenditures. Economic sectors
such as agriculture, manufacturing, mining and petroleum, fisheries and
tourism were afforded high priority. Strategies were devised such that each
sector should contribute to positive growth and employment creation. The
change in policy contributed to economic growth, even though in
comparative terms it fell far short of its potential. For example, the average
annual GDP growth rate between 1983 and 1988 was about 2.7 per cent
and the formal sector employment index between 1984 and 1988 was a
positive 3.2 per cent. The balance of payments situation also improved
and there was sound import cover. It should also be noted that mining
activities and manufacturing activity contributed to a positive growth.
The cornerstone of the PNG macroeconomic policy framework
in the past and the present are the exchange rate, monetary and fiscal
policies. In general, the objectives of these policies are to maintain price
stability and external balance, achieve full employment, and promote
economic growth and development. Other objectives include equitable
income distribution, and encouragement of investment and savings.
Ultimately, the success or failure of the PNG macroeconomic policy
framework will depend on whether these objectives are achieved. These
policies are now discussed below.
EXCHANGE RATE POLICY 
Since the introduction of the kina in April 1975, two distinct exchange
rate regimes have been implemented — a fixed regime and a flexible
(floating) regime. The fixed exchange rate policy was adopted in April
1975. Under this policy, the kina was fixed (pegged) to the Australian
dollar (K1=A$1). In December of the same year, the kina was fixed to a
trade-weighted basket of currencies of major trading partners. These cross-
currencies determined the value of the kina.
The Hard Kina Policy (HKP) was the cornerstone of the fixed
exchange rate regime adopted at the time of independence. In particular,
kina revaluations formed the basis of the HKP. The primary objectives of
the HKP were to stabilise the external value of the kina, maintain price
stability and ensure free convertibility of the kina (Garnaut and Baxter,
1983). There was an active pursuit of the HKP between 1975 and 1979.
Three revaluations of the kina against all currencies and one against the
Australian dollar were effected to ensure tight control over wage and price
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increases. The period beginning 1980 saw a passive pursuit of the policy, a
period that marked the end of the HKP. The passive pursuit of the HKP
was typified by kina devaluations. In fact, there have been three devalua-
tions between 1983 and 1994. On 8 March 1983, a ‘de-facto’ 10 per cent
devaluation of the kina was applied when the Australian dollar was
devalued by 10 per cent. The objective was to strengthen the depressed
state of the economy. In January 1990, the kina was devalued by 10 per
cent to counter the adverse impact of the Bougainville mine closure and
the prolonged depressed state of the prices of major commodity export
crops. The kina was devalued by 12 per cent in September 1994, aimed at
improving the deteriorating BOP situation.
The HKP seemed to have been a success over the period of its
implementation. There were moderate wages/salaries and inflation, stable
employment growth, and satisfactory export performance. However, the
dismal economic growth and unsustainable budget deficits in the early
eighties cast serious doubts on the success of the policy.
The current flexible exchange rate regime was adopted on 4
October 1994. Under this system, the supply and demand forces in the
foreign exchange market set the value of the kina. It has been observed
that the value of the kina, especially against the US dollar and Australian
dollar, has deteriorated since 1994. The excess of demand for kina over
supply, coupled with low levels of activity in the export sector in relation
to the import sector may have precipitated this situation. Mawuli (2000)
discusses the principal determinants of the exchange rate and the means to
intervene in the foreign exchange market to stabilize abrupt fluctuations of
the exchange rate. On several occasions, however, temporary measures
have been enforced. For example, the Central Bank has had to intervene to
reverse the decline by injecting money into the banking system. Injection
of foreign exchange as a result of successful loan agreements between the
PNG government and foreign governments and external donor agencies
has also alleviated the downward pressure on the kina.
Duncan and Xu (2000) have suggested that PNG should adopt
the Australian dollar as a remedial measure to counter the free fall of the kina.
The Mekere government in 2001 was seriously considering this proposal.
FISCAL POLICY 
Fiscal policy has been the mainstay of macroeconomic policy in PNG. In
particular, government taxation and expenditure and budget balances have
been the ingredients of fiscal policy.
Fiscal stability was maintained over the 1975–1979 period.
However, in the early eighties fiscal indiscipline saw budget deficits
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balloon. But the second half of the eighties witnessed the restoration of
fiscal discipline and hence, control over budget deficits. A relaxed fiscal
policy was pursued between 1992 and 1993. Specifically, the mineral and
petroleum boom allowed the Wingti government to impose broad tax
reductions. For example, top personal income tax was reduced from 45 to
28 per cent and company tax was reduced from 30 to 28 per cent. 
The relaxed fiscal policy also involved unplanned recurrent and
development expenditures and more government borrowing. This resulted
in a fiscal crisis. Budget deficits and public debt increased while economic
growth and welfare were adversely affected. A tight fiscal policy involving
reductions in expenditure but broad tax increases was adopted in early
1994. This policy is currently pursued.
MONETARY POLICY
Monetary policy in PNG has complemented the fiscal and exchange rate
policies. Specifically, it has been employed to achieve internal and external
balance. Internal balance refers to attaining stability in growth perform-
ance and price and external balance refers to maintaining healthy balance
of payments and foreign reserves. Lately, monetary policy has been
employed to curtail the depreciating value of the kina.
The instruments of monetary policy often used by governments
to influence money supply and therefore attain internal and external
balance are interest rates, reserve ratio requirements, open market opera-
tions, and moral exhortation. In PNG, the specific monetary policy
instruments employed by the government (usually through the Bank of
PNG) include the minimum liquid asset ratio (MLAR), treasury bills,
competitive bidding courtesy of the Kina Auction Facility, the discount
facility offered by the Bank of PNG, and government directives on the
basis of the Bank of PNG Act (section 38).
An assessment of the monetary policy practice in PNG reveals
various scenarios. Under the fixed exchange rate regime (1975–1994), the
kina was revalued on several occasions between 1975 and 1980. The
objective of the revaluations was to contain imported inflation. The period
1981–1991 saw tightening of liquidity, particularly between 1985 and
1986 where a general decrease in interest rates was also observed. The
MLAR was also applied in this period. The MLAR rose from 12 per cent
in 1981 to 14 per cent in 1989 before contracting to about 11 per cent the
following year (BPNG, various).
An easy monetary policy was pursued between 1992 and 1997.
Indicator lending rates were reduced from 12 per cent to 8.75 per cent, but
actual lending rates remained high due to a rather slow compliance by
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commercial banks to the government request to lower rates. On 15
September 1993, the Finance Minister used section 38 of the Bank of PNG
Act to force commercial banks to lower lending rates. The deposit and
lending indicator rates and the discount facility rate fell as a result. In 1995
there was a problem of excess liquidity created by budget deficits. The
government employed several monetary policy instruments to mitigate
excessive liquidity. These instruments included the increase of the MLAR,
abolition of the Central Bank’s discount facility, selling of treasury bills, and
use of the kina auction facility (BPNG, various).
In 1998 a tight monetary policy was instituted. This policy was
still intact in 2001 even though there have been suggestions to ease
monetary policy so as to kick-start the producing sectors of the economy.
The objective of tight monetary policy was to combat excess liquidity and,
in more recent times, to stop the kina from sliding further against all
major currencies. The danger of pursuing a tight monetary policy is that it
can act as a disincentive mechanism. It can discourage domestic savings
necessary for capital formation, discourage private investment, and inhibit
creation and expansion of business. It can also lead to capital outflow. The
problem of capital outflow has been very much prevalent in PNG in
recent times because it has been aided by both a tight monetary policy and
a fast depreciating kina. The Central Bank therefore needs to enforce strin-
gent control measures to counter the problem of capital flight.
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES
PNG is not only the land of the unexpected but of promise. The nation’s
prospects hinge on sound economic governance and adequate attention to
solving its structural problems. Mawuli (1999) argues that the most
important factor that influences the course of development is economic
management policies. He argues that economic growth and development
can be constrained by both exogenous and endogenous factors, but
economic management failure should be blamed for the persistence of any
economic adversity. The conditions that influence steady economic devel-
opment are macroeconomic stability, economic liberalisation, and both
business and political commitment.
It is therefore absolutely essential that there is sound design and
management of economic policy. The design and implementation of
sound economic policy in PNG can, however, be a daunting task. This is
because economic policy has to be devised and implemented under several
challenging contexts. First and foremost, due recognition must be given to
the fact that PNG is and will continue to be a small open economy. The
economy will always be subject to the dictates of external market and
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natural forces. While natural events are inevitable, sound economic gover-
nance requires that the domestic economy is adequately insulated from
market forces. This requires a synergy between economic policies such that
they are operating in unison. It also requires complementarity in the objec-
tives of such policies.
Second, as previously mentioned, there are endemic structural
problems that are well entrenched. Economic policy formulation and
implementation needs to give due recognition to these problems and their
underlying causes and sources must be explicitly identified. Examples
abound of economic policies in PNG that are superficial.
Third, there are both natural and man-made internal and
external shocks that policy design, economic planning, and budgeting
have to account for. However, such shocks are hard to predict in advance.
Nevertheless, good policy design, economic planning, and budgeting
requires adequate accounting of internal and external shocks. Personnel in
strategic government agencies lack appropriate econometric forecasting
and mathematical modelling and programming skills to predict unforeseen
events. Current forecasts of economic variables are rather ad hoc and based
on guesstimates. The use of both partial and general equilibrium models
for forecasting are fraught with technical and methodological problems. It
is therefore commonly observed that convergence of government estimates
of economic variables with actual values rarely occurs. One simply needs a
glimpse of the national budget documents to verify this assertion. 
Fourth, policy designers have to contend with the inevitable
process of globalisation. In addition, PNG has an obligation to the WTO-
sanctioned trade and market liberalisation requirements. These probably
pose the greatest challenge.
Fifth, management of the economy under the flexible exchange
rate regime is not a simple task. Given the unpredictable nature of
exchange rate movements at any point in time, economic planning and
budgeting can be a precarious task.
Sixth, the objective of sustainable development and not just
development per se needs to be met. The underlying tenets of sustainable
development are the fundamental concepts of equity (both inter and intra-
generational), efficiency and resilience (Gumoi, 2000). PNG is a signatory
to the 1992 UNCED accord signed in Rio de Janeiro and has a global
obligation. But fulfilment of the global objective means a national
commitment to achieving sustainable development in all sectors of the
economy. It also means that all components of economic policy need to
achieve this objective. This is a daunting task. Experience has shown (e.g.
Gumoi, 2000) that in practice inequitable income distribution is prevalent,
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there is inefficient management and resource use and the need for develop-
ment has led to serious environmental degradation. In a nutshell, the need
for development has superseded the need for sustainable development.
Seventh, the transformation of the informal sector to the formal
sector poses a major challenge. Most of the populace is in the informal
sector, where most production and consumption decisions are made. Yet
these decisions are not accounted for in the System of National Accounts
(SNA) and, hence, are absent from economic growth calculations. There is
therefore some validity in the view that the use of GDP as an indicator of
economic growth is suspect. In most cases, this indicator may be a gross
understatement.
Eighth, basic institutions need to be in place to ensure a
continual flow of private investment and development. They include those
in support of property rights (land tenure), security of contracts and
competition in markets. The role of the government should move from
production to one of institutional development and market regulation to
ensure competition. The government also needs to ensure that there is
political stability. 
Ninth, PNG needs to improve its ability to manage risks
through economic diversification and developing a sound and vibrant
financial system that is competitive and operating efficiently.
CONCLUSION
The PNG economy has been in transition over time. There have been
both positive and negative changes. These changes have been shaped by
both international and domestic events. The events have either been
natural or man-made in nature. Man-made events relate to economic
policy formulation and implementation.
The overall economic performance and development experience
has been rather dismal even though there have been positive improve-
ments. This is paradoxical given the rich natural resource base and
substantial external financial assistance. Development constraints and
structural problems are endemic and well entrenched and have been a
deterrent to sound economic performance. Despite these constraints and
problems, the prospects for PNG are bright and its destiny is within.
Future prospects can be enhanced with sound design, implementation and
management of appropriate macroeconomic policies, eradication and/or
minimisation of structural problems and sheer hard work.
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THE FUTURE OF
FOREIGN AID IN PAPUA
NEW GUINEA AFTER 




After over 25 years of political independence, Papua New Guinea (PNG)
continues to receive a high volume of foreign aid for her socioeconomic
development. The purposes and worth of that spending remain issues of
debate by observers. The debate is intensified by a rather disappointing
socioeconomic development record since 1975 and this has led donors to
call for its elimination or wholesale reform. But is aid to blame for the
disappointing record? How effective has foreign aid been in PNG? What
would be the future of foreign aid in PNG after 25 years of experience?
Could it be improved or should it be done away with?
This chapter attempts to shed light on some of these profound
questions, especially with regard to the question of ‘the future of foreign
aid in PNG’. It begins by examining the nature and flow of foreign aid so
as to establish the context for analysing the future of foreign aid in PNG.
It then attempts a cursory evaluation of the successes and failures of aid in
the country over the last 25 years and draws some conclusive recommen-
dations on its future in PNG. The article is a mere overview of this
1 Any views, opinions or facts expressed in the article are solely the author’s and
do not reflect any position of the Asian Development Bank or the
Department of Finance & Planning, Government of Papua New Guinea.
multifaceted subject,2 which is complicated by limited reliable data. Hence,
it is based largely on the experiences of the author on the subject.
FOREIGN AID TO PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Official Development Assistance (ODA), commonly known as develop-
ment assistance/cooperation or foreign aid, is provided by member
countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Foreign aid is provided for various reasons3 including that of the donor
country’s strategic, economic, political and ideological priorities and
historical or cultural links. For aid-receiving countries like PNG, aid is an
important source of capital to complement the shortages of domestic
resources necessary for social and economic development. It has at times
been a determining factor in their development processes.
The main aid donors to PNG are Japan, Australia, Germany, the
USA, China, New Zealand, Korea, the World Bank group, the Asian
Development Bank, the European Union, the United Nations systems, the
International Fund for Agricultural Development, Commonwealth Fund
for Technical Cooperation and Kuwait Development Fund. PNG receives
the following types of aid: (i) Direct Budgetary Support Grants; (ii)
Programme or Project Grants; (iii) Micro-project Grants; (iv)
Concessional Loans; (v) Technical Assistance; and (vi) ad-hoc Aid. All
these types of aid have their own terms and conditions.
Papua New Guinea’s foreign aid policy states that all aid should
be directed towards the preparation and implementation of priority
programmes and projects of the Government. In the absence of any
strategic national development plans, the Government’s Public Investment
Program guided by the Medium Term Development Strategy
(1997–2002) continues to be the main vehicle to channel foreign aid
towards priority programmes. The net disbursements from all sources to
PNG increased in 2000 to K520 million from K280 million in 1975,
which is an increase of over 50 per cent. It peaked in the early 1990s and
declined in absolute terms in 1999. The net disbursements from DAC
countries to PNG have grown at an average rate of 3 per cent per annum
between 1975 and 2000 (Government of Papua New Guinea, Budget
books of 1980, 1990 and 2000; Office of International Development
Assistance 1994). Figure 1 shows the average flow of foreign aid over a
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2 A thorough evaluation of the impact of foreign aid on Papua New Guinea’s
economic development is covered in Hnanguie, (1997).
3 See the Chapter on Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries, in Hnanguie,
Christopher T., (1992).
twenty-five-year period between 1975 and 2000 and projections for 2005.
The steady growth of foreign aid to PNG has and will depend on the
continued commitments by the donors and improvements to Papua New
Guinea’s capacity to efficiently implement projects and programmes.
THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN AID IN PAPUA NEW GUNIEA
One of the common arguments posed by Papua New Guinea’s donors is
that foreign aid to the country is no longer necessary because of the
dramatic increase in private capital flows from the developed countries to
the developing world. In this argument, aid was justified until recently to
palliate the failure of private capital to flow to the developing world. In
2000 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that net private
capital flows to developing countries totalled some US$120 billion, up
from an annual average of US$3 billion as recently as 1990 (International
Monetary Fund, 2000). Private flows are now much more important than
public aid flows (which in 2000 totalled just under US$60 billion). In this
situation, these donors assert: why provide aid at all to PNG? Does it not
simply allow incumbent governments to maintain inefficient economic
policies?
These arguments hold some truth, especially for middle-income
and upper middle-income countries. It is hard to justify aid to any country
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Figure 1: Average Foreign Aid Disbursement to PNG (millions kina in nominal values)
*  The substantial increase in bilateral aid is due to the shift from Australian budget support
to project aid. Projections for 2005 are based on annual averages and macroeconomic
forecasts.
Source: Government of Papua New Guinea Budget books 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000
and 2001.
in which counter-productive policies are preventing economic growth, and
economic rationale alone clearly does not justify providing large amounts
of aid to relatively rich countries that already receive significant private
flows. However, this argument is too generic and overemphasized to apply
to PNG and there are two good reasons for this.
First, private capital has been almost entirely directed to either
extremely large economies like China, or middle income countries like
Thailand. Private capital flows are heavily concentrated in a few countries,
and some flows are volatile. A surge in the late 1970s receded after the
onset of the debt crisis in 1982. Another big rush occurred in the mid-
1990s, but with the financial crises rocking East Asia in 1997 foreign
investment dropped sharply. The flow of private money to the developing
world fell by US$80 billion between 1996 and 2000. In any event, private
flows continue to go to a small number of (mostly) middle-income
countries. In 2000, 26 countries received 95 per cent of private invest-
ment; the rest went to the other 140 developing countries (Hnanguie,
2000; see also ADB, 1999, 2000).
In a typical lower middle-income country like PNG, foreign aid
remains far and away the primary source of external finance. With the
exception of the mining and petroleum sector, the country has not been
able to attract significant private capital in recent years. Perhaps, as the
country emerges from its difficult economic mismanagement, its vast
economic potential and resources will attract significant private capital,
and so proponents could then push for elimination of foreign aid. But that
maybe sometime away. Meantime, aid remains one of Papua New Guinea’s
major revenue flows, providing about a quarter or comprising about 30
per cent of total Government revenue every year. Table 1 below shows the
composition of aid in Papua New Guinea’s annual budgets between 1975
and 2000. A significant portion of grant aid is not reflected in Table 1, as
it is not provided through the Government’s budgetary system. Hence, for
the foreseeable future, PNG will rely on public money for her external
capital requirements. In some instances, it is true, private capital has been
driven away by certain governmental practices and counter-productive
economic policies and the law and order situation.
However, the Morauta Government in 2001 has implemented
difficult reform programs amidst strong domestic opposition under the
guidance of the World Bank and the IMF and can now boast of market-
friendly economic policies, and yet investment has been kept away by
many of the characteristic features of a lower middle-income economy:
small consumer markets, poor physical and communications infrastruc-
ture, an ill-trained labour force, law and order and uncertainty about
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future stability. Nor has PNG benefited substantially from the dramatic
expansion of trade generated by trade liberalization, most recently under
the aegis of the World Trade Organization. Papua New Guinea’s share of
trade continues to decline and was insignificant in 2000. Indeed, the
evidence suggests that PNG may prove to be a big loser, with its share of
trade further declining if present trends continue.
Second, Papua New Guinea’s development needs remain
enormous. Close to two thirds of the country’s population continues to
live below the poverty line, as measured by the World Bank. On average,
90 per cent of the rural population lives below the poverty line. Despite
the progress made over the last 25 years in the areas of health and education,
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Table 1: Average Composition of Foreign Aid in Annual Budgets, and Projections,
2000–2004 and as a Proportion of Total Revenue 1975–2000*
(millions kina in nominal values)
Source 1975– 1980– 1985– 1990– 1995– 2000–
1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004**
I. Domestic
Internal Revenue 400 520 650 760 1,050 1,700
Domestic Borrowing 100 90 110 160 210 315
Subtotal 500 610 760 920 1,260 2,015
II. Foreign Aid*** 
Australian Budget Support 180 220 200 190 210 0
Project Grants n.a. n.a. 3 11 175 430
Concessional Borrowing (Loans) 50 60 50 120 130 150
Commercial Borrowing (Loans) 10 20 50 290 210 180
Subtotal 240 300 303 611 725 760
Total Revenue 740 910 1,063 1,531 1,985 2,775
Foreign Aid as % of
Total Revenue 32 33 29 40 37 27
Australian Budget Support as %
of Total Revenue 24 24 19 12 11 0
Project Grants as % of
Total Revenue n.a. n.a. .28 .72 9 16
Concessional Loans as % 
of Total Revenue 7 7 5 8 7 5
Commercial Loans as % 
of Total Revenue 1 2 5 19 11 7
* Figures refer to average for the period. 
** Projections are based on annual averages and macroeconomic forecasts. 
*** A significant portion of grant aid is not reflected, as it is not provided through the
Government’s budgetary system.
Source: Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure, Government of Papua New Guinea Budget
books, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2001.
PNG remains behind other Asia–Pacific countries and further back on a
number of important indicators. Only 60 per cent of school age children
are in primary school compared with full enrolment in most of the
countries in the Asia–Pacific. Infant mortality has been cut by a third in
the last 25 years but, at some 90 per thousand, remains more than twice
the prevailing levels in the Asia–Pacific (ADB Newsletter, 2001).
Moreover, partly because of the political instability and
economic mismanagement, and partly because of a typically small
economy trapped by its own poverty, PNG is simply not capable of
meeting all of its development needs from its own resources. The Wingti
and Chan governments, for example, routinely devoted close to a quarter
of their total expenditures on education, and yet PNG still has an adult
literacy rate of less than 55 per  cent, while only 75 per cent of school age
children are in primary school. In many provinces, the density of the road
network is less than five per cent of the levels in Australia and other devel-
oped Asia–Pacific economies, yet the cost of maintaining existing roads is
larger than the country’s total transportation budget (Hnanguie, 1996).
The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the private sector will not
provide much help for overcoming these problems, which will remain the
responsibility of the Government for some time yet.
With economic growth, in time PNG will be able to finance
these developmental expenditures out of her own revenues. Thailand, once
one of Asia’s largest per capita recipients of aid, sustained one of the fastest
growth rates in the developing world during the 1970s and can today
finance nearly all of its ambitious development programmes from its own
funds. The country is gradually receiving less aid from most donors,
including the ADB (Asian Development Bank). Thailand can today attract
private capital on its own. But for most Asian and Pacific countries
including PNG, foreign aid remains necessary if they are to break out of
poverty.
SUCCESSES OF FOREIGN AID IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Given the relatively large volume of foreign aid since 1975, how effective
has this aid been in the development efforts of PNG? The answer depends
on what aid was intended to achieve. As a tool of transferring resources,
the results have been mixed. As a project funding gap filler, the answer
would be positive. When aid was primarily intended to bridge the gap
between the country’s investment target and domestic savings, it did help
to bridge that gap, in gross terms. An externally derived resource, aid also
bridged the foreign exchange gap. Alongside many disappointments, aid
has financed many development projects and programmes which achieved
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very high internal rates of return, including schools, clinics, health posts,
bridges, roads, capacity building and training programmes.
The egregious failures of foreign aid usually get the headlines.
Indeed, much aid has been ineffectual in economic terms, not least
because it has often been given for reasons that had little to do with
economic development. During much of the post-independence period,
PNG was the leading recipient of Australian aid; in retrospect, it should
not be surprising that aid so obviously given for historical reasons would
prove ineffective at promoting economic growth and poverty alleviation.
Fortunately, this type of aid appears to be gradually phasing out. In any
event, the egregious cases tend to obscure the fact that aid to PNG is
behind many important achievements over the past two decades. Indeed,
the results of many individual aid efforts are unmistakable across the
country: roads and bridges have been constructed, schools and hospitals
built, institutions established, and thousands of Papua New Guineans sent
abroad for scientific and technical training.
In the health sector, aid can claim much of the credit not only
for infrastructures such as the Port Moresby General Hospital, but for the
eradication of endemic diseases such as smallpox and polio. The dramatic
decline in fertility in some provinces can be directly linked to the popula-
tion programmes of donors, notably the United Nations. The critical
battle now being waged against AIDS is almost entirely funded by foreign
aid. Characteristically, aid is not only helping to finance the establishment
of new health institutions, the training of personnel and the development
of public awareness campaigns to spearhead this battle, but it was also at
the forefront of the initial effort to convince sometimes reticent incum-
bent governments of the very need for public action.
In the agricultural sector, aid was largely instrumental in estab-
lishing the network of research and extension programs that plays an
important role in the widespread development and dissemination of high
yield tree crop varieties, now a key component of the national tree crop
system. In the transport and infrastructure sector, aid has contributed
immensely to building or upgrading major roads and bridges including
portions of the Hiritano and the Okuk highways. Many of the key sectors
in the country have experienced the use of foreign aid. From agriculture,
livestock, fishery, education, health, water supplies, finances, transport and
socioeconomic infrastructures to institutional capacity building and
training. Thanks in part to aid, the social impact of the 1998 tsunami in
Aitape was not too severe; Kokopo sprouted from the volcanic eruptions
in 1996 from the reallocation of aid funds; Bougainville is being rebuilt
from the ruins of civil war in 2000 from donor assistance.
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There is thus simply no denying that aid can be credited for
much of ‘what works’ in PNG. At the same time, aid has undeniably been
less successful in promoting sustained economic growth across the country.
Many of aid’s achievements during the 1980s and 1990s were negated by
the counter-productive economic policies of successive governments. Since
the early 1990s, the donors, led in particular by the World Bank, have been
assisting successive governments to undertake economic policy reform, in
order to reduce heavy-handed government intervention in the economy
and create policies that are friendly to the private sector. Progress on reform
has been slow and halting. Powerful interests have mobilized to defend the
old policies,4 despite their dismal economic legacy. Nonetheless, after
almost three decades of effort, enormous progress has been made on policy
reform. Aid has helped convince the Government to implement realistic
exchange rates, improve monetary policies and widespread deregulation
and price liberalization. Much remains to be done, notably in the areas of
privatization and institutional reform, but the donor-led reform process has
helped transform the policy environment in PNG.
FAILURES OF FOREIGN AID IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Over the 25-year period, even those seemingly positive achievements
started to be put to the test. Indeed, resorting to project rehabilitation and
structural adjustment programmes in the 1990s is adequate testimony to
this conclusion. With the onset of structural adjustments, the goals of aid
became a lot more blurred and the effectiveness of aid much more compli-
cated to evaluate (Asian Development Bank, August 1998).
Foreign aid in PNG between 1975 and 2000 has seen more
failures than successes. The Asian Development Bank’s 1998 Country
Assistance Plan reported that of the 16 ADB for Papua New Guinea
assisted projects that have been evaluated only five were rated as generally
successful. The World Bank (1998) summarized the performance of the 30
projects it undertook since it began operation in PNG in 1968, and
concluded that projects evaluated between 1968 and 1978 had a failure
rate of 22 per cent. But the failure rate of projects completed after 1978
rose to a disappointing 60 per cent. The large failure rate of aid from these
two multilateral donors is largely attributed to the lack of counterpart
funding and economic mismanagement by the Government.
A number of factors have undermined aid effectiveness in PNG.
First, aid was not effective when the principle objectives of the donor were
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4 Lives have been lost in attempts to prevent the reform process. In late June
2001, three students from the University of PNG and others were shot and
killed by police during protests against aspects of the reform process.
not Papua New Guinea’s economic development. Aid which was motivated
by commercial or foreign policy motives inside the donor country have
often not served well the interest of the local economy. The problem in
each case is that non-economic motives have led to aid activities that were
not tailored to the specific needs and capacities of PNG. Similarly, it is
evident that the socioeconomic and political environments in PNG have
critically affected aid effectiveness. Aid has been successful in an environ-
ment of macroeconomic stability, characterized by low inflation,
predictable and sustainable policies, and secure property rights. The
quality of the economic environment depended largely on the policies and
stability of successive governments.
The ability of the Government to integrate aid into its own
coherent development strategy and management has been critical to the
success of aid. Donors can never fully compensate for the absence of an
effective government with an appropriate budgeting and planning process.
Most of the recurring problems of aid in PNG have their origin in break-
downs in these governmental functions. Thus, for example, the common
failure to sustain projects after the end of donor resources is typically due
to the failure to budget for recurrent expenditures in advance. Similarly,
the failure of aid coordination, leading to overlapping, contradictory, and
redundant aid activities, is typically a consequence of the failure of the
Government to integrate these activities within coherent national develop-
ment budgeting and planning exercises.
Several factors have particularly affected the ability of successive
governments to adequately manage aid resources. First, the low capacities
of many national institutions account for the majority of difficulties
during the project cycle. While the level of education and training avail-
able in the civil service has improved over the years, the ability of public
bodies to implement aid projects effectively remains very limited. These
abilities vary enormously across the country, but in general, most national
public organizations especially government departments are rarely capable
of implementing more than simple administrative tasks; typically, they
possess limited analytical capacity to design or critically evaluate aid activi-
ties. As a result, aid projects that did not involve complex procedures and
intensive administrative oversight have been less taxing of the Government’s
limited managerial capacities and thus more successful. Similarly, aid activi-
ties have been successful in programmes or projects where there were a few
clear objectives that were easily assimilated by government officials and
enjoyed the support and commitment of the top leadership.
Second, high administrative turnover and economic mismanage-
ment in PNG has had a devastating impact on Government capacity and
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thus on aid effectiveness. Economic mismanagement has pushed successive
governments to reduce various recurrent expenditures and over time led to
reduced governmental effectiveness. For example, public service salaries are
less than a tenth of their levels of 20 years ago in real terms, pulled down
by the combination of sustained high inflation and the Government’s
almost permanent fiscal crunch. At such wage levels, staff turnover is
extremely high, particularly at skilled positions, while corruption,
nepotism, moonlighting, and absenteeism is rife. This has resulted in the
Government’s diminishing capacity to manage its aid resources effectively
(Hnanguie, 1996).
In addition, the chronic political infighting and instability over
the years have institutionalized a kind of crisis management, in which
long-term development planning and careful budgeting are replaced by ad
hoc gap filling, continuous negotiation with external creditors and the
increased politicization of revenue allocation. Over time, sound manage-
ment practices are eroded and public corruption increases. Continual
under-spending on maintenance and various other recurrent expenditures
eventually prevents public organizations from functioning effectively.
Starved of resources and left to their own devices, individual public
managers or politicians lobby on their own for foreign aid to meet pressing
emergency needs rather than to address longer-term development
problems.
Third, certain donor practices have contributed to weakening
government development management capacities. The proliferation of
donors and donor projects taxes existing government capacities. There are
about 20 official donors and over 60 distinct projects. These totals do not
even include non-governmental organization (NGO) aid, often
fragmented over dozens of small organizations. About 15 NGOs are
officially registered with the Government, including several international
NGOs. While donors have increased informal coordination at the country
level, little progress has been achieved in consolidating or harmonizing
project accounting, procurement, or evaluation procedures.
Pressed by the need to achieve quick results, donor agencies have
often sought alternatives to the arduous and long-term task of developing
the central government’s management capacities. They have, for example,
exercised control over the identification, design, and evaluation of projects
to compensate for the limited ability of the Government to undertake
these critical functions. Many aid projects continue to be designed with
little or no local input. Donors have fielded long-term expatriate experts to
man projects, rather than rely on local expertise. As a result, there are still
between 2,000 and 5,000 foreign experts in PNG, even though their
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salaries are often equivalent to those of several hundred civil servants.
More pernicious yet, donors have too often tried to bypass central govern-
ment institutions entirely, first by setting up single project structures in the
1980s and 1990s, and today increasingly by turning to civil society and
the NGO sector to implement their projects.
These donor practices have undermined capacity development,
because government institutions are often marginalized in the aid process.
For example, only two per cent of all projects in the mainly donor-funded
Public Investment Program have ever been formally evaluated by the
Government. Valuable opportunities to gain experience designing and evalu-
ating projects in order to ‘learn by doing’ are lost; more seriously, such
practices erode the Government’s sense of ‘ownership’ over projects, and
lessen the likelihood that the Government will develop a long-term financial
commitment to the project. The higher levels of aid effectiveness can be
explained by the Government’s insistence on integrating all aid within its
own budgeting and planning and where the Government was willing to turn
down aid resources that did not fit into its own development priorities.
The plethora of organizations involved in aid activities defies
adequate coordination by the Government. In the health sector alone,
official donors are currently funding no fewer than five single projects
outside the Department of Health. Often, these independent structures are
more efficient than the Government at delivering short-term results; they
may be cheaper, closer to the population, and less bureaucratic. But
bypassing the central government leads to predictable results in the longer
term: projects are less likely to be sustained after the end of donor support,
there is a haphazard and fragmented quality to policy implementation and,
starved of resources, government institutions suffer further decline in skills
and capacity. Empirical evidence suggests that NGOs can be extremely
cost-effective service providers, but that it is a mistake to believe they can
replace the central government across a wide array of public goods
(Hnanguie, 2001).
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Papua New Guinea continues to face many economic problems, including
mounting external debt, declining exports revenue, economic stagnation,
and government dominance of key economic activities. The difficulties
facing the majority of Papua New Guineans are enormous. Among other
things, they lack access to many services crucial to a quality of life. For
instance, 4 million people — more than 85 per cent of the national
population — have no access to electricity, about 3.5 million do not have
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proper sanitation facilities, and some 3 million have limited access to basic
services (Hnanguie, 1997: 7).
Foreign aid, although helpful particularly for the poorer
provinces, is not adequate in accelerating Papua New Guinea’s economic
development. This kind of international resource flow is largely governed
by factors outside Papua New Guinea’s control; it is highly fluctuating; it is
inadequate; and it is often being mismanaged. It should also be observed
that much of the foreign aid is directed towards the ordinary activities of
the public sector and/or for humanitarian purposes. Little, if any, of the aid
is utilized for the development of the private sector, or for the establishment
of institutions for supporting entrepreunership. In addition, aid is mainly
‘tied’ in that it is allocated by donor countries to a specific sector, project or
purpose in the country. Put differently, PNG is normally incapable of influ-
encing the allocation of much of the financing among her developmental
programmes, or among other critical needs. The shift in the Australian aid
from budget support to project support, for instance, has already shown
signs of the Government losing all control over the allocation and utiliza-
tion of the only aid share over which it once had direct influence.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING AID
EFFECTIVENESS IN FUTURE
Given the successes and failures of foreign aid over the past 25 years, let us
focus on several measures that could help to improve the capacity of the
Government to manage its aid resources effectively in future. First, donors
have to start taking this issue more seriously and stop trying to bypass the
central government. The widespread belief of both free-market economists
and NGOs that government is the problem and not part of the solution
has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In fact, far from undermining the
private sector, a limited but effective government is needed to enable a
vibrant civil society and strong business sector. It is the best means to
foster both economic growth and poverty alleviation. Donors must devote
greater attention and resources to help build the capacity of the
Government to effectively manage aid, even as they encourage the central
government to retrench from nonessential functions.
This entails giving more support to the policy, planning, and
evaluation divisions of key government departments including the
Department of Finance & Planning, as well as to central budgeting activi-
ties. Perhaps more importantly, it entails a greater respect for the integrity of
the national budgeting and investment planning processes of government
during the aid cycle. Donors should assist the Government to develop its
five-year rolling development plans and medium term investment strategies
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to set objectives and increase the coherence of government development
efforts. Basing their aid on the Medium Term Development Strategy
(MTDS) has seen a lack of focus and coherence in their operations. Donors
should ensure that aid activities are explicitly integrated into these
processes, so that the long-term recurrent expenditure implications of aid
are formally planned, budgeted and accounted for.
Second, donors should give preferences to a government that
demonstrates commitment to improve its management of aid.5 Current
efforts to promote performance-based allocation of aid should be continued
and deepened. It is important to establish clear incentives for the
Government to improve its capacity to manage aid resources. With poorly
performing governments, foreign aid should be refocused onto the non-
governmental sector and the meeting of basic needs and human capital
investments.
In this context, donors must allow the Government to play a
larger role in the design, management, and evaluation of aid activities.
Rather than ‘pushing’ aid and seeking short-term results, donors should
rather help the Government formulate its own preferences and act upon
them, even if this means lower aid levels in the short run. Encouraging the
decentralization process, privatization, and the growth of civil society are
all appropriate and desirable, but donors should not view them as substi-
tutes for central government institutions.
Third, the World Bank and the IMF’s economic stabilization
and adjustment efforts should be supported. Achieving macroeconomic
stability is a prerequisite for the effective use of public resources, including
foreign aid. Progress on such issues as poverty reduction and child welfare
will not be sustained in the absence of steady growth and healthy public
finances. There is thus no alternative to the sometimes quite painful
reforms advocated by the international financial institutions, which have
gained valuable experience at reform implementation. At the same time,
more attention should be devoted to enhancing local capacities in
provinces undergoing economic reform to ensure that they are not eroded
by the fiscal crisis. Wholesale reform of the public service may be prohibi-
tively expensive in the short run, but the donors can and should begin to
upgrade key parts of the civil service right away, most notably those
involved in economic policymaking like the Department of Finance &
Planning.
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5 Without realizing the implications of the Wingti Government’s decision to
abolish the Office of International Development Assistance (OIDA) in the
Department of Finance & Planning, donors continued to pour in massive
amounts of aid. It should be noted that the management of foreign aid in
PNG deteriorated after the abolition of OIDA in 1995.
Fourth, donor coordination efforts should be refocused. It is a
peculiar irony of aid today that donors do not coordinate their individual
aid coordination efforts. Groups like the Development Assistance
Committee, Consultative Group Meetings or the National Development
Forums are useful avenues for donors to engage in dialogue with each
other and to harmonize their policies and procedures. They should be
reinforced. At the country level, however, the Government should be
empowered to coordinate all aid activities and donor-directed forums such
that the Roundtables or the Consultative Group meetings can be progres-
sively downgraded.
The donors can, however, undertake a number of measures at
the country level to facilitate government coordination efforts. For
instance, donors should consider specialization in a few sectoral and sub-
sectoral areas, in which they have a comparative advantage. The resulting
decrease in the number of donors present in any one area would facilitate
governmental coordination and thus increase effectiveness. Similarly, the
World Bank or the ADB should be identified as a ‘lead donor’ and charged
with conducting the policy dialogue with the Government and estab-
lishing the broad policy framework within which other donors would plan
their activities. This would free the Government from the current burden
of engaging in policy dialogue with some 20 different donors. Given their
unparalleled policy analysis capacities, the World Bank or the ADB are
uniquely qualified to play this role.
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HAVE WE WALKED ‘ON
THE CLEAR(ED) PATH’?
An Assessment of the
Development of Industrial
Relations in Papua New Guinea
Benedict Y. Imbun
INTRODUCTION
In this paper I discuss the development of industrial relations in Papua
New Guinea (PNG) since the early 1960s when core institutions were
established for the political and economic governance of the colony.
Institutions such as those relating to industrial relations were particularly
developed and introduced as ‘stepping stones’ for future ‘advancement’ by
an indigenous state. This chapter examines the introduction of industrial
relations institutions and assesses their operations as well as their activities
since 1975.
Although the PNG industrial relations institutions have
changed very little since inception, the government and other social
partners have cultivated an atmosphere of a dynamic industrial relations
system, which is pluralistic in character. At the outset, the chapter
compares PNG with similar less developed countries and notes the devel-
opment of an open industrial relations system in PNG, despite some
imperfections. Moreover, it discusses the rather constrained environment
within which the state has evolved which inhibits it from improving the
effectiveness, and optimising the efficiency of, the industrial relations
system. The chapter concludes that although the country has not
‘advanced’ from the colonial government’s introduced institutions, the in-
corporation of the institutions has not been that easy and smooth in the
process of making the institutions work to everyone’s liking. In the future,
there is optimism that the industrial relations system would come of age
and play a significant role in the country’s economy and polity.
OVERVIEW
In most developed countries of the world, governments have established legal
frameworks for their societies, necessarily impacting on the area of industrial
relations. Theoretically, this impact of state or government on labour relations
takes the course of restoring power balance where there is inequity between
capital and labour. It is often perceived that the countries of the developed
west have promulgated a laissez-faire approach to both industrial relations
and economic management. This mode of approach allows the state to act
strictly as a referee in disputes between unions and management. A govern-
ment does this by utilising the installed state mechanisms (i.e. arbitration
tribunals) to address industrial disputes. Everything else is left to the contract
of employment or existing regulated terms and conditions of the respective
occupations to determine industrial relations practices.
The assumed minimalist approach of states in the west is not
equivalent to industrial relations practices in developing countries. In
order to enhance industrialisation right after independence, automatic
state intervention in industrial relations in most developing countries has
become more of an ‘indispensability’ than a constitutional obligation
(Caire, 1977; Siddique, 1989). Hence, in such countries, governments are
said to control every aspect of industrial relations in the supposedly best
interests of economic development. The crucial regulations and policies
that justify such intervention have been the handiwork of ‘development
obsessed’ and repressive regimes, or supposedly developmental states.
Much of these regulations are ‘home grown’ initiatives which have super-
seded outdated ones that colonial masters had utilised to extract capital
under the guise of dispensing development.
IMPOSITION OF AN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM
The Australian government imposed its system of industrial relations
together with other inseparable core institutions on the Territory of Papua
and New Guinea (TPNG). The other core institutions which were vital to
the function of the colony, included the legislature, judiciary, military,
administration and the economic system, which all had to accommodate
labour relations. It was anticipated that the new environment was to be
conducive to the emergence of a system of industrial relations. As one
observer puts it succinctly:
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In this sense the industrial relations system was part of the over-all
socio-political and economic development process formulated by
the colonial administration. Obviously, it was intended to settle
potential industrial disputes in the capitalist production process.
Hence, its effectiveness depended on the existence and prosperity of
other institutions such as education, judiciary, legislature, police,
agriculture and economic system (Gissua, 1993: 4).
In the TPNG, the industrial relations framework with its dispute
settlement process was introduced as a matter of urgency (Hess, 1982). It
did not derive from the making of any major industrial development
programmes or capital intensive industries nor major industrial unrests in
the Territory, but from international pressure and Australian domestic
politics. However, against bureaucratic advice and settler resistance, Paul
Hasluck, the Australian labour minister, moved away from the indentured
labour system and pushed for modern industrial relations legislation to be
introduced in the Territory. It was in 1963 that the two pieces of legislation
responsible for formally establishing the industrial relations machinery in
the TPNG were enacted and introduced. The Industrial Relations Act and
Industrial Organisations Act allowed for the existence of conciliation and
arbitration machinery, trade unions and employers organisations, respec-
tively. To Hasluck, the indigenous state was to develop its own system of
industrial relations and what he had done was to facilitate that process with
the initial enactment of the relevant Acts. As he put correctly, ‘he would
clear the path but let them walk it’ (Gissua, 1993: 4). In all fairness, the
industrial relations legislation was not relevant and practical at that time, as
nearly all the indigenous population was in the subsistence sector. But
Hasluck’s ingenuity and foresight has to be acknowledged for having the
initiative to establish core labour legislation, as colonies elsewhere never had
that luxury. However, the operation of the industrial relations system in the
post-colonial era in PNG was to reveal whether we have ‘followed the path’
or deviated from it.
OPERATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM
After political independence in 1975, PNG inherited the colonial indus-
trial relations machinery that had already been in force for some eleven
years. The industrial relations machinery was in theory established as an
avenue for the state, workers and employers to converge and settle labour
issues. However, in practice some unique problems have constrained each
of the parties, especially the union movement, in its endeavour to become
an effective partner in the industrial relations sphere. Nonetheless, the
union movement has demonstrated an ability to survive the demise of
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colonialism, and it continues to play an influential role in the nation’s
economic and political life as a partner in ‘pluralist’ bargaining arrange-
ments and as a largely independent ‘loyal opposition’ to employers and
government. The further development and operation of the industrial
relations system can be explained in the context of government institutions,
employers’ organisations and trade union development in the country.
THE ROLE OF THE STATE
Unlike many developing countries, the role of the state in the country’s
industrial relations system was developed and maintained within the
laissez-faire framework that is found mainly in the developed west, where
the economy and polity are kept almost separate. This is in contrast to
Siddique’s (1989) assertion that the state in developing countries has a
dominant position in influencing industrial relations policies, because of
weak market institutions.
Siddique (1989) and others (Crouch, 1977, 1979; Wiarda,
1981; Poole, 1984) characterise the dominance of the state in industrial
relations as ‘corporatist’. The political system in developing countries
allows the state to dominate both the industrial relations system and the
economy. Although PNG shares vast similarities with other developing
countries in having weak class formation, weak political organisation and a
dualistic economic structure, these characteristics have not helped shape a
strong state able to dominate the various groups in society (Collier, 1979:
366; Wesson, 1982). Among other reasons which will be discussed later,
the minimal role of the state in PNG in industrial relations is partly
because of the absence of the following factors: relevant and exclusive pro-
capital policies, a surplus skilled labour market, an expanding economy,
and dire poverty. These factors have come collectively to be the common
denominator of countries particularly in Asia and Latin America, where
the emergence of a strong interventionist state has occurred (Henley,
1979; Schregle, 1982; Leggett, 1988; Deyo, 1989; Ai, 1990). According to
Siddique’s (1989) model of the Third World industrial relations system,
the presence of these factors, coupled with a weak working class and
capitalist class, have allowed the state in the developing countries to play a
dominant role in both the economic and industrial relations system.
The PNG state’s role in industrial relations, however, does not
resemble Siddique’s model of the dominant state nor the interventionist
state, but is a pluralist state dealing only with its established institutions.
Its functions are in theory and practice performed in a laissez-faire
environment, allowing it only a minor role, which is surprising for a devel-
oping country. Similar to developed countries such as Australia, the role of
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the PNG state is threefold in its intervention in the industrial relations
system. Firstly, it legislates through parliament on the workplace by estab-
lishing substantive rules on leave, working hours, and in what form wages
should be paid. The state also creates the general economic environment of
industrial relations through its policies on such matters as incomes,
employment, inflation, and tariff protection. Secondly, being the largest
employer in the country, its wages and conditions paid to public servants
set standards, which affect wages and conditions in private industry. The
third role the state plays (which is more relevant to this part of the discus-
sion) is in the area of establishing procedural rules to limit the ways in
which employers and employees may conduct their negotiations and
disputes.
This administrative role of the state is in the hands of the
Department of Labour and Employment (DLE), which is the agent for
overseeing the productive relationship of workers and employers at the
workplace. Of the several objectives of the Department, administering the
laws pertaining to the employment relationship is the crux of its activities.
In PNG the two pieces of legislation which have the greatest impact on
the industrial relations system are the Industrial Relations Act and the
Industrial Organisations Act, both enacted in 1963 by the administration.
Only minor amendments have been made to these Acts. The former
allows workers to form their own unions and the latter allows establish-
ment of industrial relations processes such as Industry Councils, Boards of
Inquiry and direct negotiations as well as compulsory conciliation and
arbitration. These laws set up the voluntary framework for employers and
trade unions to meet together to settle disputes and to allow the state (in
this case, the DLE) to intervene in certain circumstances. But the
employers and unions are left to come up with viable agreements
governing the conditions of work.
In an effort to provide a more conducive industrial environment
and make existing industrial relations more productive, the DLE opened
up Provincial Labour Offices in the twenty provinces of the country. A
Provincial Labour Officer was responsible for labour disputes within the
province but industrial relations officers from Port Moresby attended
serious disputes. In a further move in 1972, the DLE created the Bureau
of Industrial Organisation (BIO). The BIO was established after recom-
mendations from the ILO to provide assistance to the fledgling union
movement. It had a statutory character and operated under a tripartite
Board of Management, which was allocated the task of helping workers to
form unions and educating the union officials on the workings of an
industrial relations system. But the BIO failed to achieve the objectives it
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had initially aspired to due to lack of funds and mixed reactions from the
already established unions, who saw it as a ‘puppet recruiting’ exercise by
government (Gissua, Interview, 21/4/94).
A subsequent initiative by the DLE was the establishment of the
Labour Advisory Council (LAC) of PNG which basically served to bring
about changes to some aspects of the Industrial Relations Act which the
three parties (government, employers and unions) felt needed attention.
Some of the changes included methods of improving industrial relations to
achieve high levels of employment and productivity (Daley, 1987: 32). In
1974, ironically, the LAC disbanded because the parties could not agree
on the proposed amendments (Gissua, 1993). Another attempt at making
amendments was made in 1982 by the DLE through a tripartite working
party, which arrived at some possible amendments. It went only as far as
getting read in Parliament and was then abandoned because the unions felt
some of the changes were detrimental to their growth and progress. The
latest attempt at amendments was in 1989, when the DLE once again
spearheaded the formation of a National Tripartite Council (NTC) which
was similar in function to the previous LAC. The current status of the
NTC is in an operational stage and encourages dialogue between employers,
government and trade unions on significant issues affecting the parties.
CONSTRAINTS ON THE STATE ROLE
There are several other reasons, which have also led to the rather mediocre
role of the state in industrial relations in the country. Firstly, it has been
constrained by an unreceptive and apathetic civil society. The role played
by the civil society, whether active or passive in acknowledging the
presence of the state in both the economic and industrial relations systems,
has not been articulated in Siddique’s (1989) model of the Third World
industrial relations system. Generally, Papua New Guineans’ ‘don’t care’
attitude to the state’s role in administrating the country differs significantly
from other developing countries. Much of this circumstance is the result of
the late advent of the cash economy. The conventional structure of PNG
society had no ethos of union organisations nor an economy that created
large numbers of ‘proletarians’ who survived by selling labour to the
capitalist. A working class ideology has been virtually absent apart from
nationalistic resentments against foreign companies (McGavin, 1991).
The great majority of wage earners enter employment because it provides
what is judged to be the most favourable alternative rather than the only
alternative. In such circumstances the state’s role in industrial relations has
been rather minimal and restricted to interacting with existing institutions.
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The general level of community acceptance of the state’s role in
industrial relations and other areas is not high in PNG. Hess (1989: 118)
observed that a ‘lack of familiarity’ and compliance with the directions of
the state (which is seen as an outside authority) has made the workers
generate ‘ambivalent attitudes’ regarding any government’s action as
‘government’s business’ and not ‘our concern’. This pattern of avoiding
commitments to the legitimate state has weakened the role of industrial
tribunal based industrial relations where the audience is the general
community.
Additionally, the state has not dealt with industrial relations
issues more urgently because there has been no pressure for it. A former
senior public servant claims that PNG unions are too weak to pose a threat
to government policies (Post-Courier, 6 May 1995). There have been a few
unions in the public and private sectors that have taken up industrial
action due to poor working conditions. But the bulk of the workforce
both in the public and private sectors is still content with the wages and
other conditions offered by their respective employers. Only on some
occasions, where the issue is other than that of working conditions, has the
state intervened in some chaotic situations to quell dissatisfied workers. In
Port Moresby a near majority of public service workers stood down from
work for a day in August 1988 as a result of law and order problems in the
city. This quickly led the PNG Parliament to pass stringent laws on crime
and robbery in the city and the entire country (Niugini Nius, 14 September
1988).
The state also bears partial responsibility for what seems to be
inactivity in the area of industrial relations. This is because some parts of
its own industrial relations machinery has been weak or has become
defunct and is therefore unable to adequately perform its role. Minimal
funding to the BIO and finally its abandonment has adversely affected the
Industrial Registrar and the Conciliation and Arbitration sections of the
DLE. In some respects it has been the parties who now provide informa-
tion regarding disputes to the industrial relations machinery which has
been unable to pursue its own assignment (Daley, 1987: 13).
Notwithstanding its constraints and weaknesses, the ability of
the state to influence industrial relations has been best demonstrated in the
wage tribunals over the years after independence. The wage fixation system
has so far been consistent, in which the state determines and sets the
minimum rural and urban wages. But the Minimum Wage Board (MWB)
with its increasing prestige and seminal effect on decisions has been simply
an adoption of the Australian model. The high wage structure (in contrast
to other similar developing countries in the region) has been consolidated
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and adjusted at various times over the years, however the question of
relevance and the ability of the country to sustain such a wage structure
has been the focus of reservations by economists (see Levantis, this volume).
It has only been recently that a deregulated wage system has
been created. In 1992 the MWB opted for a deregulation of the minimum
wage system by leaving the employer and employees more leeway in deter-
mining the wages at the workplace based on productivity and capacity to
pay. Similarly, the current wage system is aimed at generating more
employment opportunities especially for youths. The decision was reached
amid some controversy mainly from the trade unions that opposed the
determination on the basis that the new wage system was not socially and
economically adequate to cope with the ever-increasing cost of living in
the urban areas. They favoured the traditional wage fixation system, which
was tied to the CPI and argued strongly that it should be maintained in an
already expensive society. Despite the heated saga, in the end Government
and the various key employers successfully put pressure on the MWB to
decrease minimum wages to allow the economy to attain greater employ-
ment (Carrol, 1993).
Moreover the state has so far played an influential role in the
settlement of industrial disputes in the country. Being the single largest
employer of more than 63,000 public servants its maintenance of various
awards for its employees has been well kept and controlled through the
different branches of government. The public service tribunal and teaching
service tribunal respectively has effectively handled mainly wage issues for
public servants and teachers. In the private sector the state has intervened
and established boards of inquiries in attempts to settle serious industrial
disputes. The successful settlement of the Ok Tedi mine dispute in 1988,
the Air Niugini case in 1990 and numerous public service cases are signifi-
cant industrial dispute settlements the government has become involved in
over the last few years (Hess and Gissua, 1992).
EMPLOYER ORGANISATIONS
As in Australia, employers’ organisations fulfil two major functions. One is
to promote and represent the trade interests of their members. This is
done in PNG mainly by keeping an eye on the Government to make sure
that its policies are not detrimental to the trade of the members but
positively help and encourage it. The second function is to determine the
conditions upon which its members will employ labour. Depending upon
the circumstances, employers’ organisations vary in function from only
representing their members for commercial and trade interests to
performing as industrial relations agents for their members.
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In PNG the Employers’ Federation of PNG (EFPNG) registered
as an industrial organisation in 1963 and was one of the first four bodies
to be registered under the Industrial Organisation Act. The organisation
originated in the late 1950s when it acted as the mouthpiece for its
members in the territory (Daley, 1987: 160). Currently the federation has
ten members whose commercial activities are diverse, although all fall in
some important sectors of the economy. The federation has been a
unifying force acting for all the major employers in PNG, particularly in
industrial matters. However, over the past few years large companies have
been taking over industrial relations functions and, as a consequence, its
influence has declined. There is also the Port Moresby Chamber of
Commerce whose membership of fifteen includes representatives of
businesses in the wholesale and retail, hospitality and construction indus-
tries in the city. It also has sister organisations in other major provincial
towns. This group has not been industrially active but it has represented its
members’ interests in MWB hearings.
Another significant group of employers is the Papua New
Guinea Planters’ Association. This group comprises members mainly from
the agriculture sector. It has remained a powerful lobby group for some
years particularly on the MWB and has represented its members at fact
finding meetings held by the government on issues affecting the agricul-
ture industry (Daley, 1987: 162). Recently the Papua New Guinea
Chamber of Manufacturers has registered as an employer’s organisation. It
only represents a few members in small manufacturing industry and its
role so far has been restricted to lobbying (DLE, 1994: 23).
The PNG Chamber of Mines and Petroleum (CMP) represents
the mining industry. With an office in Port Moresby and an executive
officer at its head, CMP is the mouthpiece of the companies in the mining
and petroleum sector (there are only two current petroleum projects in the
country). The organisation is made up of 115 companies which includes
the companies operating in the mines and the support companies whose
business relates entirely to mining and petroleum. The role of CMP is
non-industrial. It fulfils several functions with the aim of serving the inter-
ests of the members. It mainly liases and consults with government on
matters pertaining to the industry and also engages in public relations
exercises. The Chamber also gives priority to the promotion of education
and training at all levels and sponsors training schemes at universities and
colleges. Conferences and seminars on topics and issues relating to the
industry are also coordinated and run by the organisation (PNG
Resources, 1994: 3). Industrial relations matters have, however, become
largely the preserves of the individual management in the mining projects.
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The mines have single-handedly been representing their position in major
industrial disputes with close backing from parent organisations and joint
venture partners. They have signed new awards for workers in close associ-
ation with relevant unions and the DLE (PNGTUC, 1995: 23).
TRADE UNIONS
The development of trade unionism in developing countries differed
significantly from that in developed countries. According to Siddique
(1989: 390) the very different process of industrialisation, social formation
and economic structure have hampered the proletarianisation of the
workers of developing countries. Because of the restricted economic devel-
opment during the colonial period, there remained a dual economy, which
still continues in most developing countries. The dual economy, a surplus
labour market, and pro-capital government policies have reduced the
economic bargaining power of the working class, forcing them to supple-
ment their earnings from the subsistence sector. It is in these circumstances
that workers have formed trade unions which often have to battle many
other obstacles, including colonialism, culture, tribalism, and politics to
stay committed to representing the workers’ needs (Taylor, 1979: 238).
The emergence and development of unionism in PNG provides us with
an example of the hardships and struggles workers have gone through to
form and maintain unions in the face of adversity.
Trade unionism formally began in PNG after the enactment of
the 1963 Industrial Relations Act and Industrial Organisations Act by the
colonial government. Unions replaced the ethnically based welfare societies
that had sprung up in the towns during the 1950s as Papua New Guineans
struggled to come to terms with an urban lifestyle and permanent wage
labour. Several former regional workers’ associations (such as the Kerema
Welfare Society and the Western Welfare Society) were the first to register
as unions under the Industrial Organisations Act. Only three such workers’
organisations have attracted detailed study (Metcalf, 1968; Stevenson,
1968; Hess, 1982). Out of these studies there emerges a common picture of
capable, ambitious leaders who led the unions and often quickly moved on
to the national political stage. There was very little grassroots contact by
these leaders with the result that the unions were unable to represent their
workers in mundane workplace matters. Basic clerical tasks such as
conducting annual elections and audits were never completed and the
unions were far from meeting their obligations under the Industrial
Organisations Act. However, they were not deregistered, but were propped
up by the DLE to fulfil, on paper at least, the tripartite requirements of the
industrial relations system (Interview, Apmeledy, 6 March 1994).
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The failure to develop effective unionism in the 1960s and
1970s has prompted various commentators to identify reasons for this
situation. Reasons range from poor leadership (Chapman, 1965), colonial
background (Rowley, 1968), and ‘misconceptions’ about how unions
should operate (Patterson, 1969), to workers’ lack of education (Bailey,
1970). This poor level of union development undermined the industrial
relations system’s potential for dispute resolution and wage fixing (Isaac,
1969). But there are a few exceptional organisations, which have devel-
oped both the membership and leadership prerequisites for effective
operation within the system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration
(Spaull, 1974; Hess, 1986).
In fact, there were a total of 142 trade unions registered between
1963 and 1996 (Imbun, 1999). Of the 142 registered, only a very few
managed to actually perform their industrial role of attending to member
needs and expectations. A lot of them merely existed on paper for a brief
period and quickly disappeared into oblivion. In fact this seemed to be the
trend up until the 1990s. This happened for a number of reasons. The first
is the extremely small size of the unions with only nine having more than
500 members at the time of their registration. For the rest it was not finan-
cially viable to adequately represent members against well-established
employers’ organisations. The second is the significant number of unions
with a regionally located membership. These particular unions were ineffi-
cient and failed to exist as viable industrial organisations because they had
a membership whose jobs were irregular and their membership declined
dramatically as companies and government departments ceased to operate
in these particular areas. Moreover, there were a few notable exceptions
like the Bougainville Catholic Teachers’ Association whose membership
covered teachers on the island (Badely, 1982). Finally, the general
membership composition of many unions was not steady but subject to
fluctuations with the result that the unions’ organisational capacity was
adversely affected. All these problems contributed to the malfunction of
the overall trade union movement in the country. However, some unions,
which did manage to survive, have subsequently consolidated their
membership strength by including new member intakes that are mainly
from the public sector and a few in the private sector, such as mining.          
After independence in 1975 only a handful of unions began to
use the newly installed industrial relations system. The Public Service
Association and the Teachers’ Association were organisationally competent,
while in the private sector only the Bougainville unions and the Central
District Waterside Workers’ Union were able to represent their members’
interest. Other unions were able to participate in the industrial relations
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system at the level of award making through the intervention of leaders
absent from the workplaces. Members of these unions received flow-ons
from major awards as periodic minimum wages increased (Hess, 1986: 42).
Only a few unions had the ability to negotiate over a wide range of issues
and to sometimes use industrial action to achieve gains. However, with the
introduction of MWBs (the centrepiece of the wage fixing system) in the
early 1970s, these same unions were able to advocate successfully. The
outcomes had a seminal effect and other unions had to apply to have their
awards altered to abide by the new national minimums (TUC, 1979).
PEAK UNION COUNCILS
Attempts to establish a peak union organisation began in the mid-1960s.
It was mainly initiated by the colonial government to bring the regional
workers’ associations together into a territory-wide federation (Hess,
1988). There were to be two crucial roles played by this peak union
council. The first was the industrial role in which it was to represent the
interests of workers in the newly created industrial relations system. As the
colonial state interpreted it, such a central body was to provide the much-
needed balance in making the newly established industrial relations system
work. This was simply because there were few unions capable of acting as
representatives of workers in the formal proceedings of conciliation and
arbitration. Dwyer (1972) explains that the belief was that a central organ-
isation would have greater potential than the tiny regional associations for
fulfilling the role ascribed to unions by the government.
The colonial state also wanted the national union organisation
to play a political role in the transition to independence. This role was
necessary because the colony lacked both national institutions and
national leadership, as the colonial state was minimally prepared for the
eventual transfer of power. In such a situation, the establishment of a
national peak union council had particular significance for the broader
political process as well as for the individual union leaders who were
attempting to make their mark on national politics (Interview, Dembo,
12 March 1994).
With the assistance of the colonial state the Federation of
Workers’ Association (FWA) was established in early 1970. Initially, the
FWA’s function was mainly to be that of lobbying for more indigenous
representation in the 1970 MWB, where only two Papua New Guineans
were appointed as members: John Guise and Paulus Arek, two of the most
experienced indigenous politicians, both representing themselves as
champions of workers rights. They declared that the era of cheap labour in
PNG was over and that workers must be treated as ‘people and not as
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slaves’ (Post-Courier, January 1970). This incident shows the political
importance of these industrial issues and indicates the extent to which the
new generation of indigenous politicians was to go beyond the spheres of
the industrial relations arena. With a combination of political ambition
and rhetoric they used their positions in the House of Assembly to make
‘an effort to ensure that the voice of the workers is adequately heard in the
highest councils of the land’ (Arek, 1970: 8).
In practice the FWA’s achievements were limited to those it
could make through a bureaucratic mode of operation. Again it had to rely
on the presence of the colonial labour bureaucracy. Literally the
Department of Labour in the colonial era provided everything from office
space to support staff. The FWA sponsored two industrial actions, which
brought about a 50 cent per week increase for workers and a second flow-
on of $3.50 per member of urban unions from the 1972 MWB decision.
There were those critics who quickly pointed out that the FWA had
achieved very little and therefore had become inactive and existed merely
as another political avenue to consolidate power (Langmore, 1973: 169).
However, for the Department of Labour officials the eventual establish-
ment of the peak council meant the existence of a body with which it
could liaise in order to facilitate the smooth operation of the infant indus-
trial relations system. For the politicians, it was an institution that they
could be proud of, where they could be seen to lead the aspirations of the
indigenous working class. In reality the FWA was frustrated by a lack of
genuine worker participation and achieved very little for both the politi-
cians and the bureaucrats and for the workers at the level of their
workplaces (Hess, 1992: 148). It existed in a weakened state throughout
the 1970s and early 1980s until the formation of the Papua New Guinea
Trade Union Congress (PNGTUC).
By the end of the 1970s the TUC existed as a nationally effec-
tive organisation under the leadership of Tony Ila. Effectiveness was visible
in the expansion of affiliates and the attraction of funds from government
and international sources. However, as an organisation geared towards
providing the base for a genuine union movement, it was frustrated by its
lack of attention to advocating industrial issues. It appeared in some
MWB hearings where flow-ons were gained from decisions for its affili-
ates. Moreover, overall, the organisation functioned to aid one person, Ila,
in his quest for political office and financial grants were largely used in his
electorate to fund various community projects (PNGTUC, 1976: 5).
The TUC in the late 1980s was in a better position for the first
time for many years under the full-time general secretary Lawrence
Titimur and the ICFTU trade union adviser, Harry Sandrasekera. Titimur
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was an able media user and often made press releases on issues relevant to
the workers. Though most of these were plain remarks and rhetoric, at
least it created the impression among the public that ‘at last the unions are
doing something’ (Interview, Gissua, 6 March 1994). In the meantime the
TUC, under this reformed leadership, attracted more affiliates. Several
unions including the Ilimo Workers’ Union, Ok Tedi Mining Workers
Union (OTMWU), and the Burns Philip Citizen Staff Association joined
the TUC. Some of these unions had earlier sought TUC assistance in
setting up their organisations. The reformed TUC demonstrated the
capacity to provide both administrative and technical assistance in such
areas as registration and award negotiations and made sure the members
received appropriate wages. In return those unions whose members had
benefited from such assistance became the strongest supporters of the new
TUC leadership.
The next couple of years saw the TUC consolidating its position
as a truly national peak union organisation. Former fence-sitters such as
the Public Employees’ Association (PEA) and the Teachers’ Association
(TA) made moves to join the TUC. The latter actually sought affiliation
and Titimur called it an ‘historic’ occasion. PEA’s affiliation fees amounted
to K18,722 for the year (Post Courier, June 1987). This represented a third
of the TUC’s budget, and with the eventual affiliation of the TA boosting
the TUC’s membership to 20,000, financial independence for the peak
organisation was nearing a reality. This funding from affiliates was reliable,
unlike the funding from relatively strong unions such as the Waterside
Workers’ and Seamen’s Union and the BMWU which had not been
meeting their financial obligations to the TUC over the years. With
improved financial and industrial strength of a revived union movement,
Titimur was able to claim with justice that the ‘TUC had gained greater
legitimacy in the eyes of government’, employer organisations and the
general public (Interview, Paska, 19 November 1995).
The fragile cooperation of the major unions, however, was
short-lived. During the 1990s the TUC was reduced to its former days of
disorganisation and fragmentation. The PEA and the TA pulled out
suddenly from the TUC claiming policy differences and personality
clashes. What in fact occurred was disagreement over the allocation of
TUC executive positions, none of which were allocated to representatives
from the two large unions. The larger unions also felt their financial
contributions had gone to ‘rescue’ the TUC’s activities but that in return
they had gained very little. Their officials openly stated their organisations
‘don’t need the TUC’ (Post-Courier, August 1991). From then on they
conducted their own affairs. The final blow to the effectiveness of the
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TUC was the sudden resignation of Titimur in 1987 to contest the general
elections for parliament. With an under strength executive and a small
number of affiliates, the TUC in the 1990s and 2000s continues to
function in a rather mediocre way under John Paska, who is now the
general secretary.
The PNG experience shows that its industrial relations institu-
tions are under-utilised because the key players are either weak or
restricted by many factors beyond their control in fully representing their
members’ interests. Unlike other developing countries where such a situa-
tion has allowed the state to monopolise power and control every aspect of
industrial relations (Siddique, 1989), in PNG the absence of pro-capital
policies and relatively weak unions has prevented this. Notwithstanding
the constraints, the ability of the state to influence industrial relations has
been felt in the staffing of wage tribunals over the years, but this falls short
of the authoritarian intervention characteristic of other Third World
labour relations systems.
CONCLUSION
After more than two decades of independence and some thirty-eight years
after the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act and Industrial
Organisations Act, the PNG industrial relations system has achieved some
maturity. However, it has done that in a rather constrained industrial and
economic environment. Generally, the workings of the industrial relations
system have come to reflect the whole problematic situation of other
service-orientated institutions in the country. In theory, there is the
Australian style conciliation and arbitration system in existence, but, in
practice, unions have remained weak and they have been unable to use the
industrial relations system to their advantage. The struggle of the TUC to
establish itself as the mouthpiece of the trade union movement in the
country, amid the narrow perception of some workers and the policy
differences of leaders, shows just how hard it is to exist as a viable peak
union organisation in a newly developing country with fragile post-colonial
institutions.
Surprisingly for a newly developing country, however, PNG is
something of an exception with the legal and political framework which
allows for a pluralistic environment that encourages the exercise of
freedom of association, collective bargaining and the right to strike. The
right to strike therefore is not seen as a barrier to economic development.
The competing parties produce decisions of industrial and political
consensus. However, when contrasted with a number of developing
countries PNG’s industrial relations system is enviable, to say the least. In
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these countries it is usually the state and employers that excerise unbridled
authority over unions and labour. For example, in the neighbouring
South-East Asian countries there is very little participation by trade unions
in their industrial relations system, which are strongly governed by author-
itarian states. Often solutions are offered whenever there is an industrial
dispute between unions and employers, which reflects the paternalistic
style of government. Negotiated outcomes often reflect the achievement of
a pluralistic consensus by both parties.
As experienced, the parties to the PNG industrial relations
system operate as equal partners in a tripartite arrangement. They have
their own structural and organisational weaknesses but their commitment
and dedication to acknowledging and advocating for an independent
industrial relations system is encouraging. The roles the unions, employers
and state play in upholding and making use of the existing industrial
relations system differ according to the expectations and wishes of the
constituencies they represent.
Trade unions operate as independent institutions in the indus-
trial relations system very much in the pluralist tradition. Generally, the
PNG state and the employers accept unions as part of the industrial
landscape, which allows them to resolve industrial issues through the
industrial bargaining process. This, in turn, consolidates the pluralistic
relationship. Although unions may be organisationally weak, they enjoy a
wide range of worker and state support which places them as equals in the
bargaining environment with employers. Union leaders are very much part
of the economic and political decision-making process where they appear
on Boards and other organs of the state decision-making apparatus.
Hence, they play an influential role in both political and economic aspects
of the country.
Although rough and rudimentary, PNG’s industrial relations
machinery is independent and focused on collective bargaining and indus-
trial tribunals and so warrants the epithet ‘pluralistic’, and in this sense is
also somewhat ‘exceptional’ when contrasted to labour systems in similar
developing countries. Despite weakness and constraints in the industrial
relations system, the country has ‘walked on the path’ Hasluck had paved
some thirty-eight years ago. However, the ‘walk’ has not been easy and
smooth as the stakeholders have witnessed, there is optimism that in the
long run the pillars of the industrial relations system will continue to
function as they have been doing for the last thirty-eight years.
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ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT IN




Twenty-five years of independence in Papua New Guinea is a time of
celebration and reflection. Reflection continues for many concerned Papua
New Guineans, who ponder over the state of affairs in the country over
the last twenty-five years, as such development, its outcomes and other
related issues continue to be the focus of discussion. The deep concern
that is currently being expressed is that after the next twenty-five years
when Papua New Guineans sit back to reflect on its golden jubilee, the
development scenario of the present must not be the case.
Papua New Guinea has always been regarded as a potentially
rich country because of its mineral and oil wealth, its tropical climate, the
ready availability of cultivatable land, its immense water resources, and the
rich biodiversity of its forests and fisheries. However, in the years since
independence while the overall wealth of the nation has increased in real
terms, this increase has been accompanied by an increased gap between
rich and poor. At the same time the benefits of the utilization of Papua
New Guinea resources have been inequitably shared. One of the major
causes for concern is the fact that financial prosperity has been achieved
with unacceptable levels of environmental degradation and destruction,
thereby robbing opportunities for future generations.
DEVELOPMENT IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA TODAY
Development in PNG has not been without its success stories and it is
appropriate to highlight some of these achievements. The maintenance of
a strong political tradition has been one of the country’s strengths. PNG
has been able to successfully hold elections and form new governments
every five years. A continuous improvement in health and social condi-
tions has taken place: for example, life expectancy at birth has vision from
47 years in 1970 to 56 years in 1993; and despite high population growth
rates the number of physicians (1:100,000) and nurses per capita has
remained constant. PNG has also joined a select group of countries that
have been pronounced polio free since 1997 by the World Health
Organisation (Post Courier, October 2000: 4). A strong increase in access
to education has also occurred although this is offset by the concern that
this increase has not corresponded to an increase in the quality of educa-
tion, and that many young people are still being denied the opportunity to
be formally educated. 
Observations concerning development in PNG are made in
following manner. Development is generally described as lagging, uneven,
stagnant and even backward in some areas of the country. Development
definitely cannot be described as having been environmentally friendly in
most situations; the forestry industry and large natural resource develop-
ment projects such as mining have been highlighted in these instances.
Development is seen as overstretching resources, especially financial. In
short, despite the success stories, the summary of the development process
in Papua New Guinea is that the broader picture shows that development
continues to be unsustainable. In relation to the environment, develop-
ment has tended to destroy the environment rather than to work towards
an ecological sustainability.
After twenty years of independence, an appraisal was made of
the ‘environmental friendliness’ of current developmental practices as part
of a wider study of development generally in Papua New Guinea Planning
the New Century Committee (1998). The Committee concluded that
there were real problems in relation to current development practices. The
unsustainable use of natural resources was a major cause of concern for the
committee, so much so that it was prompted to note that:
The 4NGDP [National Goal and Directive Principle] commits the
Nation to sustainable resource management and to intergenera-
tional equity to ensure that present generations did not use the
environment in a destructive way for their own use and leave a
degraded environment for future generations.
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Over the last twenty years, a considerable proportion of PNG
wealth has been generated from the utilisation of PNG’s natural
resources, particularly petroleum and mineral resources and
through the logging of PNG’s forests.
In some areas PNG’s natural resources have been ruthlessly
destroyed by largely foreign companies which have not contributed
sufficiently to PNG’s prosperity through vertical integration and
transfer pricing arrangements which have minimised tax paid in
PNG. They have been permitted to do so by a corrupt and selfish
political leadership which has facilitated such short term plundering
of PNG’s natural resource heritage (Planning the New Century
Committee, 1998: 67).
These findings served to confirm and strengthen what was
already common knowledge to many Papua New Guineans who had felt
that there was something terribly wrong with the development process.
A case in point that needs to be mentioned here is the issue of the
Bougainville crisis. Some of the contributing factors to the crisis emanate
from the fundamental issue of environmental destruction as a consequence
of the Bougainville Copper Limited activities; perhaps even more funda-
mental is the question of who owns the development process? and who
stands to benefit from any development that is to occur? The position
taken by Bougainvilleans on these issues is actually prompting other Papua
New Guineans to take a position too, particularly on the issue of overall
ownership of the development process. 
Linking development to the environment is a major task that is
undertaken by all concerned development practitioners. The physical health
of the environment needs to be able to support all life forms within its
system, if the balance is altered then some life forms will have to die to make
way for a new balance. Environmental degradation today does not occur
according to the normal flow of events, rather it happens when the balance is
altered. Once the balance is altered the current quality of life is not
maintained, but starts a catastrophic downward spiral, which triggers a
negative effect on all life forms within that particular ecosystem. The environ-
ment as a subsystem of a broader system should therefore become an
important stakeholder in the development process (Turare and Kavanamur,
1999: 25).
ENVIRONMENT ON THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
The environment has been an integral part of PNG’s official development
agenda since the early 1970s. The Constitutional Planning Committee
(CPC), in its deliberations and consultations in framing the Constitution
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of Papua New Guinea, made specific recommendations on the subject of
the environment in 1972. The CPC’s approach to the environment was to
link the central elements of Papua New Guinea society, namely the people,
to their environment and resources. The Preamble of the Constitution
contains five National Goals and Directive Principles, which in totality is the
state policy of Papua New Guinea (Constitutional Review Commission,
1996). 
In his contribution to PNG’s response to the UN Conference
on Environment and Development in Port Moresby, Professor Lance Hill
of the University of Papua New Guinea made the following introduction
when referring to PNG’s development vision:
The Constitutional Planning Committee tabled their report in the
House of Assembly in 1974. The proposals were based on an
unprecedented process of consultation and consensus throughout
the country. Skillfully interwoven, the National Goals and Directive
Principles — with an emphasis on integral human development,
equality and participation, self-reliance, conservation of the
environment and natural resources and the use of Papua New
Guinean forms of social, political and economic organisation —
form a powerful statement of the type of society our country aspires
to and a fine antecedent statement on sustainable development. The
heady exhilaration of those early days passed sometime ago (The
PNG Response to Rio, 1992 : 75).
The inclusion of the fourth goal of the National Goals and
Directive Principles was deliberate on the part of the CPC to address what
had been foreseen as a potential area for abuse in future development. This
goal calls for the wise use and management of natural resources and the
environment:
We declare our fourth goal to be for Papua New Guinea’s natural
resources and environment to be conserved and used for the collec-
tive benefit of us all, and be replenished for the benefit of generations. 
We accordingly call for:
1. wise use to be made of our natural resources and the environ-
ment in and on the land or seabed, in the sea, on the land,
and in the air, in the interests of our development and in the
trust for future generations; and
2. the conservation and replenishment, for the benefit of
ourselves and prosperity, of the environment and its sacred,
scenic and historical qualities; and 
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3. all necessary steps to be taken to give adequate protection to
our valued birds, animals, fish, insects, plants and trees.
The environmental policy in Papua New Guinea contains the
fundamental ingredients of ecological sustainable development. Terms such
as ‘wise use’, ‘replenishment’, ‘for future generations’, ‘adequate protection’
and ‘conservation’ integrate the principles and goals of ecologically 
sustainable development.
The CPC saw the need to join these for what they defined as
proper development or what is currently defined as ecologically sustainable
development. In so doing, the CPC treated the environment as part and
parcel of a development process that would maximize benefits accruing to
everyone from the exploitation of natural resources. This in effect recog-
nized the nature of natural resources, and the inter-generational nature of
usage of those resources. Therefore the CPC intended that the use of
natural resources could not justify environmental degradation, which not
only involves the destruction of land, rivers and wildlife but also impedes
the need for the integral development of people. For the CPC, unsustain-
able development practices, and development that neglects the human face
of Papua New Guinea, would have dire consequences for future develop-
ment in PNG.
Since independence in 1975, a policy document entitled ‘The
Environment and Conservation Policy — A Statement of Principles’ was
adopted by Parliament in 1977. 
This policy relates to the wise use and management of the
environment, and is divided into three parts. Part 1 sets out the introduc-
tion, the key element reads ‘Development must be ecologically, socially
and culturally suitable for Papua New Guinea and her people’. Part 2
declares the environmental responsibility of the people in their pursuit of
development and Part 3 spells out the environmental principles to be
taken into account when planning for development (Constitutional
Review Commission, 1996: 13). The environmental policy sets out very
noble principles of environmental management. However, it lacks the
necessary structural framework for its implementation.1
Despite these statements and the commendable efforts on the
part of the state to declare a forward looking environmental protection
policy with the relevant legislation, the inclusion of environment and
conservation in the constitution, the enactment of a series of environ-
mental protection laws and the signing of the South Pacific Convention
on Environmental protection, there remain today serious problems in the
sustainable management of our natural resources. 
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1 This point was clearly highlighted in the Constitutional Review Commission, Interim Report on
the Constitution and Management of Natural Resources: 30.
An examination of the environmental policy reveals that it does
adopt and promote the ecologically sustainable development concept. The
Constitutional Review Commission’s review of the environmental policy
indicated that the policy is in ‘broad terms and lacks any concrete frame-
work for implementation’ (Kwa, 1997: 5). In other words, the
environmental policy could not be effectively implemented because it had
not been given the relevant tools. There are a number of factors that have
effectively restricted the active implementation of ecologically sustainable
development. Two of these were identified by the Constitutional Review
Commission as (1) mismanagement of the natural resources and environ-
ment by successive governments; and (2) lack of constitutional support of
ecologically sustainable development in its substantive provisions (Kwa,
1997: 3). The other factors are lack of political will, lack of expertise in
environmental management and lack of funding. Together these factors
pose momentous obstacles in including a practicable environmental
perspective in the development process of Papua New Guinea.
MISMANAGED DEVELOPMENT PROCESS INSTIGATING
ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION: EFFECTS ON THE
COMMUNITY
The impact of the development process is seen most clearly at the commu-
nity level. The availability of basic health services can make a big difference
in the lives of villagers for whom basic health care is a luxury. Likewise, the
availability of teachers in rural areas can make a big difference in rural life
and is an important service that starts the cycle of human and social devel-
opment in the local area. 
The successes and failures of all decisions ought to be measured
at the community level based on how they impact on rural livelihoods. If,
for example, a decision is not being implemented and the effects are not
recorded, then the difficulty needs to be rectified. In other words, there
should be impact indicators developed so as to facilitate clear feedback
signals. Examples of possible indicators are abundant in service delivery
and the mechanisms dealing with citizen’s representation. Decisions and
practices that have detrimental effects at the community level have
rippling effects on social, cultural, economic and political spheres of influ-
ence. It is therefore important to note that the nature of development
impacts most significantly within the local community. For example, if the
Gross National Product is acceptable by international standards, but the
vast majority of Papua New Guineans in communities continue to live
without enough food and drink dirty water daily, then clearly develop-
ment benefits are not being equally distributed.
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The state of health in an environment directly affects the quality
of life in the community. The importance of the environment becomes
clearer when the intimate relationship between the environment and
people is taken into account. In PNG, as is the case with communities
throughout the world who coexist with the natural environment, percep-
tions of their well-being and their very existence in the world is ruled by
the nature of the environment they live in. Alterations to the physical
environment generate chain effects throughout the human communities
that depend upon a particular ecosystem for their livelihood. Put simply,
the well-being of such communities depends on the health of the environ-
ments within which they live.
Despite the forward looking policies that subsequent PNG
governments have espoused, policies have not ensured the ‘wise use’ of our
natural resources. This has led to the destruction of many pristine ecosys-
tems in the country. Ecologically Sustainable Development or
development that is environmentally friendly was initiated at independ-
ence. The fundamental difficulty with Ecologically Sustainable
Development in Papua New Guinea is its application. At the root of this
difficulty are the fundamental choices that are being made. Successive
PNG governments are faced with the dilemma of choosing Ecologically
Sustainable Development (development that places priority on environ-
mental health) or steaming ahead with development at the cost of
environmental degradation. Experience has shown that despite the inclina-
tion of the governments to accept the former strategy, the latter continues
to predominate, leading to numerous environmental disasters. The
Government’s piecemeal approach to natural resource management
continues to compromise the health of the environment for the benefit of
the minority. Instead of integrating ecologically sustainable development
practices into the existing mining and petroleum projects, or even across
the board covering all natural resource projects, the Government has
instead opted to concentrate on forestry and fisheries projects which result
in less environmental degradation. The Government has continually failed
to recognise that environmental degradation cannot be readily quantified
in terms of economic benefits, such as those derived from the exploitation
of a natural resource.
The devastating effect of the government’s irresponsibility is felt
most severely within the community by the vast majority of people who live
lifestyles that revolve around communally owned land and sea resources.
The case of the Middle Fly people in the Western Province and their plight
as victims of the environmental injustices emanating from the mismanage-
ment of the Ok Tedi mine is a case in point. In this situation, the choice is
between closing the mine operations now or sometime in the future. The
choice has already been made by the government. Minister for Mining, Sir
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Michael Somare made the views of the government clear that mine closure
before 2010 was not an option. The landowners themselves have stated
clearly that OTML (Ok Tedi Mining Limited) can close until they (OTML)
have given ‘something’ (meaning development) back to the people. 
FLY RIVER, SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL REGION
The Middle Fly floodplain is 15–20 km wide. This area is a mosaic of
lakes, alluvial forest, swamp grassland and swamp savanna. These include
Papua New Guinea’s largest lake, Lake Murray. There is extraordinary
diversity of the freshwater fish species of the Fly wetlands, with at least 105
species from 33 families which make the fish fauna of the Fly River system
the most diverse in the Australasian region (Roberts, 1978: 20).


























































The people of this area have a special ecological adaptation to a
distinctive environment: that of the lagoons. The key resources here are
sago swamps, fish, reptile and avifauna in the lagoons and lagoon inlets,
and the macropods, cassowaries and other game animals of the bush tracts
behind the lagoons. The Boazi and Zimakani people, in particular, are
occasionally described as following a hunter-gatherer way of life, but in
reality all peoples of the area are gatherer-hunter-horticulturalists:
‘gathering’ consists mainly of processing sago at distinctly located sago
swamps; ‘hunting’ includes a range of hunting methods and fishing with
nets, traps and line; and ‘horticulture’ is anything from opportunistic
planting of bananas in small patches in settlement areas and along river-
banks to more systematic lagoon-fringe gardening and tree-cropping
among the Suki (people from further down the river).
The environmental degradation which the Fly River has under-
gone as a result of the dumping of mine waste by OTML has destroyed many
important sections of the river’s ecosystem. Some of the environmental effects
are the flooding of riverine gardens, deep muddiness of sago swamps, and so
on. As a result of this activity, the lifestyles of river communities have been
affected adversely. For the Yongomm, Boazi and Zimakani people, the Fly
River is a ‘dying’ river and for them this also means that life has changed
irreversibly for them and their children.
Burton (1995) sought the opinion of the Middle Fly villagers on
their prospects. He asked these people, What do the your troubles boil
down to? From the responses given by the villagers, the focus of villagers
everywhere is on the deterioration of their situation. Burton’s summary
was that, according to the answers they gave, the respondents perceived all
their troubles arose from the following three sources (1995: 59):
PROBLEMS OF THE GOVERNMENT: we remember the
optimism of the pre-mine days around Independence when the
government officials led us to believe we would at last see develop-
ment in our area, but none of this has occurred and all we see of it
is big money figures for someone else, somewhere else — in fact we
are worse off than we ever were;
PROBLEMS OF THE VILLAGE: we occasionally get opportuni-
ties for development, but we never get anywhere because we cannot
sort out our village problems, we are ‘jumping over one another’ —
we were better off before Independence when the mamus (kiap)
simply laid down the law;
PROBLEMS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: we used to have a
pristine environment, but the mine waste has caused changes clearly
observable to us all — it was better before the mine.
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Burton qualifies these responses in the following terms. It is true
that the government has neglected the province as a whole. Therefore in
many parts of the Middle Fly area villagers are condemned to ‘jump over
one another’ because the limited resources available for development are
misapplied and because no agency other than the two churches (the
Catholic and the Evangelical Church of Papua) that operate here possess
basic social planning skills. The period 1984–1994 in Western Province
saw substantial windfall monies from the Ok Tedi project flowing into the
Western Province Government, but with no lasting effects for the people
in those districts (Burton, 1993: 60). The environment is one of the three
sources of woe for villagers. Each concern no doubt is sufficiently impor-
tant on its own to pose a threat to livelihood in that area.
Burton wrote the following comment on development in the
Middle Fly in his report (1993: 27): 
By any reckoning, the Middle Fly villages are surrounded by
bountiful natural resources. Opportunities would seem to exist,
therefore, for a dramatic improvement in living standards. Yet no
one who visits this area can fail to be struck by the absolute lack of
progress in achieving the most modest social development goals.
The Fly catchment has, by comparison with other remote areas
in Papua New Guinea, experienced relatively rapid development and
arguably, progress. However, this has been brought about almost exclu-
sively through the spin-offs of technologically intensive and commercially
dominated enclave developments. No other development models have
received anything other than cursory attempts at application within the
Fly catchment. The knowledge that the current enclave developments are
likely to be transitory and the lack of tried and tested alternatives is the
crux of the current dilemma.
Having set the wider stage on the current state of environment
and development in the Middle Fly. The discussion will now focus on the
community and the situation as it is today in the Middle Fly in relation to
the issues at hand. In real terms, environmental destruction of the river
system means that these villagers have been affected profoundly, for them
they are payers of development or progress for the rest of Papua New
Guinea.
MIDDLE FLY VILLAGERS’ VIEWS ON THEIR 
ENVIRONMENT
Many of the statements made by villagers have yet to be verified by officials.
However, are the communities along the Middle Fly supposed to wait for
this confirmation before some action is taken? Or should these communities
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use the changes to their current way of life as indicators of the status of
environmental health? The former has been the strategy adopted by consec-
utive PNG governments, OTML and other stakeholders as a delay tactic.
While action has been delayed for one reason or another, the result has
been that the environment in the Middle Fly continues to deteriorate. The
result is that the ability of the environment to sustain life forms and act as a
natural sink is on the wane. This is the environmental reality, despite
official reports from OTML that water is of drinking quality and marine
life is not sufficiently affected to cause concern.
It is obvious that in the Middle Fly, a level of intense negative
environmental alteration has occurred. The following gives a brief descrip-
tion of the environmental situation. Dieback has occurred in areas of
prolonged flooding. Build-up of sedimentation in the riverbed has resulted
in the river overflowing its banks and the shallowing of the actual river and
the blocking of smaller river channels normally used as breeding grounds
by fish and other river species. The effect on food sources is devastating, as
the overflowing has resulted in the destruction of riverine gardens and sago
swamps. The increased levels of copper and other metals in the river
system is showing in the food chain of the wildlife with villagers reporting
that they often find small black balls in the intestines of fish (especially
barramundi), while deer and wild pig are reported to have pusslike liquid
and a terrible stench from their flesh soon after being killed. Villagers also
report that harvested sago is no longer at the level of the quantity and
quality as it used to be, and the riverine garden produce that has survived
is not fit for human consumption. The water is not fit for drinking and
washing; and there are health complaints of severe stomach problems and
skin diseases shortly after usage. Villagers who claim that these areas and
sources are unsafe for drinking or even for dwelling have in extreme cases
moved their homes further inland or no longer use these areas as sources of
food, because they fear for their own and their children’s health. 
When villagers make these statements they are referring to felt
changes in their societies. For these people, life is inter-related with and
dependent on the ecosystem. Therefore if one part of life, such as the
environment, is affected then, their perception of their relationship, conse-
quently their responsibility to their environment is altered. Reduction in
marine life profoundly affects their lives because for them it affects their
nutritional intake as well as their spiritual cosmos. Interestingly, the
importance of wildlife is not only seen as a major source of food, rather,
clans in the area are named after the cassowary, crocodile, turtle, and so
on. The relationship becomes even more significant when the Boazi tribes
explain that marriages are formed following a strict pattern of marriages
being arranged between members of certain clans, because some clans are
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considered cousins and others are considered enemies. Elaborate rituals are
followed to maintain these relationships are formed from marriages and
bloodlines. Thus the importance of environmental health is part and
parcel of community life. Unfortunately this importance does not translate
into gender relations and the following discussion will clarify this point by
focusing on sago swamps and the prolonged flooding along the river, and
its effect on gender relations.
SAGO SWAMPS AND WOMEN
‘Sago swamps are drowning because there is a lot of mud build-up in the
swamps’, answered a man from Bosset village when he was asked what in
his opinion the main concern facing the village and his own household
was. His opinion was reminiscent of those raised by many other villagers
in all the Middle Fly villages interviewed. Sago is the staple diet of these
people, and in many cases is the only meal they may eat over long periods
of time. The women harvest the sago and prepare the sago for consump-
tion by the family. For the women of the Middle Fly, the destruction of
sago swamps has profound and devastating implications for their lives as
individuals and as a contributing and participating group in society today.
The destruction of sago swamps means that sago palms are not
growing and producing the normal quantity and quality of sago. Women
point out that the harvesting of a sago palm is hardly sufficient to fill a
sago bag nowadays as was the case prior to the mine’s operation. For the
women this means that they have to travel further away from the village,
paddling a canoe, looking for sago palms that are healthy. Women noted
that many sago palms have black liquid inside and are not edible when
harvested. As a result women spend more time harvesting sago. Where
women were able to do other work in the home and even sit in at public
meetings in the past, they are now absent from these activities because
most of their time is spent looking for food for their families. Women are
generally overworked and undernourished in the Middle Fly area and the
destruction of sago swamps is the major contributing factor. Men, children
and youth have also suffered and that is obvious from the lack of activity
in the villages and the general state of health in the community. There is
no doubt that hunger is prevalent because of declining supplies of sago. 
PROLONGED FLOODING AND THE COMMUNITY 
The effect of prolonged flooding in the Middle Fly area has devastated
riverine gardens, and produced dieback where many trees have died. Trees
that have been used for house posts, canoes, paddles and vines used for
rope have all but disappeared in the immediate area of the Fly River. 
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For the men who are mainly involved with house, canoe and
paddle making, this means that they have to travel further into the bush to
look for these materials. Houses are not being maintained and/or replaced
as often as they should be because the materials are very distant. In the case
of the roof materials which are made from sago leaves, the palms no longer
produce the right size of leaves as the leaves are now much smaller. This
has meant that the general standard of housing has dropped, so that today
most houses are in dire need of repair. The workload for maintaining
houses and canoes which has been the task of the menfolk has increased
threefold because of the increased distances required for preparing and
transporting building materials. For example, even the vines needed to
build houses are no longer growing on the main riverside. 
As a result of the prolonged flooding, one of the concerns raised
by Middle Fly villagers is that OTML or the Government must consider
building permanent houses for villagers. This request was a genuinely raised
concern in response to housing materials being destroyed by the prolonged
flooding which has resulted in dilapidated houses not being replaced sooner.
The destruction of the environment in the Middle Fly has
devastated these communities. Their devastation is one that cannot be
easily measured because it has far reaching consequences even into future
generations. Environmental destruction is irrecoverable for a minimum of
fifty years even if the Ok Tedi mine were to cease operations tomorrow.2
Today the consequences of the environmental destruction on development
for the people of the Middle Fly have meant that these people now live in
poverty.
POVERTY: THE LACK OF …
Poverty is the lack of something whether it be lack of essential services such
as health and education, lack of basic food, lack of information to make
informed decisions, lack of finance, the lack of any basic need: that is the
true meaning of poverty. In fact poverty occurs in extreme rural areas and in
the middle of high-rise cities in the modern world. Poverty knows no
boundaries and respects no one. Poverty in short is the lack of development. 
Today more and more Papua New Guineans have acknowledged
that poverty exists. In Papua New Guinea, poverty has become a face to be
reckoned with because development has not followed the visions espoused
in the National Goals and Directive Principles. The following discussion
suggests that poverty caused by environmental damage is an outcome of
development resulting from the neglect of Goal 4 of the NGDPs referred
to earlier. 
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2 This is a well-acknowledged fact that Managing Director for OTML, Roger Higgins, highlighted
in the 1999 Waste Management Report. 
In the case of the Middle Fly people, the environment has not
been used wisely, the interests of the environment have not been
maintained such as to preserve its abilities to conserve and replenish itself,
and wildlife as well as human beings have not been adequately protected
against actions in the name of development. The situation plainly illus-
trates the choices that have been made in the name of development.
The choices that have been made are firstly, development over
environment and secondly, benefit for the majority to the cost of the
minority. In reality what it has meant is this: choice number one of devel-
opment over environment has allowed certain communities to have their
livelihood destroyed through environmental deterioration and its effect on
the Fly river communities, consequently these communities now live in
poverty. Choice number two, benefit for the majority by the sacrifice of
the minority has in effect taken away from these Middle Fly communities,
and other such communities in similar situations, their right to actively
participate in their own development. In other words, for the Middle Fly
communities, choice number two has all but disempowered them in their
own eyes. The relationship between these two choices is that poverty is fed
by disempowerment. In order to alleviate poverty, people must be empow-
ered to feel that they can actively participate in their own development or
make a difference in their own communities. 
Disempowerment is the inability to make a difference whether
perceived or real. The indicators for disempowerment are when individuals
and/or groups are unable to mobilise support or the means to create devel-
opmental initiatives whether it is political participation, social
development or economic activities that are sustaining. The inability to act
enables the self-perception that ‘we are unable to perform’ and this in turn
feeds the cycle of inaction and inertia that results in the decline of quality
of life, which results ultimately in poverty.
DEVELOPMENT BEFORE ENVIRONMENT HAS
RESULTED IN POVERTY IN PNG
The question then arises as to what is exactly meant by development that
has occurred over the previous twenty-five years. Development as
envisioned by the CPC is holistic and integrated, development that has
actually been pursued has been neither holistic nor integrated.
Development in real terms has been pushed ahead by economics because
the fundamental assumption has been that once economic development
has been achieved then all other aspects of development will necessarily
follow. However, this has not been the case, economic development has
not been followed by social, human and political development. It may be
fair to say that development in PNG has not occurred in all four areas
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despite twenty-five years of independence. Development — social, human,
political and economic — has occurred sparingly. The destruction of the
environment as a direct consequence of development has resulted in
poverty that is being strengthened by the disempowerment of the people. 
The issue then is how do we break the cycle of poverty in Papua
New Guinea? The solution lies in the people of Papua New Guinea.
Whether that person be a coffee grower in the Waghi valley, a woman
fishing for prawns on Umboi Island, a young person aspiring to be a
schoolteacher yet to complete Year 6, a current Member of Parliament, a
university graduate or even an intending political candidate in the forth-
coming elections, we all have a part to play in development. Breaking the
strengthening cycle of poverty in PNG means making choices about devel-
opment. In real terms, choices have to be made about the nature of
development in Papua New Guinea. 
The challenge for the next twenty-five years is about choices
followed by decisions, followed by actions. The first step can be made
right now by firstly, not choosing development over the environment, and
secondly, by choosing development for all with benefits for all. 
CONCLUSION
Development in PNG has been to the detriment of the environment. This
is against the grain of the development vision espoused in the Papua New
Guinea Constitution. All people of Papua New Guinea have compromised
development for the past twenty-five years since independence. The vision
for development came from the people therefore all people must take
responsibility to make this vision come alive. For too long Papua New
Guineans have allowed events to take control of the development process
thereby placing governance in crisis-management mode. The price of crisis
management is borne out in the deteriorating state of the environment as a
result of development. 
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Forest resources in Papua New Guinea (PNG) are being categorised as a
commodity from which the owner can gain benefits, by way of revenue,
social services, and economic development (Montagu, 1997). The term
‘owner’ is debatable in the PNG context. On one hand, the Constitution
places all natural resources under the administrative ambit of the nation
state — the independent State of Papua New Guinea. On the other hand,
it acknowledges that all land is customarily owned. Would it be possible
then for a nation state to efficiently manage its forest resources under this
system of ownership? Forest management is defined here as ‘the applica-
tion of appropriate forestry principles and practices and business techniques
necessary to a forest so that it remains healthy and vigorous and provides
the products and amenities that the stakeholder desires’ (Heiligmann, n.d).
There have been suggestions (Yauieb, 1979; Baines, 1989; and
Montagu, 1997) that the system of forest management introduced and as
applied in PNG is not consistent with the unique land tenure system. This
is because the land tenure system in PNG is such that ownership of land is
vested in communal groups (kinships) and not an individual, as is the case
in western society. In order for the Government to apply any form of
forest management on the land, it has to secure some form of lease —
transfer of timber rights from the customary owners. There have been
obstacles associated with this form of lease, and I am sad to suggest that
PNG has not efficiently managed its forest resources due to it. In this
chapter, I will attempt to highlight how PNG has fared in the last 25 years
since it became an independent state and offer some suggestions as to how
it may develop efficient or sustainable forest management in the new
millennium. By sustainable forest management I mean: 
the process of managing forest to achieve one or more clearly speci-
fied objectives of management with regard to the production of a
continuous flow of desired forest products and services without
undue reduction of its inherent values and future productivity and
without undue undesirable effects on the physical and social
environment (adopted from ITTO, 1998).
HISTORY OF FOREST POLICY
The colonial policy relating to forestry was (1) to locate, assess, and
regulate the availability of natural forest resources to bring them within the
reach of development; (2) to encourage investment of private capital for
the development of these resources; and (3) to ensure native participation
in this development (Montagu, 1997). It is sad to note that these objec-
tives from the colonial period have been adopted in all forest policies of
the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, with no strong evidence that
efficient forest management has taken place in the country at the turn of
the twenty-first century. Montagu (1997) suggests that PNG is still practising
a culture of forest management that was inherited from the colonial era,
which is geared towards timber production for economic growth.
Since the time of its progress towards an independent nation up
to the present period, PNG has published and implemented three forest
policies. These policies had different emphases — depending on what was
the immediate need of the nation at the time. The first forest policy of the
Government was published in 1973 — at the time of self-government.
The 1979 forest policy after independence, and the current 1991 forest
policy followed this.
1973 Forest Policy
The emphasis of the 1973 policy was on ‘managing the forest resources of
PNG as a national asset in the interests of present and future generations
of the people’ (Turia, 1995). During the period of this policy, the timber
industry was geared towards producing timber for both the domestic and
international markets. With the burden of sustaining and enhancing a new
independent nation, and the need for generating its own revenue, the
Government replaced the 1973 policy in 1979.
1979 Forest Policy
The 1979 policy emphasised meaningful contribution ‘to the national devel-
opment objectives through revenue generation, national ownership (the
concept of landowner companies), and regional economic development’
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(Turia, 1995). This policy was more geared towards log production for
export. It also created an avenue for landowner companies to be estab-
lished — the notion of national ownership, initially as joint venture
partners with foreign loggers, but a trend developed whereby landowner
companies were issued with timber permits and they subcontracted their
obligations under the timber permit to the foreign contractor.
The trend under the 1979 policy created an opening for corrup-
tion and malfeasance (Barnett, 1989). The then government under Prime
Minister Pais Wingti established a Commission of Inquiry into Aspects of
the Timber Industry in 1987 which concluded its inquiry in 1989. One of
the many findings of that Commission (also known as the Barnett Report)
was that the 1979 forest policy was a defacto policy, in that the govern-
ment was not complying fully with the objective of that policy, regarding
the allocation of forest resources and the regulation of the timber industry
(Barnett, 1989). The Commission recommended a new forest policy.
1991 Forest Policy
The 1991 policy acknowledged the merits of the two previous policies and
re-enforced them, by emphasising ‘management and protection of the
nation’s forest resources as a renewable natural asset and its utilisation to
achieve economic growth, employment creation, greater PNG participa-
tion in industry and increased viable onshore processing’ (Turia, 1995).
The important objective of the 1991 forest policy, which was also that of
the two previous policies, has been on economic growth, largely through
revenue generation. Unfortunately, the aspect relating to forest resources
being managed as a renewable natural asset has been given less attention.
Even if the Government wanted to manage the forest resources as stated in




It is widely documented that about 97 per cent of all land in PNG is held
under customary title that is unregistered, but constitutionally enforced.
This therefore means that the forest resources on the customary land are
also under customary title (Filer, 1998: 30). Within the overarching frame-
work of customary ownership, there is individual usufruct of the customary
land. While this usufruct could provide a basis for individual title — maybe
on a leasehold basis from the customary clan owner — Hunt (2000: 5)
suggests that overall ‘the forest is invariably community-owned’.
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The ownership issue has major implications for the notion of
sustainability, and whether the Government can efficiently manage the
forest resources of the country. I would suggest not — not because the
Government is incapable of managing the country’s forest resources, but
because the land tenure system does not allow the Government a free hand
to undertake forest management on customarily owned land. The situa-
tion in PNG is such that governments, even during the colonial period,
generally had no control or, at most, very little control over the land.
Forest Resource
The National Forest Plan has classified the forest resource areas of PNG
into five categories. These classifications are depicted in Figure 1, and
include:
1. production forest; comprising currently acquired and identified
production forest yet to be acquired;
2. protection forest; comprising protected areas that have been
identified and gazetted by the Department of Environment and
Conservation as being areas with high conservation and biodiver-
sity values;
3. reserve forest; comprising forest areas yet to be classified (as
productive, protection or salvage forest) pending future decision
(includes potential production forest areas, montane forest with slopes
greater than 30° and inundated areas);
4. salvage forest; refers to forest that is cleared for other uses, for
example, clearance for agricultural development;
5. land suitable for afforestation; refers to areas of grassland and
severely disturbed natural forest that have been identified and
rights acquired from the landowners for the purpose of estab-
lishing a forestry estate (Papua New Guinea Forest Authority,
1996: 12).
Sustainable Annual Cut Level
In line with the objectives of the 1991 forest policy and the ensuing legisla-
tion, the National Forest Plan set a maximum sustainable annual cut level
for the country, which is at 4.9 million cubic metres (PNGFA, 1996: 14).
There are debates (Filer, 1997) as to the reliability of this estimate, but given
that PNG has not undertaken a full forest resource inventory of the country,
this paper will not argue about the estimate. This paper acknowledges that
the estimate is above the annual log volume extracted in PNG up to 1998
— see Table 1. This suggests that PNG is harvesting a lower volume of logs
than the estimate and that it is able to maintain a sustainable level of forest
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harvest, therefore enhancing sustained yield. The estimate is also within
the recommended estimates as determined from Landsat images that
were/have developed under Australian aid, and which has been used as the
official resource estimates for the purposes of fulfilling the requirements of
the Forestry Act, 1991.
Table 1:   Log Exports, 1976–1998, also Forest Products as a Percentage of Total 
Export Earnings
Year Export Volume — Logs Export Value — Forest Forest Products as a Percentage 
(‘000 m3) Products (K’000) of Total Exports (%)
1976 488.9 22,000.0 4.7
1977 412.4 23,700.0 4.2
1978 421.9 24,200.0 4.3
1979 472.0 36,400.0 4.8
1980 641.9 47,000.0 6.8
1981 737.7 43,400.0 7.7
1982 1,057.1 61,400.0 10.8
1983 1,019.0 54,700.0 8.0
1984 1,201.1 81,700.0 9.9
1985 1,140.6 67,300.0 7.3
1986 1,298.9 74,700.0 7.5
1987 1,450.0 110,900.0 9.9
1988 1,347.9 97,500.0 7.8
1989 1,348.7 96,200.0 8.7
1990 923.4 69,900.0 6.4
1991 1,060.0 90,000.0 6.0
1992 1,600.0 148,000.0 8.0
1993 2,370.0 410,000.0 16.0
1994 2,940.0 494,000.0 18.0
1995 2,510.0 450,000.0 13.0
1996 2,610.0 480,000.0 14.0
1997 2,380.0 433,000.0 14.0
1998 1,070.0 173,000.0 5.0
Source: Fernando (1990), Turia (1995), AusAID (1999).
Table 1 only records the volume of logs exported, as the figures
for processed logs are not very reliable. However, it is sufficient to point
out that the processed volume has been very minimal — about 15 per cent
due to the low priority given by the Government in encouraging the
processing industry (Filer, 1997).
MANAGEMENT OF FOREST RESOURCES 187
This situation though appears to be changing, partly as a result
of the 1991 forest policy, but more so because of the conditions that were
attached to the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP),1 in particular, an
increase in the log export tax. This, in a way, forced some investors to
invest in downstream processing plants, for example the Rimbunan Hijau
Timber Processing Ltd plant in the Western Province, which is now
producing and exporting veneer. Although this may imply an effort to log
sustainably, this is not the case as, presently (2002), Rimbunan Hijau
Timber Processing Ltd is not able to supply all its raw logs from the existing
timber area where the processing plant has been constructed. The author
was privileged to meet with some landowners from the Vailala Blocks 2 and
3 Forest Management Area in the Gulf Province, who indicated that some of
the raw logs from their timber area is being transported to the Western
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Figure 1:    General Forest Classification (millions of hectares)
* Areas of salvage forest and areas suitable for afforestation have yet to be identified.
# Some forest areas under forest management agreement do not show/indicate all
constraints on logging.
Source: Adapted from the General Forest Classification published in the National Forest
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1 The PNG Government sought assistance from the World Bank under the Structural Adjustment
Program (SAP) in 1995 to bail it out of its economic crises. The forestry sector was one of the
sectors that had conditions attached to it as part of the SAP.
Province to feed the processing plant there (Meeting with landowners on
1/10/02).
It is important to note also that the volume of log exports has
increased markedly as compared to 1976 — see trend in Table 1. This has
been due in part to the emphasis placed by the Government on revenue
generation (Ministry of Forests, 1979). The market conditions also play a
major factor in the volume of logs harvested as can be noted in Table 1,
particularly the sharp increase from 1993 up to 1997 and then a sharp fall
in 1998 (AusAID, 1999), also as a result of the high log export tax.
PRODUCTION FOREST AREAS
The Papua New Guinea Forest Authority estimates PNG’s current poten-
tial production forest areas to be about 26.2 million hectares (Forest
Inventory Mapping System data as at 30 June 1999). Of this estimate, it
has secured timber rights over 10.5 million hectares (see Table 2),2 out of
which it has allocated 6.1 million hectares to timber loggers for exploita-
tion and management (PNGFA, 1998). This represents about 58 per cent
of the total forest areas under some form of logging activity. Table 2 shows
the breakdown of these areas by provinces. The table further shows that of
the 6.1 million hectares allocated, 64 are under the timber rights purchase,
17 under local forest areas and 9 under forest management agreements.
It would be very interesting to note the size and location of these
production forest areas and compare them with the level of forest areas
under plantations — see Table 3. As Table 2 shows, the Southern Region
has the largest forest area under logging. The New Guinea Island Region
follows this, with West New Britain Province alone dominating with a
total of 1.1 million hectares of land under logging.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOREST MANAGEMENT
Responsibility for forest management has largely been placed on the
Government, by statute; however, the Government passes some of that
responsibility onto the logger, under a negotiated project agreement. The
Government’s role has been more on regulating the Act and monitoring
the progress of the project agreements. To this end, the Government has in
place a Logging Code of Practice, and other Guidelines and Procedures for
regulating the forest industry. Even with all the above in place, I cannot see
efficient management of forest resources, mainly because the land and the
forest resources are owned by the customary landowners, and they deter-
mine whether it can be efficiently managed. I question why the customary
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2 This includes 967,508 hectares of declared forest areas under the Local Forest Area of the repealed
Forestry (Private Dealings) Act.
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Table 2: PNGFA Timber Rights and Areas Allocated to Loggers by 
Region and Province
Region/ Total Number of Total Area Total Number of Areas
Province Current Acquired (Ha.) Allocated by Type
Timber Areas TRP* LFA** FMA*** Total Area
(Ha.)
Southern
Western 9 2,028,312 5 0 0 738,906
Gulf 12 2,535,668 3 0 5 2,400,603
Central 15 482,978 3 0 2 239,741
Milne Bay 5 202,101 1 0 0 87,530
Oro 6 358,096 2 1 0 101,877
Subtotal 47 5,607,155 14 1 7 3,568,657
Momase
West Sepik 9 681,255 2 1 0 325,928
East Sepik 6 630,948 0 2 0 79,978
Madang 10 384,070 5 0 0 255,485
Morobe 14 276,569 4 0 2 119,685
Subtotal 39 1,972,842 11 3 2 781,076
New Guinea Island
West New Britain 57 1,507,008 13 12 0 1,106,046
East New Britain 26 567,517 14 0 0 375,367
New Ireland 17 562,341 5 0 0 223,065
Manus 2 51,734 1 1 0 51,734
North Solomons 11 96,660 0 0 0 0
Subtotal 113 2,785,260 33 13 0 1,756,212
Highlands
Southern 10 39,241 6 0 0 37,070
Eastern 0 0 0 0 0 0
Western 13 83,129 0 0 0 0
Simbu 0 0 0 0 0 0
Enga 6 42,767 0 0 0 0
Subtotal 29 165,137 6 0 0 37,070
TOTAL 228 10,530,394 64 17 9 6,143,015
Source: Table drawn on the basis of data from the Forest Authority as presented in:
1) The Forest Resource Acquisition General Information, November 1998;
2) Current Projects as at 18 May 2000; and
3) Status of Forest Working Plans and Annual Logging Plans for Timber Projects as




landowners have no responsibility at all in the management of the forest
on their land. Figure 2 shows the trend or culture of forest management as
currently practised by the Government. It shows that the Government is
only interested in forest management by name but in reality, no forest
management is undertaken on the ground (customary land).
Figure 2: PNG’s Culture of Forest Management
Forest Plantations
It is also worth highlighting that the Government has established some
forest plantations, mainly on land that was presumed state land from the
colonial era, and that it is undertaking natural reafforestation (very small
scale) on customary land. In respect of the plantations, these are mainly of
exotic timber species, which highlights another issue for PNG as to
whether it should be encouraging plantings of such exotic species. On the
other hand, under the natural reafforestation system, indigenous timber
species are being utilised; however the success of this system is yet to be
known. Unfortunately, some of the established plantations have now
reverted to customary ownership in Table 3 (private forest areas are
shown). Even with these plantations, it is not enough to replenish what is
being harvested from the natural forests. Table 3 gives an indication of
these plantations, by location, ownership of land, and species type.
Timber Industry
There is no strong evidence to suggest that the exploitation of forest
resources has enabled greater Papua New Guinea participation, nor
enabled more Papua New Guineans to be employed in the forestry sector
(Filer, 1998: 242). Filer further suggests that there may be between 6,500
to 7,000 people (mostly men) employed in the forestry sector, and mainly
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Table 3: Main Forest Plantations in PNG
Province Location Main Species Total Area (ha.)
State Forests
Central Kuriva Tectona grandis (Teak) 600
Madang Madang Eucalyptus deglupta 900
North Coast (Kamarere); Acacia mangium; 
Terminalia brassii
Morobe Wau-Bulolo Araucaria cunninghamii (Klinki); 12,144
A. hunsteinii (Hoop); 
Pinus caribaea (Pine)
Milne Bay Sagarai A. mangium; E. deglupta; T. brassii 1,500
New Ireland Kaut E. deglupta; Calophyllum spp.; 250
Pterocarpus indicus
Eastern Fayantina P. patula 900
Highlands Lapegu P. patula 3,200
Kainantu P. patula 1,000
Western Waghi E. grandi; E. robusta; 2,100
Highlands E. saligna; P. patula
Southern Orere, Kui, Baino P. patula; E. robusta 400
Highlands
Total State Forests 22,994
Private Forests
Madang Gogol (Gogol E. deglupta; A. mangium; 10,745
Reforestation Co.) T. brassii
East New Britain Open Bay (Open E. deglupta; T. brassii; A. mangium 12,004
Bay Timber Co.)
Kerevat T. grandis; E. deglupta: 1,900
(Customary — A. mangium; Octomeles.
ex state forest) sumatrana




Central Brown River T. grandis 1,200
(Customary — 
ex state forest)
Total Private Forests 35,107
Overall Total 58,101
Source: Papua New Guinea Forest Authority (1997).
in the logging and log exports area (1998: 50). The timber industry has
and continues to be focused more on logging for log exports, quite the
opposite of the objective of the forest policy regarding downstream
processing. As to date, the following processing facilities have been estab-
lished and are in operation: 1 plywood factory in Bulolo; 1 woodchip mill
in Madang; 49 sawmills with various capacities; and 27 furniture factories
and joinery workshops (PNGFA, 1997). It is estimated that the combined
log input for all these processing facilities is about 15 per cent of the total
log harvest.
Lessons Learnt in the Last 25 years
It would appear that the Government has not really learnt from its past
handling of forest management, especially in ensuring real forest manage-
ment occurs on the ground. Many studies under various auspices, for
example the Commission of Inquiry (Barnett, 1989), and the Tropical
Forest Action Plan (TFAP), led by the World Bank (World Bank, 1990),
have highlighted the problems in the forestry sector, which are related to
ownership of land and forests, as well as the poor efficiency of the
Government in regulating and monitoring the timber industry. This is not
to say that the government policymakers are not aware of these problems.
The Government took the necessary steps to implement some of
the recommendations of the Barnett Report under the TFAP umbrella
through the National Forestry and Conservation Action Programme
(NFCAP). It now has in place the 1991 forest policy and a unified National
Forest Service under the Papua New Guinea Forest Authority. The role of
the Authority is to manage the forest resources of the country so that they
be conserved and used for the collective benefit of all citizens now and in
the future (World Bank, 1990). Other government agencies, for example,
the Department of Environment and Conservation, the Department of
Agriculture and Livestock, the Department of Lands, the Department of
Finance and Planing) and non-government organisations were also
included in the NFCAP process. This was to allow for the management of
forest resources that would take into consideration all the factors (ecolog-
ical, economic, and social). Unfortunately, at the end of the day, the same
trend prevails, in that a government agency works on its own.
RECOMMENDED INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR
MANAGING FOREST RESOURCES
It is my strong belief that the current forest policy is appropriate as it
covers all aspects of forest management that a government would have.
What is needed though is a change in the approach and methods of
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delivery of forest management principles. The Government must now
realise that it cannot apply forest management principles on land that it
does not own. Likewise, a logger cannot apply forest management on land
that it does not own. Yet, both are interested in having a sustainable and
viable forest base.
The change that I am proposing (many others have also
suggested this: for example, the World Bank, 1990; Filer, 1997) is related
to the involvement of customary resource owners in the actual manage-
ment of the forests. Instead of the Government passing on part of its
responsibility to the logger, it should instead be looking at coming up with
an institutional framework that would enable customary resource owners
to be actively involved in the management of the forest. This framework
would include all three parties, government, logger and resource owners.
The Government would continue to regulate the industry; the logger
would undertake the logging, including infrastructure and the like; and
the resource owners would undertake the applied forest management that
has been determined and agreed to by all parties.
It may be argued that the resource owners lack the knowledge to
undertake this task of forest management. This may be true in the scien-
tific sense of understanding the growth yield and the ecological interaction
of forest disturbance. But I believe that the resource owners know the
importance of why they should have a forest resource that they could gain
benefit from now and for their children’s use in the future. It therefore
would be in their interests as well to ensure that it is managed efficiently.
I would therefore suggest that the Government improve on its present
culture of forest management by including resource owners in the manage-
ment process, along a structure such as that shown in Figure 3.
This firstly means that in line with the current forest policy and
legislation, the Government prepares the National Forest Plan. This plan
would include all the potential forest areas that have been identified by the
Government and which, in consultation with the appropriate landowners
and the Provincial Governments, are recommended and listed as the
future forest management areas. These would be the areas that the
Government will manage on behalf of the landowners for their immediate
benefit as well as for the benefit of the whole of PNG in the long term.
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CONCLUSION
As Montagu (1997) asserts, existing institutional frameworks are in place
for Papua New Guinea to enhance its drive for sustainable forest manage-
ment, and be seen in the global arena to be contributing to the well-being
of its citizens through its management system. Unfortunately, there
appears to be no efficient forest resource management in PNG. This is
because both the Government and its people have not allowed for land to
be developed and managed for the purposes of maintaining a forest
resource base. While Papua New Guineans can be proud of the form of
land tenure that they have, in that the land is not viewed as a commodity
to be traded (Baines, 1989), they must be mindful of their constitutional
obligation to foster the development of their country and their children in
the future, and not to hinder development because of their right to the
land. A suggested method of ensuring that some form of forest manage-
ment does take place is to involve resource owners in all phases of a
forestry project, commencing from acquisition, through to allocation.
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Papua New Guinea (PNG) is a tropical country and, until recently,
tropical diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, leprosy, and childhood
infections such as measles, pertusis and diarrhoeal diseases have been the
major issues on the health agenda in the last forty years of the last century.
While a few of these diseases such as leprosy are slowly waning, others
such as malaria continue to persist without signs of abating. In addition, in
the last two decades or so new infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS and
other lifestyle diseases such as diabetes have emerged, adding an extra
burden to the already overburdened health system (Crouch-Chivers, 1998).
Thus PNG has to address double burden disease problems as it
enters the first decade of the twenty-first century: first, some major infec-
tious diseases that survived the twentieth century — the unfinished health
agenda — and second, the emerging infectious and non-infectious diseases
which are becoming prevalent. This chapter provides an overview of the
disease pattern, rather than discussing the diseases in detail.
PROFILE OF SOME MAJOR DISEASES
The range of diseases impairing the health and well-being of Papua New
Guineans is largely influenced by culture, social and economic factors,
including, most likely, the consequences of adaptation or mal-adaptation to
the rapid changes associated with sociocultural change and urbanization.
The importance of diseases, therefore, may be considered from a number
of perspectives and according to their social, economic, political or health
significance.
Some of the major diseases that are of public health concern in
PNG at present can be considered under the following sub-headings: (1)
diseases that, despite health services improvement in the last 25 years,
continue to be leading causes of morbidity and mortality, and (2) diseases
that have emerged and re-emerged within the last 25 years that are poised
to overshadow persisting diseases, and (3) diseases that are not omnipresent
but are a potential health threat to PNG.
Diseases that Persist to the 21st Century
Despite the advances of the twentieth century, a significant component of
the health burden still remains, particularly those attributable to infections,
undernutrition and complications of childbirth. In this subsection, some
important diseases in terms of morbidity and mortality are outlined, and, for
simplicity, diseases are considered according to the mode of transmission.
Mosquito-borne Diseases
Mosquitoes transmit several diseases that are of medical importance.




Malaria is one of the ancient diseases of the world. Malaria is now
confined to tropical and subtropical countries including PNG. It is caused
by blood parasites and female Anopheles, mosquitoes that are abundant in
the coastal regions which transmit these parasites. There are four different
species of these parasites, causing four different forms of malaria. The form
that kills individuals with malaria is caused by a parasite species called
Plasmodium falciparum. The other three parasite species (Plasmodium
vivax, Plasmodium malariae, Plasmodium ovale) do not usually kill but can
cause acute infection and hospital admission.
Malaria is one of the five leading causes of deaths in hospitals
and health centres. From 1960 to 1970, it accounted on average for 4.6
per cent of all deaths; from 1971 to 1984, for 6.3 per cent of deaths (PNG
Department of Health, 1974, 1986) and from 1995 to 1997 the mortality
due to malaria has increased to 12 per cent, now second only to pneumonia
as a cause of hospital admissions and deaths (PNG Department of Health).
Its greatest impact is on children; remote coastal villagers who have little
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access to health services; the mobile population of the Highlands,
migrating to the coast; and individuals of coastal origin having lived in
non-malarial areas of the Highlands returning to the coast from mine sites.
Over the past two years, malaria epidemics have occurred in some
highland areas, affecting the resident population and resulting in high
mortality. The trend is expected to continue to increase with increasing
mobility of the population to and from coastal areas.
The presence of multidrug resistant forms of malaria and other
operational issues such as behaviour towards the use of insecticide-treated
mosquito nets, health promotion activities, and quality of diagnosis also
complicate the application of effective control measures throughout PNG.
Malaria will still remain a significant public health problem in PNG with
high morbidity and mortality. The trend is expected to continue to
increase as population increases, and also as a result of the changing nature
of the disease itself (Figure 1).
Filariasis
Filariasis is the name given to the general condition resulting from
parasitic infection by threadlike or filiform worms called microfilaria.
These microfilaria are transmitted by mosquitoes to humans, but are a
different mosquito species from those that transmit malaria. There are
several forms of filariasis but one form commonly occurs in PNG and is
due to Wuchereria bancrofti. The parasites live in the lymphatic system,
and block the lymphatic system (lymphatic filariasis) and cause hardened
tissue swelling. The disease does not kill directly but causes great disability.
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Figure 1:    Malaria in PNG: Admissions and Deaths
Lymphatic filariasis is a public health concern in PNG. The
disease affects approximately several hundred thousand people. It is most
widespread in PNG where the disease is endemic. However, the tools
needed to control and eventually eliminate lymphatic filariasis are avail-
able. The method for distributing a combination of two drugs is simple
and consists of annual mass distribution of a combination of diethylcarba-
mazine and albendazole. In areas where filariasis is still a problem, with
adequate coverage and good compliance, the responsible microfilaria can
be eliminated in a period of less than five years.
Elimination of lymphatic filariasis is an attainable goal in PNG.
A successful drug distribution campaign requires careful planning for mass
drug distribution and preparation of logistical support, including well
trained health workers and full community participation through
mobilization. However, it would be more difficult in areas of PNG where
the disease is endemic and logistical problems are enormous. More
resources will be needed to overcome some of these logistical problems,
which are a key to the success of mass drug distribution strategies. It is
hoped that PNG will free itself of lymphatic filariasis in the next decade as
has been achieved in some countries of the Pacific.
Airborne Diseases
Airborne diseases are spread from an infected person to others through
spitting, sneezing and coughing. The important airborne diseases of major
public health concern are:
• Tuberculosis
• Pneumonia
• Other respiratory conditions
These diseases can be prevented by preventive measures that
involve personal hygiene, improved standards of living, and better nutri-
tion. High morbidity and mortality are due to delayed and poor treatment
compliance, especially in tuberculosis. Early diagnosis and treatment will
prevent deaths and disabilities.
Tuberculosis
Tuberculosis is a disease caused by a bacterial organism (germ) called
Mycobacterium tuberculosis. The same family of germs, but different
species, also causes leprosy. Leprosy (not discussed here) is spread usually
through direct personal contact and the disease itself is declining in many
areas.
Tuberculosis is a disease that remained a public health problem
in PNG since its introduction. Tuberculosis has a higher incidence in the
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coastal provinces of the country. However, incomplete data prevents calcu-
lation of comparative incidence rates for coastal regions and the highland
provinces. In 1974 the incidence rate was estimated at 0.8 per 1000
population nationally, with rates of 1.5 per 1000 in the coastal regions
below 1000 metres and 0.04 per 1000 in the Highlands above 1000
metres. In 1984 the national incidence and prevalence of tuberculosis were
estimated to be 10.7 and 20.1 per 10,000 respectively, while the Highland
region showed increases, ranging from 0.2 to 4.5 in incidence and from
1.2 to 6.6 in prevalence. By 1999, the national incidence and prevalence
stood at 176 and 549 per 100,000, respectively, while in the Highlands the
incidence and prevalence rates were 51 and 130 per 100,000, respectively.
The mortality due to tuberculosis is unlikely to change, if
anything it will increase as the nature of the disease changes. It accounted
on average for 5.8 per cent of the mortality rate in 1960–1970, 4.5 per
cent in 1971–1984, and surged to an all-time high of 7.0 per cent in the
period 1995–1997. Tuberculosis thus has moved from sixth place in the
leading causes of death in the period 1960–1984 to fourth place in
1995–1997 (PNG Department of Health Plan, 1986, 2000). Overall,
tuberculosis is a disease that is showing an upward trend (Figure 2), a serious
concern indeed.
Pneumonia
Pneumonia (infection of the lungs) has long been recognized as a major
cause of morbidity and mortality, particularly among children of less than
five years and adults over forty-four years of age. Pneumonia is a disease
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Figure 2:    Tuberculosis in PNG: Admissions and Deaths, 1961–1997
that affects the lungs and impairs breathing. The common causes of
pneumonia in PNG are either due to bacteria or viral agents.
Hospital statistics and epidemiological studies indicate that the
disease has not changed much over the last two decades. Pneumonia ranks
third, after obstetric conditions and malaria, accounting for 14 per cent of
all institutional admissions. However, in mortality, pneumonia is the
leading cause of death, accounting for 16 per cent of all deaths in the
period 1995–1997. The regional distribution shows pneumonia to be
number one killer infection for the Highland (22.0 per cent) and Momase
(16.0 per cent) regions, while it ranks only second to perinatal conditions,
for the Southern region (10.0 per cent), and third, to malaria and perinatal
conditions for the Island region (11.0 per cent).
Although there is a slow downward trend in morbidity and
mortality (Figure 3), the mortality statistics for this condition have not
changed dramatically in forty years. From 1960 to 1970, pneumonia
accounted on average for 19.2 per cent of all hospital and health centres
deaths. This figure increased in the 1971 to 1984 period to 21.3 per cent,
but declined to 16.1 per cent in the three years 1995 to 1997. Despite
improvements in accessibility to health services and widespread use of
antibiotics for its treatment, pneumonia will still remain one of the leading
causes of death in PNG, partly as a result of overcrowding, and the trans-
mission of more virulent (drug resistant) forms of the infection.
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Figure 3:    Pneumonia in PNG: Admissions and Deaths, 1961–1997
Other respiratory conditions
Other childhood respiratory illnesses which include bronchitis, pertusis,
and asthma still carry high morbidity and mortality. These illnesses affect
young children under eighteen months of age. The incidence rate of
pertusis was estimated at 1 per 1,000 per year population in 1997–1999,
which is a decline from 8.2 per 1,000 per year population a decade ago.
Chronic lung diseases — such as asthma, chronic obstructive lung diseases,
including bronchitis — are also common, particularly in the highlands
where it affects over 20 per cent of individuals over the age of forty-five years.
It is a major concern because it results in high morbidity and disability.
Sexually-Transmitted Infections
The incidence of sexually transmitted infections, which include gonor-
rhoea, syphilis, donovanosis and chlamydia, is still unacceptably high. The
sexually transmitted infections of major public health concern are:
• Gonorrhoea
• Syphilis
• Other sexually transmitted diseases
Gonorrhoea and syphilis
Gonorrhea and syphilis are the two most frequently reported sexually
transmitted diseases in PNG. A bacterial organism called Neisseria gonor-
rhoeae causes gonorrhoea and syphilis is due to another bacterial organism
called Treponema pallidum. The diseases have become entrenched in some
regions, particularly in the highlands and National Capital district of
PNG. However, over the last thirty years or so there have been some
notable changes in the general trend of both diseases (Figure 4).
In 1963 there were 376 and 3 confirmed cases of gonorrhoea and
syphilis, respectively. In 1974 there were 6,333 cases of gonorrhoea and
1,347 cases of syphilis. In 1984 there were 16,696 and 6,943 confirmed
cases of gonorrhoea and syphilis respectively (PNG Department of Health,
1974, 1986). In 1995 there were 7,431 and 1,800 confirmed cases of
gonorrhoea and syphilis, respectively. These figures remained stable over the
last five years (1995–1999) with a trend to a further reduction in the
number of cases. In 1999 there were 4, 760 confirmed cases of gonorrhoea
and 1,199 cases of syphilis and, overall, there has been a general decline in
the number of cases reported (PNG Department of Health, 2000). This
may indicate either a real decline or incomplete reporting of the transmis-
sion of sexually transmitted diseases.
Whatever the reason for the downward trend, the reduction in
the number of confirmed cases of gonorrhoea and syphilis in the 1990s
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must be interpreted with caution — the bigger picture of both gonorrhoea
and syphilis, including other sexually transmitted diseases, has probably
been submerged by the emergence of HIV/AIDS. The potential danger of
a hidden epidemic of gonorrhoea, syphilis and other sexually transmitted
diseases (excluding HIV/AIDS) is probably overshadowed by HIV/AIDS
at present — after all, these diseases are culturally sensitive.
Food- and Waterborne Diseases
Food- and waterborne diseases are transmitted from infected individuals to
others through eating and drinking contaminated food and/or water. The
common food- and waterborne diseases of public health importance in
PNG include:




Diarrhoeal diseases remain a major public health problem despite a
downward trend in recent years (Figure 5).
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Figure 4:    Gonorrhoea and Syphillis in PNG, 1963–1999
Figure 5:    Diarrhoeal Disease in PNG, 1961–1997
Acute diarrhoeal illness caused by bacterial, viral or protozoal
organisms vary from mild bowel disturbances to fulminant, life-threatening
diseases. It is responsible for one third of childhood deaths and malnutri-
tion in PNG. It mainly affects children under one year of age with a high
proportion occurring in males. When these illnesses occur with malnutri-
tion in young children they can become particularly serious, causing severe
dehydration due to excessive water loss. Diarrhoeal diseases are not good for
children because this can affect their growth and mental development.
Diarrhoeal disease remains a major health problem for children
under five years of age. From 1960 to 1972 diarrhoeal diseases accounted
for between 4.7 and 9.3 per cent (5,000–16,000 cases) of all hospital
admissions, with mortality ranging from 3.8 to 11.3 per cent in the same
period. Two decades later (1993–1997), morbidity and mortality figures of
3.4 per cent and 3.2 per cent, respectively, still remain close to the
1960–1972 figures. Regional 1993–1997 data show the Highland region
had a high percentage (4.0 per cent) of admissions, while Momase had the
lowest (2.6 per cent) but mortality figures showed totally opposite trend,
a high death rate (4.1 per cent) in the Momase region compared to the
Highland region, which accounted for only 2.9 per cent (PNG
Department of Health, 2000; Wyrsch et al. 1998). However, the general
trend for that period seems stable for the four regions.
In adults, bacillary and amoebic dysentery are common. These
two conditions manifest as diarrhoea, however, have low morbidity and
mortality. Much of the diarrhoeal diseases are related to poor sanitation,
poor quality of water supply and overcrowding in peri-urban areas. For
children, bottle-feeding is also a known contributing factor to childhood
diarrhoeal diseases and deaths. Among the urban community the practice
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of using bottles and teats is increasing despite community awareness and
existing legislation.
EMERGING DISEASES OF THE 21ST CENTURY
Like anywhere else in the Western Pacific, PNG has been faced with
emerging and re-emerging communicable and non-communicable diseases
in recent years. The emerging diseases are due to newly identified and
previously unknown infections or disease processes that cause public
health problems. In contrast, re-emerging diseases are due to a re-appearance
and increase of infections that are known, but have fallen to a low level
and hence no longer considered public health problem. Again, the diseases
can be considered under various modes of transmission.
Mosquito-borne Diseases
Apart from transmitting malaria and filariasis, mosquitoes, but a different
species, transmit two other diseases of medical importance to PNG
(Mackenzie, 1998). The following mosquito-borne diseases are of impor-
tant public health concern:
• Dengue fever
• Japanese encephalitis
Dengue fever and Japanese encephalitis
Arboviruses cause dengue fever and Japanese encephalitis. These viral
agents are transmitted by mosquitoes to man. These are diseases that
appear to be emerging particularly along the PNG–Indonesian border area
in Western Province. However, the true incidences of dengue fever and
Japanese encephalitis are unknown at present due to poor diagnostic and
surveillance systems.
These viral infections occur sporadically and while many of the
infections are clinically mild, may, in severe cases lead to serious complica-
tions and death. However, they are important infectious diseases because
of their epidemic potential which could be devastating.
Airborne Diseases
Tuberculosis infection alone is already a major public health concern as
mentioned above. However, tuberculosis/HIV co-infection is now emerging.
Tuberculosis/HIV co-infection
Tuberculosis and HIV co-infection is a serious public health problem. As
the HIV infections increase so will tuberculosis and HIV co-infections.
The implications are that tuberculosis would be more difficult to treat
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even with current anti-tuberculosis drugs; at the least, treatment will take
more than 6 months. Without serious attention to this emerging phenom-
enon, a tuberculosis epidemic would be a likely predicament.
Sexually-Transmitted Infections
The following sexually transmitted diseases have emerged and have
become a major public health concern:
• HIV/AIDS in adults
• HIV/AIDS in children
AIDS/HIV adults
Acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome (AIDS) is the most serious expres-
sion of a series of related disorders due to infection by human
immuno-deficiency virus (HIV). HIV/AIDS, first known in 1987, is
already one of the leading causes of adult medical admissions and deaths in
major hospitals in PNG (PNG Department of Health, 1995, 2000).
Since it was first reported, there has been a steady increase in the
number of confirmed cases of HIV and AIDS (Figure 6). From 1991 to
1999, there were 2,271 confirmed cases of HIV, 769 cases of AIDS and
169 deaths from HIV/AIDS. Regional distribution shows that in the same
period (1991–1999), there were 1,635 (168.1 per 100,000), 441 (8.8 per
100,000), 145 (1.6 per 100,000), and 50 (0.8 per 100,000) cases of
confirmed HIV in the Southern, Highlands, Momase, and Island regions.
The disease pattern shows a positive trend in all four regions, particularly
in the National Capital District (Port Moresby). The annual number of
new cases of HIV/AIDS appears to be doubling. However, there is signifi-
cant under-reporting and under diagnosis of both HIV and AIDS, and
cumulative totals of only 2,271 HIV infections and 769 cases of AIDS
have been reported in the period 1991–1999; that is a total of 3,040
HIV/AIDS cases. HIV/AIDS is a major public health problem almost
reaching epidemic proportions.
Much of the transmission of HIV in PNG in adults is through
sexual contact. HIV can affect any person of any age, and in PNG it is
affecting young sexually active adults who are also in the economically
productive age group. This not only has serious socio-economic implications
for the young developing nation but also places an increased burden on the
limited resources available for prevention and control efforts. There is a lack
of appropriate legislative framework for the prevention and control of
sexually transmitted infections such as HIV/AIDS. Some form of legislation
for future AIDS care needs is also needed, which may include strategic
planning and development of clinical guidelines and protocols to meet
those needs.
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HIV/AIDS children
In children, transmission of HIV/AIDS is usually through maternal trans-
mission from infected mothers to newborn babies. The incidence of
maternal transmission from infected mothers to newborn babies is
alarming and in the last five years 90 children have been registered, their
ages ranging from birth to six years of age. The common causes for admis-
sion for these infected children are pneumonia, chronic gastroenteritis and
failure to thrive (Kiromat et al., 2000). As the HIV/AIDS population
increases so will the population of children born to mothers with HIV infec-
tion, a situation that needs immediate action for its obvious implications.
Food- and Waterborne Diseases
The common food- and waterborne disease that is emerging or re-
emerging rapidly and is of public health concern is typhoid.
Typhoid
Typhoid is a communicable disease and has recently become a disease of
major public health concern in PNG. A bacterial organism called Salmonella
typhi causes typhoid and although it has remained sporadic in the past
(Figure 7) with very low morbidity and mortality, it is feared that it might
become more prevalent as peri-urban squatter settlements expand with more
overcrowding. Regular epidemics have occurred in those peri-urban areas of
Port Moresby that have limited water supply and poor sanitation.
From 1993 to 1997, typhoid accounted for 1.9 per cent of all
admissions and 2.6 per cent of all deaths in hospitals and health centres.
The prevalence rate for the same period was estimated at 33 per 100,000.
The five highland Provinces were more afflicted than any other province in
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Figure 4:    HIV/AIDS in PNG, 1991–1999
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PNG, while Manus Province recorded no cases of typhoid in the period
1993 to 1997 (PNG Department of Health, 2000).
Typhoid is a preventable communicable disease. Drug treatment
of typhoid has its limitations; bacteria have already developed some degree
of tolerance to the readily and cheaply available drugs. This might pose a
major problem for typhoid treatment in PNG. Although incidence and
prevalence of typhoid infection show a downward trend in the last few
years (Figure 7), the challenge now is how to enhance the downward trend
and prevent the disease from ever reaching epidemic proportions.
Figure 7:    Typhoid in PNG, 1961–1997
Lifestyle Diseases
Until the 1970s, lifestyle diseases were not a public health problem in
PNG. However, there has since been a rapid increase in these diseases,
particularly amongst the urban and peri-urban populations. Lifestyle
diseases are associated with tobacco use (Kaul, 2000), excessive alcohol
consumption, lack of physical exercise and consuming food and drink
high in sugar, fat and salt. Other important factors include stress associated
with social displacement, rapid economic and cultural transition and air
and water pollution (Sinnet et al., 1992).
Lifestyle diseases of public health importance are:
• Cardiovascular diseases
• Diabetic diseases
• Alcohol and illicit drug use
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Cardiovascular diseases
There may be a hidden epidemic of cardiovascular diseases with social
changes. Collectively, within cardiovascular diseases, ischaemic heart
disease, hypertension and cerebro-vascular diseases including stroke are the
most significant conditions. The current trend appears to be that
ischaemic heart disease will be the largest single cause of disease burden in
PNG over the next decade.
Diabetes
Type-2 (non-insulin-dependent [NIDDM]) diabetes mellitus is known to
be common in some coastal populations in PNG. The disease prevalence
is high and it is increasing. It was estimated that by year 2000, there would
be approximately 180,000 diabetics in PNG in a population of about
5 million. This number would rise to 450,000 by the year 2025. These are
frightening figures by any standard and if the figures become reality, this
will be a major strain on the health budget (King, 1992; Ogle et al., 2000).
It is quite probable that currently only a small proportion of the
population with NIDDM is recognized and on treatment, while the
majority (more than 90 per cent) may have the disease but not be aware
that they have it. What we are seeing is only the ‘peak’ of the iceberg.
Neoplastic Diseases
Another large cause of disease burden in PNG is neoplastic diseases




• Primary liver cancer
These cancers are responsible for a large proportion of life lost
and years lived with disability. Neoplastic diseases are one of the ten
leading causes of hospital admissions and deaths. Among coastal men, the
common cancer is the mouth cancer, while primary liver cancer is
relatively prevalent in the Highlands. Uterine cervical and breast cancers
are the leading causes of death among women, the former being the
second most common malignancy (Mgone, 1998). Due to lack of
community awareness and diagnostic services, the extent of these cancers
including others such as lung cancer, leukaemias, oesophageal, bowel and
childhood cancers are largely unknown. Neoplastic diseases in general
seem to be rising (Figure 8).
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Figure 8:    Cancer Deaths, 1961–1997
Physical Injuries
Injuries, intentional or unintentional now constitute serious public health
concern, and account for significant morbidity and mortality. The physical
injuries result from the following events:
• Motor vehicle accidents
• Domestic violence
Injuries, intentional or unintentional, have been on the health agenda for
some time. These have been a largely neglected or ignored health problem
in all regions. Road traffic accidents are common and for adults aged
between 15 and 44 years, road traffic accidents are the biggest cause of ill
health and premature death nationwide in PNG (Watters, 2000; Kaminiel
and Kevau, 2000). Unless preventive measures are put in place, the
number of road traffic accidents is likely to increase.
Domestic violence, especially against women, is not always
reflected in physical injuries but may be apparent in psychological sequelae.
Traditionally, violence has been classified as a cause of injury, particularly
among women, where the connection may not always be evident; the
health consequences also need to be understood. So too does the different
nature of the violence experienced by men, women and children.
Nationally, injuries are responsible for some deaths and disability.
Injuries have, nevertheless, often been a neglected area of public health
policy. More attention, therefore, needs to be focused on dealing with the
growing problem of injuries — through more comprehensive prevention,
improved emergency and treatment services, and better rehabilitation.
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There has been an upward trend since the 1960s (Figure 9) and
accidents and injuries are expected to increase as mobility of population
and the number of vehicles in use increase. Accidents and injuries are not
limited to the urban population but also the rural population who have to
commute long distances to towns and cities.
Figure 9:    Injuries and Accidents (including poisoning) in PNG, 1961–1997
DISEASES UNDER SURVEILLANCE
Diseases under surveillance are those diseases to which the health services








In the year 2000, PNG joined those parts of the world where
polio is not a problem or where polio has been eradicated. To maintain a
polio-free state, continuing surveillance is important.
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THE HEALTH AGENDA FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
The Unfinished Health Business
Despite better health services and health infrastructural development over
the last 25 years, disease patterns appear to have changed little. Infectious
diseases are still the major cause of death in PNG. There are five major
childhood conditions, which are responsible for more than 80 per cent of
all deaths in rural and urban (peri-urban) areas: diarrhoea, acute respira-
tory infections including pneumonia, malaria, measles and peri-natal
conditions. It is noteworthy that most of the deaths among infants and
young children are attributed to a limited number of conditions for which
either preventive or curative interventions exist.
Immunization programmes have yielded the most significant
changes in child health in the last two and half decades. Vaccines probably
represent the most cost-effective public health intervention of all, yet the
country does not use these enough. Children still die each year from
diseases for which vaccines are available at low cost. Similarly, for
diarrhoeal disease, inexpensive and effective intervention is available: oral
rehydration therapy. A high proportion of deaths in children under five
years of age are attributable to diarrhoeal disease and pneumonia. In
several developing countries including PNG, diarrhoeal disease,
pneumonia and malaria have been merged into a programme called
‘Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses’, a simplified approach to
promoting child health mainly through preventive strategies which must
be promoted aggressively.
In adults, maternal conditions, cancers, HIV/AIDS, malaria and
tuberculosis are three major causes of the disease burden. Together they
account for almost half of all deaths. However, the burden of maternal
conditions is hard to quantify because of lack of reliable data. But it is a
major public health problem and represents a major and necessary burden
for which policymakers should be held accountable. It is unacceptable that
women should continue to suffer and die as a result of complications related
to pregnancies and childbirth. Expanding health system coverage is required:
women must have access to skilled assistance during pregnancy and child-
birth, and must be able to reach a functioning health care facility when
complications arise. This may require safe motherhood policy initiatives.
The Problems of Emerging Diseases
Emerging diseases are expected to account for an increasing share of the
disease burden. The next two decades will see dramatic changes in the
health needs of the PNG population. Non-communicable diseases such as
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ischaemic heart disease, hypertension, and diabetes are fast counterbal-
ancing the traditional diseases, particularly infectious disease and
malnutrition, as leading causes of morbidity and mortality. The rapidity of
these changes will pose serious challenges to the health care system, and
will force decisions about the allocation of scarce resources.
The Problems of the Changing Nature of Diseases
There remain some significant threats that are particularly challenging
because of the changing nature of the disease pattern and the ways it
manifests itself in a population. One clear example is malaria, which has
resurged in many tropical countries including PNG with a vengeance.
Public health efforts in the last four decades (1960s–2000) has failed to
effectively reduce the burden of malaria, hence malaria remains a major
public health problem in PNG.
Malaria, along with tuberculosis, can be classified among a
group of diseases for which control efforts are being compromised by anti-
microbial drug resistance. This has become a major public health concern
and is having a deadly impact on the control of diseases such as tubercu-
losis, malaria and pneumonia. The phenomenon of anti-microbial drug
resistance is something not new but has grown out of control in the last
few decades. In the case of tuberculosis, poor prescribing practices or poor
patient compliance with treatment has led to the development of strains of
mycobacterium tuberculosis which are resistance to available drugs.
Malaria is worse presenting with double resistance problems: resistance of
the Plasmodium parasites that cause the disease to antimalarial drugs, and
resistance of Anopheles vectors transmitting the disease to insecticides.
Bacteria that cause acute respiratory illnesses in children are also resistant
to common antibacterial drugs.
A large proportion of the deaths occurring between the ages of
15 and 49 years are attributed to HIV/AIDS and/or tuberculosis. During
the period of active tuberculosis infection, an infected person may
transmit the infection to a person previously uninfected. Effective and
cost-effective strategies exist for tuberculosis, but standard treatment
requires regimes of six or more months of chemotherapy. This relies on
well-organized services to achieve high rates of compliance. Since HIV
infection is projected to increase over the next decade or so, the burden
from tuberculosis may also increase unless greater efforts are made to
contain the disease. The interaction of HIV and tuberculosis is an impor-
tant public health matter.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The steep projected increase in the burden of some diseases in PNG is
largely driven by population increases. These increases are augmented by
the rapidly increasing numbers of people who are at present exposed to
tobacco, and other risk factors, such as obesity, physical inactivity and heavy
alcohol consumption. Increases in diseases induced by changes in age distri-
bution also pose significant problems. Health systems must adjust to deal
effectively and efficiently with the changing nature and pattern of diseases.
Papua New Guinea is passing through a stage of demographic
transition, where demographic characteristics of the population are rapidly
shifting from very low birth rates and high death rates to high and low rates,
respectively; from, initially, a low population growth rate to a high growth
rate with a consequential increase in total population; from an age distribu-
tion that was biased towards middle-age with few young and few elderly, to
one with a high young and middle-aged population; and from a non-mobile
rural-based population to a high mobility one with trends towards urban
migration. These demographic changes are likely to impact on the epidemi-
ology and the epidemiological profile of the diseases in the country.
Health policymakers are challenged with ways to find the most
cost effective uses of their limited resources to control the rising trend of
infectious and non-infectious diseases. Increased health services may be
required to provide for an increasing demand for health services with the
changing nature of diseases and the disease profile. Although the bulk of
the population live in rural areas, easy accessibility by road and other
means will increase the proportion of population seeking medical services
in urban hospitals — the rate of increase will parallel closely that of the
urban population.
The challenge posed by these persisting and emerging health
issues is that the tools to control them have either not been developed or, if
available, are not used effectively or in some cases are becoming increas-
ingly ineffective. Anti-microbial resistance is a worrying phenomenon
since it could have a greater effect on the control and treatment of diseases
such as pneumonia, tuberculosis and malaria. These developments empha-
size the need for health systems to invest in research and development
strategies to counter these health problems.
It is hoped that this overview will provide some sense of direc-
tion for all of us, particularly to the leadership of the twenty-first century.
If this country is to achieve sustained socio-economic development we
must all work together towards a common goal, and what is important is
to focus our limited health resources on where these resources can make a
big difference — PREVENTION.
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There has been a variety of theoretical debates and policy decisions by
governments the world over on the issue of what development is and how
development can be achieved. These debates have sometimes stressed that
technological advancement and material goods and services are important
but at other times have focused on the social well-being of humanity. In
pursuing either of these goals for development a key variable has been the
role that education plays in the process of development.
Is there a correlation between education and development?
If yes, how has Papua New Guinea as a country planned and managed the
development of its education system? Is resource allocation to education
adequate and is investment in education as an overall policy of the
Government justified? After 25 years of independence as a sovereign
nation what have been some of the achievements and shortcomings in the
development of the education sector in Papua New Guinea? It is the inten-
tion of this chapter to reflect on these questions.
Discussions will begin with a brief theoretical perspective on
why education is a significant variable as a government policy in the
aspirations of the country’s development objectives. A review of the
progress, if any, in education during the colonial experiences of the
country and the state of education at the time of self-government and
independence will be discussed to give a backdrop on the current develop-
ments, including strengths and weaknesses and accomplishments and
challenges ahead. After 25 years of independence the Papua New Guinea
education system, from elementary to tertiary level, has made considerable
progress in all facets of its core functions and this will be presented in the
final sections. It is to be noted here that much of the historical facts and
data in this chapter have been taken from Jinks, Biskup and Nelson (1973:
129–31). For the other two sections I relied on the work of Thomas
(1976) in his discussion of the challenges confronting the provision of
education at the time of self-government and independence, and the
National Department of Education’s (NDOE 1999b) report, The State of
Education in Papua New Guinea on policy direction and current reforms in
the education system.
ARGUMENTS FOR INVESTMENT IN EDUCATION
Fagerlind and Saha (1989), in presenting a comparative perspective on
education and development based on the work of economist Shultz on
investment in human capital, point out that education has traditionally
been justified by optimistic assumptions. The first is that an educated
population contributes to the socio-economic development of the society
as a whole, and second, that education contributes to the well-being of
individuals within the society.
Further, it has become clear that rapidly changing technologies
and the changing face of the world economic and political systems require
a new flexibility and adaptability by societies and individuals. There is no
doubt that education is increasingly being seen as an essential component
of an adaptable and flexible population. Papua New Guinea is a member
of the changing global community and to achieve its developmental objec-
tives education must be embraced as a major factor in achieving these
goals. The debate on rates of return (public/private) at differing levels of
education has, however, been argued out in the case of PNG by Curtin
(1991), amongst others.
EDUCATION IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD
Prior to self-government and independence, education was provided
mainly by Christian missions, with the specific objective of spreading the
Christian message and evangelization in both British Papua and German
New Guinea.
In his review of the Australian Administration of 1920
Governor Murray admitted that the colonial government had done very
little for the education of the people of Papua, but he was able to
announce a new scheme: the missions were to be subsidized from the
Native Taxation Fund so that they continued to provide education. In
1929 the Government Secretary of British Papua, H.W. Champion (Jinks
et al., 1973: 36), described the progress made in education by the govern-
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ment and the missions; this is summarized in the following two sections
and draws on Jinks et al. (1973).
EDUCATION IN BRITISH PAPUA
The first school that was opened in Papua for the indigenous population was
in Port Moresby in 1874, by the London Missionary Society (LMS). By
1918 the Native Taxes Ordinance came into force. Under this scheme the
Government invited the various mission organizations, in return for finan-
cial assistance, to extend and improve the educational facilities that existed
for the indigenous population. Because of the many different languages and
dialects, the Government thought that there should be one common
language and chose English as being the most suitable and, as far back as
1907, directed its officers to use English in speaking to Papua New Guinea.
The first inspection under the new conditions was made in
1927. The total number of pupils in the schools inspected was about
2,000. The accommodation was found suitable and adequate, and the
equipment satisfactory, but the want of an English reading book in
keeping with Papuan conditions was commented on. The European
teachers and their native assistants were favorably spoken of.
The schools were again examined a year later by the same
Inspector. A school reader suitable for Papuan conditions had been written
by a missionary of the LMS, published by the Government, and its use
made compulsory in all the subsidized schools. The Inspector found a
decided advance upon the year before. The use of English had made some
good progress while arithmetic was still weak. Not much progress had
been made in general knowledge, but the Inspector’s view on the new
reader was that it was a valuable factor in the education of Papuans. At this
examination 1,366 pupils were examined, and 1,147 passed.
One of the practical benefits of the education of the indigenous
population was seen in the number of Papuans employed by Europeans at
clerical and other duties, which was a result not believed possible a few
years earlier. In the Government Service many native Papuans were
employed. On the issue of the provision of higher education for Papuans,
Governor Murray’s thoughts were as follows:
My own opinion, which in itself is not of any importance, but
which probably coincides with that of most of the European
residents of Papua, is that Papuan and European overlap; that is
I think that the best Papuans are superior to the worst Europeans,
but that Europeans as a whole have an innate superiority over
Papuans. As for the possibility of higher education among Papuans
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one must admit that, if a Papuan can qualify for the priesthood,
there is no reason to suppose that another Papuan could not qualify
for medicine or law. Personally, I have no doubt that Papuans could
be found who could be educated to the standard of an ordinary
professional career; but, in order to prevent any possible misunder-
standing, I may say at once that I am quite opposed to the creation
of a Papuan intelligentsia, and would rather aim at the diffusion of
an elementary education, with a knowledge of English, over as wide
an area as possible (Jinks et al., 1973: 135).
EDUCATION IN GERMAN NEW GUINEA
In German New Guinea the colonial government entered the field of
education in 1907 by opening a school at Namanula, East New Britain
Province. The language of instruction during the first two years was
Kuanua, thereafter German. The government also subsidized missions for
the teaching of the German language.
For the first twenty-three years of the Protectorate all educational
activity was in the hands of the Christian missions. Even when the
Government did enter the educational field, its activities, though influential,
were restricted.
For the most part the medium of instruction was the vernacular,
the learning and writing of which entailed tremendous labour and
resource. There was no lingua franca, no literature, not even an alphabet.
In this they had to start with a blank sheet. As in Papua, there were
hundreds of languages and obviously it was impossible to learn them all or
commit them all to writing. Hence, the administration developed the
practice of selecting a local language, committing it to paper, and then
teaching this language to people of other linguistic groups, superimposing
one vernacular to make it the lingua franca for a whole area. And as their
influence spread to other areas, they took that vernacular with them, with
its alphabet and its books. A start was made to introduce German, but this
did not make much headway.
When the Government did interest itself in education, it did so
in a limited field only, with one European and one Native School, both in
Rabaul. Even then in the latter, subsistence gardening was necessary to cut
down expenses, and the Native School was also the Government Printery,
which helped cut down the costs of administration. Towards the end of
the era, it seemed that the Government was planning to coordinate the
work of the different missions and so to develop some sort of unified
system of education. However, when the 1914–1918 War came, each
mission was still running its own schools in its own way. Their common
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purpose was to use the schools as a means to the end of bringing the
gospel to the people.
In 1914 the Germans prepared a three year ‘developmental plan’
involving the opening up of new areas in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, an expan-
sion of medical and agricultural extension services, and the establishment
of a government school system. The latter was prompted by increased
demand for educated workers rather than by welfare or humanitarian
considerations. Government schools were also opened at Kieta and
Kavieng. The erection of a second school on the New Guinea mainland,
probably at Aitape, was reserved for future years, in order to disseminate
the German language in the colony.
Under the Mandated Territory of Papua and New Guinea the
aim of the government under the Australian Administration appears to
have been to provide a more advanced education than the missions. The
first elementary school was opened in Kokopo in 1922, and another at
Kavieng soon after. In 1927 it was announced that similar schools would
be opened in each of the nine districts but nothing was done (Jinks et al.,
1973: 279).
Consequently two reports were commissioned, the McKenna
report of 1929 and the Griffiths proposal of 1933. The McKenna Report
made six specific suggestions that included the following:
(a) The establishment of elementary schools for natives in populous
centres;
(b) The establishment of boarding schools at selected centres for the
training of native teachers, the trainees to be selected by the teachers
of the elementary schools;
(c) The drafting to Rabaul of pupils selected for training as teachers,
tradesmen, agriculturists, and so on;
(d) The creation of a staff of white teachers who will be officers of the
Territory, and who will have the charge of the bigger schools, and
the supervision of such adjacent village schools as can be efficiently
supervised;
(e) The holding of refresher courses for European teachers at the
Kerevat Agricultural College;
(f ) The granting of subsidies to Mission schools on condition that they
teach English and throw their schools open to Government inspec-
tion — the granting of such subsidy to be subject to a satisfactory
report by an Inspector.
The Griffiths proposals were that all education should be
entrusted to missions and subsidized by the government. Change of the
administrators in 1934 saw a souring of the relationship between the
missions and the proposals were never implemented.
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CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE PROVISION OF
EDUCATION AT THE TIME OF SELF-GOVERNMENT 
AND INDEPENDENCE
State of Education at the Time of Independence
At the time of independence in 1975 at least two different schools systems
were beginning to emerge. There were the government schools, including
the Primary ‘A’ schools for the elite and the expatriate community and
those schools that were operated by the many different missions. School
curriculum varied accordingly but no nationally developed curriculum was
in use in the different schools.
In commenting on the state of education at the time, Barrington
observed the following:
Papua New Guinea will soon become independent of Australia, and
will seek admission to the Commonwealth of Nations. With the end of
the colonial era, Papua New Guinea will acquire new status, new
dignity, and new responsibilities. Many of the old problems will
remain, however, and not the least of them will be the problem of
providing suitable education for its population of 2.6 million, scattered
over two million square miles of land and sea (Thomas, 1976: 3).
The Development of a National System of Education
The following and the next five sections present the challenges of educa-
tional provision in Papua New Guinea, as noted by Thomas (1976: 3–13)
at the time of independence.
Papua became an Australian Territory in 1906 and German New
Guinea was acquired by Australia in 1914, becoming a mandated territory
in 1921 and a Trust Territory in 1946. The Australian Territory of Papua
and the Trust Territory of New Guinea had been jointly administered since
1946, and the first Director of Education was appointed in that year.
Prior to the Second World War, schooling offered by missions
was almost entirely elementary. In 1939 there were approximately 90,000
pupils in mission schools. The schools tended to be modeled on the
German, Australian or American pattern. Apart from the opportunity for
a few select students to become mission workers or pastors, there was little
employment available, so the main aims of the missions were ‘to develop
character and personality, prepare children to grow up as good Christians
and useful members of society, to advance cultural development and to
promote a healthier existence’ (Thomas, 1976: 4).
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The commonly held view of education as a tool for changing
individuals and society as a whole was noted to be held by the populace at
the time of independence and continues to prevail twenty-five years on.
The post-war period saw an emphasis on the extension of mass literacy.
According to Thomas (1976: 4), ‘Many village people wanted education
for their children, believing it was bound to transform their society.
Education was looked upon as the source of western influence, power,
privilege and wealth.
In 1955 the Australian Minister for Territories declared the
following educational objectives for Papua New Guinea: universal primary
education, the blending of cultures, the voluntary acceptance of
Christianity by the indigenous people, and the fostering of English as a
common language. In 1958 the Director of Education drafted a plan for
universal primary education within fifteen years. The Minister for
Territories outlined plans in 1961 to increase school enrolments from
150,000 to 350,000 in the next five years, and long-range plans to increase
enrolments to 750,000 by 1975, by which time all children of school age
would be within reach of school. However, the United Nations Visiting
Mission of 1962, under the chairmanship of Sir Hugh Foot, was critical of
these plans for mass literacy, acknowledging that whilst it was commend-
able enough in principle, it was inadequate for the needs of Papua New
Guinea at the time. The UN Mission pointed out that the system was not
providing the secondary and tertiary education necessary to train Papua
New Guineans to replace Australians in professional and administrative
positions. A new approach was essential to provide at least one hundred
university graduates per year.
Thus, Australia’s educational policy in Papua New Guinea
changed direction in the sixties, and became one of elitism. Secondary and
higher education began to receive high priority in the country’s educa-
tional development. New high schools were established. The University of
Papua New Guinea commenced classes in Port Moresby in 1966. An
Institute of Higher Technical Education was also established in Port
Moresby in 1967. It was later transferred to Lae, and is now called the
Papua New Guinea University of Technology.
Primary Education
Although the objective of universal primary education was postponed
during the sixties, the growth in the school system was remarkable.
Whereas in 1960, enrolments totalled 95,366, in 1972 the figure was
251,557. In 1960 only 2 per cent of the total number of indigenous
children enrolled was in high school; in 1973 this figure had grown to 14
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per cent. Further evidence of the growth of the school system can be
gained from the figures shown in Table 1, relating to the number of
schools and teachers in 1960 and 1972.
During the sixties, as the education system expanded, it became
increasingly clear that the missions, which provided about 65 per cent of
primary education and 35 per cent of secondary education, and trained
their own teachers, could not maintain these services unless the financial
structure was changed. Voluntary agency teachers were resentful of the fact
that they received, in general, only about half of the cash salary of
Administration teachers of comparable grade. Furthermore, the missions
and churches were predominantly local or regional in character, and were
becoming increasingly doubtful about sharing control of the system with a
powerful Department of Education centralized in Port Moresby. In 1968
Professor L.J. Lewis, of the Institute of Education, London, visited Papua
New Guinea, and was invited to extend his visit to make a review of the
primary school curriculum. In this report, Lewis commented that the
differences in status of teachers with the same qualifications and experi-
ence being employed by different agencies in the system would become
‘increasing causes of frustration and dissatisfaction’ (Thomas, 1976: 6);
suggested that the establishment of a National Teaching Service separate
from the Central Civil Service would become inevitable; and recom-
mended the appointment of a Committee of Inquiry to look into the
matter and report to the Government.
In February 1969 the Minister for External Territories announced
the appointment of a three-man Advisory Committee on Education ‘to
advise on the relationships between mission and Administration educational
systems in Papua New Guinea’ (Thomas, 1976: 7).
In its Report, the Committee pointed out that although there
were mission and administration schools, the system was not, in a number
of important ways, a separate or dual one. The curriculum, the external
examinations, and the classification of teachers’ qualifications were the
same for all schools. Every recognized school was subject to inspection. At
the primary level, every village school was part of a system ‘in that it is
recognized by the Administration, and with some reservations by other
missions and churches, as the only school for the village or area that it
serves’ (Thomas, 1976: 7). So there was already, in a sense, a national
system. What was lacking was a completely national system in the sense
that there should be equality of salaries, duties and conditions for all
teachers, whether employed by the missions or the Administration.
The Committee also stressed that it found two distinct viewpoints
on educational planning in Papua New Guinea. The missionaries were
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accustomed to looking at education from the viewpoint of the village and
the individuals in it, and so set out to give as many children as possible an
education, of some sort. However, another, newer purpose of education
was to help a country achieve independence, economic growth, and higher
living standards. These two views of education, the village-centred and the
nation-centred, could, if pressed to extremes, lead to very different policies
for education.
Table 1:    Government and Non-government Schools and Indigenous and 







Teacher Training 6 3





Teacher Training 21 7
Sub-total Non-government schools 958 1,055






Teacher Training 3 29





Teacher Training 36 184
Sub-total Non-indigenous teachers 623 2,378
TOTAL, ALL TEACHERS 2,098 9,062
Source: Adapted from Thomas (1973).
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The 1970 Education Ordinance established a National Teaching
Service, whose members would be employed by a Teaching Service
Commission, and declared a tripartite system of control that divided
functions between the Department of Education, the voluntary educa-
tional agencies, and the local government councils and district education
committees. This form of administration permitted a gradual devolution
of certain powers from the centre to the provinces. Thus, the Education
Ordinance was an attempt to reconcile local and national needs. This was
the beginning of the decentralization of education functions in Papua New
Guinea.
The establishment of Provincial Education Boards (PEB) was
seen as the cornerstone of the new education system being developed at
the time of independence and reflected a genuine desire to decentralize
decision-making in education. There were nineteen of these boards, one in
each province of the country. The assistant secretary for education was the
chair and membership of the board included representatives from the
Government, churches and missions, local government councils, teachers
and the community. Functions of the PEB included selecting entrants for
primary, secondary and technical schools, appointing staff, determining
school fees, administering education funds, and coordinating education
activities within the province. In addition, the boards were also required to
prepare plans for the establishment and development of schools in the
province, and the supervising and carrying out of these plans when
approved by the National Education Board.
The National Education Board has fourteen members, drawn
from many different sectors of the community. Its chair, and chief executive
is the Secretary of Education. It is responsible for keeping the economy and
efficiency of the National Education System under continuous review, and
must submit an annual report to the Papua New Guinea Parliament through
the National Executive Council. Its functions include advisory and supervi-
sory duties, as well as the allocation of staff to provinces and of students to
teachers’ colleges, and the establishment of national criteria for the selection
of students for secondary schools and colleges.
High School Selection and School Leavers
The real problem is the ‘bottleneck’ situation created at the completion of
grade six. Although the absolute number of students in high schools
increased rapidly the proportion admitted declined steadily. The children
between the ages of 13 to 16 considered ‘drop-outs’ are being ‘uprooted
and abandoned’ by an unkind education structure. The fact that only a
very limited number of primary school graduates can be admitted to
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secondary school has had the most far-reaching social and educational
consequences in Papua New Guinea. Primary education is not seen as a
phase of education in its own right, but merely as a prerequisite for admis-
sion to high school. Those successful at the grade six examinations who are
not selected for high school tend to be regarded as failures by themselves,
their peers and their families. Those who fail, and those who pass but are
not admitted to high school, either remain in the village-where they
frequently do little else but sit around wondering why the world refuses to
owe them a living, and cause trouble and concern to the elders of the
village, or drift to the towns to compound the problems of unemploy-
ment, poverty, overcrowding, crime and misery existing there. In both
cases, the student’s education has not fitted him/her for either the old life
or the new.
Curriculum
What kind of education do Papua New Guineans want for their children?
There was evidence of disillusionment with the western model. After
Paulias Matane visited Africa in 1967, he urged on his return that provi-
sion should be made in schools for the primary school leavers who will go
back to a rural life. The aim should be to produce good farmers or rural
workers — people who would be happy to work on the land. Somehow
the drift of young people to the towns would have to be stopped, and
village life made more interesting and useful. The then minister for educa-
tion Ebia Olewale (Thomas, 1976: 13) pointed out in 1972 that Papua
New Guinea had a ‘perfect’ system of education for a static society long
before the arrival of the Europeans. The teachers were experts, the pass rate
was high, and there were few dropouts. Today, however, the village folk
can’t impart the ideas of the village traditions and the dances and the ritual
to their children. The children are also neglecting their obligations and
making attacks on such cherished institutions as bride price payment.
In 1971 the Department of Education invited thirty-three
Papua New Guineans, representing all sections of the community, to come
together to discuss the aims and objectives of the primary curriculum.
They were asked to list the most important tasks for the primary school.
The resolutions showed the concern of indigenous people for an education
relevant to the needs of Papua New Guinea society. They stressed the need
for the education system to prepare children for a changing society, to
teach them to respect the views of their parents and the village community,
to give them practical knowledge to enable them to live a full and useful
life, and to teach them how to reconstruct their cultural heritage through
practising traditional dancing, folk songs, drama and craft.
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In April 1974 the Minister for Education announced that an
eight-person committee, consisting entirely of Papua New Guineans and
headed by Alkan Tololo, had been formed to prepare a five-year education
plan. The overriding aim of the plan would be to gear the education
system to more practical aspects and to make every stage of education as
self-contained as possible. The Minister stated that it was important that
the system should help people to acquire useful skills at different levels to
fit them into the communities they live in, both urban and rural, and to
avoid social dislocation arising from lack of opportunities in rural areas.
Supervision and Inspection
The education system has developed a rigorous inspection system covering
all levels from primary through to secondary and national high schools,
vocational centres and teachers colleges. This ensures that procedures are
followed and standards maintained. In 1971 nearly two-thirds of the
primary teachers in Papua New Guinea had only a primary education and
one year of teacher training. For many teachers, their primary education
was indifferent and their training meagre and far from recent. In such
circumstances, school inspectors have a special responsibility to assist the
professional development of teachers. Compounded with this are problems
of supervision and inspection in an area of such scattered population and
rugged terrain. Inspectors travel by air, by vehicle, by boat, by canoe, and
on foot. It is not unusual for an inspecting officer to walk half a day to see
one school of twenty to thirty children, and then to have to walk the same
20 to 30 kilometres back to a canoe or a boat for a short journey.
Tertiary Institutions
At the time of independence Papua New Guinea had more than thirty
post-secondary training institutions, including two universities, an
Administrative College, a Forestry College, an Agricultural College, a
Local Government Staff College, and Co-operative College; colleges for
medicine, nursing, dentistry and paramedical training; three technical
colleges, two agricultural training institutes, and eleven teachers’ colleges;
not to mention training institutes operated by such diverse organizations
as the Department of Civil Aviation, the Police, the Corrective
Institutions, the Army, the Electricity Commission, and the Department
of Transport. There were over 3,500 students in these institutions, which
are scattered over ten of the nineteen provinces. Institutions that are
within the same province are often separated widely from each other; even
those in Port Moresby are sufficiently separated to make coordination of
effort between them a major problem.
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The cost of operating the two universities was a concern for the
Minister for Education. The Minister stated that the cost of operating the
two universities for some 2,000 students was in excess of $10 million the
previous year. The total educational budget for the whole country was
some $30 million. He observed that the figures do point to a ‘certain
imbalance’ and warned that a system that benefits a few at the expense of
many results in the creation of a privileged group, set apart from the bulk
of the people. One does achieve development that way in the short run,
while sowing the seeds of a revolution in the long run.
Policy Directions: Education Reviews and Reforms since Independence
After independence major educational reforms have been undertaken.
These education reforms have not happened overnight. There are a number
of milestones that have occurred over the years since independence that are
significant. Studies have been undertaken and reports put together mostly
by Papua New Guineans themselves to determine and chart the future for
the development of the education sector. These signposts, as stated in the
State of Education Report (NDOE, 1999b), are as follows:
• Tololo Committee, 1974
• The Matane Report, 1985
• The Jomtien Declaration of Education for all (EFA), 1990
• The Education Sector Study, 1991
• Conference of the Council of Education Ministers, 1991
• The National Education Reform Task Force, 1992
• NEC decisions made in 1992 and 1994
• The Education Sector Resources Study, 1995
• The National Education Plan, 1996
• Provincial Education Plans, 1995–1998
• Ministerial Consultation, 1998 and 1999
• World Bank Education Sector Study, 1998
• World Bank Cost Effectiveness Study, 1998
• Department of Education Corporate Plan, 1997
• Technical Vocational Education and Training Corporate Plan, 1999
• National Skills Plan, 1999–2000
In the next section I discuss in brief each of these key studies
and reports.
The Tololo Committee of 1974 was the first of these significant
reports. Many Papua New Guineans were unhappy with the direction that
colonial administrators set for education. In 1974, a committee chaired by
the then Director of Education, Alkan Tololo, with an entirely Papua New
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Guinean membership, drafted a post-independence five-year education
plan. It proposed that schooling be community based, the use of vernacu-
lars be emphasized, and education be linked to development and more
widely and more equally provided. They planned to expand primary
schooling to Grade 8 and expand access to Grades 9 and 10. They were
also concerned that greater access to education should be given to females
and to those from disadvantaged areas.
The Matane Report published in 1985 was entitled ‘A
Philosophy of Education’ for Papua New Guinea. This should be seen as
being the birth of the education reforms, in particular the reform of the
curriculum.
The National Goals as expressed in the National Constitution
recognized the importance of:
• Integral Human Development
• Equality and Participation
• National Sovereignty and Self-Reliance
• National Resources and Environment
• Papua New Guinean Ways
The Matane Report stressed that the school can help educate
children but cannot and should not be regarded as the only agent of
education. The home, the churches, the community, the police and the
politicians are also influences on a child’s life and must all contribute to
the integral human development of the child. The attitude that the school
is the only agent of education must be changed.
The process of integral human development calls for an educa-
tion system that helps individuals:
• identify basic human needs;
• analyse situations in terms of needs;
• see these needs in the context of spiritual and social values of the
community;
• take responsible action in cooperation with others.
The success of such an education system requires the integrated
involvement of all the agents of education: home, church, school, commu-
nity and others. Within that broad educational system the school must
integrate knowledge, skills and attitudes to create subject matter appro-
priate to producing the desired outcome of integral human development.
To achieve the aim of integral human development, an
individual must live and work with others and, accordingly, the goals of
education should be directed towards socialization, participation, libera-
tion and equality. The needs of individuals, the educational input from
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different agents, the learning content and the goals of integral human
development are interrelated.
There were twenty-three recommendations altogether and it is
instructive to reflect on some of the recommendations of the Matane
Report and note just how much has been implemented, either through the
education reforms or through other policy measures.
Recommendation 12 is that the vernacular language be used as the
medium of instruction in the early years of schooling and English be used in
later years. Recommendation 13 is that ways be found to immediately expand
upper secondary education. Recommendation 8 is that funds be redirected
from Higher Education towards the goal of Universal Primary Education.
Recommendation 15 is that standards in English and Mathematics be nation-
ally monitored and further improved. Recommendation 7 is that those who
benefit from upper secondary and tertiary level education should pay a larger
proportion of the costs of that education.
In the final analysis of the Matane Report, the challenge posed
for Papua New Guinea was this: ‘What kind of a citizen do we want for
our society?’
In 1990 the National Government joined other nations to sign a
Declaration of Education for All in Jomtien, Thailand. By signing this
agreement the National Government, along with other nations of the
world, committed itself to providing Education for All, and in Papua New
Guinea, if not at all levels then at least for the lower primary sector.
The 1991 Education Sector Study was a major investigation
into the state of education in Papua New Guinea. It was carried out at the
behest of the Education Minister of the time, Utula Samana. The study
identified the problems of the system and then looked at various ways in
which those problems could be solved. If the Matane Report can be seen
as being the birth of the curriculum reforms, then the Sector Study was
the birth of the restructuring of the education system.
Major problems were identified at both the primary and
secondary levels. It became clear that the country could never achieve
either universal primary education or its targets for access to secondary
education, under the system that was operating at that time.
The Council of Education Ministers met in Madang in 1991
and considered the findings of the Sector Study. This meeting chaired by
Minister Samana endorsed the recommendations of the study and tasked
the Department of Education with implementation.
Two specific National Executive Council decisions of 1991
paved the way for these first initiatives. These decisions, as part of
Decision No. 183/91, were that the NEC:
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[The NEC] … approved in principle the topping up of existing
selected Provincial High Schools as a means to rapidly and econom-
ically expand the National High School system. This be critically
evaluated as part of the revised education structure proposed by the
Education Sector Review and the results of this evaluation
presented to NEC with recommendations for action;
[The NEC] … directed that the recommendations of the Education
Sector Study, particularly as they relate to the restructure of the educa-
tion system, be critically evaluated for implementation resulting in a
full report to NEC. Possible projects resulting from the Sector Study be
formulated and fully documented for consideration and future funding
as some of the donor agencies have indicated interest in funding
human resource development related projects (NDOE, 1999b).
A National Education Reform Task Force chaired by the
Secretary for Education was formed in 1992 to look at ways in which the
recommendations of the Conference could be implemented. This Task
Force was made up of representatives from the Education Department, the
provinces and other interested groups. The Task Force met frequently
through 1992 and 1993. It was decided to start the primary and secondary
initiatives in the Madang and West New Britain Provinces.
Provincial Education Reform Task Forces were also formed
during 1992 and 1993 to consider ways in which they could implement
the reform agenda in their particular provinces. The Department was able
to support these Task Forces with small amounts of money to ensure full
representation.
There were further decisions made by the NEC in 1994 regarding
the expansion of access to grades 7 and 11. NEC Decision No. 68/94 reads:
On 17th May, 1994, Council:
1. approved the establishment of grade 11 and 12 classes at selected
provincial high schools at the rate of at least 3 a year as being a
major strategy for increasing access to upper secondary over the
next five years;
2. amended its Decision No.224/90 of meeting No.64/90 relating to
the establishment of five new National High Schools in Western
Highlands, Oro and New Ireland Provinces except for those
underway for Gerehu in NCD and Markham Valley in Morobe;
and
3. approved the establishment of grade 7 and 8 classes at primary
school as being a major strategy for increasing access to grades 7 and
8 instead of building new Provincial High Schools (grades 7–10).
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A major study was embarked upon in 1994 and 1995 called the
Education Sector Resources Study. This study was co-funded by AusAID
(or AIDAB as it was called at the time), the Asian Development Bank and
the Government of Papua New Guinea.
The reason for this study was that it was realized that there were
enormous cost implications involved in the implementation of the educa-
tion reforms. The Resources Study looked at all of these implications —
financial, manpower, infrastructure, and so on. A major finding was that,
although the education reforms reduced unit costs significantly, there was
still a resource gap that needed to be closed. In order to achieve this the
country would need to commit itself to a number of cost saving and cost
recovery measures.
The National Education Plan was completed in 1996 following
a considerable effort from many officers within the department, in partic-
ular from the newly formed Facilitating and Monitoring Unit. The plan
leans heavily on the recommendations from the Education Sector Review
and also the Resources Study. In two parts, Part A describes the problems
and outlines what will be done, while Part B goes into much more detail
about what has happened in the past and the reasons behind the education
reform programme.
The Plan was forwarded to the National Executive Council for
endorsement which was received in June 1997. The Plan was officially
launched by the Prime Minister, Mr. Bill Skate, prior to the January 1998
conference of the Council of Education Ministers that was held in Lae.
The National Education Plan was to be revised and updated in
the following years. This would incorporate many of the lessons learnt from
the early years of implementation and reflect fully the effects of the passage
of the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments.
The Department of Education Corporate Plan was produced following
instruction from the Prime Minister’s Department and should be seen as a
companion document to the National Education Plan.
The World Bank conducted an education sector study in early
1998. This study looked at the implementation of the education reforms.
It painted a particularly rosy picture whilst suitably identifying the
problems that were being faced by the country. Five key issues identified in
reform implementation were: Teacher supply; Institutional strengthening;
Assessment; Curriculum development, and International efficiency.
In a decentralized system, such as that operating in Papua New
Guinea, there was no point in having just one national plan. There was
clearly a need for twenty provincial education plans. Work on these started
in 1995 and continues. Members of the Facilitating and Monitoring Unit,
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along with the Regional management and Planning Advisers, have been
working closely with provinces in order that these plans be completed and
endorsed by their respective Provincial Executive Councils.
The role of Department of Education officers is to ensure that
the Provincial Education Plans are consistent with the National Education
Plan and to provide technical expertise where required. It was important
that provinces had a sense of ownership of these plans. By mid-1999
sixteen provinces had completed their education plans, along with the
implementation schedules. A much lower number had managed to get
their plans through all of the endorsement procedures. A few provinces
have started the important process of reviewing and amending their plans.
This is a very healthy sign.
Ministerial Consultations were held in Lae, January 1998. It was
the first such gathering since the 1991 conference in Madang. The most
important recommendation to come out of this conference was that all
provinces should have completed their provincial education plans by
September 1998 and that these plans be consistent with the National
Education Plan. This meeting strongly reaffirmed its commitment to the
education reform agenda.
One of the objectives of the World Bank funded study was to
look again at measures identified in the 1995 Education Sector Resources
Study to enable education services to be provided in a more efficient
manner. This study was completed in late 1998 and its major recommen-
dation was to look at teacher deployment, and to utilize funds saved
through a more efficient use of teachers for a variety of activities such as
incentives for teachers to go to more remote areas. It built on the World
Bank’s Education Sector Study earlier in 1998 and looked at the internal
efficiency of the system. The final study was endorsed by the Senior
Education Officers Conference at Goroka in June 1999.
Again, under the auspices of ministerial consultations, a confer-
ence was held in Rabaul in January 1999. The Chair of the Education
Committee in each province reported on the progress that had been made
on their plans. Major decisions were made with regard to a National
Education Skills Plan and the state of literacy in the country. The National
Skills Plan has many objectives, one of which is to identify the develop-
ment of skills for life and living required by young people at each level of
schooling.
A Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET)
Corporate Plan was produced for the ministerial consultations in Rabaul.
At this conference the plan writers were asked to reconsider and to consult
more fully with the provinces. It was endorsed in principle at the Senior
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Officer’s Conference in Goroka, June 1999. The TVET shows the way
forward with relation to the unification of technical and vocational education.
Implementation of the Education Reforms: 25 Years on
The 1991 Education Sector Study looked at these tensions building within
the system and proposed a totally new structure for education.
The reform involves the restructuring of the formal education
system from the pre-primary level through to the upper secondary level.
The reform was designed to directly address most of the systemic
weaknesses and problem areas identified in the sector review.
The ‘old’ 6-4-2 structure had been characterized by high attrition
rates at the primary level and a serious access problem at the secondary
level. The two major bottlenecks were at grade 7 and grade 11. In the new
structure as shown in Figure 1 the first ‘push out’ would be at grade 8 and
not grade 6 as in the old structure. The ‘push outs’ have pathways opened
to them to pursue further education through grades 9 and 10 and
vocational education or pursue studies, distance and open learning.
Elementary Education
At the first level, village or settlement-based elementary schools will be
formalized. Annual intakes will become possible allowing for the reduction
of staggered intakes. This, in time, should solve the problem of over age
entry. Enrolment at the prep level begins at six years of age. These schools
should be building on existing Tok Ples Pre Skul (TPPS) initiatives and
provide a preparatory year’s education (EP) followed by grades 1 and 2.
These are often referred to as Elementary 1 (E1) and Elementary 2 (E2) in
order to distinguish them from grades 1 and 2 in the community schools.
The language of instruction in elementary schools is the vernacular
allowing for acquisition of literacy in the language which the children
speak. Prep curricula emphasizes initial literacy, numeracy, ethics, morality
and cultural bonding. To make the curriculum more relevant, expand
enrolments, and help improve retention in elementary schools, EP, E1 and
E2 will comprise a new integrated curriculum based on the child’s own
culture and community. In many schools, teaching is done by one teacher
using multi-grade teaching methods. The transition to English begins in
the third year. A new more relevant, integrated activity-based curriculum
has been adopted, and will use locally developed materials. An initial
literacy kit of eighteen stories has been provided. School is for four hours
duration each day. There are more than 137,000 children enrolled in the
three years of elementary education in 2000. Most of these children are
between six and eight years old.
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Elementary teachers are being trained through a three-year
mixed mode program. A system of supervision for elementary school
teachers is being developed. Teachers receive a salary commensurate with
training and hours of duty.
Primary Education
The elementary schools act as feeder schools for primary schools. The
introduction of elementary schools in the villages frees classroom space
and other facilities within the primary schools. This allows for the reloca-
tion of grades 7 and 8 classes from the high schools. There need be no
great increase in either the enrolments or number of teachers in the
240 BUILDING A NATION IN  PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Notes:
1. P: Preparatory class with initial literacy and general education in the vernacular.
2. Vocational: Two years of lower secondary education with a vocational skills bias.
3. Other: A wide range of ‘permitted’ institutions which offer two or more years of
secondary education, with a bias determined by the needs and opportunities in the
areas they serve.
4. Grades 11–12: Upper secondary education or Matriculation will develop particular
curriculum biases, for example, academic, agriculture, technical, commercial and so on.
The reform structure provides for Grades 11 and 12 in traditionally separate institutions,
or added on to existing provincial high schools.
5. PETT: Pre-Employment Technical Training courses, which are for two years post-grade
10, and located in technical colleges.
6. College: Covers the more than sixty non-university ‘tertiary’ institutions which
currently take mainly grade 10 leavers, but who are in the process of raising their entry
level to grade 12 as the pool of grade 12 leavers increases.
7. Open learning: College of Distance Education, and other distance education providers.
Source: NDOE (1999b).
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Elementary
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Figure 1:    The New Education Reform Structure
primary schools over the plan period. Six years of primary education can
be provided through to grade 8. All children are expected to be able to
continue with their education until grade 8. It is hoped that this will help
overcome the problem of the loss of students, particularly girls, from the
system after grade 6. To improve the quality and relevance of education,
the primary curriculum will become more subject-specific and a strong
vocational component will be developed for the upper grades as part of a
Curriculum Reform Project. A new examination system will be formulated
for graduation from grade 8 and to enable selection for grades 9 through
to 12. Teachers currently within the system are being offered the opportu-
nity to upgrade their qualifications to diploma level through an in-service
programme. New graduates from the Teachers Colleges will be diploma
holders equipped to teach in the upper primary grades. Figures from the
NDOE (1999a) show that in the primary and community schools there
are approximately 550,000 children enrolled.
Secondary Education
The facilities freed up by the relocation of the grade 7 and 8 classes can be
used in one of two ways. In the majority of schools there will be an
immediate increase in the number of grade 9 and 10 places — up to
double in most cases. At the same time, grades 11 and 12 are being devel-
oped at selected schools. It has been a government objective to have one
such school in each province. Secondary education therefore consists of
four years — grades 9 to 12. There should be no great increase in either
the enrolments or number of teachers in the secondary schools over the
plan period. However, additional teachers still need to be trained to fully
localize the teaching force. The University of Goroka is expected to
develop programmes for the upgrading of existing secondary school
teachers. Enrolment in secondary schools was more than 76,000 children,
but taking into account the 6,000 or so enrolled in the College of Distance
Education the total enrolment figure would surpass the 80,000 mark.
The curriculum will be broadened to include more technical,
agricultural, commercial and scientific content. Vocational centers will
become part of the secondary system. Open learning will provide an alter-
native opportunity for secondary education.
The net effect of all this on schooling will be greatly increased
access at all grades. The major expenditures required will be the upgrading
of facilities and provision of materials at the primary and secondary levels,
and the cost of elementary school teacher salaries. The unit costs of educa-
tion in grades 7 through to 12 will be reduced through the increased
enrolments utilizing facilities at existing primary and provincial high
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schools. This reduction is further enhanced by the almost complete aboli-
tion of boarding students in Grades 7 and 8.
The following table shows the figures under the reform from
elementary schools through to teachers’ colleges and the College of
Distance Education (CODE).
Table 2:    Total enrolments by institution type, 1997 and 1999
1997 1999
Elementary EP 19,686 55,464
Schools E1 5,012 46,902
E2 935 27,825
Elementary subtotal 25,633 130,191
Primary and G1 122,538 98,065
Community 2 104,562 120,965






Primary subtotal 548,256 603,885
7 17,032 14,764
Secondary 8 16,182 15,526
and Provincial 9 18,644 23,540
High Schools 10 15,562 18,807
11 1,263 2,745
12 1,063 1,659
National 11 1,339 1,280
High Schools 12 1,334 1,280
Secondary subtotal 72,419 79,601
School Total 646,308 813,677
Vocational Centres 11,106 15,573
Technical Colleges 1,859 1,949
Primary Teachers’ Colleges 1,870 1,731
Post-Secondary Total 14,835 19,253
CODE 13,691 students enrolled in 22,727 subjects
Source: NDOE (1999a).
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Post-Secondary Education
With the expansion of the upper secondary system one thing is obvious:
that there are more grade 12 school leavers now than when there were only
four national high schools. With a combined grade 10 and 12 output of
more than 20,000 students per year with an intake capacity of only about
5,000 existing in the tertiary sector institutions, where will the remaining
15,000 or so end up? Will they all return to the villages as envisaged?
The number of tertiary institutions has not increased nor
expanded in capacity in correspondence with the expansion of the
secondary level. According to Education Department figures in 2000,
about 30,000 school leavers were undertaking courses at vocational
training centres and technical colleges.
Teacher Education
Teacher training for primary level and vocational schools is provided by the
two government owned colleges, Madang and PNG Education Institute
(formerly an in-service college) and five mission owned colleges. For
secondary teacher training, the University of Goroka is the major provider
of training with Pacific Adventist University training a smaller number.
University Education
The establishment of the Higher Education Sector of the National
Education System was the end result of the 1962 visit by the United
Nations Mission led by Sir Hugh Foot. In 1970 the Currie Commission
stressed the need for an appropriate balance between various levels of
education and the maintaining of sound academic standards in the then
newly established University of Papua New Guinea.
In 1971 the Brown Report strongly recommended the establish-
ment of the Commission for Higher Education, enacted by the parliament in
accomplishing the National Higher Education Act in 1983. The 1998 Higher
Education Act then moved to separate the Office of Higher Education (OHE)
from the Department of Education. The Higher Education Act empowers the
OHE as a secretariat to foster the rational development of higher education
with regard to the needs and resources of the country and to coordinate the
growth and development of institutions of higher education.
With the rapid expansion of upper secondary education from
only four national high schools to more than thirty top-up secondary
schools, the pressure has now shifted to universities and colleges. Will
universities in their current capacity be able to accommodate the influx
from these top-up secondary schools?
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These are the next questions the government and its policy makers
through the Commission on Higher Education will have to answer. In the
National Higher Education Plan II, launched in April 2001, the Government,
in conforming to the reform program at the lower level, states the following
from its White Paper on Higher Education as its vision statement:
• lively, just, and self-reliant nation forward and outward-looking
citizens;
• at peace with our neighbours at home and abroad;
• proud of our rich cultural and environmental diversity;
• upholding and upheld by Christian principles;
• equipped with the best that higher education, research, and science
and technology can provide to improve and sustain the quality of
life for the good of the nation as a whole, and in accordance with
the national goals and directive principles, as embodied in the
Papua New Guinea Constitution.
The White Paper goes on to state that specific objectives in each
policy area include:
• increasing access, participation and rates of advancement at every
level of higher education, while improving the range and quality of
services provided, and achieving the highest academic standards
appropriate to circumstances, including resources and needs;
• raising the productivity, quality and relevance of research;
• promoting awareness, knowledge and application of science and
technology.
The three main principles underpinning the Reform Program
that are presented in the White Paper and endorsed in the NHEP are
productivity, responsiveness and responsibility, and partnership.
From only two universities at the time of independence, Papua
New Guinea now has six, with at least one university in each region. This
is a significant expansion for the university sector.1 Table 3 provides some
statistical information on the growth of university education showing
current enrolment and staffing.
Compared to the status of education twenty-five years ago,
Papua New Guinea no doubt has made considerable progress in providing
a modern education for its people.
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1 Apart from the four new universities and the amalgamation of the government-owned provincial
nursing colleges with regional ones, many of the department-owned institutions such as the Civil
Aviation Training College, Telikom Training College and PNGIPA, remain independently
operated and do not come under the OHE.
CONCLUSION
While education is being vigorously applied as a solution to social
problems, the problems often seem to get worse. Many people move to
urban areas, while fewer move away. The number of classrooms increases
every year, while the number of people to be educated increases every
hour. The demand for education grows rapidly, but the means of satisfying
that demand grows slowly. Papua New Guinea will keep juggling to imple-
ment its policies and priorities influenced by factors such as population
growth and availability of resources to meet its educational needs.
A lot may have been achieved; however, it must be noted that
only half of Papua New Guinea’s eligible school age children are currently
engaged in some kind of formal schooling. The country still has a huge
task ahead to redress this situation.
Table 3:    University Enrolment and Staffing, 2001
University Year of Student Total Non- Citizen Citizen
University Enrolment Academic Citizen Academic Academic
Status & Staff Academic Staff Staff
Controlling Staff with PhDs
Authority
UPNG 1966–Govt 3042 * 222 51 171 44
UNITECH 1968–Govt 2034 ** 145 55 90 8
UOG 1997–Govt 789 71 13 58 15
UOV 1997–Govt 267 17 Nil 17 Nil
PAU 1996–SDA 323 28 23 5 1
DWU 1997–Catholic 496 59 42 17 Nil
* Figure excludes distance education students through IDCE
** Figure excludes distance education students through DODL
Source: Statistical data obtained from Staff/Personnel Offices from the respective universities
counting warm bodies only and does not include vacant positions.
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One of the more promising developments in Papua New Guinea (PNG)
in the last two and a half decades has been the emergence of non-govern-
ment organisations engaged in all manner of activity. It is promising
because it underscores the increasing acceptance and legitimacy of the state
as civil society becomes engaged with the state. It is also promising because
of the high level of participation by women in mass-based civil society
organisations. The appearance of civil society organisations means that the
weak PNG state is not ‘suspended’ above PNG society.1 As in other third
world societies, it is recognised that there is only partial penetration of the
state into society, especially in the rural and peripheral areas. The forma-
tion of national and provincial civil society organisations demonstrates
progress in state-building in welding together some seven hundred
linguistic units into a nation. They have begun to shed some of their
parochial loyalties to work for the common good.
Both the state and civil society in Papua New Guinea have
developed slowly and remain relatively weak and fragmented (May, 1998:
66). This discourse adopts Stepan’s definition of civil society which distin-
guishes associational life from institutions of ‘political society’ such as
political parties (Stepan cited in Bratton, 1989: 419). Under civil society
in Papua New Guinea, I include charitable and voluntary associations,
women’s groups, religious organisations, non-government organisations
(NGOs), unions, various business, industry and professional organisations
and landowner groups and associations. There are now NGOs in PNG
specialising in human rights and democracy, literacy, land rights, small
1 I am using Goran Hyden’s description of states as in Africa, see ‘Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania:
Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry’ cited in (Bratton, 1989).
business enterprises, environment, micro credit, a nuclear free Pacific,
gender, decolonisation in the Pacific, health, breastfeeding (susu mamas),
Christian fellowship, youth, HIV/AIDS, poverty alleviation, and conflict
resolution just to name a few. There are numerous civil society organisa-
tions which have been formed, nationally, provincially, community and
even village-based throughout the country. Many are offshoots of interna-
tional NGOs such the Anglican Mother’s Union, Girl Guides, the Young
Women’s Christian Association (YWCA), Christian Women’s Association
(CWA), Rotary International, Greenpeace, Summer Institute of Linguistics
(SIL) and Groots International to name only some. Some are linked to
NGOs throughout either the Pacific subregion or the Asia–Pacific region.
Many have formed solidarity networks linked to international NGOs
beyond the region, working on specific issues such as violence against
women, women and politics, decolonisation, the environment and human
rights. A few have formed links with European funded NGOs in order to
access funding from Europe through the European Union (EU) under the
EU–ACP (Africa, Carribean and Pacific) Cooperation Agreement, though
inter-church aid organisations Bread for the World, and the German
Protestant Association for Cooperation, Evangelische Zentralstelle fur
Entwicklungshilfe e.V. (EZE).
BACKGROUND DISCUSSION
But indigenous civil society organisations in Papua New Guinea have a
history that goes back beyond 1975. While documenting the emergence of
locally-based mass movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Ron May
has characterised many of these movements as micro nationalist (1982:
chapter one). These were locally-based movements which attempted to
mobilise people in various parts of the country in order to maintain some
form of independence against the encroachment of the colonial state. And
as May and others have asserted, cargo cults which appeared after the
Second World War were precursors of micro nationalist movements which
appeared immediately before self government (1973) and independence
(May, Gerritsen et al., 1981; May, 1982). Much of the idealism imbued by
many leaders of micro nationalist movements was also held by the member-
ship of non-government organisations which began to emerge in the 1980s
and 1990s. But like leaders of the marginal cargo cults, local protest
movements and the self-help development movements, many of the leaders
from the NGO movement in the 1990s also used these movements and
organisations to launch their individual political careers. There are strong
indications that women leaders may also follow that route to power.
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The involvement of Port Moresby-based NGOs such as Melsol
and PNG Watch in the 1997 Sandline upheaval2 and the 1997 national
elections — when a number of NGO leaders were elected into parliament
such as Fathers Lak and Ambane, Peti Lafanama, as governors of Western
Highlands, Simbu, and Eastern Highlands respectively — has tarnished
the reputation of NGOs and the good work done by them in the 1980s
and early 1990s. This was made worse by the forging of political alliances
between NGO leaders (now governors), with the Skate Government, a
government which many observers see as the worst post-independent
government yet. Unfortunately, the endemic corruption that exists in
PNG is not confined to officers and leaders in government authorities and
state instrumentalities: it has seeped into civil society organisations with
the infusion of financial assistance from external non-government organi-
sations and international donors through government approved projects. It
has led to the collapse of and disillusionment with the once promising
local NGO movement (see Cox, 1999; Faraclas 2001).
The fiery idealism of the 1970s and the self-help groups has given
way to the realisation of the growing strength of free market forces and their
attendant liberal political institutions in the country. This realisation is
manifested in the emergence of landowner associations and groups.
Landowner groups are registered clan-based landowner associations which
have been transformed, to accommodate and negotiate with state authorities
their traditional land rights in a market driven economy. Landowner groups
are a new kind of civil society organisation peculiar to Papua New Guinea.
They were created by clan members out of ‘clans’ using the traditional
concept of clan-based access to land: the exploitation of resources on and
beneath the graun (or land) has transformed the relationship of clan
members to the land. The same graun to which clan members had once
upon a time (in most cases still do, because it contains amongst other
factors, the clan cemetery) formed a spiritual attachment, because of
common access and user rights. Thus forest or certain trees on clan land are
now identified as economic trees such as coconut, banana and betel nut
trees.
STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN PNG
A discourse on civil society organisations presupposes the existence of a civil
society. Alfred Stepan’s definition sees civil society as an ‘arena where manifold
social movements and civic organisations from all classes … attempt to consti-
tute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express
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2 A number of books have been written on the Sandline Affair, see O’Callaghan (1999), Dinnen,
May and Regan, (1997), Dorney (1998).
themselves and advance their interests’ (cited in Bratton, 1998: 417). Civil
society consists of the public political activity that occupies the space
between the state and the family. I agree with Bratton that civil society
does not necessarily have an adversorial relationship with the state. Civil
society organisations may choose either conflictual or congruent relations
with the state depending on a particular issue or policy under considera-
tion. For instance, various organisations in business and industry, such as
the Chamber(s) of Commerce and the PNG Employers’ Federation, may
support or oppose various aspects of the state, economic policy because of
their business interests. For instance, the outgoing chairman of the PNG
Business Council, Mel Togolo, reiterated the Council’s stand ‘…where
possible, support the reform program of institutional strengthening public
sector reform, micro-economic stability and good governance. These
elements of the reform program are good for business, and will create
confidence and facilitate investments in the country’ (Post Courier, 11 May
2000: 36).
In a recent examination of the PNG state and society, Ron May,
using Migdal’s tools, has concluded that PNG is a clear case of a weak state
and weak society (May, 1998: 60–76; see also Dinnen, 1998), while, at the
same time, he claims that PNG has been a remarkably stable polity. This
chapter attempts to describe and explore the nature of this remarkable
polity by claiming that this is due to a vibrant and increasing confident
civil society. Up to the late 1990s, it has remained almost inconspicuous
mainly because it has not shown much dissent (with the exception of
Bougainville), until the recent Sandline crisis in 1997. But this lack of
dissent should not be seen as weakness. The combined effectiveness of a
weak state and a stable civil society has seen a number of state policies
reversed. Two significant achievements were the defeat of the Internal
Security Act in 1993 and the cancellation of a World Bank SAP condition
on land registration in 1995. Non-government organisations, churches,
women’s groups, students and unions have been around in PNG for more
than twenty-five years but the linkages between them, the synergy, 
has only recently become obvious. There was dissent on the eve of
independence: for instance, the renegotiation of the Bougainville Copper
Agreement, the aspirations and activities of self-help and micro nationalist
associations such as the Matanguan Association, the Kabisawali and the
Napidakoe Navitu and the only anti-colonial movement ever to be led by
a woman, Papua Besena.3 For female citizens, the legislative conception of
the National Council of Women in 1979 was a significant milestone.
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3 The Matanguan and the Kabisawali Associations, the Napidakoe Navitu and Papuan Besena are
all discussed by various authors in May (1982).
Bratton’s useful survey of the literature on civil society (1994:
51–81) identifies the essential definitional notions about the nature of civil
society and its relationships with the state which can be summarised as
follows:
• civil society is a public realm between the state and the family;
• civil society is distinguished from political society;
• civil society is a theoretical rather than an empirical construct;
• state and civil society, although conceptually distinct, are best
considered together;
• civil society is the source of the legitimation of state power.
Thus, for example, the University of Papua New Guinea
(UPNG) students organised around provincial groups are not part of the
family in the household or private arena, but are citizens from the
provinces who are engaged in collective action to pursue shared goals.
Their public civic actions are not part of politics in the ‘public sector’,
which is the realm of the state. The use of the terms ‘private’ referring to
family life, and ‘public’ meaning state actions, presupposes no public space
for civic actors (Bratton, 1994: 56). Yet in the last 25 years many citizens
in PNG have developed shared interests that are inadequately expressed by
ideas of the family or clans or state institutions. Thus the evolution of
clans into landowners in the resource-rich areas. Civil society is a public
formation. In PNG civil society is where clan members wean themselves
from dependence on either family or state and forms an important arena
for their becoming citizens in a state which was created or imposed in
1973. It is the arena in which citizens relate politically to each other and to
the state. Using Stepan’s definition of civil society which, as Bratton
indicates, is opposed to Gramsci’s (Bratton, 1994: 56), women’s groups,
youth, unions, churches, student unions, NGOs etc. are not part of insti-
tutions in the political society such as political parties, legislatures,
elections etc. Stepan locates civil society in society while Gramsci views
political society to be synonymous with the state. ‘Political society is not
part of the state, but its institutions specialise in partisan contestation over
state power’ (Bratton, 1994: 56). Thus the state stands apart from civil
society.
NGOs are essentially any organisation or association that isn’t
directly connected to government and is not profit making. They range
from the tiny collection of people working in a specific community using
just their own human labour and intellectual skills to the massive interna-
tional NGO working throughout the world with a multi-million dollar
budget. But civil society organisations are more than NGOs: they are any
collective that is not part of the state machinery which is working towards
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the collective good of society. This includes labor unions, churches,
community organisations, industrial organisations, charitable organisa-
tions, manufacturing councils and foundations. The most successful
mobilized opposition to the state has come from separatist movements: the
pre-independence Papua Besena Movement (see Daro, 1976; Badu, 1982)
and the Bougainville Secession Movement whose roots date back to
Napidakoe Navitu in 1964 (see Griffin, 1982). The former drew on a
shared common colonial history and the latter on common ethnicity and
the conviction of being neglected by the former colonial power. The
Bougainville Secessionist Movement has since developed other grievances
against the state.
CHURCHES
The establishment of the mainline churches in the country predated the
creation of a civil society and the colonial state. The London Missionary
Society and the Methodists (who now form the United Church), and the
Anglicans arrived in the country and began establishing their respective
bureaucracies before formal annexation was even contemplated by Germany
and Britain in 1884, to be followed soon after by the Catholics, and Seventh
Day Adventists. According to Foreman, ‘foreign missionaries did not want
to rule or dominate but were helpers of the indigenous people, providing a
kind of scaffolding to aid in the construction of an indigenous church’
(Foreman, 1978: 35). And so the scaffolding they built included health,
education and agricultural extension work. The Christian churches
pioneered development efforts in the provision of education and health since
the 1890s. The church still forms the bulk of the NGO involvement in the
health sector, providing about 45 per cent of all health services nationwide
(UNICEF & GoPNG, 1996: 95). In some remote rural areas they provide
around 49 per cent of health services, and up to 90 per cent in some districts
(UNICEF & GoPNG, 1996: 95). They train all of the community health
workers and most of the nurses (AusAID, 1999: 13). Church health services
continue to be administered by the Church Medical Council and at the
provincial level, church health services are part of the provincial divisions of
health.
Churches were instrumental in founding formal education in
the country. Their influence remains strong today and church-run institu-
tions account for nearly half of all student enrolments. The churches also
run six of the nine teacher colleges. Both the church health personnel and
teachers now draw salaries from the state. They remain active in agricul-
tural development through the ownership of small and medium-sized
plantations and the provision of high quality extension services. The
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churches, through the Papua New Guinea Council of Churches
(PNGCC), operate a number of NGOs: these include environmental
organisations such as the Melanesian Environment Foundation; City
Mission which works with youth; Caritas which targets justice, peace and
development issues; and Lutheran Development Services which specialises
in agriculture and shipping.
The seven major churches are part of the ecumenical movement
through the Papua New Guinea Council of Churches (PNGCC). They
include the United Church, the Catholic Church, the Anglican Church,
the Salvation Army, the Evangelical Lutheran Church, the Baptist Union
of Papua New Guinea and the GutNius Lutheran. The churches are the
largest formal organisation with a mass following and a capacity to span
ethnic and clan loyalties. Although the churches are the longest established
civil society organisation, certainly the most experienced as service
providers, they have been relatively quiet in contributing to public opinion
and debate, a role that they undertake in the privacy of the pulpit. Despite
the formation of the PNGCC, the churches maintain their separate identi-
ties through denominational loyalty. The churches were affected by
criticism in the 1970s for contributing to the large-scale destruction of
traditional culture. The churches themselves have undergone a remarkable
transformation during the last twenty-five years in terms of localisation in
both personnel and ritual and a search for their place and purpose in a
young Pacific nation.
The churches are now very much an indigenous church, those
newly arrived in the various Evangelical and Pentecostal denominations
have indigenous members now highly placed in the church hierarchy. It
has only been in the last decade that the churches have begun to criticise
the fledgling state. This self-imposed silence was broken in 1997 during
the Sandline crisis, when Bishop Getake Gam of the Evangelical Lutheran
Church publicly opposed the Government’s deal with Sandline
International to hire mercenaries to bring the Bougainville crisis to an end.
There was also a report of a Federation of Religions with a membership of
more than 1500 sisters, brothers and priests in both PNG and the
Solomons who called the government to terminate its engagement with
Sandline International (Ferea, 1997: 9–16). The launch of the ‘Operation
Brukim Skru’ (kneel and pray) campaign by the Christian Leadership
Crusade (CLC) during the 1997 national elections is another example of
the church attempting to influence state policies. This was a campaign by
the CLC amongst its parishioners to elect God-fearing leaders after prayer
and contemplation. Brian Barnes, the Catholic Archbishop of Port
Moresby, led a stinging criticism of the Skate government in 1999. The
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archbishop’s criticism was levelled at the gross mismanagement of the
nation’s affairs especially its economy. Archbishop Barnes explained how
he could no longer watch in silence the pain felt by his parishioners and
continue to refrain from criticising the Skate government. According to
the Archbishop (and the Catholic archdiocese in Port Moresby), to remain
silent, (under those circumstances) would have been obscene.
The churches were the first national institution to recognise
women as individual persons by providing the opportunity for women to
organise as women and as citizens (see Dickson-Waiko, forthcoming). All
denominations including the Evangelical and Pentecostal churches have
women organisations. Churches have provided a space within their hierar-
chies for women to become mobilized to be part of civil society, raising
awareness and tackling issues not even thought possible in the 1950s and
1960s (see Dickson-Waiko, forthcoming). In addition, the women’s organ-
isations in the seven mainline churches under the PNGCC have formed a
coalition called PNG Christian Women. As members of PNGCC, they are
linked to the World Council of Churches (WCC). Through this linkage,
Christian women, particularly the United Church Women’s Fellowship
being the first of the church women’s groups to affiliate, have been exposed
to global political issues, long before their secular sisters in the National
Council of Women. In fact, many of the church women leaders now
provide leadership within the secular National Council of Women. As an
example of the WCC’s progressive stance on global issues, it is now calling
for the cancellation of debt incurred by Third World debt-ridden
countries.
LABOUR UNIONS
Although the union movement remains weak and fragmented it has
formed important links to unions outside the country. Trade unionism
began after the enactment of the 1963 Industrial Relations Act and
Industrial Organisations Act. They replaced mainly ethnically-based welfare
associations that had sprung up during the 1950s in towns as problems of
urbanisation became noticeable. The earliest unions included the Papua
New Guinea Workers’ Association (PNGWA) formed in response to the
1959–60 Native Wages Board hearings, the Milne Bay Workers’
Association organised by John Guise in 1965 and the first real union, the
Central District Waterside Workers’ Union which brought together the
ethnically-based welfare associations in Port Moresby. In 1975 the number
of registered unions with the Labour Department stood at 47 registered
unions (Hess, 1992: 74). Most were ineffective, small, and district-based,
and were only able to enjoy a very short lifespan. Of those registered, only
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eight had membership beyond 500 (Hess, 1992: 73).Unionism was new
to Papua New Guineans in the late 1960s and early 1970s and this showed
in their initial attempts at unionism.
Attempts were made in the mid-1960s to establish a peak union
organisation. This initiative came from the colonial government who
wanted to bring together the regional and town-based workers’ associa-
tions and to ensure the workings of the newly created industrial relations
system (Imbun, 1999: 38). After many discussions the Federation of
Workers’ Associations (FWA) was formed in 1970. One of its first acts was
to lobby for more indigenous representation on the 1970 Minimum
Wages Board. This action resulted in the appointment of John Guise and
Paulus Arek to the Board. Both men championed workers’ rights in the
House of Assembly of which they were also members. Despite much polit-
ical rhetoric, the FWA remained ineffective. Paulus Arek served as the first
president of the FWA. The FWA was to be later transformed into the
Trade Union Congress (TUC) in 1974. The TUC was effective in the
mid-1970s under the leadership of PANGU stalwart, Tony Ila. It had
gained new affiliates while at the same time attracting funding assistance
from the government and international sources. The close association of
PANGU and the FWA and the TUC reflected PNG’s political history at
the time, with PANGU as the leading nationalist voice for Papua New
Guineans articulating the lived reality of colonized subjects.
The 1980s saw a reinvigorated TUC under the leadership of
Henry Moses, then general secretary of the Bougainville Workers Union
(BWU). Mr Moses brought a more industrial orientation to the TUC
(Imbun, 1999). With more ‘industrially competent unions’ such as the
BWU, the Waterside Workers Union and the Seamen’s Union (Imbun, 1999
:41), the TUC affiliated a number of public sector unions such as the
Teacher’s Association (PNGTA). With the appointment of Lawrence Titimur
as a full-time general secretary and other professional staff after 1986, the
TUC was able to function, albeit briefly, as a peak union organisation. The
affiliation of the Public Employee’s Association (PEA) and the Teachers’
Association (PNGTA) in the late 1980s boosted its affiliation fees to over
K18,000 (Imbun, 1999: 42) representing a third of the TUC’s budget. The
TUC enjoys a membership of some 43,751 workers (Hess, 1992). An
updating of the Labour Department’s records will have seen a significant rise
in union membership. This cooperation ended in 1991 when both the
PNGTA and the PEA pulled out of the TUC over differences on the TUC’s
allocation of executive positions (Imbun, 1999). As the two largest unions in
the country, they felt both this and their financial contribution should be
adequately reflected in the TUC’s executive committee representation.
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The mining boom in the 1990s realised the formation of
mining unions. The Bougainville Mine Workers’ Union was the first to be
established, followed by the Ok Tedi Mine Workers’ Union, the Pogera
Mining and Allied Workers Union and the Misima Mine Workers’ Union.
The mining unions have left their mark on the labour history of PNG as
being the most active industrial organisations of the 1990s. Generally the
mining unions have been more successful in negotiating tangible benefits
for their members because of the strategic importance of the mines to the
political and economic landscape of the country.
By far the largest, most vocal, and the longest surviving union is
the Public Employees’ Association (PEA). The PEA was formed in 1947 as
an all expatriate Public Service Association, until 1962 when its constitu-
tion was amended to include indigenous state actors. The PEA has been
predominantly Papua New Guinean in membership since 1972. Other
government workers have since formed separate unions such as the Papua
New Guinea Teachers’ Association (PNGTA) established in 1970, the
Papua New Guinea Nurses’ Association (1972), the Police Association of
Papua New Guinea (1965), the National Doctors’ Union (1991), the
Postal (PTC) Workers’ Union (1983), the ELCOM Workers’ Union
(1990), the National Airline Employees’ Association (1969) and the
National Academic Staff Association (NASA) (1987), National Capital
District Interim Staff Association (1988) and the National Academic Staff
Association of Unitech (1990). Each of these unions has successfully
negotiated, separately, salary increases during the last two decades. In 1997
a total of 152 industrial organisations had been registered with the
Department of Industrial Relations but subsequently, 97 workers’ associa-
tions had to be deregistered due to non-compliance of some of the
conditions stipulated in Chapter 173 of the Industrial Organisations Act
(Gima, 1998: 78). There are a number of workers’ associations which are
large and nationally-based enjoying the services of full-time paid staff.
The 1990 census showed that just over 9 per cent of the citizen
population have paid employment. Labour Department records show that
only a little over 19 per cent of them were registered members of unions.
Most unions are weak and suffer from a lack of able leadership with a
demonstrated capacity for union organizing. With a very few exceptions,
most of the leadership are not full-time union workers and thus the
possible termination of their employment has posed difficulties for the
leadership in speaking out for better employment conditions and
providing a critique of state policies. This has been demonstrated by the
sacking of unionised Air Niugini Aircraft engineers in 1999. There have
been attempts by the various Port Moresby-based unions to collaborate on
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issues such as the attempted blocking of passage of the 1999 budget which
had included legislation for a new Value Added Tax (VAT), but this kind
of solidarity has not been sustained. The PEA does have full-time staff, and
continues to be a vocal, often the sole critic of major national issues and
state policies through its current president Napoleon Liosi. Mr Liosi is the
first elected full-time president and has served ten consecutive terms, now
almost twenty years, at the helm of PEA. While the PEA has bargained
hard for salary increases for state workers, it has backed down on a number
of occasions, ‘claiming it would have been irresponsible’ (Gima, 1994: 87)
to squeeze increases out of various governments who have struggled to
manage the economy. Unions, including the PEA, have threatened to
bring workers out on nationwide mass strikes but that has not eventuated
as yet. The PNGTA were the first to demonstrate their solidarity in their
claims for pay increases in 2000. But solidarity was not maintained as
various regional (Highlands and New Guinea Islands) and provincial
branches (Eastern Highlands) of the PNGTA broke ranks with the leader-
ship who were negotiating with the state. The responsibility to organise
public sector mass actions would have to come from a union council in
the TUC. Under the able leadership of a number of articulate TUC organ-
isers such as Lawerence Titimur and John Paska, the TUC has been able to
increase its public profile through its effective use of the media. Generally,
the unions continue a ‘cautious and pragmatic approach to improving
wages and [employment] conditions’ (Gima, 1998: 86). Most unions are
too small to be viable industrial organisations. In the 2002 national
elections John Paska contested under a newly formed PNG Labour Party
of which he is the President.
EMPLOYER ORGANISATIONS
Employer organisations have existed in Papua New Guinea since the late
1950s. The Employers Federation of PNG (EFPNG) was one of the first
four such bodies to register under a new Industrial Organisation Act in
1963 (Imbun, 1999). The EFPNG currently has ten members, mainly
from the private sector and brings together all major employers over indus-
trial matters (ibid.). There is a Port Moresby Chamber of Commerce with
some fifteen members representing business interests from the wholesale,
retail, hospitality and construction industries in the country (ibid.).
A number of provinces have a Chamber of Commerce set up outside the
capital. There is also the Papua New Guinea Planters Association repre-
senting the agricultural sector, a Chamber of Manufacturers representing
employers from the small manufacturing industry and the PNG Chamber
of Mines and Petroleum representing employers from the mining and
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petroleum sectors (ibid.). They monitor economic policies of the state,
making sure that taxation and employment policies remain in their best
interests. The Chamber of Mines and Petroleum has also been prominent
in the last two years organising high level conferences and symposiums to
facilitate communication between the government, donors, and potential
investors. They liaise and consult on both economic matters and other
development issues including the development and maintenance of infra-
structure, social services and law and order problems throughout the
country. This function has been formalised through their membership of
the multi-sectoral Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council
(CIMC) since 1998.
STUDENTS
The development of student politics in the country provides an insight
into the development of civil society in PNG. Tertiary students, particu-
larly from the first national university, University of Papua New Guinea,
have since the early 1970s considered themselves as the voice of the nation
and have, through public forums, petitions, demonstrations and the award
winning student newspaper Unitavur, expressed strong views on numerous
national and student issues. Issues raised have ranged from whether PNG
should join the Commonwealth in 1975, to law and order, single line
salary, registration of customary land, the World Bank/IMF Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP), user pay systems for health and education,
freedom of the press, electoral development funds (MPs’ slush funds),
violence against women and student allowances and scholarships. They
joined forces with NGOs to defeat the dreaded Internal Security Bill and
provided key leadership in mobilising the country against compulsory land
registration, an important condition of the 1994 SAP programme. In the
last eight years various civil society campaigns have sought out linkages
with students. Many student leaders have since moved on to state politics;
so far two have served as Prime Minister. Student politics at the University
of Papua New Guinea has contributed to the moulding of the strategic
elite in PNG.
NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS
In those crucial years between the 1970s and 1980s, the young state was
engaged in placing building blocks for a new nation. The human resources
produced by a handful of tertiary institutions were quite literally
consumed with nation building. Most of the good work undertaken by
NGOs also took place in the mid-1980s and early 1990s. An attempt was
made to combine a number of NGOs in 1988/89 in the formation of an
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umbrella organisation called NANGO, but after some bitter struggles
NANGO became moribund. NANGO stands for the National Alliance of
Non-Government Organisations. Initially funded by UNDP, NANGO
brought together between fifty and seventy NGOs with a broad range of
development interests including spiritual, cultural, education, business,
women, the environment and landowner awareness. It appears that the
formation of NANGO was at the beckoning of donors who wanted to see
some kind of coordination from this burst of civil society activity which
was part of a global trend.
The initiative behind NANGO’s formation came from an inter-
national NGO named the Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific
(FSP) which, in 1986, formed a regional umbrella organisation called the
Pacific Islands Association of NGOs (PIANGO).4 Together with the Wau
Ecology Institute and others, FSP wanted to see a PNG umbrella organisa-
tion so that NGOs would have access to international funding while
implementing the Tropical Action Plan (TRAP) (a rather disarming
acronym). The FSP now operates under the name Foundation for
Community Development. The FSP introduced a new wave of NGOs in
the Pacific who, according to Nicholas Faraclas, ‘were funded and
controlled by a group of Americans with powerful links to the US State
Department (pers.com. 2001). The acrimonious debates which occurred
between various members of NANGO were over attempts by indigenous
NGOs, such as the PNG Trust and the Melanesian Environment
Foundation, to wrestle control of NANGO away from foreigners
(Favaclas, pers.com., 2001). Some indigenous NGOs were totally opposed
to receiving money from the World Bank (Favaclas, pers.com., 2001).
FSP–PNG managed and implemented the National Forestry and
Conservation Action Plan’s (NFCAP’s) EcoForestry programme. Other
NFCAP projects were subcontracted to other NGOs.
The TFAP Plan was renamed the Tropical Forestry Action Plan
(TFAP), a global plan backed by a number of multilateral organisations, the
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), United Nations Development
Program (UNDP), the World Bank and the World Resources Institute
(WRI). The aims of the Plan were to curb tropical deforestation, to promote
the sustainable use and conservation of forest resources to meet local and
national needs, and to increase the flow of international aid to the forestry
sector (Mayers and Peutalo, 1995).
Late in 1988 the PNG government made a decision to be involved
in the TFAP process. In a memorandum of understanding the government
instructed UNDP to take a lead role in supporting the development of the
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4 FSP organisations have been formed in a number of Pacific Island countries such as Vanuatu, the
Solomon Islands, Fiji and Tonga.
non-government sector (Fergie, 2001). This initiative led to the commis-
sioning of the first major study of non-government organisations in Papua
New Guinea and the formation of the National Organisation of Non-
Government Organisations or NANGO.
The TFAP Plan provided the basis for PNG’s own National
Forestry and Conservation Action Plan (NFCAP). The PNG NFCAP was
different to other TFAP programmes elsewhere in the world. The owner-
ship of the PNG NFCAP was broadened to include and involve more
national ownership by including PNG-based NGOs and landowners. The
increased global activity and interest in forest conservation coincided with
the holding of the Barnett Forest Inquiry in 1989. The idea was to
strengthen NGO capacity in environmental management and to promote
the concepts of sustainable resource use and conservation (Mayers and
Peutalo, 1995). The task of preparing and implementing the NFCAP
would also be jointly performed by the Government and the NGO
community under this new umbrella grouping of NANGO under a new
‘partnership with NGOs’ (Mayers and Peutalo, 1995: 11). Needless to say,
the expectations of both landowners and NGOs were raised as they were
promoted under this project as ‘equals’ with the Department of
Environment and Conservation and the National Forestry Authority
(NFA). They were represented as ‘equals’ on the NFCAP Steering
Committee and several sub-committees, the Board of the National
Forestry Authority created under a new Forestry Act in 1991 and the
provincial forest management committees (Mayers and Peutalo, 1995).
A Technical Support Project (TSP) was established to provide
support to the new project whose composition included the lead donor, the
World Bank. The World Bank represented other donors to the project
which included Japan and Australia mainly through technical assistance,
New Zealand, Sweden, Germany, UNESCO, the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) and the International Tropical Timber Organisation (Mayers and
Peutalo, 1995). Those NGOs working on environment and forest issues
embraced this windfall with open arms. Donor money was not restricted to
environment-oriented NGOs. Other NGOs, described by Mayers and
Peutalo as ‘critically engaging’ with the community, were included to carry
out awareness in their areas such as the Village Development Trust, East
Sepik Council of Women (ESCOW), East New Britain Sosel Eksen
Komiti, Individual and Community Rights Advocacy Forum (ICRAF),
Daga Bahai’i Spiritual Assembly in Milne Bay, the Enga Baptist Union and
the Kiriwina Community Council (Mayers and Peutalo, 1995). For
instance, in the space of two months in 1993, some US$ 286,400 was paid
out to ten NGOs (Mayers and Peutalo, 1995) to implement their respec-
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tive environment projects. In September 1994, some US$ 303,600 was
allocated to five NGOs in Milne Bay, Morobe, New Ireland and Enga
provinces (Mayers and Peutalo, 1995: 15). This sudden influx of money
was a case of ‘too much too soon’. Although NGOs and self-help associations
were mushrooming everywhere, most lacked organisational, management
and leadership capacity. Unfortunately, donors and the Government
showered them with too much cash and power, which most could neither
handle, nor absorb. Nevertheless the NFCAP project provided an opportu-
nity for NGOs to learn and expand. A number of NGOs did survive this
experience and continue with their work in their local areas.
The lessons from this experience appear to have gone unheeded.
Other schemes continue regardless, such as the World Bank conceived
Targetted Community Development Project (TCPD) and AusAID’s
Community Development Scheme (CDS). These schemes mean well but
cash-strapped NGOs have taken the money in order to survive. Many
volunteer workers in NGOs have left their voluntary jobs for consultancies
offered by donor-driven projects to administer and manage donor-funded
projects. The success of the NGO campaign on the land mobilisation
programme led to their undoing. According to Faraclas, ‘the World Bank
got quite a scare from the reversal of its policy that it began to buy off
NGOs’ (pers.com., 2001). It was immediately after the anti-land mobilisa-
tion campaign and the cancellation of land moblisation as a SAP
condition that PNG Watch was created. Its only function was to disburse
World Bank funds to NGOs. PNG Watch was dominated by Melanesian
Solidarity (MelSol). The Targetted Community Development Project was
yet another scheme conceived following the heels of the anti-land mobili-
sation campaign. The anti-land mobilisation campaign brought out an
outpouring of sentiments against the Structural Adjustment Program
(SAP) and thus the World Bank in 1994 and 1996. NGOs were at the
forefront of the vehement opposition to SAP. The TCDP was conceived by
the World Bank, to be funded by the PNG Government to channel
money to the NGO sector to keep them quiet. The TCDP has been
unfunded in the last three or four years due to shortage of money from the
state coffers. Those NGO leaders who were elected to Parliament in the
1997 national elections have everything but NGO needs on their minds.
Their immediate priority now is to stay abreast of the competitive bisnis of
staying on the right side of the House.
It is little wonder that NGOs view the infusion of funds,
especially by the World Bank, as part of a conspiracy to control them and
destroy their good work. Donor interest in civil society comes from a
global realisation of the failure of democratic institutions to gain a firm
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grounding in many developing countries such as PNG. Political cronyism,
endemic corruption, patronage politics and bureaucratic inefficiency have
paralysed those democratic institutions created in 1975. Thus the donor
community sees the development of civil society as a possible opening out
of this cul de sac. The state considered the funding of NGOs as a viable
option in terms of ‘diversifying’ outlets for development funding (Mamae,
pers.com., 2001). That is to say, development funds could be disseminated
through NGOs rather than relying solely on the state route. Certain civil
society organisations had demonstrated the capacity to manage increased
funding in the late 1980s and early 1990s through their work on literacy,
women, poverty, social justice and human rights, and forest conservation
and the environment.
The most recent indigenous NGO development is landowner
groups. Landowner groups have organised to negotiate royalties for the
exploitation of resources from tribal lands and to make demands on both
the state and transnational companies for ‘development’ services such as
roads, schools and hospitals in their local areas. It is an innovative use of an
indigenous social institution to manage the impact of resource develop-
ment and royalties or equity. Landowner groups are the fastest growing
indigenous NGOs. Landowner groups pose a formidable challenge to the
state because of the complexity and the explosive nature of the issues they
are dealing with, and the strategies they use to achieve their goals and
demands.
Over the last ten years NGOs have attracted into their member-
ship government employees who are both state actors and members of the
civil society. This has improved access for some civil society organisations to
state funding and other state resources. The relationship between state and
society is acknowledged but inroads made by society, in this instance civil
society, into the state are equally important. An increasing number of
tertiary-educated citizens have chosen to work with civil society organisa-
tions. This has raised the standard of debate within civil society, and the
enhancement of society–state relations. However, their participation in civil
society has also had negative consequences, in that they aggravated the
conflicts between indigenous NGOs and the international NGOs as they
tried to gain control and manipulate NANGO (Faraclas, pers.com., 2001).
A DEVELOPING ‘WOMEN’S MOVEMENT’
There is a small struggling nascent women’s movement but its position
wavers between opposition to and cooption by the state. The ‘women’s
movement’ is overwhelmingly mass-based, conservative and has yet to
develop a feminist framework. It has successfully mobilized rural women
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through the National Council of Women network and the various church
women’s organisations but it lacks focus. The most effective examples of
mobilized women are found in the Western Highlands, Eastern
Highlands, East New Britain, East Sepik and Manus provinces. It suffers
from a general lack of interest amongst female citizens within the strategic
elite who have opted to pursue individual class-oriented goals. There are
women in mixed NGOs but the leadership has been predominantly male.
Women who are organised within the Council network view it as an alter-
native to state-led development programmes and projects which are not
reaching those within civil society and those beyond the state. The
involvement of women in civil society organisations especially the church
is impressive considering the inherent cultural constraints circumscribed
by a gendered post-colonial state.
Thirty-three percent of the sixty female candidates who
contested the 2002 elections were closely associated with, supported by or
leaders of NGOs. Like their male counterparts who have used their NGO
network as their primary electoral base, they will have to extend their
political base significantly in order to increase their chances at the polls.
Female activism cannot be easily transformed into political votes.
STATE AND NGO RELATIONS
There may be some merit in the criticism levelled at the state and major
donors, particularly the World Bank in its attempts to control and divide
NGOs. One of the unexpected outcomes of the surge in the NGO
movement was the creation of a government NGO unit. NGOs everywhere
have guarded their autonomy. The NGO Unit was created in 1993 from a
National Executive Council (NEC) decision in 1991 ‘to facilitate communi-
cation between NGOs and the state, among NGOs and to monitor
activities of NGOs’ (Kua, pers.com., 2001; Mamae, pers.com., 2001; Fergie,
2001: 1). The NGO unit was to be housed in the Department of Home
Affairs and Youth. This policy decision was taken with little memory of
events in the late 1980s when the department failed to agree on a national
policy on religion and development. Two consultations were held, out of
which a government NGO policy was developed in 1993.
By the beginning of the 1990s the Government had begun to
acknowledge its inability to accommodate the growing aspirations and
demands of Papua New Guinean communities. In a paper by Camilus
Midire (cited in Fergie, 2001: 1), Midire admitted that the government
cannot implement all its development agenda, and that it does not have
the capacity to do so. Midire also stated that the government recognised
the significant contribution of NGOs and churches in the delivery of
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social services to the communities (Fergie, 2001: 1). He further stated that
the government’s offer of a partnership recognised NGOs as a more effec-
tive vehicle for delivery of services to communities (my emphasis). This
was a major concession by the state as Mr Midire was then first assistant
secretary, Social Planning Division, Department of Finance and Planning.
This shift in government policy happened at a time when the
Australian Government had made known its intention to change its bilat-
eral aid arrangements from budget support to programme aid. The
Australian Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade had
since 1991 accepted the idea of increased development assistance through
NGOs (see Fergie, 2001: 4). The Department of Home Affairs and Youth
was well aware of the position of the Australian International Development
Assistance Bureau (AIDAB) on an appropriate policy and delivery mecha-
nism for distributing aid through Australian NGOs (see Fergie, 2001: 4).
While there was great interest from NGOs and churches in the
initial deliberations to develop an NGO policy, this had dissipated by
1995 because of the Department of Home Affairs insistence on locating
the unit within the government ambit despite its opposition from NGOs,
NANGO, churches and other arms of the government (see Fergie, 2001).
The disregarding of NGO views on the location of the NGO Unit speak
volumes about ‘partnership and cooperation’ and may be the contributing
factor to the NGO Unit’s lacklustre performance.
Despite the intent of the NGO policy, very little was achieved
by the NGO Unit except its regular consultation to facilitate communica-
tion and disseminate useful information. The promised funding by the
state and the donors was controlled by the Planning and Monitoring
Department, and thus the NGO Unit within the Department of Home
Affairs has remained ineffective (Paraha, pers.com., 2001). The Unit, like
most units within the Department, remains underfunded.
One of the innovative strategies being attempted as best practice
is the multi-sectoral approach being undertaken by the Government. This
is state–civil society approach to development. This is the approach which
builds on linkages between civil society and the state through institutions
such as the Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council
(CIMC) and a multi-sectoral National AIDS committee. These two
agencies have a built-in consultative process which allows civil society to
directly contribute to, assess, critique and assist in the development of state
policies. They also allow the state to independently monitor the success
and failure of development policies and their impact on society. For
instance, the CIMC held two economic development summits in 1998
and 1999 and four regional workshops in 2000, and four more were
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planned for April and May 2001. A number of state projects have
included civil society input in the organisation, planning, implementation
and management processes of projects. This is particularly true for
programmes in health, population, informal education, skills training for
the informal sector, the National Training Council and forestry.
2002 NATIONAL ELECTIONS
The political ambitions of a number of NGO leaders elected in the 1997
elections post-Sandline, have suffered a setback in 2002. These include
Ludger Mond, Peti Lafanama and Fr Robert Lak. However, with eighty-
five appeals pending in the Court of Disputed Returns, political fortunes
may change. It is difficult to draw conclusions from the 2002 election
results due to widespread cheating and vote-rigging in a number of
electorates. In the case of the former governor of Western Highlands, Fr
Lak was able to double the number of votes received in his 1997 victory
but was still unsuccessful in 2002. Fr Louis Ambane has retained his
conections to the NGO community and was successfully returned in
2002. Peti Lafanama has been described as being ‘aloof ‘ since his election
to high office in 1997, and thus was replaced by Malcolm Smith Kela as
governor of the Eastern Highlands. Lafanama was also referred to the
Leadership Tribunal for the alleged misuse of public funds from the
Gaming Board on the eve of the elections. Smith Kela sits on the board of
a strong, province-based NGO called the Research and Convention
Foundation. Other vocal NGO leaders who contested the elections and
did not do well include John Paska, General Secretary of the Trade Union
Congress, and Powes Parkop of Melsol.
CONCLUSION
When Papua New Guinea attained sovereignty in 1975, the country was
very much a collection of different ethnic and tribal peoples who had to be
coached into believing they belonged to ‘one nation, one country’ and that
they were ‘one people’. Twenty-five years later, they are well into the
process of accepting their common fate as a nation. Aside from the various
Christian denominations, students and a handful of unions, there were
very few civil society organisations twenty-five years ago.
The growth in civil society organisations in the country in the
1990s augurs well for Papua New Guinea as a fledgling democracy. It
strengthens the legitimacy of the state created during colonial rule. In
many ways the development of civil society organisations in the 1990s is
the manifestation of the political idealism so evident on the eve of
Independence 25 years ago. Those politically conscious citizens, highly
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motivated and overly idealistic, with a firm desire to bring ‘development’
to their communities, have been able to achieve a measure of meaningful
participation. All the rhetoric about self-reliance and sustainable human
development which was commonplace at the time of independence has
been channelled into the development of a growing civil society. It has
given rise to the participation of non-state actors in self-help development
projects. Unfortunately, some of the idealism has since been extinguished
by some state actors through endemic corruption, and community and
group welfare replaced by individualistic self-interest. This insidious social
disease has also penetrated our civil society organisations in the 1990s,
affecting its most able leaders in certain women’s groups, churches,
church-linked organisations and NGOs.
The emerging civil society in PNG has not escaped the notice of
opportunistic politicians on both sides of parliament, as recent events such
as Sandline and the accompanying military siege and two military stand-
offs at Murray Barracks have shown on the eve of, and soon after the
country’s silver anniversary. The state has survived some unsettling polit-
ical crises in the past but the respect for the state, the nation and the
constitution (the mama lo), even by General Jerry Singorok who led some
factions of the military against the state’s Sandline deal, should mean
something. The support given by NGOs in Port Moresby to Singorok’s
bold stand and the military-led siege on parliament stunned Francis Ona,
Sam Kaona, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and the various
factions of the Bougainville secessionist movement. This has subsequently
led to the current ceasefire and negotiations for a peaceful settlement of
the ten-year Bougainville crisis. It is an abiding legacy for civil society
organisations in PNG.
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In Papua New Guinea gender and development is still a very new concept
to many people. Its application as a development tool has not yet been
fully harnessed.
Gender in Papua New Guinea should be addressed from the
viewpoint of improving the roles of both genders (male and female) in the
community in order to enhance their contribution to economic develop-
ment through increased productivity. With this in mind, gender and
development is another approach to addressing development which should
also be incorporated in the project cycle.
In this context, gender can be defined as the sociocultural attrib-
utes that are assigned to men and women, as they play their roles in
society. However, gender should not be confused with sex, which refers to
the biological attributes of men and women. Men are able to produce
sperm, while women produce ova and have the capacity to give birth and
breastfeed babies. These attributes are fixed at birth.
In contrast, gender attributes are not fixed. They can be changed
over time. Gender attributes are influenced by factors such as education,
the environment, and culture. Gender addresses the roles that individuals
play, and can be classified into three groups — reproductive roles, productive
roles and community roles. It is the productive roles that influence an
individual’s contribution to economic development.
This chapter attempts to address women’s development in Papua
New Guinea since independence. The chapter has been divided into five
sections.
The first section presents the history of gender and develop-
ment. It describes the events of women’s work from as early as 1850, when
the first missionaries arrived, through to independence, when the women’s
movement was given a foundation to build upon, and into the 1990s
when a women’s policy was put in place. It is this policy that has been the
vehicle upon which the women’s movement has tried to address women’s
issues affecting development in Papua New Guinea.
The second section looks at how international developments
have been a driving force in pushing the development of gender in PNG.
It also looks at the different approaches to development in this area, and
how these approaches have changed, over time. The third section is on the
reality of development of women and children in PNG. It looks at the real
situation of women and children in terms of education, health, and other
human development indices.
The fourth section is on gender in agriculture. It provides a
practical example of how gender can be institutionalised, using the skills of
lobbying and networking. The section also highlights how the mechanism
can be made ineffective, if it is not properly resourced. The final section is
the conclusion.
HISTORY OF GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT IN PNG
In Papua New Guinea, new activities for women were introduced in the
1850s by the early missionaries. The idea was to equip women with basic
skills to enable them to look after their families. The women were taught
basic skills to improve their roles as mothers and homemakers. This
included cooking, sewing, hygiene, and child-care lessons which were
developed around Christian principles. Then came the extension officers,
welfare officers, and community development officers in the 1960s. They
tried to pass on general information on health, agriculture, law and order,
governance, and community organisation. Women were also taught home
economic skills.
In 1974 a female adviser was appointed to the Prime Minister’s
Department. During that time, a Women’s Unit was created in the
Department of Decentralisation. This move led to the appointment of
activity officers in all provinces in Papua New Guinea (National Steering
Committee, 1995).
In 1975 Papua New Guinea gained its independence from
Australia. Along with independence came our National Constitution. It is
the Papua New Guinean Constitution that is the foundation upon which
the Women’s Movement is built, especially on the following goals:
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Integral Human Development
We declare our first goal to be for every person to be dynamically
involved in the process of freeing himself or herself from every form
of domination or oppression so that each man or woman will have
the opportunity to develop as a whole person in relationship with
others.
Equality and Participation
We declare our second goal to be for all citizens to have an equal
opportunity to participate in, and benefit from, the development of
our country (National Constitution of PNG 1975).
The Papua New Guinean Constitution has been most progres-
sive and liberal in embodying equal rights for all its citizens.
Although women did not have to fight for equal rights under
the National Constitution, revisions to some legislation were required to
implement its spirit. However, cultural beliefs, practices and attitudes have
restricted women from fully exercising their rights (National Steering
Committee, 1995). On the other hand, Papua New Guinea has embraced
new initiatives aimed at enhancing women’s development. It has estab-
lished the National Council of Women, which is a non-government
organisation that advocates for a better quality of life for the women of
Papua New Guinea. The National Council of Women, although set up in
1975, was formally established by an Act of Parliament in 1979. Its goal
was to promote the status of women, as equal partners in development in
Papua New Guinea.
In 1983 the Women’s Section in the Department of
Decentralisation was upgraded to divisional status (National Steering
Committee, 1995). In 1984 the first Women’s Development Program was
introduced. The aims of this programme were to:
• mobilise women and get them involved in the development process;
and then,
• establish a vibrant network of women’s organisations from the
district level to the national level in order to implement develop-
mental projects and activities.
It was later realised that there were no policy guidelines in place
to guide women’s development in the country. This resulted in working
towards developing the Women’s Policy, which was put in place in 1990.
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EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS ON GENDER AND PAPUA
NEW GUINEA’S COMMITMENTS AND PROGRESS
As a sovereign nation and a member of the British Commonwealth, Papua
New Guinea also had global commitments to consider when addressing
the situation of women and children in the country.
At the time of gaining its independence from Australia, the first
international conference on women was held in Mexico, and Papua New
Guinea participated. The global trend at this time was to advocate specific
projects which would enable women to participate more fully in various activi-
ties to improve their situation. The Women in Development (WID) approach
was used to address women’s issues, through programmes and projects.
The Nairobi Conference on Women in 1985 reviewed the
performance for the period 1975–1985 and found that, although there
was some improvement in certain areas, the overall situation of women
had not improved at all. The WID approach was seen as isolating women’s
issues from the mainstream of development. This led to a call for the
integration of gender issues into the development process of governments
and the global move towards the use of the Gender and Development
(GAD) approach in planning. This was because:
Despite these early initiatives, successive government policies have
not been consistent enough to maintain the momentum. This has
resulted in fewer achievements in the advancement of women with
the consequential impact of a poorer quality of life for women in
Papua New Guinea (National Steering Committee, 1995).
In 1994 the Papua New Guinean Government ratified the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW).
The Beijing Conference (held 4–15 September, 1995) was the
significant international event that meant a lot to women’s policy and devel-
opment worldwide. Domestically, it was very important for gender and
development in Papua New Guinea. Papua New Guinea began its prepara-
tions for the Beijing Conference some eighteen months before the actual
conference took place. A steering committee, which comprised officers from
all key departments, organisations, and non-government organisations
(NGOs), met on a regular basis to discuss the United Nations document
that was to be the basis of deliberation at the world conference. The
committee had to reach a position for PNG on every issue in the document,
and these decisions had to be consistent with all other commitments into
which PNG had already entered. Christianity, culture, and ‘Melanesian
identity’ played a big role in many of the decisions that were taken.
272 BUILDING A NATION IN  PAPUA NEW GUINEA
The continuous publicity in the media and on radio raised
awareness of the bleak situation that women and children in this nation
were facing, and the need to address it. There was also a call for inter-
departmental involvement on the steering committee. This initiative raised
an awareness of the situation among other departments, agencies, and
NGOs, and it was anticipated that an integrated approach was needed to
address the situation. This dialogue raised awareness in other government
departments through the concept of gender and gender-mainstreaming in
the planning process.
Papua New Guinea prepared well for the world conference by
resolving the issues at the subregional and national levels. This preparation
enabled PNG to establish its final position on the global level. The subre-
gional meeting was held in New Caledonia, and PNG had its inputs into
the Pacific Platform for Action, which was titled, ‘Rethinking Sustainable
Development for Pacific Women Towards the Year 2000’. This document
gave Pacific islanders a stronger position at the ministerial meeting for the
Asia–Pacific Region (Government of PNG, 1999). In June 1994 the Asia
Pacific Ministerial Conference on Women was held in Jakarta, and was
attended by forty-eight ESCAP members. It was at this meeting that the
‘Jakarta Declaration for the Advancement of Women in Asia and the
Pacific’ was adopted (Papua New Guinea Delegation, 1995).
Papua New Guinea sent a delegation of 111 participants to the
Beijing conference. Thirty-one were from the government sector, and
eighty from NGOs. The government delegation comprised representatives
from the Departments of Home Affairs, Personnel Management,
Agriculture, Fisheries, Health, Education, Works, and Justice. The Prime
Minister’s Department, and the National Planning Office were also repre-
sented. Two national government ministers were also part of the
delegation.
The Commonwealth Ministers’ Meeting was convened on the eve
of the official opening of the Beijing Conference, and all Commonwealth
nations pledged their government’s support for the Beijing Platform of
Action. PNG was also represented.
Papua New Guinea had its country paper presented on 11
September 1995. It had nine critical areas of concern that needed to be
addressed to improve the situation of women in Papua New Guinea. The
critical areas of concern presented were:
• health;
• education, training, and literacy;
• mechanisms to promote the advancement of women and shared-
decision making;
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• economic empowerment and employment opportunities and
conditions;
• legal and human rights, which address the issues of violence, peace,
and national unity;
• culture and family, which address the issues faced by young women,
girls, and special groups;
• transport, shelter, water, and communication;
• agriculture and fisheries; and,
• environment and development (National Steering Committee, 1995a).
Each of these critical areas contained specific issues that were
seen as constraints on women’s development, and required action from the
relevant government departments if the present situation faced by women
and children was to improve.
At the Post-Beijing Conference, four priority areas were identi-
fied to set the scene for the implementation of the Global Platform for
Action and the Papua New Guinean Platform for Action.
These priority areas were:
• institutional strengthening and upgrading of the national women’s
machinery;
• economic empowerment of women;
• shared decision-making and good governance; and,
• integration of gender issues in policies, programmes, and plans
(National Steering Committee, 1995a).
Progress in the four priority areas since the Beijing Conference
has been very slow. This is due to the lack of commitment by the
Government to allocate financial and human resources to implement the
platform for action.
Efforts to strengthen the women’s machinery have stalled due to
financial and human resources constraints. At present, the national
women’s machinery in the Women’s Division is housed under the
Department of Social Welfare and Development as a division. This means
that the Department of Social Welfare and Development’s budget has to
be shared with seven divisions. This has made it almost impossible for the
Women’s Division to carry out programmes and monitor the implementa-
tion of the Beijing Platform of Action. Also, as a result of the government’s
restructuring programme for the public service, the officers in the
Women’s Division were reduced from thirteen officers to only four.
Calls for the establishment of a Women’s Office and for upgrading
the status of women contradicts the policies of the present Government,
which is trying to downsize the public service. This has a direct effect on the
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establishment of the proposed office. If the Women’s Division is not
upgraded to Office status, with its own budget, then very little progress will
have been made by the end of decade (1995–2005) for the Beijing Platform
for Action (BPA). A high-powered, interagency committee has been
revitalised and expanded to coordinate the progress and implementation of
the BPA (PNG Delegation, 2000). This may be an interim way to address
the monitoring of the BPA while other alternatives are considered.
The economic empowerment of women has advanced through
two projects. First, the National Women’s Micro-Credit Scheme. The aim
of this project was to enable women’s groups at the grassroots level to
obtain mini-loans to operate small-scale, income-generating projects.
However, loan repayments have been a problem. Loans are not being
repaid on time to enable allocation to other women, as the scheme works
on a revolving concept. Repayment of loans is also a common problem in
other mini-credit schemes, where proper training and awareness were not
conducted before the loan applications were processed. Second, is the
launching of the Small and Medium Enterprise Policy, which provides a
starting point for women’s effective engagement in the formal economic
sector (Government of Papua New Guinea, 1999).
In the area of shared decision-making and good governance,
there has been good progress, because the Organic Law on Provincial
Governments and Local-Level Governments (OLPGLLG) accommodates the
representation of women at all levels of government. As a result of this law,
some eighteen women have been appointed to the provincial level of
government, in their respective provinces. At the local level of government,
there are some 284 appointed women members throughout the country.
At the ward level, there is provision for two women on a ward council.
There are 5,747 wards throughout Papua New Guinea. If these positions
were all filled, there would be 11,494 women’s representatives at ward level
(Government of PNG, 1999). However, many of these posts are yet to be
filled. Prior to the introduction of the OLPGLLG, there were only two
women in the national Government, out of a total of 109 members
(National Planning Office, 1998).
Women’s desks and gender units are being established in several
government departments, which is in line with the Commonwealth Plan
of Action that states:
The Commonwealth Plan of Action aims to strengthen women’s
machineries within governments and integrate gender issues into
the mainstream of all government and secretariat activities in order to
achieve equality and equity of outcomes of women (Commonwealth
Secretariat, 1995: 6).
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The trend began with the establishment of a Gender Unit in the
National Planning Office in 1992, and was followed by the Department of
Agriculture and Livestock (1996), the Department of Education (2000),
and the Department of Police, and the Defence Force. The gender desk
within the Department of Education carries out gender awareness in
schools, teachers’ colleges, and other institutions of higher learning. The
University of Papua New Guinea has a gender studies programme which
began enrolling students in 2000.
Despite these achievements, many of the gender desks and
gender units are not able to carry out their plans and activities because
they are inadequately funded, or are not receiving any funding at all from
their respective departments. It is imperative that these gender units
should not be transferred to the Women’s Division of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development because the department has no technical
expertise, and the units will end up being abolished. An example of this is
the Women in Fisheries Project, which was transferred from the
Department of Fisheries to the Women’s Division in the Department of
Home Affairs and was eventually abolished.
REALITY OF DEVELOPMENT OF WOMEN AND
CHILDREN IN PNG
Papua New Guinea has one of the lowest life expectancy levels in the
world. Present life expectancy is estimated at 53.5 years for females and
54.6 years for males (National Planning Office, 1998). In 1980 average
life expectancy was 50 years. Since 1980 there has been a marginal life
expectancy increase of 3.5 years for women.
In comparison with neighbouring Pacific Island countries,
Papua New Guinea has a low life expectancy rate compared with Fiji (75
years, 1995 data), New Caledonia (76 years, 1995 data), and the Solomon
Islands (61 years, 1986 data) (National Planning Office, 1998). It is also
one of the few countries in the world where male life expectancy is higher
than that for females.
Papua New Guinea has one of the highest rates of pregnancy
related deaths in the world, at 930 per 100,000 (Government of PNG and
United Nations Children’s Fund, 1996). The national infant mortality rate
is 73 per 1,000 live births, and the national child mortality rate is 31 per
1,000 live births, for children between the ages of 1 and 5. This situation
is worse in the rural areas than in the urban areas. The heavy workload,
that the women are daily burdened with, is compounded by inadequate
health facilities, poor sanitation, the lack of safe clean water, and violence,
all of which lead to a low life expectancy.
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A comparison of provincial data on infant mortality rates and
female adult literacy rates shows a correlation between these two variables.
Provinces with high adult female literacy rates have low infant mortality
rates. In contrast, provinces with low adult female literacy rates have high
infant mortality rates. For example, the National Capital District has the
highest adult female literacy rate and the lowest infant mortality rate
(National Planning Office, 1998).
In PNG, some of the common diseases that kill children are
pneumonia, meningitis, malaria, diarrhoea, and anaemia. Malnutrition,
which is another common problem among young children in PNG, is
estimated to affect approximately 34 per cent of all children under the age
of five years.
Education is important in bridging the gender inequality gap in
Papua New Guinea. At present, formal education is reaching only 70 per
cent of primary school children, and less than 20 per cent of secondary
school children (Government of PNG and United Nations Children’s
Fund, 1996). The current National Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) for
elementary schools is 90.5 per cent, for primary schools 55.8 per cent, and
for secondary schools 9.2 per cent (National Planning Office, 1998). The
transition rates from elementary to primary, and primary to secondary
education are relatively high, with national averages at 89.4 per cent and
89.9 per cent, respectively.
However, retention rates, that is, the number of students who
finish school compared to the number who start, show fluctuations for the
country as a whole and for individual provinces (Government of PNG and
United Nations Children’s Fund,1996). During the period 1983–1988, the
average retention rate was 62.1 per cent. However, there has been a gradual
decline to an average of 56.5 per cent during 1989–1994. Retention is
regarded as the most serious problem in primary education in PNG.
Access to education by females is still a problem in PNG and is
attributed to cultural attitudes (Yeoman, 1987). In 1980 female enrol-
ment, as a percentage of total enrolment, was 41.4 per cent. In 1994 this
rose to 44.9 per cent, which is only a 3.5 per cent increase over a fourteen-
year period (NDOE, 1994). This occurred, even though 736 new schools
were opened during that time (Government of PNG and United Nations
Children’s Fund, 1996).
However, literacy for women in PNG has increased from 22.8
per cent in 1971, to 40.3 per cent in 1990. This increase has mainly
occurred as a result of the numerous literacy programmes that were put in
place by NGOs. The literacy rate is still slightly lower than that for males,
which was 49.5 per cent in 1990. The 1990 national census showed that
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45.1 per cent of the population, aged ten and over, are literate. However,
this is still very low compared to other Pacific Island countries, where the
national average literacy rate is some 85 per cent.
Another concern with the literacy rates is that they are highest in
the vernacular, and then Tok Pisin. Only 29.1 per cent of the population is
literate in English which is the language that is used in education,
commerce, and government (Government of PNG and United Nations
Children’s Fund, 1996). This means that functional literacy1 in Papua
New Guinea is still very low, and could be a factor hindering development
in many rural areas.
While no definite study has been conducted on literacy, it is
estimated that there is only a 25 per cent functional literacy level in the
population.
The national Human Development Index (HDI)2 value for
Papua New Guinea is 0.363, which indicates that, although there has been
a considerable amount of economic development,3 it is not filtering
through to improve human development (National Planning Office,
1998). On a global scale, Papua New Guinea ranks in the lower one-third
of all nations, and lowest among the Pacific island nations.
The rankings are even worse when human development indica-
tors are analysed, using gender. Achievements in gender equality have been
poor throughout Papua New Guinea. The Gender Development Index
(GDI)4 value of 0.318 shows that, in every province, male achievement in
life expectancy, educational attainment, and income are greater than
female achievement. The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)5 value
of 0.177 highlights widespread inequality between men and women in
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1 Functional literacy is defined as the capacity to use reading and writing skills as a means of
communication, to access information through various media, and to express needs and views to
decision-making authorities (Ahai and Bopp, 1993).
2 Human development can be described as the process of enlarging people’s choices to improve
their well-being. Development is often measured in terms of economic growth, technology,
markets, and gross domestic product. However, the human development model differs by placing
people at the centre of development (National Planning Office, 1998). The Human Development
Index (HDI) is a measure developed to show human well-being. It focuses on a long and healthy
life, knowledge, and level of living. Four variables are used to calculate indices: life expectancy at
birth, aggregate gross enrolment ratio for Grades 1 through 12, adult literacy rate, and domestic factor
income (National Planning Office, 1998).
The HDI ranges from zero to one. A value of 1.000 represents an optimal condition, while a
value of zero represents extremely poor conditions.
3 Extractive sector led development.
4 The Gender Development Index (GDI) has a maximum value of 1.000, which represents
equality, and a minimum of 0.000 which represents absolute inequality between males and
females in terms of life expectancy, education, and income (National Planning Office, 1998).
5 The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) measures the opportunities by focusing on the
inequalities between men and women in the areas of economic participation, decision-making,
and political participation (National Planning Office, 1998).
terms of economic and political participation and decision-making
(National Planning Office, 1998).
The difference between GDI and GEM national values indicates
that relative improvement in human development for women in the last
two decades has had minimal effect on their economic and political partic-
ipation. The majority of the female labour force in Papua New Guinea is
engaged in agricultural production, primarily as subsistence food
producers, while only 4 per cent is engaged in formal sector employment
(National Planning Office, 1998).
It is also evident from data that a large gap exists in earned
income. Females earn only 16 per cent, whereas males earn 84 per cent
(National Planning Office, 1998).
GENDER IN AGRICULTURE — GENDER
INSTITUTIONALISATION
An important priority area is the integration of gender issues with policies,
programmes, and plans. This is the fourth priority area, as stipulated in the
Papua New Guinean Platform for Action, from the Post-Beijing
Conference. The majority of Papua New Guineans live in rural areas
where the agricultural sector plays a multiple role of being the main source
of income, subsistence, and employment. The majority of the female
population (37.3 per cent) are engaged in this sector. Therefore, the
integration of gender into agriculture policies, programmes and plans is
important for the development of the country.
Women’s labour6 is important in food production in Papua New
Guinea. For example: ‘Women’s work in the subsistence agriculture sector
is vital for the survival and well-being of the families that make up the
nation of Papua New Guinea’ (Vatnabar, 1999).
According to the Department of Agriculture, women play a
major role in food production because they contribute between 50 to 70
per cent of agricultural labour in tasks such as clearing, planting, weeding,
harvesting, and the transporting of food crops. They are also dominant in
the marketing of food crop surpluses at the local market and in urban
markets. They are also responsible for food processing and the preparation
of meals. The task of carrying heavy loads of garden produce, firewood, and
water can take up to 30 per cent of women’s time, as Jenkins found (1992).
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6 In PNG, a woman’s labour can be described as a continuum of diverse multiple and overlap-
ping activities. This is because she plays the role of a mother, a housewife, a food producer, a
food processor, and the family breadwinner, unlike in Western society where the male is the
breadwinner. Unfortunately, there is no clear boundary between monetary production of
food, and food that is for the family’s consumption. This results in women’s labour being
taken as invisible and not being included in official accounts (Vatnabar, 1999).
With respect to cash cropping, women also provide a large
amount of labour through weeding and harvesting. Furthermore, ‘Women
are also responsible for the maintenance of the gene pool for food crops so
that there is a continuous supply of planting material to ensure that food is
available for their families, as well as a surplus for societal obligations and
sale’ (Vatnabar, 1999).
Factors constraining women’s productivity are:
• time constraints between agricultural production and multiple
domestic tasks, such as food processing and preparation; collection
of water and firewood; and childcare; as well as time involved in
walking to and from food gardens;
• the lack of technical extension support, facilities, and financial
advisory services on food crop cultivation and marketing directed to
women;
• the lack of access to relevant information and technology on inten-
sive cultivation techniques and cash crop management;
• the lack of micro-credit facilities where women can obtain small
loans to assist them in the purchase of appropriate items of
technology ;
• the lack of informal education programmes for rural women, which
are aimed at empowering them economically to improve their
standard of living; and,
• lack of access to a proportion of earnings from cash crops
(Shoefffel-Melissea, 1987).
It is important that agricultural policies and extension services
attempt to address these constraints in order to increase food production.
There is a Gender Unit in agriculture within the Department of
Agriculture and Livestock which is struggling to achieve its objectives. So
far, the unit has succeeded in incorporating actions to alleviate these
constraints noted in the Department’s White Paper on Agriculture, Sectoral
Policies: 1996–2000 and the National Food Policy. Despite the recognition
of these constraints and the announcement of policies, there is no struc-
tured mechanism in the agricultural sector to implement these objectives.
CONCLUSION
New activities for women in Papua New Guinea were introduced as early
as the 1850s, and were given formal recognition in 1975. Despite this
recognition, very little improvement in women’s standard of living has
occurred, especially in the areas of health, hygiene, functional literacy,
education, and employment opportunities.
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Although the National Constitution has been an empowering
instrument for equal participation of all citizens including women, in
reality, this has not been the case. The main obstacles to gender develop-
ment in PNG have been the traditional and cultural beliefs and practices,
the attitudes of men, and also to a large degree, women who are bound by
tradition.
Also, the constant policy changes by different governments in
this area have not allowed developments in gender to gain momentum.
The general view by most governments is that gender development is a
low priority area.
The planning approach of the 1970s and 1980s, using the
Women in Development Approach (WID), was portraying women’s issues
as welfare issues. Therefore it isolated women’s issues from mainstream
programming and project planning.
It has been five years since the 4th World Conference on
Women in Beijing. However, very little has been achieved in terms of
implementing strategies in the nine critical areas by the respective in
sectors, as outlined in the document Papua New Guinea Platform for
Action: A Decade of Action for Women Towards National Unity and
Sustainability 1995–2005 (National Steering Committee, 1995).
The four priority areas set after Beijing were :
• institutional strengthening and upgrading of the national women’s
machinery;
• economic empowerment of women;
• shared decision-making and good governance; and,
• integration of gender issues in policies, programmes, and plans.
The overall progress in these areas has been very slow. Institutional
strengthening and upgrading of the national women’s machinery is still an
outstanding issue that has not been dealt with since 1995. It has been found
to contradict the policies of the present Government. Today, the call for an
establishment of a ‘Commission for Women and Development’ is still
echoing in the ears of our leaders, while women and children are dying. If
PNG is to continue this way in addressing the situation of women and
children, then there will not be much progress to report back to the United
Nations World Conference in 2005.
Economic empowerment is still a long way from becoming a
reality, while shared decision-making has made some positive progress by
enabling women’s representation at all levels of government. Many of these
positions still need to be filled.
The integration of gender issues in policies, programmes, and
plans has started in many sectors such as Agriculture, Education, Health,
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Police, and the Defence Force, although there is still a lot more work to be
done. There is an enormous need for many more planners to be gender-
sensitised across the country, if much is to be achieved through sectoral
plans and programmes in terms of an improved human development
index. There is still a lack of gender analysis in most public investment
programmes and projects. This is where the gender desk at the
Department of National Planning needs to be more aggressive in
addressing the situation.
REFERENCES
Commonwealth Secretariat, 1995. The 1995 Commonwealth Plan of Action on Gender and
Development, London, Women and Youth Affairs Division.
Department of Agriculture and Livestock, 1996. White Paper on Agriculture: Sectoral Policies,
1996–2000, Port Moresby, Department of Agriculture and Livestock.
——— 2000. Papua New Guinea National Food Security Policy. Port Moresby.
Government of Papua New Guinea, 1999. Report on Implementation of the Global Platform
and the National Platform for Action, 1995–1999, Port Moresby: Department
of Social Welfare and Development.
Government of PNG and United Nations Children’s Fund, 1996. Children, Women, and
Families in Papua New Guinea: A Situation Analysis. Port Moresby.
Jenkins, C., 1992. Issues in the Promotion of Improved Health and Nutrition in Papua
New Guinea, Papua New Guinea National Nutrition Policy Workshop, Port
Moresby, Institute of National Affairs, pp. 177–86.
National Planning Office, 1998. Papua New Guinea Human Development Report, Waigani,
National Planning Office.
National Steering Committee, 1995a. Papua New Guinea–Country Report, United Nations
Fourth Conference on Women, Beijing, China, 4–15 September 1995, Port
Moresby, Department of Home Affairs.
——— Beijing Conference, 1995b. Papua New Guinean Platform for Action: A Decade of
Action for Women towards National Unity and Sustainability, 1995–2005, Port
Moresby: Department of Home Affairs.
Papua New Guinea Delegation, 1995. Report on the United Nations Fourth World
Conference on Women, Beijing, China, September 4–15, 1995, Port Moresby,
Department of Home Affairs.
Vatnabar, M., 1999. Situation Analysis of Gender Influences on Smallholder Food
Production in Papua New Guinea, MEc thesis, University of New England,
Armidale, NSW.
Yeoman, L., 1987. ‘Universal Primary Education: Factors Affecting the Enrolment and
Retention of Girls in Papua New Guinea Community Schools’, in S. Stratigos,
and P.J. Hughes (eds) The Ethics of Development: Women as Unequal Partners in
Development, Waigani, UPNG Press.
282 BUILDING A NATION IN  PAPUA NEW GUINEA
THE ROLE OF CHURCHES




The Church in Papua New Guinea has played a significant role in the
process of nation building. Since first contact by various missionaries in
Papua New Guinea in the 1870s (Piau, Lynch and Crowley, 1992: 113),
the work of the Church has taken on wider dimensions. Different mainline
churches have laid the foundation by planting local churches and engaging
heavily in evangelism. In the process of engaging in different areas of
ministry, they have contributed much to the building of Papua New
Guinea. The churches got heavily involved in training and equipping Papua
New Guineans. They also got involved in building up people’s leadership
potential and capacity to realize a vision and future challenges for the
Church and the nation. The Church therefore, is seen today as a catalyst for
change, a facilitator for national development, and an equipper for the
ministry of the Gospel of Jesus Christ.
To add, the churches saw the need not only to preach the Word
of God but also to apply what they preach and teach in practical situa-
tions. Such application of the work of churches in practical situations
involved the provision of health services, education, literacy and transport.
These areas are considered as very crucial for the development of Papua
New Guinea. But before we look at some of these practical involvements
of the work of churches in nation building, I shall begin by discussing
some of the challenges and moral responsibilities of churches in PNG and
see how these contribute to nation building.
MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF CHURCHES TOWARDS
NATION BUILDING
The Church in PNG has a moral role to play based on justice and right-
eousness. The Church also needs to combat activities that contribute to
poverty and economic and social disparity, it needs to encourage peace,
love and social harmony and emphasize the development of the total
person, rather than an aspect of it. We shall look at each of these and see
how they could contribute to nation building.
Promoting Justice and Righteousness
The Church needs to exercise justice and righteousness based on biblical
principles. One of the ways to do this is to speak out against injustice and
evil practices prevalent in state or private institutions, the established
systems which people manipulate to pursue their own agendas and inter-
ests. For example, in the distribution of goods and services, some people in
government, especially, politicians and bureaucrats make decisions and
allocate resources in favour of their cronies or supporters.
Senior executive appointments are decided by politicians and
other senior bureaucrats, usually those associated with major political
parties in government. In some cases, it appears that appointments are not
made on merit (based on qualification and experience). One is put in a
position just because he or she is an ally or political associate of certain
major ruling bodies, such as political parties in government or unions. As a
result of this type of injustice or unfairness in the selection and distribu-
tion of goods and services, there tends to be inefficiency and a lack of
productivity in various organizations. Given the unstable political situa-
tion in the country, those who are placed in various responsible positions
to administer and manage public assets or funds tend to misappropriate
these public monies as much as possible.
Because of these injustices at institutionalized levels, churches in
Papua New Guinea have a moral duty to propose alternatives and
solutions, which both seek to reform and, if necessary, draw guidelines and
to eliminate practices that may have adverse effects on the nation. The
Church must proclaim the truth about the injustice and pressure the
government and its institutions, in particular the managers and guardians
of those public institutions, to come out fair and play a righteous and just
role. The Church needs to rebuke injustices and emphasize righteousness
to supersede all dealings of the government, from decision-making to
resource allocation and resource management. Only then, will we begin to
see a just and fair society.
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The Church in PNG is in a better position to advise people in
leadership and management positions to be good servants and stewards of
the resources. They have to acquire wisdom if they wish to lead and manage
material and human resources wisely and effectively. Jesus Christ, for
example, has convincingly shown this kind of management skills in relation
to the calling of the Twelve Disciples. According to Avis (1992: 96), Jesus
Christ showed scant regard for modern management wisdom; he was not
looking for managers, but for learners and leaders — disciples and apostles.
According to the Gospel of St Mark, Jesus appointed the Twelve
to be with Him and to be sent out to proclaim the message (Mark, 3:14).
Jesus’s appointment of the Twelve Disciples, Avis maintains, point towards
the twofold requirement of today’s Church for (a) highly trained personnel,
equipped with professional skills, whose learning programme continues
throughout their career, and (b) leaders of communities who can not only
ensure that all things are done decently and in order (management skills),
but who can focus and direct the energies and even the conflicts of that
faith towards the attainment of goals, the overcoming of problems, and a
realization of a vision of the glory and grace of God (Avis, 1992).
This is what the churches in Papua New Guinea need to preach,
particularly to reiterate and encourage their members to utilize their
professional knowledge and skills in an orderly, effective and honest
manner. The church members should be encouraged to be good and
faithful managers and servants in whatever responsibility they may be
engaged in. They have to be transparent in their dealings with public
resources, such as financial matters. If most public servants in PNG know
their roles as ‘servants’, then they should be motivated to serve the
Government and its people with respect and dignity. They should not
allow themselves to be served by others but to serve others with honesty,
humility and with genuineness. People, who serve the Government in
whatever capacity for mere pay, may not be productive and innovative
enough; they may tend to have the ‘don’t care attitude’. On the other
hand, however, we would see a real difference if the people who work
under various organizations in the public and private sectors serve whole-
heartedly by committing their time, effort and talents to producing best
results. The churches, apparently, have to get their priorities right by
encouraging their members to exercise these servanthood qualities in non-
government or government-related activities.
Combating Poverty and Social Disharmony
Furthermore, the Church needs to speak out against practices that allow
for poverty and social disharmony within individuals, families and groups.
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The example shown by the Catholic Bishop of Port Moresby, Bishop Brian
Barnes (Post Courier, 14 August 2001), in speaking out against the
national Government’s overwhelming support to retain poker machines in
the country should be noted. Here is a concerned clergy, a bishop, repre-
senting a main denomination, speaking against a practice that has, over
the years, enslaved and crippled individuals and families.
Time and time again, some church groups and individuals have
warned about the dangers of such games, poker in particular. This game
has marginalized urban dwellers and, particularly, the casual and middle
class workers into poverty. Yet, the decision-makers, especially the politi-
cians, see fit to defeat the motion recently to abolish poker machines in
PNG. Where is the justice when a handful of politicians who represent the
majority failed to listen and to seriously take note, the concern of the
people to abolish poker machines in Papua New Guinea?
The national Government, in the name of development and
subsequent job creation, allows certain businesses to operate, such as poker
and other related games businesses, which tend to have an adverse effect
on the society. The churches, therefore, have to come out and warn the
Government, and particularly their church members, about the negative
implications such games have on their lives and the society. When people
begin to realize the negative impact these games have on their lives and
quit or avoid such habits as much as possible, they will then begin to see
some positive change in their lives.
The Need to Proclaim Peace and Love
The Church also has a moral role to play in proclaiming peace within the
PNG society. This is considered to be crucial as far as nation building is
concerned. Peace and reconciliation have an important place in a society
like PNG where there are ethnic, racial, social, religious and political
conflicts. ‘Reconciliation’, as White & Blue (1985: 47) put it, is that
process by which hostility is abolished and peace restored. It is God
replacing war with peace, alienation with friendship and intimacy. Peace
with God, peace with ourselves and peace with our neighbours (even peace
with our physical environment) are inseparably linked. To lose one is to
lose all. To regain the one (peace with God) is to begin to regain all.
The various churches’ role in mediating peace in the
Bougainville conflict in PNG, for example, needs to be noted. The
Catholic Church, the United Church, the Evangelical Church, the
Anglican Church, the Salvation Army and the Seventh Day Adventists
have put in a lot of their time and effort in providing support, encourage-
ment and counselling with those affected by the conflict. There was
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tremendous help from church groups in prayer and kind (money and
clothing) for the war-torn island.
The driving force that permeated these church organizations
and individual Christians to preach about peace and act as mediators is
‘love’. When a person is motivated to do things in love, he or she wishes to
go beyond the normal to do the unexpected and extraordinary. Love wants
to give freely without reward or pay; love does not take revenge; love does
not hate others; love wants to sacrifice. This is biblical love, the ‘agape’ love
that God has. It was while we were sinners that Christ came to die for us.
God, taking the form of a man and dying for the sins of the World, is a
clear demonstration of self-sacrificial love. As White and Blue (1985) put
it, the gospel is the story of a loving God reaching out to people. The
Apostle Paul, as God’s servant, tells us he is preaching the gospel because
love forces him to (2 Corinthians 5:14). Love, he tells us, reconciles us to
God (2 Corinthians 5:18). Such love makes our salvation more than
ransom from merited punishment.
To this end, the Church in PNG should be compelled to preach
peace and love to those in conflict, those in need, having in mind that the
one they preach about (Jesus Christ) is the Peace Maker (Ephesians 2:
13–14) and the One who loved us so much (John 3:16). Christ preached
peace to us so that instead of being enemies, we might become members
of His family (Ephesians 2:17–19). The Church has an obligation to go
out and tell the world, in particular, the people of PNG, that sin enslaves
(John 8:32). Christians must adopt the character of God by preaching
against immoral behavior and encouraging people to follow Christian
principles and values, such as showing love to others and establishing
peace within us and with our neighbours. By doing this, we should be able
to build a peaceful society, a peaceful nation that even outsiders would
have the glamour of visiting.
Relevant here are the words of the former President of South
Africa, Nelson Mandela, who had this to say when addressing an
International Pentecostal Youth Day Function in his country in June
1997:
Religious institutions can help restore the culture of moral responsi-
bility and a respect for human dignity. This means each individual
taking responsibility for building our country and forging our
nationhood. In our own small way each one of us can help to
rebuild this country, by every criminal we refuse to shelter and by
every policeman we help to do his job. If every Church member
decides never to buy stolen goods, the market for stolen goods will
be made that much smaller. 
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He further reiterates that:
… as South Africa strives for reconstruction and reconciliation,
nation building and development, religious organizations can make
a contribution of particular importance in their programs for the
youth, especially those that build moral strength, emotional maturity
and civic responsibility in young children. (Mandela, 15 June 1997).
It appears that Mandela’s speech came in the midst of restoration
and reconciliation after a long struggle of conflicts of various types,
ranging from ethnic or racial tensions, youth unrest and subsequent
criminal activities. One can agree the words of Mandela and take it as a
challenge for Papua New Guinea. The problems prevalent in South Africa
and other countries also apply in PNG. Therefore, church leaders in
collaboration with government leaders should be challenged to stand up
and address issues that contribute to social unrest. The factors that
contribute to the deviant behaviour of youth — such as drugs, alcohol,
prostitution, armed holdups, rapes, to name a few — should be addressed
hand in hand with the churches and the national Government. Law
enforcing agencies, such as the local court system, the police force and
correctional institutional services, or even the Defence Force, can be given
more powers to eradicate problems, but this alone may not help. One can
use force to minimize crime and to punish law-breakers but this may have
very little effect on the life of the law-breaker and the society.
The Church therefore, has a major role to play in such situations
where spiritual counselling, love, care and encouragement is required.
Unemployed youth and those involved in drugs, alcohol and prostitution
need to be cared for, accommodated and fed. If the Church and govern-
ment leaders begin to develop a tendency to avoid such people, we are
going to have real problems. Rehabilitation centres like the Halfway
Christian Centre of Morata Settlement, in Port Moresby and Koki’s Every
Home for Christ Centre, also in Port Moresby can be revitalized with
financial support by the national Government and donor agencies in the
country. One hopes that this financial support would help in a major way
to bring in more unemployed youths, drug addicts, ex-prisoners, crimi-
nals, and the abused in society. These people would then be trained and
taught vocational and recreational skills and about morality and its impor-
tance. Further, financial support should also be made to similar mission
organizations like the Salvation Army. The Salvos throughout the country
are doing exceptionally well, particularly their involvement in humani-
tarian activities and their provision and facilitation of capital works like
schools and health facilities. This sort of work should be encouraged and
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supported by the national Government, as it would help to bring positive
changes in society.
Such action of rehabilitating the unemployed and deviant youths
in Church and mission-run centres in the country should, in a major way,
alleviate or lessen some of the identified social and economically-related
problems. Other such rehabilitation centres in the country should also be
identified by the national Government and allocated funds so that the
organizations, especially churches who are engaging in these activities, can
continue to provide essential services to young people who may need such
facilities. This is seen to be the churches’ practical approach to helping
people, particularly the unemployed, school leavers, drug addicts, ex-
prisoners and the homeless in society. By doing so, the churches in Papua
New Guinea would contribute immensely to nation building.
Combating Economic and Social Disparity
In addition, we have to look at what some World Church organizations
are doing in relation to combating economic and social disparity and see
how they might apply in Papua New Guinea, such as Asia’s World
Evangelical Fellowship Group headed by Secretary-General Wong Kim
Kong. In his keynote address at a gathering of World Evangelical
Fellowship leaders in Cyprus in 2000, Mr. W.K. Kong, quoted by Bryan
L. Myers of World Vision, presented the following needs and challenge:
… Economics, demography, technology, the social and spiritual
fabric of society, all are undergoing foundational change at a rate
almost too fast to follow. Asian nations are grouping for answers to
the serious problems of economic crises, political turmoil, religious
and ethnic conflicts, moral decadence and ecological abuse. With
such phenomena threatening human life and institutions, how is the
Church, the ‘ecclesia’ of Jesus Christ, going to face these challenges
in these end-times and be God’s agent to reconcile the Asian
community with God and bring transformation through the Gospel.
In trying to answer this question, Kong has the following to say
in relation to the ‘Lust of the Eyes’, which we view as relevant to our
Church, Government and society here in Papua New Guinea. In
summary, there tends to be a hindrance to accepting God’s message, and
that is the obsessive concern with and pursuit of wealth, often at the
expense of social values and the individual may become inevitable, the
spiritual and aesthetic (i.e. the things to do with beauty, the lusts of the
eyes). This has led to an inevitable corruption of spiritual and moral values
of society and individuals. The Church needs to be increasingly challenged
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to develop a radical kind of Christianity that is willing to count the cost of
discipleship and stewardship and to fulfil its mandate to be the ‘salt’ of the
earth and the ‘light’ of the world. The Church must develop ‘issue’ studies
and engage in discussion with government, authorities and civic organiza-
tions in making economic policies and legislation that will eradicate this
disparity. If conventional solutions no longer respond to today’s problem,
Kong continues, the Church needs to be proactive in facing the following
challenges.
There is a need for continuous evangelical response and articula-
tion of this issue. The Church cannot remain silent. We must become
advocates for the poor. There is a need for the development of certain
social clauses that may elevate this condition of disparity and a need for
social and community development. Social and community development
is a precondition for permanent economic development and increases
productivity and efficiency; better education strengthens competitiveness,
better wages boost purchasing power, and just distribution of land among
many people increases productivity. Kong further maintains, that the
Church is called to continue to give mutual assistance, relief and to under-
stand development projects. The goal of economy is to serve life, which
means to enable a decent development of the marginalized. The Secretary
General further reiterates the Church’s need to manifest the power of the
Holy Spirit by breaking the principality of economic materialism and
individualism. The Church must be seen in the promotion and practice of
economic sharing; exhibiting a deep sense of koinonia…
These issues and challenges facing the Asian Church and the
need to eradicate these social and economic disparities is something that
the churches in PNG must resolve if they want to see change in the right
direction. The poor, the homeless, the bereaved, the uneducated, the
unemployed, the street seller, the subsistence farmer, the casual labourer,
the middle class, etc., all need to see some form of change, not necessarily
in material terms but spiritual change in the lives of Papua New Guineans.
Developing the Total Person
The notion of ‘being poor physically and rich spiritually’ tends to deviate
from a holistic view of developing the total person which is stipulated in
Papua New Guinea’s philosophy of education. If one wishes to elaborate
on this philosophy, it obviously calls for the development of the whole
person, that is, integral human development. In the context of education,
this means that education should be geared towards integrating and
maximizing the potential of individuals, their socialization, participation,
liberation, and equality (Ministerial Committee, 1986: 7).
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The churches, therefore, are called to play their roles in meeting
these needs to develop the whole individual. Incentives and avenues
should be provided by the Church where both the affluent and the less
affluent in society should become dynamically involved with others, not
only in a family context but also in schools, church, community and
beyond. By interacting with each other and by sharing ideas, skills, and
expertise, they motivate and encourage one another to conserve and
transmit knowledge and cultural values to future generations and to bring
about development in the lives of individuals and the society.
Moreover, the Church, in collaboration with the government,
can identify influences that dominate and oppress the lives of many Papua
New Guineans. In a developing nation like PNG, people tend to focus their
attention on identifiable objectives or needs and ignore the very fundamen-
tals that make up the human being. Spiritual, emotional, psychological, and
social or economic needs can be ignored in a way that is oppressive. Thus,
the goal of liberation for every Papua New Guinean is to minimize this both
within himself or herself and within society. The emphasis is for every
person living in PNG to have the opportunity to take part in the spiritual,
social, physical, economic and political life of the country.
There should be positive steps taken by the Church and
Government to identify disadvantaged individuals or groups in PNG and
make attempts to redress the inequalities by providing them with the
stated basic human needs. Only then will we begin to see some form of
change in the right direction for this country (Leke, 1997: 27–8). Only
then, will the Church contribute much to building Papua New Guinea in
a better and just way.
Having discussed the moral responsibilities and challenges for
the Churches in PNG, we now draw our attention to some of the services
and activities some churches and mission organizations are engaging in which
are contributing much to economic development and nation building.
SERVICES PROVIDED BY CHURCH ORGANIZATIONS 
IN PNG
There are a number of services some churches in PNG have engaged in
which contribute to nation building. Among other Church-related respon-
sibilities, the notable ones we want to concentrate on are health services,
education, literacy and transportation. We will see how these areas
contribute to nation building in PNG.
Health Services
One of the key objectives of the Church (i.e. the universal Church, the
Bride of Christ made up of all Believers) is not only preaching about
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‘Spiritual Salvation’ as the result of ‘believing’ and ‘accepting’ the Word of
God, but also about ‘Physical Salvation’. The emphasis is that a person
must be both physically and spiritually healthy. A person must experience
both physical and spiritual healing. The former cannot happen without
the presence of the latter; both must work hand in hand in order to
produce healthy physical and spiritual results in the life of a person. This
ideology has become a driving force for various church and mission organ-
izations in providing health services. They tirelessly commit themselves to
providing some of the best health facilities and services in the country.
Most health services in the early stages of Papua New Guinea’s
development came about as the result of the pioneering work done by
committed foreign missionaries and mission volunteers. Many of the
missionaries came to PNG with a view to preaching the Gospel of Jesus
Christ to the lost tribes and did not give much attention to other social
services until they were faced with the realities of life in the land of the
unknown. Soon they realized the realities of the ‘Great Commission’ of
Jesus Christ (Mathew 28:19–20) which required them to go and make
disciples of all nations, baptizing them and teaching them everything that
the Lord commanded them.
A Summary of a Ministerial Brief by the Churches Medical Council 
of PNG
A paper prepared for the Minister for Health by the Churches Medical
Council of PNG (3 July 2001) has some important information about the
responsibilities of churches in providing health services and facilities.
According to this document, the churches today provide a total of 363
health facilities throughout PNG (Table1), or about 45 per cent of the
total health services and slightly more, 49 per cent, of all rural health
services (Tables 2 and 3). They also provide 60 per cent of General Nurse
Training and 100 per cent of Community Health Worker Training.
Church health work is now mainly confined to two main areas: the provi-
sion of health services in rural areas and the training of nurses and
community health workers. Service delivery involves preventive and
curative care being provided through the District Hospitals, Health
Centres and Sub-Health Centres and Aid posts throughout the country.
The tables that follow provide a surprisingly clear picture of
how much the various churches and mission organizations have put and
are putting into health work for the development of this young country —
Papua New Guinea. Let us admit now that, given the scope of this
material, it is our interest to look only at the Church Health Services and
not Government Health Services. However, we will provide a comparative
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review on education, that is, both government and Church-run education
agencies. Table indicates Church Health Facilities by province.
Table 1:    Number of Church Health Facilities by Province, 2001
Province Provincial District Health Sub/Health Aid
Hospital Hospital Centre Centre post Total
Western - 2 - 18 25 45
Gulf - 2 2 7 19 30
Central - - 2 12 6 20
Milne Bay - - 2 23 4 30
Oro - 1 1 4 1 7
Southern Highlands - - 4 25 12 41
Enga 1* 1 2 4 - 8
Western Highlands - 2 1 11 4 18
Simbu - - 1 5 3 9
Eastern Highlands - - 2 12 3 17
Morobe - 1 3 3 - 7
Madang - 1 5 11 12 29
East Sepik - - 1 21 8 30
West Sepik - 1 1 20 - 22
Manus - - - - 3 3
New Ireland - - 5 6 - 11
East New Britain - 1 - 12 - 13
West New Britain - - 1 12 2 15
North Solomons - - 1 6 - 7
PNG 1* 12 34 212 102 3631
* There is a second district hospital in the Enga Province, run by the Baptist Church, the
Kompian District Hospital, not shown in the original table.
Source: Churches Medical Council of PNG (2001: 5).
Table 1, clearly shows that the churches are responsible for 1
Provincial Hospital (Sopas Adventist Hospital in the Enga province), 13
District Hospitals (in all), 34 Health Centres, 212 Sub/Health Centres and
102 Aid posts. In addition, there are 5 General Nursing Schools and 13
Community Health Worker Schools. 
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Table 2:    Church Health Services as a Percentage of Total PNG Health Services by
Province and for National Captial District, 2001




Milne Bay 64 61
Oro 29 26
Southern Highlands 61 60
Enga 27 29
Western Highlands 50 48
Simbu 29 26
Eastern Highlands 38 38
Morobe 31 26
Madang 42 38
East Sepik 70 67
West Sepik 76 71
Manus 33 25
New Ireland 36 33
East New Britain 43 42
West New Britain 65 59
North Solomons 45 39
Total Coverage 49 45
Source: Churches Medical Council of PNG (2001: 6).
The Regional Summary provided by the National Department
of Health specifies Health Services Coverage by regions of the country.
This can be seen in Table 3.
Table 3:   Church Health Services as a Percentage of Health Service, by Region





Total Coverage 49 45
Source: Churches Medical Council of PNG (2001: 6)
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As seen, Papua New Guinea is divided into four main regions,
namely the Southern, Highlands, Momase and Islands regions. The
provinces that are part of the Southern region include Western, Gulf,
Central, National Capital District, Milne Bay and Oro; while the
provinces in the Highlands region includes the Southern Highlands, Enga,
Western Highlands, Simbu and Eastern Highlands. Likewise, the
provinces in the Momase region include Morobe, Madang, East Sepik and
Sandaun (or West Sepik) while the provinces in the Islands region include
Manus, New Ireland, East New Britain, West New Britain and North
Solomon. According to the rural Church health services coverage by
region, it appears that Momase and Southern regions have a higher
percentage of rural health services than the Highlands and Islands regions
respectively.
Health Institutions
As specified in the Churches Medical Council of PNG’s Ministerial Brief
(2001: 12), churches are largely involved in a number of Health Worker
Training Institutions. Many of these health worker training schools were
established to train Nurses, Nurse Aides and Aid Post Orderlies. All
training institutions are approved and are visited regularly by the Nursing
Council of PNG. Nurse Aide and Aid Post Orderly training were
combined and are now known as the ‘Community Health Worker
Programme’. The other course is the General Nurse programme to train
nursing sisters.
Health worker training remains a national function and the
subsidies for training are the responsibility of the National Health
Department. There are two major channels by which the Government
subsidizes training schools: running costs, student allowances and tutor
salaries. The Government, through the Human Resources Division of the
Health Department and the Commission of Higher Education, provides
grants to assist training schools. Table 4 shows an estimate of General
Nurse Staffing and Student levels per school.
Similarly, the Ministerial Brief Document shows that there are
well over 13 Community Health Worker Schools. These schools also have
a staff/student ceiling and gives a good picture of the kind of training
various churches provide which ultimately contributes to nation building.
This is indicated in Table 5.
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Table 5:    Community Health Worker School Staffing and Student Levels
School Church Programme Student Tutor Province
Ceiling Ceiling
Rumginae ECPNG CHW 45 5 Western
Kaupuna GCS CHW 60 6 Gulf
Veifa,a Catholic CHW 35 3 Central
Budoya Catholic CHW 12 1 Milne Bay
Salamo United CHW 12 1 Milne Bay
Oro Bay Anglican CHW 40 4 Oro
Det Catholic CHW 30 3 Southern Highlands
Tinsley Baptist CHW 40 5 Western Highlands
Braun Lutheran CHW 50 6 Morobe
Gaubin Lutheran CHW 60 7 Madang
Aitape Catholic CHW 60 7 Sandaun
Telefomin Baptist CHW 12 1 Sandaun
Lemakot Catholic CHW 45 5 New Ireland
Total Schools 13 501 54
Source: Churches Medical Council of PNG (2001: 13).
All these examples of health services show that the churches
contribute much to the development of Papua New Guinea. The health
services, facilities and training given to Papua New Guineans and the
subsequent improvement of life for the people of this country is such that
it should not go un-noticed. The imparting and facilitating of health
services, basic theory, skills, and practical application of this knowledge has
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Table 4:   General Nurse Staffing and Student Levels per School
School Church Programme Student Tutor Province
Ceiling Ceiling
*Balimo ECPNG General 40 4 Western* (closed)
Nurse
Kudjip Nazarene GN 60 7 Western Highlands
Sopas SDA GN 40 4 Enga
Madang Lutheran GN 90 12 Madang
Alotau Combine GN 45 5 Milne Bay
St Mary’s 
Vunapope Catholic GN 90 12 East New Britain
Total 325 40
Note: A training school run by the ECPNG for general nurses, with a student ceiling of 40
and a tutor ceiling of 4, previously operated in Balimo.
Source: Churches Medical Council of PNG (2001: 12).
been and will continue to be the foremost objective of churches which will
enhance the well-being of the people of this country. This is a clear indica-
tion of the roles that churches play in contributing to the building Papua
New Guinea.
Education
Education in Papua New Guinea is divided into two main systems: the
private and the state. The former operates under two sub-systems: church
agency institutions and non-denominational, while the latter is operated
and controlled by the state. Similar arrangements are seen elsewhere,
particularly in Australia (Chalklen et. al., 1986: 16). We can focus our
discussion on the church-run schools in Papua New Guinea and see how it
contributes to nation building.
Table 6 shows the numbers of church agency institutions by
province and institution type in Papua New Guinea. According to these
statistics made available by the Department of Education (1997: 9), there
are 21 provinces and each province has a number of educational institu-
tions run by various churches. The church agency institutions range from
elementary schools to secondary, then to colleges and universities. Table 6
shows these Church-run institutions include 259 elementary schools,
1,511 community schools, 49 provincial high schools, 50 vocational
centres and 6 teachers colleges. The total number of educational institu-
tions ranging from elementary to college is 1,876. 
The figures shown above were recorded for the 1997 cohort year
and could have increased, especially under the new Education Reform.
Under the new Education Reform, a number of schools (both community
and high schools) have become primary and secondary schools in which
the former provides for grades 3 to 8 while the latter takes in grades 9 to
12. Also, a number of elementary schools have been introduced
throughout the country, which cater for preparatory classes (Prep 1 & 2
stages).
In contrast, the government agency institutions during the same
cohort consist of 274 elementary schools, 1,374 community schools, 97
provincial high schools, 61 vocational centres, 5 national (senior) high
schools, 7 technical colleges and 3 teachers colleges. The total number of
state-owned institutions is 1,821. This distribution is shown in Table 7.
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Table 6:    Church Agency Educational Institutions by Province and Institution Type**
Province Elementary Community High Vocational Teachers Total
School School School Centre College Institutions
Western 17 42 1 - - 60
Gulf 1 39 - - - 40
National Capital 5 9 2 2 - 18
Central - 92 2 1 - 95
Milne Bay 7 115 3 5 - 130
Oro - 40 1 1 - 42
Southern Highlands - 37 2 - 1 40
Eastern Highlands - 71 4 1 - 76
Simbu 24 47 2 4 - 77
Western Highlands 20 101 3 4 1 129
Enga 15 60 3 4 - 82
Morobe 9 95 2 3 1 110
Madang 10 111 6 2 129
Sandaun - 106 4 9 - 119
East Sepik - 146 3 2 1 152
Manus 5 36 2 1 - 44
New Ireland 34 74 2 4 - 114
East New Britain 31 82 3 5 2 123
West New Britain 22 83 - 1 - 106
North Solomons 43 84 4 1 - 132
Kiunga/Lake Murray* 16 41 - - - 57
Total 259 1511 49 50 6 1875
* District status
** Other church institutions, such as, theological colleges, seminaries and universities are
not included here.
Source: Department of Education (1997: 9)
Table 7:   Government Agency Educational Institutions by Province and Institution Type
Province Elementary Community High Vocational National Technical Teachers Total
School School School Centre High College College Institutions
Western 16 37 1 2 - - - 56
Gulf 17 60 5 3 - - - 85
National 
Capital 17 28 5 4 1 2 1 58
Central - 78 6 2 1 - - 87
Milne Bay 50 51 3 3 - - - 107
Oro - 56 3 4 - - - 63
Southern 
Highlands 15 162 9 3 - - - 189
Eastern 
Highlands - 88 6 2 1 1 1* 99
Simbu 15 78 7 2 - - - 102
Western 
Highlands 3 52 7 2 - 1 - 65
Enga 35 51 6 4 - - - 96
Morobe 20 188 9 6 - 1 - 224
Madang 4 62 2 3 - 1 1 73
Sandaun - 48 4 7 - - - 59
East Sepik - 96 5 4 1 - - 106
Manus 9 31 3 1 - - - 44
New Ireland 22 42 3 1 - - - 68
East New 
Britain 1 54 4 3 1 1 - 64
West New 
Britain 36 71 5 3 - - - 115
North 
Solomons 1 23 2 - - - - 26
Kiunga 
L. Murray** 13 18 2 2 - - - 35
Total 274 1374 97 61 5 7 3 1821
* District Status
** Goroka Teachers College became the University of Goroka in 1996.
Source: Department of Education (1997: 8).
When we compare the totals in Table 6 and 7, we find that there are
1,875 church schools for the 1997 cohort while the state has 1,821 schools for
the same period. Surprisingly, it appears that the church has 54 schools more
than the Government but in terms of enrolments, it is the opposite: the
Government has 52,952 enrolments more than church institutions.
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Moreover, the Church-run universities and other theological
colleges and seminaries with their student outputs are not included as is
also the case for government-run universities, theological colleges and
seminaries. However, to highlight some of the universities and theological
colleges, we note that there are two church-run universities: the Pacific
Adventist University outside Port Moresby, and the Madang Divine Word
University which is run by the Catholic Church. These institutions
compete with the state-owned universities and colleges by providing some
of the best programmes. Similarly, the church-run theological colleges
include the Christian Leaders’ Training College of Papua New Guinea
(CLTC), an Evangelical Alliance College, in Banz, Mt Hagen, Western
Highlands Province; Raronga Theological College in Rabaul, East New
Britain Province, run by the United Church of Papua New Guinea and the
Solomon Islands; Sonoma Adventist College in Rabaul, East New Britian
Province; Lae Martin Luther Seminary, Morobe Province, run by the
Lutheran Church; and Kwinkya Baptist Bible College, Baiyer River,
Western Highlands Province, to name a few.
The Church agency educational institutions (including all levels
of education) tend to provide an integrated curriculum. The courses
include both religious and secular material. Adherence to Christian values is
part of the school rules, and the students are required to apply them in their
lives. The teaching and practising of religious beliefs is an integral part of
the educational process. This integrated religious and secular curriculum
makes church schools in the country different from the rest of the schools
in the public sector, even though the Religious Instruction (RI) Class is
promoted but for a limited time only, for only one hour per week.
In addition, it is worth noting that most of these church agency
institutions in PNG and abroad, including Australia, are both religious
and secular-oriented and cater for all needs of children including religious,
social, political, mental and intellectual needs. Because of this holistic
approach to education, some parents see it as especially worthwhile for
their children to attend these schools. They believe that the state schools,
which are secular in nature, would detract from their children religious
and moral values, such as tolerance, reverence for others and the funda-
mentals of literacy and numeracy, which church schools claim to have
taught in a disciplined and stimulating way resulting in the high perform-
ance of their students (as Hogan [1984: 37] argues for Australia).
Similarly, according to Fox (1985: 142) some parents view Church schools
as better because they maintain better academic results, provide a disci-
plined training, treat children as individuals, provide better teachers and
teaching methods, manage the class and the school efficiently, and the
general teaching and learning environment is quite attractive.
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The parents’ views about Church schools are considered to be
genuine because they not only want their children to be Christians but
also to behave in an orderly fashion. Church schools in Papua New
Guinea, for that matter, are seen as having a moral obligation to teach
children to behave properly and do things wholeheartedly as this could not
only contribute to their well-being but also lead to an ordered civil society.
It is both the parents’ and Church schools’ view that children and youths
engaging in drugs, alcohol, gang holdups, prostitution and gambling,
contribute to the moral decay of individuals and the society at large.
Therefore, such behaviours are not allowed in church schools. Students are
given maximum penalties if they are found guilty of engaging in such
illegal activities as taking drugs or alcohol.
Enforcement of such rules of behaviour by church-run schools
in the country is seen to be in the right direction as this will help to build
Papua New Guinea in a right and just way. As the Bible states, ‘When the
wicked rules, a nation suffers but when a righteous rules, a nation
prospers’ (Proverbs 29:2). This refers to people in leadership positions, but
it is equally applicable to ordinary people, family members, church groups,
community organizations, social clubs, schools and public or private
offices. If Papua New Guinea can produce a well-equipped, well-
mannered, honest, hardworking, committed, God-fearing population, one
believes the country could prosper in wider dimensions. Church schools
for that matter, are doing all they can to produce a system of education
that meets these criteria, that is, to build Papua New Guinea based on
justice, peace, honesty and integrity. It may take quite some time to
produce such a good civil society but at least the churches in PNG are
becoming the catalyst or bridge for such human resource developments.
Literacy Work
Mere verbal communication of information in any of Papua New Guinea’s
three main lingua francas (English, Tok Pisin and Hiri Motu) or 854
vernacular languages spoken by almost five million people (Nekitel, 1998:
78; Nekitel and Kamene, 1991: 3) may play some role in nation building
but not to an effective or extended level. One assumes that, to develop a
human being and thus a nation, it requires both spoken and written
language, which is understood meaningfully by individuals. In order to
make communication relevant or meaningful and establish understanding,
the form in which the information is transferred must be accurate. This
requires basic literacy skills, that is, the ability to read, write and speak
effectively and confidently in one or more of the lingua francas and
vernacular languages of the country.
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As far as the churches’ role in nation building in terms of
‘literacy knowledge’ is concerned, one is convinced that they (the
churches) have been at the forefront in promoting literacy. If one refers to
the historical development of literacy in PNG, it seems that the missions
were teaching the native people the basic skills of reading, writing and
speaking in the two lingua francas (Tok Pisin and Hiri Motu) and other
dominant vernacular languages. This provision of literacy was purposely
done for the local people to read the Bible and other religious documents
for themselves and also for them to teach others their new knowledge
(Ahai, 1984: 27). This was seen as a breakthrough, especially for some old
people during those first mission contact days, because they learned the
skills of reading some versions of the Bible being produced for them in Tok
Pisin, Hiri Motu and other local vernaculars (Leke, 1997: 36).
It is also encouraging to note literacy programs in modern PNG.
For example, when providing an overview of Women’s Literacy Programs,
Nekitel and Willie (1989: 2) indicate that the main church organizations in
the country have run literacy programs for women. These literacy skills
enabled them not only to read the Bible but also equipped them to become
more effective contributors in family life, because they were able to read
about the skills of health care, home economics and the like.
Likewise, a multi-strategy method workbook, entitled Working
Together for Literacy, co-authored by Dr Mary Stringer from the Summer
Institute of Linguistics (SIL) at Ukarumpa, in the Eastern Highlands
Province, PNG, and Dr Nicholas Faraclas of the Department of Language
and Literature (University of Papua New Guinea), (Stringer and Faraclas,
1987), specifies the primary reason for providing literacy for people in
their community languages (including Tok Pisin and Hiri Motu). The
main aim in providing literacy is to help the people solve their own
community problems and for them to achieve community goals which are
stipulated in the Ministerial Committee’s (1986) A Philosophy of Education
for PNG (see Faraclas, 1991: 2). Solving such community problems would
relate to reading vital information on health and hygiene matters, family
planning, land and resource management, legal aspects of life and so on.
The Government and churches alike have a greater role to play in
imparting literacy knowledge to Papua New Guineans, especially those
living in rural areas so that the nation can benefit from it and grow as a
result of it.
Moreover, a few main mission organizations heavily involved in
promoting written literacy in PNG can be highlighted. The first of these
notable organizations that provide written literacy in a number of
languages is the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) based in Ukarumpa,
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Eastern Highlands Province, PNG. In collaboration with Bible Translation
Association (BTA), SIL produces a number of religious materials,
including the Bible, articles, pamphlets, journals and many other works of
Christian literature and cassettes. The organization is managed and staffed
by qualified personnel, especially linguists, teachers, translators, inter-
preters, mechanics, carpenters, health workers, pilots, and equipment
operators. Most of the specialists are from the United States and a few
from Papua New Guinea. Its fleet of aircraft provides daily flights to
remote communities in the country.
Other mission organizations that get involved in literature
production and distribution, which subsequently contribute to nation
building, include: Christian Bookshops, Wewak Christian Books
Melanesia, Christian Leaders’ Training College of Papua New Guinea,
Scripture Union of PNG, Gospel Recordings of PNG, Evangelical
Brotherhood Church of PNG, and many other theological colleges and
church organizations. These organizations play a very important role in
imparting literacy skills and knowledge to the people of PNG. Having
access to information contributes in various ways to the development of a
person and thus, a nation. That is, a person becomes spiritually, physically
and mentally aware of himself or herself and able to make decisions in the
right way, which contributes to improving one’s livelihood, the commu-
nity and the nation. These organizations should be supported financially
by the national Government and other financial institutions so that those
who are engaging in literacy work can do more. Most of these mission
organizations have done literacy work without such help, and it is neces-
sary now that they be encouraged and supported by the national
Government.
Air Transport
One of the important means of contributing to nation building is through
the use of air transport services. For the purpose of this discussion, it is
relevant to omit land and sea transport and concentrate on air transport
only. As such we ought to highlight the important role that the Missionary
Aviation Fellowship in Papua New Guinea plays in contributing to nation
building. The following information is summarized from the Missionary
Aviation Fellowship’s website.
The Missionary Aviation Fellowship (MAF) is a worldwide inter-
denominational Christian aviation organization, which aims to serve the
church and communities in remote areas. Drawing highly specialized staff
from many nations, MAF seeks to extend God’s Kingdom through the
provision of air transport in less accessible areas and through the witness of
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its staff. Church workers, missionaries, patients and goods are flown across
great distances in much less time than they could travel by others means.
MAF works in thirty-one countries worldwide, in Africa, South
and Central America, the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific. Four major
operational organizations, MAF–USA, MAF–Europe, MAF–Canada and
MAF–Australia are independent, though united in name, concept and
aim. MAF–Australia serves in Papua New Guinea, remote parts of
Australia and in Cambodia. Australians and New Zealanders predomi-
nantly staff it, with others drawn from MAF organizations overseas.
Though it is a mission agency in its own right, MAF is also an
important servant of other Christian organizations — increasingly
national — working in remote areas of the world and, in particular, Papua
New Guinea. MAF’s main objectives are: to witness and to expand the
Kingdom of Jesus Christ, a ministry of support and service to the Church
and its community through aviation and related services; to provide staff,
aircraft and facilities to meet the needs of the Church and its community;
to train persons interested in the aviation vocation so as to gain the neces-
sary qualifications for the purpose of carrying out the objectives of the
society; and to engage in charitable operations as may best be served
through air services and aviation technology.
In addition, MAF provides church support through increased
mobility and time savings, as well as radio communications and a commu-
nity air service by providing a crucial supply line and reliable
transportation to isolated areas. Thus, MAF in PNG, rated as a third level
airline, serves in some of the remote parts of the country. MAF has its
Headquarters in the Western Highlands Province, PNG, and seven bases
all around the country. From its Headquarters, MAF provides flying
training on fixed wing aircraft from initial training through to commercial
pilot licences and instrument ratings. Also, young Papua New Guineans
get their training in aircraft engineering in the form of apprenticeship or a
diploma level course. This covers theory and practice up to CASA airframe
and piston-engine licences level.
As one can see, MAF in PNG not only provides air services but
also trains Papua New Guineans to become pilots and engineers. This is a
clear indication of a mission organization that aims to pass on knowledge
and skills to young Papua New Guineans, and create employment. MAF
should be applauded for its faithfulness and dedication in providing air
services and creating employment for the people. Definitely, the tourists
would find MAF an ideal air transport to visit remote places in PNG.
Other mission organizations that provide air services are the
Seventh Day Adventists and the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL).
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The former is restricted to its church work as it has at most a couple of
aircraft. The latter needs more of our attention as it serves a nationwide
function, thus contributes much to the development of PNG. As seen
earlier, SIL has its Headquarters in Ukarumba in the Eastern Highlands
Province, Papua New Guinea, and has taken the front line in translating
the Bible and other Christian literature into a number of local vernacular
languages, including the three national lingua francas (English, Tok Pisin
and Hiri Motu). In order to facilitate and effectively fulfil these objectives,
SIL provides a fleet of aircraft that operate effectively out of Ukaramba.
Unlike the Missionary Aviation Fellowship (MAF) which is a
third level commercial airline, these SIL airplanes, to our knowledge, are
not allowed to compete commercially with other established air services in
the country. However, these planes, in their limited capacity, play a very
crucial role, particularly in very isolated regions of the country. They
provide air transportation as situations allow, not only to their workers,
but also to government officials, missionaries and, in urgent cases, to the
local travellers in the areas where SIL works, at reasonable prices. Like the
MAF, SIL also operates radio transmitters and receivers in remote stations
in order to maintain contact with its linguists in the field, with its aircraft,
and with its office workers at Ukarumba. Also, SIL air services do have
accounts with MAF and have to either refuel or transit passengers and
cargo, as situations require. The people living in rural areas of PNG, do
treasure the air services being provided by these missions. Where Air
Niugini and other third level airlines are unable to go, MAF and SIL are
both able to provide a very needy air service that does ultimately
contribute to the building of PNG.
CONCLUSION
It is very encouraging to see the way the churches in PNG have
contributed to nation building. The various church organizations have
realized the need to embark on preaching justice and righteousness in a
society where there is dishonesty and injustice within social institutions. It
appears that the Church needs to do more if it wants to see real change in
the lives of people who administer private and public offices. Also, some
churches and church workers realize the need to combat activities that
contribute to poverty and social harmony. This is seen to be in the right
direction, but they need to do even more to provide avenues where the less
affluent in society can realize their potential and benefit materially and
spiritually, thus living a meaningful life.
The churches have also done much to preach about peace and
love in the midst of social and political conflicts. The people in various
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ethnic, racial and social groups need to come together and live peacefully
and harmoniously. But the Church and church workers need more time to
demonstrate how to establish peace and love others. Love is seen biblically
to be the central thing in any human relationship and that needs to be
emphasized and encouraged. As Christians, the need is to remind people
about the dangers of a materialism that dominates individuals. The more
the people have lusts for pleasure and possession, the more likely it is that
these people will not share their wealth and talents. If the country can
learn to share resources, such as lending money to the less fortunate to
start a business, we will begin to see some form of change in life and the
society. The Church also needs to emphasize the importance of developing
the total person. In other words, the Church needs to focus on integral
human development, which is provided for and recognized in PNG’s
Philosophy of Education. Every person in PNG should realize their poten-
tial to maximize their liberation from all forms of influences and
domination so that they can participate equally in areas of education,
religion, politics, work, speech or communication and decision-making.
It is also seen that some churches and mission organizations are
engaging in some important activities that contribute immensely to nation
building. The highlights are the involvement of church organizations in
health, education, literacy and air transport services. The air services that
the Missionary Aviation Fellowship and Summer Institute of Linguistics
provide should be encouraged by the national Government. The national
Government, through its Rural Action Program (RAP), should make
funds available, as an incentive, to upgrade airstrips in rural areas of PNG,
so that MAF and SIL planes can continue to provide effective air services
to the people. Whether it is providing health, educational work, literacy or
air transport services, all are vital agents for development for Papua New
Guinea. These services rendered by churches and other mission organiza-
tions are integrated in such a way that they meet the physical, mental and
spiritual needs of the people in this country. For example, the missions
provide health services to bring physical healing that, at the same time,
aimed at bringing spiritual healing and wholeness in one’s life. Similar
goals are achieved through educational services, literacy work and air
transport services.
Yes, the churches and other mission organizations are engaging
actively in PNG in becoming the agents of development. They engage in
promoting moral responsibilities, such as enforcing justice and righteous-
ness, combating activities that contribute towards poverty and social
disharmony and encouraging peace and love. They are also combating
economic and social disparity, promoting integral human development
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and contributing immensely towards other activities such as health, educa-
tion, literacy, and air transport services. Yes, again we realize that the
Church in PNG has and is playing a major role in building our beautiful
nation – Papua New Guinea. We shall treasure their service, their commit-
ment and their zeal, and by doing so, become part of their service, working
hand in hand to build our nation. Yes, the Church in PNG has played a
role and will continue to play a role in building Papua New Guinea.
To conclude, we reiterate that if the national government can
give a hand, in providing resources like money and other materials to cater
for certain activities of the Church, we believe the country should develop
in the right direction. Most churches survive on individual donations and
support from church members. Some churches are comfortable with the
Weekly Church Offering (Tithes and Love Offering) but the amount
collected is not enough to meet the ever-growing demands of the Church.
Other churches have wider visions of expanding their ministries in impor-
tant areas like combating law and order problems, rehabilitating
ex-criminals and unemployed youth, and engaging in rural health work,
education, literacy, and air transport services, to mention a few. These
areas of ministry require sufficient funding from the national government.
A few churches want to maintain their independence and have become
reluctant to seek funding from the national Government. As a result, they
have done little in terms of development. Other churches have invested
much in business and are able to get some things through quite success-
fully. This is seen as positive as far as development is concerned, so long as
they do not loose sight of their prime objective — which is for winning
souls for Jesus Christ in order to expand God’s Kingdom.
Whatever the ministries the churches are engaging in, it is for
the development of this nation. As such, the Church should not isolate
itself from the state. Rather, they should work hand in hand. The national
Government should provide the required funding and the Church should
put the money and other resources into good use so that our people can
benefit from it and the nation can grow as a result of it. God, through His
Holy Spirit, richly blesses Papua New Guinea.
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PEACE STUDIES AS 
A PROCESS OF PEACE
BUILDING: An Alternative
Approach to Violence 
in Papua New Guinea, 
25 Years and Beyond
Julienne Kaman
INTRODUCTION
I write this article with great pride, joy and compassion for a great country
I love and call home. Papua New Guinea (PNG) is a nation endowed with
immense wealth both on land and in the sea. The country is equally
blessed with diverse cultures and traditions and has over 800 different
languages and dialects. The common expression — the land of the
unexpected and the land of the unusual — depicts this diversity. After 25
years of independence, so much has changed in such a short time in
pursuit of economic growth. While economic growth has benefited a few
people, the majority are suffering in varying degrees. For instance, people
no longer feel safe in their environment because they fear being robbed,
raped, or even killed by rascals. Nor can they afford balanced meals daily,
have access to clean water nor a good home. The buying power of the poor
continues to deteriorate due to falling values of the kina. Feelings of
insecurity are prevalent, causing many citizens to question the adopted
western model of development and to ask questions relating to the owner-
ship of the current development process. The majority of Papua New
Guineans for whom development is intended have remained marginalised.
Against the backdrop of this situation, the drive for profit making
continues to be the relentless focus of development as depicted by the
current World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF)
sponsored Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), or economic recovery
programme. Frustrated by the country’s entrenched injustices, youths who
have been pushed out of the education system, joined by many employed
workers in the formal sector, turn to violence. Coupled with this type of
violence is white collar crime. Therefore the cry everywhere throughout
the country is simply for nothing more than peace.
The search for peace in PNG will come to fruition when devel-
opment is centred on four key factors. These include (Ekins, 1992; Bopp,
1995; Jenkins,1999):
• the valuing of indigenous cultures;
• the liberation of the local people from all forms of oppression and
domination;
• protection of the environment;
• a change of attitudes and values among Papua New Guineans; and
• the active involvement of Papua New Guineans in the process of
development.
Peace in the context of this paper is used not to mean simply
absence of violence. Its meaning is broader and deeper and includes
overcoming the emotional, physical, and spiritual feelings of insecurity that
may arise as a consequence of social, economic, political and even legal
systems that restrict or deny people’s access to realising their full innate
potential as complete beings (Ahai, 1996; Kaman, 1998; Spence, 1999).
Violence has escalated so much in the last ten years posing a
serious threat to development and peace. The high level of violence has
also acted against political and economic stability in the country.
Government’s typical reaction to violence is increase spending on law and
order and arm the police to fight crime. Militarisation of the police and
the PNG Defence Force by the Government consumes a large slice of the
national budget every year contributing to the country’s soaring foreign
debt (George, 1994, 1995). It appears that succeeding governments and
aid donors have so far failed to critically address the underlying causes of
violence other than merely bandaiding the symptoms. This chapter
presents the argument that as long as the underlying root causes of
violence are ignored, the cycle of violence will continue (Ahai, 1996;
Kaman, 1999). Hence, Peace Studies (PS) or Peace Education (PE) is
proposed as an alternative means to achieving long-term peace. PS is
proposed as an alternative non-violent strategy to human development
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and demilitarisation. There are numerous non-government organizations
(NGOs) in PNG whose work focuses on human development and peace
and their efforts need to be applauded, supported and strengthened. In
this light, education has a role to play by introducing new curriculum
initiatives to develop students’ critical thinking and nurture appropriate
values and attitudes to counteract entrenched injustices (Toh Swee Hin
and Cawagas, 1987).
In this chapter, I present a brief overview of a PS curriculum. The
philosophical basis for PS is in line with Matane’s Philosophy of Education
proposed in 1986. Matane’s Philosophy is premised on five themes: integral
human development, equality and participation, national sovereignty and self-
reliance, conservation and sustainable development and Papua New Guinea
ways. These values can be developed via the teaching of PS.
VIOLENCE IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Violence in PNG has been documented widely and continues to capture
headline news in both the Papua New Guinean and overseas media,
namely the Australian media. Although violence is often highly sensation-
alised, the nation is well aware of the seriousness of the problem ( Clifford
et al., 1994; Dinnen, 1992; Reid, 1993). In many of the direct forms of
violence, one hardly gets to hear about the underlying causes. This may be
due to ignorance or that elites are the direct beneficiaries of such a corrupt
system that they will resort to whatever means, even violence, to protect
the status quo.
DIRECT OR PHYSICAL VIOLENCE
This form of violence is widespread in PNG and is mostly executed by the
growing number of unemployed urban youths, predominantly males
between the ages of 12–30 who have been pushed out of the formal educa-
tion system (Ahai & Faraclas, 1991; 84, Ahai, 1996: 236). They are
known as raskols. These youths see themselves as ‘failures’ and feel alien-
ated from their traditional cultures by a western system of education;
education has turned them out to be misfits in their own culture. Many
are lured into crime, ranging from petty theft to more serious criminal
activities associated with brutal killings, murder, robbery, savage rapes,
armed robberies, motor vehicle theft and breaking and entering homes
and buildings (Clifford, et al. 1994; Harris, 1988). Violence of this nature
is a growing problem in urban towns of PNG. The magnitude of the
problem is more serious and widespread in Port Moresby. One reason is
due to the problem of urban drift; an increasing number of the country’s
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rural population are migrating to the city in search of better opportunities
such as education services and employment. These people join their
friends and relatives in squatter settlements on the city outskirts. Children
who grow up in squatter settlements have parents who have no source of
cash income and cannot afford their education. When these squatter
children are old enough, many join raskol gangs in order to acquire goods
and services of the modern cash economy. Also, some of the employed join
raskol gangs as a means of accumulating wealth. At the same time, politi-
cians and those in the top echelons of society have also been observed to
encourage the culture of raskolism by employing criminal gangs to engage
in violent crimes so as to protect themselves against rival criminal gangs
attached to their political rivals or bigmen, and to build their own power
bases. Thus what one sees emerging in PNG is the rise of warlordism.
Despite the unreliability of crime statistics in PNG, the huge increase in
the period 1980–1990 is confirmed by my own observations, and
overwhelming anecdotal reports as shown in Table 1.





Armed Robbery 530 1,944
Breaking and Entry 2,438 2,200
Arson 197 2,137
* Informed sources suggest that only 30–40 per cent of all sexual assaults is reported. Of
those reported, a portion is classified as aggravated assault.
Source: Fallon (1992).
INDIRECT VIOLENCE
Indirect or institutionalised violence is another form of violence embedded




The education system adopted from the country’s former master, namely
Australia following the British education system, is still the dominant
education system in the country at all levels of education. To many Papua
New Guineans, it is still an alien system because the medium of instruction
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is in English, the language of the coloniser, while the curriculum transmits
western values, philosophies and ideologies (Ahai and Faraclas, 1991;
Kaman, 1998). Teaching about PNG and Third World development issues
and problems seems to play a peripheral role in the curriculum. Moreover,
teaching is about imparting knowledge to students rather than practised as
a process of empowerment and peace building (Kaman, 1998). The present
education reform spearheaded by the WB and funded also by the
Australian Government continues to perpetuate the status quo since the
curriculum has no significant relevance to PNG. In fact, although the
reform has made some significant inputs, such as the introduction of
vernacular language at the elementary level, the problems it has created for
this country are immense, given the magnitude of the restructure. For
example, lack of modern classrooms, qualified teachers and funds to
purchase appropriate school materials are only some examples of a whole
range of issues about the quality education. There is a desperate need in the
country for decision-makers and planners to think systematically and criti-
cally through these educational issues before accepting many of the
educational reforms in the country.
Churches
While churches have contributed positively to peace in PNG, it is time
Papua New Guineans stood back and critically assessed the practices of
some of these different denominations. In particular, the many new
religious groups entering PNG is beginning to raise concern among many
citizens. The Constitution of PNG states that PNG is a Christian country.
In the last ten years, the country has seen an influx of a whole range of
denominations building their churches throughout PNG. There are other
individuals and groups that enter the country under the pretext of being
part of a Christian organisation while their real motive is to seek business
opportunities. For others, their primary goal is to convert the ‘savages’ and
the ‘uncivilised’ into the western culture as agents of westernisation, aside
from some Eastern religions in the country. At the same time, some of
these churches, using direct and indirect means, are destroying the rich
cultures of PNG which are treated as backward, inferior and sinful
(Narakobi, 1980: 134–43). Followers are often indoctrinated into the
church-defined doctrines and, in the process, the churches fail to impart
the fundamental principles of all religions which are love, compassion,
tolerance, humbleness, respect for one another and the environment
A more meaningful process is to contextualise religion and this
is where the practice of liberation theology offers a meaningful solution as
a suitable alternative if religion is going to be a catalyst for peace building.
Liberation theology has the potential to relate religion at the personal level
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to the realities of the wider social context. Churches have a moral obliga-
tion to be active at the political level to do something constructive about
injustices and poverty in society. For example, it is wrong to preach that
happiness waits in heaven and that it is all right to suffer and remain poor
while the inner soul and spirit is healthy. Although the search for personal
peace is important and very necessary, social peace is equally important
and should be fulfilled. It is the inner peace that is dependent on a socially
peaceful environment. To promote wider social peace, for instance,
churches can exert their influence at the political level and make a direct
contribution to social, political and economic changes for justice (Boff and
Boff, 1987).
Media
Media ownership in PNG remains mainly state-owned but with key inter-
ests in foreign hands. Media, being a powerful tool, is used extensively as
an effective way to promote Australia and the Papua New Guinean
Government’s political and economic interests. Reporting on EMTV
features mainly Australian news, which has a direct impact on shaping the
minds and attitudes of viewers; as an agent of western capitalism it raises
so many hopes, dreams and fantasies among Papua New Guineans that
only a few can afford.
On the other hand, reporting in the local papers is often biased
towards the Government and in the process fails to promote critical
journalism other than merely reporting facts. For example, while ordinary
citizens read about the alarming rise in corruption, nepotism and graft
(Gawi, 1996), the media reports these incidences often without addressing
their root causes. Instead, reports make reference to the problems created
by previous government or state that the issue is being referred to the
Ombudsman Commission. Journalism ought to take a critical dimension
to reporting, with a view to raising people’s awareness of problems, and it
should offer possible solutions. The media can be a powerful tool to culti-
vate a feeling of nationalism among Papua New Guineans.
Political Dimensions
Western democratic system of government
When the western system of government was adopted in PNG, citizens
were denied the opportunity to analyse the system to obtain a balanced
view. Moreover, this system and laws governing the country seem to pave
the way for politicians and their cronies to abuse the system. So far,
democracy has paved the way for western domination of the Third World,
as is evident in PNG.
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Legal laws
The legal laws in the country are not only foreign but are too difficult for
any layperson’s comprehension. It only allows lawyers to interpret laws;
morever poor citizens can hardly afford qualified lawyers. For instance,
how many people in PNG actually understand the PNG Constitution and
are thereby denied the right to understand the so-called mother law of this
country? How many citizens know what their legal rights are?
Moreover, crown law introduced by Australia during the
colonial period regarding land rights conflicts with traditional land owner-
ship. The law relating to mining in PNG, which states that the first two
metres of top soil belong to the landowners and the rest remains the
property of the state, has been protested by landowners throughout PNG
where the mines are located. In the eyes of any landowner, everything
above and below the land belongs to them regardless of how deep one
digs. These two value systems have since been in constant conflict and
have led to more serious conflicts, such as the Bougainville crisis. The issue
of land has still not been effectively resolved. The crisis is further compli-
cated in matrilineal societies where women are the traditional landowners
because western laws are patrilineal.
Furthermore, succeeding governments often manipulate the law
to suit their own interests and those of their foreign counterparts, namely
large multinational companies (Jenkins, 1999; Turare and Kavanamur,
1999). Broken Hill Propriety (BHP) and Ok Tedi Mining Limited
(OTML), for instance, are pulling out of the mine after causing diabolical
damage to the livelihood of the local people and the environment.
However, despite being aware of the environmental damage caused by
BHP, the PNG Government allowed BHP to operate the mine without
any tailings dam. BHP knows that the action is legally wrong and it would
not have got away with it in any developed country. In fact, the PNG
Government went ahead and changed a section of the law pertaining to
mining companies merely to protect the interests of BHP. This law
empowers foreign companies like BHP, and the PNG Government, to
suppress landowner protests for compensation. Only now that BHP is
closing the mine is the Government openly stating that PNG does not
have laws governing the conduct of mining companies in the country (Post
Courier, 17 April 2000: 2).
A disheartening scenario is developing where the political system
acts as a haven for politicians to acquire their power and abuse the power
bestowed on them by the people, as they see fit. There is a general feeling
among politicians that as leaders they are above the law and so can change
the law at will. The acceptance of foreign laws, coupled with the general
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disrespect and abuse of the law by politicians and the law enforcement
agencies, has prompted the public to show little respect for the law and
confidence in the state resulting in the current worsening law and order
situation in the country.
Comparing traditional leadership and modern leadership
The political system evidently is a breeding ground for more serious
corruption under the guise of democracy. As one critic once said, ‘politi-
cians in PNG are like bees. They suck honey from one tree and when the
honey runs out, they move to the next tree.’ In the process, they forget
that democracy means ‘power of the people for the people and by the
people’. Failing to understand the bigger picture of why they are politi-
cians, most leaders view winning elections as the road to becoming rich
overnight. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why politicians were initially
reluctant to support the proposed Political Integrity Bill. The Political
Integrity Bill may be an advantage to women at least to open the door for
women to enter politics. Overall, PNG needs to do some critical
rethinking of the practice of democracy to make it more suitable to the
people of PNG. The recent coup in Fiji is an example of a democratic
system being seriously contested by indigenous Fijians.
At the traditional level, the western system of democracy that
promotes accumulation of wealth for enhancement of personal power,
greed and competition, is contrary to the interests of traditional leaders.
Traditional leaders gained power and popularity through the distribution
of their accumulated wealth. In the Melanesian context of leadership,
power was either inherited or attained based on certain specific qualities,
such as being an orator, a war strategist, a decision maker or peace maker,
and possessing the wisdom and supernatural power to lead.
Economic Dimensions
The current economic model needs, just as the practice of democracy does,
to be critically analysed to determine whether national wealth is trickling
down to the majority of the population or not. The Government intro-
duced the Eight Point Development Plan at Independence to correct the
fallacies of the current economic model which was being followed by the
colonial administration. However, although governments claim to base
development on the Eight Point Plan, the economic system is still predomi-
nantly geared towards the modern market economy. This economic system
breeds rural and urban disparity when wealth fails to trickle down to the
poor but instead benefits 20 per cent of the internal and external elites
(Standish, 1993; Pokawin, 1996). Rural areas throughout PNG lack the
very basic essentials such as clean water supply, proper sanitation, fuel for
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cooking, good homes, electricity, roads and access to medical services. Over
the years, funds allocated to national politicians for rural development
projects have failed to reach the grassroots.
Trapped in debt, the country has been coerced by the World
Bank to be further integrated into the globalised economy in order to earn
more and repay debts owed to foreign governments and banks. To start the
process, the kina was devalued and then floated. This was a deliberate act
by the WB and the IMF to force the PNG Government to commit itself
to selling government assets and the country’s natural resources to earn
foreign exchange. Other measures undertaken include downsizing the
public service.
The effect of globalisation and privatisation is borne out in
rising levels of poverty just as it was predicted by renowned critics of the
Bretton Woods institutions such as Susan George (1994, 1995). Faced
with the hardship of struggling to make ends meet, the poor are turning to
fast money schemes, poker machines, begging, illegal prostitution, bribery,
and con artistry, coupled with increased levels of brutal violence. In the
process, the victims and the perpetrators lose all sense of dignity and
morality. The number of HIV victims is rapidly increasing in the country
because of poverty and development-related problems. Women are further
victimised in this process of economic hardship. In urban towns, more
women are forced into prostitution to support their families. Others
submit to sexual demands from their bosses who take advantage of their
condition. There have been incidences of women who have been physi-
cally assaulted by their husbands frustrated over their poor salaries and
their inability to meet the demands of their families and wantoks. Some
men spend all their fortnight, earnings in poker machines and, when their
wives complain, they beat them to cover their shame and guilt. More
unemployed women in urban towns are forced to search for means of
supporting families in the informal sector.
Advocates of the SAP and the PNG Government explain that
these actions of economic rationalisation are necessary only as a short-term
measure. The underlying message is that in the long run, the kina will
regain its normal value and the country will return to normal. But this will
only be possible once the country’s debt obligations are met in full.
Meanwhile, every year the Government is asking for more foreign aid
while the generated profit goes to service past debts. Part of this aid money
from donor countries goes to support fly-in, fly-out consultants who claim
to be experts in the recipient country to help solve their development
problems whether in education, health, police, women or agriculture.
Usually, they leave behind a big report which can only be interpreted by
other consultants.
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Cultural Violence
Cultural violence refers to how the varied dimensions of violence in the
social, political economic and the legal domain are used to legitimise
violence in its direct form (Galtung, 1990: 291). There is a greater
tendency to simply accept the situation and live with it. This type of
violence colours the values of people thereby conditioning them to
accepting the other types of violence as morally justifiable (Swan, 1995:
41). A feeling of powerlessness sets in when nothing is done to make a
difference. For example, the widespread use of guns in PNG shows that the
people have come to accept them and are not applying pressure on the
Government to remedy the situation. If peace is going to be given a chance,
it is necessary to find alternative solutions to pave the way for peace. For
example, is PNG going to pursue the policy of globalisation when the
majority of Papua New Guineans continue to suffer from poverty? Why
can’t the Department of Education and the Curriculum Unit provide more
appropriate curriculum to address the needs of students? Should educa-
tional curricula teach only facts and not develop students’ critical thinking,
attitudes, ethics and morals? What can be done to bridge the widening gap
between the rich and poor in PNG? Is it morally right that a few enjoy the
fruits of development while the majority suffer?
Emotional and Psychological Violence
When violence affects the heart and spirit of individuals, it breeds pain
and hurt such as loss of pride, self-esteem, happiness, integrity, self-respect
and dignity. Persons who lack in these areas often end up being discon-
tented with life and therefore tend to be suicidal.
Moral Violence
Moral violence is placed at the bottom of all the forms of violence because
this is where it matters the most if humanity is serious about changing a
culture of violence. Johan Galtung (1969, 1990), the leading peace
researcher, proposed the concept of ‘cultural violence’ in which he referred
to the notion of a violence triangle representing direct violence, structural
violence and cultural violence. The first is overt. The second institution-
alises indirect violence embedded in the social, political and economic
system. The third colours the values of people making the other forms of
violence morally justifiable. However a fourth category of violence can be
added that underlies all classes of violence, making the violence triangle a
violence tetrahedron. This is moral violence which Swan (1995: 41–2)
defines as:
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Violence that originates in the belief that the human being is
his/her own point of reference and the sole arbiter and judge of
what is right and wrong, reducing morality to personal or social
preference and need … Morality is then seen as relative. Moral
violence confuses and culminates in societies where the blind
believe that they see, and lead the blind. It militates against peace,
for it may infect and indeed, poison nations, societies, organisa-
tions, groups and individuals, whether secular or religious and even
those who speak for peace.
In PNG, in view of some of the worst committed violence and
corruption witnessed at the political level, ordinary people are asking: what
happened to morals, ethics and values embedded in the PNG traditional
culture premised on the value placed on human life? Increasingly, there is
greater realisation of the magnitude of the social problems eating away at
the very fabric of society. 
Moral violence raises some of the deeper human concerns that
become matters of the heart, not the mind. The perpetuation of violence
signals that not all is well in PNG and that something more than the
absence of direct, structural and cultural violence needs to be built. It is
about ethical issues of right and wrong. For human beings to make a
decision as to whether it be wrong or right, there are certain fundamental
values that should be developed and fostered to aid the process of deciding
whether an action is just and or unjust, right or wrong. These include
values of altruism, compassion, shame, trustworthiness, tolerance,
empathy, honesty, respect and self-dignity (see Kavanamur, this volume).
When the heart is deeply touched about the justices and injustices in the
system, it is powerful and can make a difference to lasting peace. People
can be influenced to value the simplicity of life, and to develop a feeling of
contentment to defeat greed generated by the material culture. This devel-
opment will lead to a certain level of discipline in people who will say no
to violence and work for justice and peace.
HOW IS THE PNG GOVERNMENT DEALING WITH
VIOLENCE?
The state of PNG resorts to violence to counteract violence by institution-
alising laws to deter and control violence. These laws are implemented via
the legal system and law enforcement agencies such as the police, Defence
Force and the growing number of private security firms. The approach by
the state has two weaknesses. First, the grassroots can clearly see discrimi-
natory practices when it comes to implementing these laws. One set of
laws protects politicians and senior government officials. The other set of
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laws deals with crime committed by the poor especially raskol gangs.
Frustrated and angry at such injustices, criminals take the law into their
own hands by inciting more violence. According to Dinnen (1992: 1), ‘the
impression is one of escalating lawlessness, on the one hand, and a progres-
sively ineffectual crime system, on the other’.
There is generally a lack of respect for the law when Papua New
Guineans fail to see themselves as belonging to one nation or state. This is
the reason why there is a lack of nationalistic sentiment expressed among
Papua New Guineans. Instead, they identify themselves more closely with
their own province and tribal groups, reflecting a deeper level of societal
disunity in the country. Moreover, the legal laws are unsuited to the Papua
New Guinean cultural context and thus remain weak and ineffective. For
instance, the acceptance of bribery among the PNG police force has raised
serious concerns. PNG is living more or less in a state of anarchy.
Overtaken by the growing level of violence throughout the country,
government reacts by implementing short-term solutions. For instance, in
1991 the National Security Advisory Council submitted a package of
control measures for consideration by the national Government that
included:
• the introduction of capital punishment for murder, rape and drug
offences;
• the tatooing of convicted crime;
• more maximum security fenced facilities;
• the possible introduction of ID cards;
• vagrancy laws; and
• the forced repatriation of unemployed people and troublemakers.
(Post Courier, 15 March 1991: 1, quoted in Dinnen, 1992: 2).
Included also is the proposed introduction of the ‘electric chair’
(Post Courier, April 20 2000: 1). In view of the actions taken by Governments
to deal with criminal cases, Dinnen (1992: 3) further remarks: 
State responses to crime in Papua New Guinea since independence
in 1975 appear to have been influenced by considerations of polit-
ical expediency rather than any discernible philosophy of crime
control. In practice, this has increasingly entailed bypassing the
normal processes of criminal justice in favour of more visible and
direct exercise of state power.
The overt violence perpetrated by the unemployed draws quick
reaction from the PNG Government, foreign governments, and foreign
investors, and even the public who call for harsher punishments for the
perpetrators. In fact, the state acts on the demands of local and international
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investors to stamp out behaviour they find threatening to their interests.
This is the underlying reason why, in the last five years, law and order has
become the focus of attention by the PNG Government, aided by the
Australian Government which invests huge sums of money and human
capital into enhancing the capacity of the police. Police in Port Moresby, for
instance, are issued with Australian-made Falcon cars, a helicopter named
‘Eye in the sky’ to assist police operations, new homes built for the special
Police Task Force and armoury for storing guns. In fact, a friend working
with the Australian High Commission mentioned that the armoury was too
heavy to be shifted to some of the most remote Police Stations in the
country so that the project was abandoned. The more serious concern is that
violence is consuming a large portion of the national budget as indicated
below:
Table 2:    Government Expenditure on Selected Categories, 1989–1996 (current prices,
thousands of kina)
Year 1989* 1991 1994 1995* 1996*
Education 44,878 45,055 78,303 88,998 52,807
(20.5%)** (20.1%)
Health 44,475 40,887 51,498 53,486 45,106
(20.3%) (17.2%)
Agriculture 41,688 26,212 11,185 11,499 10,000
(19.0%) (3.8%)
Police 47,156 NA 67,857 69,850 86,235
(21.5%) (32.9%)
Defence 40,820 NA 83,342 57,043 68,000
(18.6%) (25.8%)
Total 29,1017 262,148
* These figures refer to actual expenditure rather than to appropriations. 
** Bracketed figures refer to the proportion of the total expenditure on these five categories.
Source: PNG Budget Estimates, various years.
Violence in PNG therefore remains a cancerous disease that no
one seems to know how to cure. It is time appropriate action is taken to
look into long-term measures to effectively address the root causes. The
overemphasis on mere control, threats and suppression seems to give rise
to more violence and is costing the country millions of kina each year.
PS is proposed as a major component of education programmes
across all levels of education to support the process of peace building. The
following presents a brief overview of a peace curriculum I developed as
the main focus of my PhD research study at UPNG.
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PEACE STUDIES EDUCATION IN TERTIARY 
INSTITUTIONS
Peace Studies — University of Papua New Guinea
The PS course was conducted in the second semester of 1996 in the
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, UPNG, as the main focus of
my field research for my doctoral programme at the University of New
England, Armidale in New South Wales, Australia, completed in 1998.
I undertook the study with the confidence that PS can make a difference
to students and in the long run to PNG. The title of my thesis reads:
A Search for Peace and Justice in Papua New Guinea: Can the Study of
Peace Make a Difference?
The research study proved that PS can change attitudes and
influence sound moral and ethical development among learners and that it
stands as a critical prerequisite to building peace and justice. In a PS course,
the content is as important as the process of teaching to achieve the end
result. PS is an empowering method of peace building, exposing learners to
a method of teaching where the learning environment is conducive to
promoting four critical stages of learning: holistic understanding, conscienti-
zation or awareness raising, critical thinking and a questioning mind that
would lead eventually to action for peace and justice. PS aims to move
academic learning away from specialised learning to a multidisciplinary or
transdisciplinary domain of learning that links theory to practice.
Emergence of Peace Studies
PS was initiated in the Western countries because of the Cold War,
militarism and the threat of nuclear war. PS was a later development
following the early peace movements. The purpose of PS was to discover
what militated against peace and what would promote and enhance it
(Swan, 1995: 34, 1997: 5). It is a course not easily accepted in academic
institutions to be taught alongside traditional disciplines, either because
the course does not fit into any specific discipline or because of fear that
the course will bring the status quo into question. The introduction of PS
to PNG and other countries of the Third World is in direct response to the
level of peacelessness stemming from poverty that can also lead to death.
According to Galtung (1980: 145), ‘in war life is taken away from people,
people are killed. But in misery life is also taken away from people, not
instantly and quickly by a bullet or a bomb, but slowly through diseases
until they pass away.’ In a recent G77 Summit meeting of Third World
leaders, Fidel Castro made this remark:
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a world economic order dominated by the rich was criminal for
insisting the poor pay ever-swelling debts and for pushing down
prices of their commodity exports. We need a Nuremberg to put on
trial the economic order that they have imposed on us that every
three years kills more men, women and children by hunger and
preventable disease or curable diseases than the death toll in six
years of World War 2 (The National, 14 April 2000: 10).
Goal of Peace Studies at UPNG
PS can best be understood by reflecting on these two questions:
1. How can PS contribute to a better awareness of the root causes of
conflicts, violence, and peacelessness in PNG and globally?
2. How can PS cultivate values and attitudes that will encourage
individual and social action for building peace in PNG and
ultimately a more peaceful world? (Toh Swee-Hin and Cawaga,
1987: 2).
Do Peace Studies Really Make a Difference?
From the questionnaires, structured and unstructured interviews and
journals, students were convinced that PS had made important differences:
differences in the way they understood issues of conflict and injustice; in
their motivations; in their willingness to reject conventional thinking (with
some doubts) about their ability to act to change society for the better.
Are they right in their convictions? We now turn to two ways of
validating these opinions — before/after comparisons of PS students and
comparisons with no-PS students’. The most obvious way of discerning
change is to make appropriate measures over time. In this instance,
learners are measured on various dimensions before undertaking the
course and after its completion, i.e the before versus after method. The
main limitation of this method is that the environment that affects
students over this period includes influences other than the PS course.
How can we distinguish between changes (if any) that are the result of the
course and those that are the result of other influences, which would have
occurred in the absence of the course? The usual way of tackling this
problem is to employ a separate (control) group of people who are similar
to the (experimental) group. The experimental group were twenty-three
second-year UPNG students who chose to take the course. The control
group in the present study consisted of third and fourth year Politics
students. Assuming that the two groups were initially similar and that they
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went through similar experiences over time other than the PS course, then
any changes discernible in the PS students but not in the Politics students
may be reasonably attributed to the PS course.
Three hypotheses follow from the above reasoning:
1. Politics and PS students are initially similar in terms of their
personal characteristics and responses.
2. Politics students are not significantly different at the end of the
period.
3. PS students are significantly different at the end of the period (and
are therefore different from Politics students at the end).
If each of these hypotheses is supported, then this is evidence of
the impact of studying peace.
The major difference is that over half the PS students, who had
work experience, were a little older. This difference, it must be admitted,
may cast doubt on the validity of the first hypothesis. Of more potential
importance for the first hypothesis, however, is the fact that the PS
students voluntarily chose to undertake the course. It may be, for example,
that they were initially more conscious of and active in working for peace
and justice than the Politics students and we examine this point shortly
when we discuss responses to a series of twenty questions on conflict,
violence and peace issues.
Table 3:    Characteristics of Peace Studies and Politics Students
Politics (n=22) Peace Studies (n=23)
Gender Male 17 16
Female 5 7
Age (mean) 25.8 29.0





Previous work experience 1 13
The survey instrument consisted of questions relevant to each of
the dimensions identified earlier – holistic understanding, conscientiza-
tion, critical thinking and peace values and action. Respondents were
asked, for example, to indicate their level of agreement (1 = strongly agree
to 4 = strongly disagree) to statements like: ‘The government needs to 
use more force to deal with law and order problem (critical thinking
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dimension), ‘I feel powerless to do anything for peace’ (values dimension)
and ‘I would be willing to take part in a non-violent protest if the issue
was important enough’ (action dimension). The same questions were
answered at the start and end of the course.
Results
Table 4:    Mean Scores on the Three Dimensions
Number of Values Critical Action
respondents thinking
Peace Studies before 23 2.48 (0.75)* 2.89 (0.78) 3.10 (0.82)
after 22 2.91 (0.88) 3.21 (0.70) 3.24 (0.83)
Politics before 22 2.39 (0.51) 2.72 (0.52) 2.93 (0.70)
after 17 2.38 (0.44) 2.78 (0.54) 3.01 (0.73)
* Figures in brackets are standard deviations
Table 4 records the mean scores on each dimension for PS and
Politics students before and after exposure to the PS course. For each of
the relevant comparisons (i.e. PS students before and Politics students
before, PS students before and after and Politics before and after), the well-
known difference of means test was applied to determine whether
apparent differences (e.g. the increase in the mean score for PS students on
the values dimension from 2.48 to 2.91) could reasonably regarded as a
real change. The resulting t values indicate the following:
1. There were no significant differences between PS and Politics
students on the four dimensions before the start of the PS course
(lines 1 and 3 of  Table 4).
2. There were no significant differences between Politics student
responses before and after (lines 3 and 4).
3. PS students had significantly higher scores on values and critical
thinking (at the 5 per cent level) after their study. That is, PS
students had become more positive, generous and optimistic and
they had become less accepting of the conventional wisdom. There
were no significant differences as regards holistic understanding or
the action dimension.
The apparent effect of studying peace on the values and critical
thinking dimensions is impressive, given the relatively short time available
for the study of peace to ‘do its work’. This may be a similar case in past
evaluations of PS course that the frequently non-significant results of
previous studies of this type might be explained by a need for a consider-
able period of time (e.g. several years) to elapse after studying peace for its
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effect to become apparent. It may be that the extent of actual or perceived
conflict and violence in PNG compared to the United States (where all the
previous studies were carried out), and/or the novel and optimistic
approach which PS offers to such issues in PNG, explain why its effect is
as strong as it is. An alternative explanation may be the participatory way
in which the course was presented. It may be thought that the gender and
cultural background of the lecturer(s) may have facilitated or constrained
students learning. In my opinion, the effect was more strongly influenced
by the subject matter of the PS course, its capacity to personally confront
students and the methods used to teach the course.
The experiment described here provides some confirmation of
the strong opinions, expressed by students during structured interviews,
and in their journals, that studying peace makes a difference. Students
become more optimistic that a more peaceful and just society is achiev-
able; they recognise and increase their ability and willingness to think
critically; and they found the continual linking of issues to provide holistic
understanding, beyond a narrow discipline approach, to be quite
intriguing.
CONCLUSION
Violence is a serious concern in PNG. The strategies used by the
Government of PNG over the years have failed so far to promote any level
of peace. The underlying problem is society's embedded injustices that
have not been effectively addressed in the process of development. PS is
proposed as a process of raising the awareness of Papua New Guineans to
this problem in the hope of working towards building a better society.
UPNG students, as future elites, can make a difference to building greater
social peace if they have studied PS as a subject at UPNG or at any other
tertiary institution.
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Housing problems are ultimately problems of turning official commit-
ment by governments in the form of policies and programmes into reality
through improving the housing and living conditions of a country’s
people. The extent to which housing policies are implemented by govern-
ments is largely hampered by resource constraints and administrative
shortfalls. Housing market inputs, namely land, finance, infrastructure,
labour and materials are essential, but lack of these resources or inefficient
organisation and use of resources often contributes to problems. 
Appropriate state intervention which directly attacks these
constraints is necessary; but instead, many governments intervene in
housing production by such means as price fixing, and rent controls. These
actions distort signals to the market and exacerbate the original problems.
Factors that impair a competitive market include an unorganised land
market, inappropriate and poor housing finance systems, inadequate provi-
sion of infrastructure and an underdeveloped building materials industry.
Inappropriate planning and zoning regulations, taxes, rent controls and
building standards are also vital factors that influence the extent to which
poor people can have better access to appropriate housing (Shidlo, 1990).
Large-scale resources, proper planning and sound administration
are necessary for the successful implementation of any housing policy. The
most important issues are the availability of land, and an equitable system
of land tenure; the availability of housing finance on flexible terms and
conditions for the most needy sections of society; the setting of clear lines
of responsibility for public agencies; the speedy resolution of administra-
tive problems and delays; the provision of infrastructure, namely transport,
schools and other public facilities; and the provision of appropriate
building materials at affordable prices. Developments in Papua New
Guinea suggest that these principles have not been fully grasped. Housing
policy has been erratic, poorly directed and inefficiently applied. The
result has been a catalogue of fundamental errors. 
Active state intervention in housing in this country only
commenced in the 1970s. There is no comprehensive housing policy for
the entire country comparable to that for health, education or other social
services. Housing policy in Papua New Guinea is focused almost entirely
on urban needs and the rural majority of the population has been ignored.
The following section provides a brief outline of the main policy develop-
ments in housing. The rest of the discussion considers the major problems
that have hindered and continue to influence the effective development
and application of necessary resources to implement official policy incen-
tives over the last 25 years. 
STATE INTERVENTION IN HOUSING
National Housing Commission 1968
In response to the rapid increase in the urban population and settlement
formation, the National Housing Commission (NHC) was set up in 1968
by the Australian administration following its recommendation by the
World Bank. The National Housing Commission was given wide-ranging
responsibilities to improve housing conditions throughout the country. It
was vested with the function to build houses either for sale or rent, but the
houses were too expensive for most people (Stretton, 1979). Attempts
were made to reduce housing costs by changing designs and specifications,
yet still the cheapest house produced by the National Housing
Commission was beyond the reach of most nationals. In the end the
houses were offered for rent at highly subsidised rates.
The Self-Help Housing Scheme 1973
By 1973 the administration recognised the difficulty of providing housing
through conventional methods and introduced a government White Paper
on self-help housing (PNG Ministry of the Interior, 1973). The White
Paper set out its policy on self-help housing for urban areas. The self-help
housing scheme was introduced in 1974 and the responsibility for imple-
mentation was vested with the National Housing Commission.
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The main principles of the self-help scheme included recog-
nising existing urban settlements as part of urban activity that needed
improvement, upgrading of settlements on a self-help basis and developing
new settlements in conjunction with employment opportunities (PNG
Ministry of the Interior, 1973; Mangar, 1977). The National Housing
Commission was most successful in the area of self-help housing in terms
of coverage rather than through its provision in the formal sector.
Unfortunately, cost recovery was not built into the programme and this
resulted in high subsidies which had to incurred by the Commission.
The self-help housing approach has also been commended by
international observers as having demonstrated an enlightened policy. It
drew on the best of international experience and adapted it to local needs
and conditions. For example, Emiel Wegelin (1983) commented on the
policy:
At a time when the country was preparing for independence, the
policy took a more sympathetic view of difficulties faced by new
migrants in housing than do many other countries. The customary
references to ‘squatters’ and ‘squatter areas’ were missing in policy
documents and have been replaced by the use of terms ‘settlers’ and
‘migrant settlements’.
The Morgan Scheme 1979
After Independence, as the expatriate civil servants were replaced by
nationals, nationals began to move into the houses that had been occupied
by the expatriates. While statutory bodies have had and continue to
control their own housing stock and allocation, most government houses
were tied to specific positions in the public service and the tenant acquired
the house by virtue of their position. Higher, senior management level
employees in the public service were provided with high cost subsidised
housing, while those further down the income scale were given low cost
housing or lived in NHC houses. Semi-skilled or unskilled employees were
not catered for, so they lived in villages, settlements, boi-haus (bed sitter
type accommodation for domestic servants) or with relatives. 
After only two years of Independence the government came to
realise that the cost of maintaining its housing stock was too expensive. A
study to find ways in which costs could be reduced, and possible alternative
forms of housing, recommended that all government housing be sold to
sitting tenants. In order to save costs and to encourage Papua New
Guineans to acquire home ownership, government houses have been
progressively sold to sitting tenants under the Morgan Scheme since 1979
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(Stretton, 1979). This initiative implanted the seeds of future directions in
housing policy development in the country. A number of very basic and
crucial issues were not considered even before recommending for home
ownership. The questions of whether urban home ownership was appro-
priate, affordable and desirable for most people at that stage of the country’s
development was given no consideration at all.
The effects of the Morgan Scheme were that those who had a
house and money were able to buy their houses on highly concessional
terms at below market prices and there was an increase in housing shortage
due to the loss of existing stock of houses that were sold off. Demolition
and renovation of some of the existing houses and the somewhat slow pace
of any new construction activity made the problem even worse. 
National Home Ownership Scheme, 1981
This scheme was introduced by the Wingti Chan government in 1981.
The home ownership approach reinforced the pace of development that
was set by the Morgan scheme. Its objective was to encourage urban home
ownership among Papua New Guineans. Under the Home Ownership
Scheme, the National Housing Commission was to continue to imple-
ment the Morgan Scheme, build houses for sale to potential home owners,
and develop and sell serviced plots for home ownership purposes (Newell,
1982). The responsibility for implementing the national Home
Ownership Scheme was also placed with employers to assist their national
workers to obtain their own homes. Following the re-launch of the
National Home Ownership Scheme in 1985, a number of the major
employers, such as Air Niu Gini, the Electricity Commission, Telikom,
South Pacific Holdings, and the Steamships and Harbours Board, have
established and operate home ownership schemes for their staff. An inves-
tigation into the implementation of the Home Ownership Scheme by
employers has shown those who benefit from the scheme are mainly
employees who are at the top end of the income scale, staff on contract,
highly skilled and economically better off than the majority of middle or
low income groups (Kopel, 1989, 1991, 2000). 
National Housing Corporation 1989
In 1989 the National Housing Corporation was set up through an Act of
Parliament with the amalgamation of the National Housing Commission
and the Department of Housing. Since that time Papua New Guinea has
been the only country to have a Minister for Housing without a depart-
ment to head. Two most fundamental changes came with the formation of
the National Housing Corporation. First, the National Housing
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Corporation is the only government arm responsible for housing, yet its
newly acquired function was no longer to build housing for rent or sale,
but to develop and sell land for urban housing and continue to sell
existing government housing. The Corporation has no social housing
responsibility, it is supposed to be self-sustaining and operate as a commer-
cial body. 
Second, under the new Act the former National Housing
Commisson’s settlement responsibilities were done away with and handed
back to the Provinces. That policy is ill-conceived, and short-sighted as the
Provinces do not have the legal responsibility over land matters which rest
entirely with the National Lands Department. Provinces do not have the
administrative structure, capacity, personnel and funds to take on such a
huge responsibility on top of their existing work (Wrondimi, 1994). The
effect has been that Provinces have played an ignorant role and in the
meantime the growth of unplanned settlements has been rising for more
than a decade.
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Consecutive governments in Papua New Guinea have adopted policies
that appear to look good on paper without a proper consideration of their
implications and appropriateness. Policy ideals are based on advice from
western experts or local elites with western values acquired through their
education and training in western countries. The real source of housing
problems has not really been considered and addressed in sufficient detail.
Because of this, housing policy has not made much difference to most
people’s housing circumstances. 
This section aims to analyse the practice of official housing
policy through the development and application of necessary resources.
First, the availability of land and land tenure issues are crucial because
houses cannot be built up in space. Second, the availability of housing
finance on flexible terms and conditions in favour of the most needy
segments of society is another key element to consider. Third is the need
for people to have access to durable building materials at affordable prices.
Fourth, the provision and maintenance of basic infrastructure and services
and efficient administration and coordination of activities related to
implementing housing policies are important factors. Unnecessary delays
are caused by inappropriate zoning and planning regulations. There are
also administrative problems with clear division and allocation of responsi-
bilities between different departments and individual officers. These often
leads to confusion and unnecessary delays. Any real policy attempt to
address housing problems has to tackle these issues.
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COLONIAL APPROACH TO MOBILISATION AND 
USE OF HOUSING RESOURCES
During the colonial period, the usual practice was for employers both in
the public and private sector to provide housing for their employees. The
development of and access to the use of resources necessary for housing
provision and maintenance was the responsibility of employers. Housing
came as part of the employment package for all expatriate workers and
indigenous workers in the territory. This also continues to be the case in
mining towns such as Ok Tedi, Kutubu and Porgera where the employers
are entirely responsible for the provision and maintenance of accommoda-
tion for their workers, both married and single. Other employers who
provide housing for their workers are similarly responsible for organising,
acquiring and using the necessary housing resources, which means that the
tenant is free from hassles of personal housing responsibility. For most
people, the process of acquiring the necessary resources that would enable
them to access the most basic form of housing is too complex and expen-
sive. Housing policy in practice operates against the interests of those who
need housing. The discussion which follows explores the strategies through
which official policy is implemented and its impact on the poor and settle-
ment and rural dwellers.
ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT OF LAND FOR
URBAN HOUSING
Simet (1993: 12) outlines two of the most familiar problems of land for
urban development and housing purposes. These relate to the shortage of
alienated land supplies in urban areas for development purposes and the
inefficient administration system which impairs the development and
delivery of available land for housing purposes. The legal and administra-
tive procedures governing the release of both customary and alienated land
compound the problems of physical shortage of urban land, and the land
allocation procedure further delays the process of shelter development
(Simet, 1993: 12). In outlining the progress of the implementation of the
National Housing Corporation’s programmes over three years, Simet
(1993: 16) highlights the problem of acquiring required land with legal
titles for housing from the Department of Lands and Physical Planning.
In an attempt to overcome the problems of using customary
land for housing and general development purposes, four procedures have
been developed for formalising evidence of customary land ownership.
These procedures were developed so that customary land owners in rural
areas, where land registration is not required can have access to credit from
financial institutions (Aruga, 1987: 135). First, clan land usage agreements
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enable the clan leaders to sign an agreement certifying that an individual
member has usage rights over a given piece of land. The Agriculture Bank
provides a loan if it is supported by a number of guarantors from the clan.
The problem with these agreements is that the amounts involved are quite
small (a maximum of K10,000 over ten years), but the bank hardly has
any extension services to promote this type of development so this option
is not widely utilised. Second, the Land Groups Incorporation Acts enable
the identification of group or individual interests in customary land and
these names are registered. The concerned tribal parties have to make an
agreement on the identified group or interests, but this is a very delicate
and time-consuming process. For example, in mining areas, the govern-
ment leaves the responsibility of this tedious task to the mining companies,
and intervenes only to formalise the agreements (UNCHS, 1993: 32). So
far this approach has been mainly applied in areas where there are
commercial interests. 
The third system instituted for formalising the use of customary
land for development purposes is the Lease-Leaseback system under which
the government leases land from the customary owners and then leases it
back for a specified period to a legal entity formed by all or some of the
members from the same clan group. This option is more promising and
effective. As a registered interest, the land can be formally mortgaged by
the customary owners to the Agriculture Bank and substantial amounts are
lent on this basis. Problems are caused by the lengthy delays in the process
of land acquisition to get an application accepted. These schemes have not
yet been tried in peri-urban or urban situations (Aruga, 1987: 135;
UNCHS, 1993: 32). The final option is direct dealings through which
speculators negotiate directly with customary land owners, with the lease
issued by the state. This method was noted to have had some success in
Wewak and Lae and appears to be straightforward, but the procedure is
very sensitive and time consuming. 
Unfortunately, these approaches to formalising evidence of
customary land ownership are not sufficient in themselves to meet the
need for individual housing loans. Banks are well aware of disputes over
land claims, and the danger that customary land cannot be alienated
should the borrower default. Because of this banks often refuse to lend for
housing on customary land and insist on an individual land title as
security, plus regular employment and evidence of savings capacity. This
practice actually discriminates against the urban poor who do not have
either the funds, secure employment or land title to offer as security.
Residents in unplanned settlements do not have any land title at all.
However, despite criticisms and problems most of those migrants who
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occupy customary land in urban areas or the peri-urban centres, both in
Port Moresby and other centres, make some form of informal personal
arrangements with customary land owners and pay nominal monthly or
annual rents to occupy specified portions of land for housing until the
land is needed by the owners. Residents on unplanned settlements are at
the mercy of the government or customary landowners, and cannot make
any long-term plans to improve their temporary structures. They do not
have security of tenure and can be evicted at any time. 
The complex nature and lengthy administrative practice of
applying for and acquiring titles to land and housing is described by
Doherty (1987). In a paper presented at the International Seminar on
Housing Actions towards Shelter in Asia and the Pacific in 1987 in the
International Year for the Homeless, Doherty succinctly highlighted some
of the common issues of land rights, title and transfer of titles for low cost
urban housing in Papua New Guinea. She points out that the constitution
of Papua New Guinea does not allow for non-citizens to acquire freehold
land (1987: 152). The Land Act prescribes a procedure whereby customary
landowners wishing to dispose of their land must first sell it to the state.
The state will then lease the land to third parties while retaining the
freehold title. Virtually all alienated land in urban areas used for housing is
owned by the state. If and when a lease is granted, a document is issued
stating the rent payable, the use to which the land must be put (which in
turn has to conform to the zoning of the land under the Town Planning
Act), the amount of improvement that must be made to the land, and how
long the lease will run (Doherty, 1987: 153).
If the leaseholder wishes to sell or dispose of the land he must
seek approval from the state through the Minister for Lands based in Port
Moresby. There is stamp duty payable for the processing of the transfer of
title documents together with payment for an additional supporting
contract document that has to be written in English to accompany the
transfer document. In reality, there are no guidelines on the grounds on
which transfer of titles can be approved, and there are no offices in the
Provinces to supply the forms or qualified lawyers to assist individuals to
draw up the contracts. The majority of low cost house owners for houses
bought under the Morgan and sell-off schemes were never issued with a
title document, a copy of approved transfer or a contract copy, even though
many have paid off the full price. In some cases people have waited for
three to five years. This came about partly because the National Housing
Commission never had any title documents themselves to begin with. The
problem is compounded by inefficient administration within the national
housing authority which continues to debit a tenant who has paid off the
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price early because their calculation of a payment schedule is fed into a
computer and acquires an irreproachable status (Doherty, 1987: 158).
The National Housing Corporation leases parcels of land to
developers or employers who then develop it and build housing for the
market, or provide housing for their employees, in the case of employers,
under the National Home Ownership Scheme. On completion of building
on the plot, individuals obtain individual lease titles from the Department
of Lands; but problems with this process include lack of clear criteria for
allocating leases and lack of services in new housing areas. The Department
of Lands and Physical Planning has the responsibility for processing every
land transaction in the country which involves cumbersome multi-stage
procedures. A major and continuing problem has been the inability of the
department to keep up with the flow of new applications and to make
headway in reducing the backlog of pending applications (UNCHS, 1993:
42). The requirement for the state to process and approve all land transac-
tions is supplemented by the need to comply with planning and zoning
regulations, building regulations, and survey requirements. 
According to the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements:
Planning and zoning regulations require conformity with the
standard of building required in addition to land use conformity;
building regulations require full conformity with the building
regulations, resulting in the need for a high cost building (except in
designated self-help areas under the NHC); and the surveying
regulations, using the Torrens system, require high cost methods of
plot survey and registration. The effect of these regulations is to
make possible only high cost construction, affordable only by the
higher income groups (UNCHS, 1993: 43).
HOUSING FINANCE
Inadequate housing finance is a major constraint. The initial development
of infrastructure requires public finance. Funding that is needed for devel-
oping land and servicing individual plots for people to construct houses is
often not available and land rates are high. Most people lack the collateral
to qualify for loans and those who are fortunate to access mortgages are
faced with having to pay high mortgage interest rates. Poor people do not
have secure long-term employment, cannot save much and so they do not
qualify for loans from formal sources. In most other Third World and
developed countries there are state sponsored special arrangements for
housing finance intended to benefit lower income groups, but not in
Papua New Guinea. 
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There are six main sources of housing finance in Papua New
Guinea, which include five commercial banks, Government guarantee
schemes, employee contributions towards pension funds, employer subsi-
dies and informal sources. Access to any one or more of the formal sources
of funding depends largely on income and employment factors. This
problem is compounded by the shortage of freehold land that can be used
as collateral to acquire long-term housing loans. This means that the elite,
those in formal employment with more funds and registered land titles
have the best chance of benefiting from formal sources of finance. The less
fortunate and low income groups are denied assistance. The crux of the
problem is not lack of lending capacity, but lack of effective demand.
Driven by the profit-oriented motive, commercial lending institutions
require land as a major collateral for lending and most customary owned
land is not registered. Therefore, most customary owned land cannot be
used as collateral, and consequently the level of lending for housing has
been noted to remain very low (Dahanayake, 1991: 6).
Commercial Banks
Lending for housing in the formal sector is mostly done by the commer-
cial banks. With commercial motives, banks require collateral, set high
interest rates and loan repayment terms and conditions that eliminate low
income groups from accessing such services. Interest rates on housing
loans are quite high, but the exact figures differ between banks. The
commercial banking industry lacks long-term deposits and this is partly
why home loan repayment periods are less than ten years. Even though
commercial bank lending for housing has increased since the introduction
of the national home ownership policy, there is still an acute shortage of
long-term mortgage finance (UNCHS, 1993: 34). In order to assist
individuals to obtain loans from the banks and enter into home ownership
the government has devised and instituted two schemes with the commer-
cial banks. These include the Home Loan Guarantee Scheme and the Home
Loan Interest Subsidy Scheme.
Home Loan Guarantees
The Home Loan Guarantee Scheme was introduced in 1986 to provide a
government guarantee of up to 80 per cent of a loan to assist potential
homeowners to obtain housing loans from financial institutions. Its main
aim was to overcome the land title problem which many borrowers are
confronted with. The scheme progressed quite well over the years with a
default rate of only about 2 per cent (Dahanayake, 1991: 13). The govern-
ment provided home loan guarantees in which it guaranteed to the banks
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80 per cent of the outstanding loan balance in case of default by the
borrower. The guarantee programme has raised K10 million within five
years and three of the participating private commercial banks reported low
default rates (UNCHS, 1993: 34).
Interest Rate Subsidies
The Home Loan Interest Subsidy Scheme was established in 1984. The
main aim of this scheme was to reduce the cost to low income earners of
financing low cost formal sector housing by subsidizing interest rates over
the first ten years of the loan (National Planning Office (1984), cited in
Dahanayake, 1991: 13). This involved granting interest rate subsidies to the
borrower which either reduced the amount of periodic loan repayments for
loans or increased the borrower’s eligible loan amount and this programme
mobilised less than K2 million in five years (UNCHS, 1993: 34). 
However, in 1990 the Home Loan Guarantee Scheme and the
Home Loan Interest Subsidy Scheme were terminated, and replaced with
legislation to permit public employee pension (superannuation) funds to
be used as down payments for housing loans (UNCHS, 1993: 34).
A scheme for a mortgage finance company was also approved by govern-
ment in 1990, but more than ten years later it has not yet materialised.
Yet, like the old schemes the new schemes are also characterised by the
need for a regular, higher level income in order to qualify for a loan and to
be able to afford the regular loan repayments (UNCHS, 1993: 34). 
Superannuation Funds
The use of superannuation funds to finance housing has been applied in
Singapore and it proved to be very successful (Seng, 1991; Doling, 1999).
This can be a useful way to finance housing, but Papua New Guinea has its
own problems which prevent superannuation funds from being fully
utilised. There are two major superannuation funds to which workers make
regular contributions. Public sector employees contribute to the Public
Officers’ Superannuation Fund (POSF) and those in the private sector
contribute to the National Provident Fund (NPF). The use of superannua-
tion funds as down payment for housing loans has not progressed as
anticipated. This scheme has not been publicised. Because of this there is
very limited awareness that people can use their superannuation funds for
housing purposes and this facility is not widely used. In addition, those
who do apply for funds have to put up with excessive periods of administra-
tive delay. The worst situation with the NPF at the moment is that
management has made poor investment decisions as well as misappropria-
tions which have resulted in huge losses. The World Bank has agreed to
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help with financing a recovery package on the condition that the manage-
ment is changed and that half of members’ contributions are written off.
The latter condition has been considered to be totally unacceptable by the
unions and negotiations are still under way to find an acceptable and more
economic solution to the problem. If the security of members’ personal
contributions cannot be guaranteed, how can anyone, let alone the govern-
ment expect these agencies to better organise and provide additional
services to the public? Savings and loans societies also make advances for
housing purposes, but only in small amounts (UNCHS, 1993: 35). Finance
and insurance companies do not provide housing loans.
Employer Subsidies
Some major employers provide subsidies towards the equity for securing
housing loans under their respective National Home Ownership Schemes
through arrangements with commercial banks (Kopel, 1989; UNCHS,
1993: 35). Most employers contribute the 10 per cent equity that is
required by commercial banks for a housing loan for their staff who are
entitled to join their home ownership schemes. The only exception is the
South Pacific Holdings company which contributes 40 per cent of the cost
of the house to each employee, while the potential home owner
contributes 10 per cent and 50 per cent of the cost of the house is covered
by the loan. The condition of this very high rate of subsidy is that the
employee has to serve the company for at least ten years, but if she or he
leaves earlier than that the principal amount has to be repaid with 14 per
cent interest to the company (Taim and Kaitilla, 1996: 146).
Informal Sources
Those in medium and low income regular employment, and the bulk of
the self-employed and unemployed segment of the urban population who
survive in the informal sector, cannot benefit from formal sector sources of
housing finance. They are left with having to save and use their own funds
for housing as and when they can, or obtain loans, material and labour
assistance from informal sources. Sources of informal financial assistance
for urban housing in Papua New Guinea are mainly in the form of cash as
loans or in kind, offers of cheap or free labour or assistance with trans-
portation mainly from family, relatives, wantoks (Pidgin term used to refer
to someone who comes from the same place or speaks the same language)
and friends. It is common for those in need of finance for housing or other
purposes to borrow from family, friends, neighbours and wantoks rather
than approach the banks, which require security, regular income and
secure employment. 
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BUILDING MATERIALS AND TECHNIQUES
The high cost of building materials is a common complaint in Port
Moresby and other urban areas. Though high costs affect the entire
population, the middle and low income groups suffer the most. Among
factors that exacerbate and inflate housing costs is the use of a higher
proportion of imported building materials. With the depreciating value of
the Kina, imported materials are very expensive. This leads individual
builders to trade quality for quantity by using cheaper, poorer quality
materials. Poor materials wear out faster and require frequent mainte-
nance. Untreated timber is often eaten away by ants and termites over
several years. Aluminium tin walls and corrugated iron-sheet roofing do
not permit air circulation and make the houses extremely hot.
Labour costs and wage levels in the building industry are also
very high. Building regulations demand very high construction standards.
The building construction industry is dominated by a few, big foreign
owned companies with international connections (UNCHS, 1993: 47).
There are very few local construction companies capable of adapting local
materials and methods to the needs of the middle and low income groups.
Additional factors include the use of machinery intensive construction
methods, the cost of construction finance, the use of high- technology
management techniques unsuitable for the current level of management in
the country. The private real estate sector concentrates on supplying high
cost housing as there is an effective and stable demand from the high
income sector, with the prospect of quickly recouping capital investment
and making high profits. Problems of land shortages are overcome by
building high rise housing complexes especially in Port Moresby
(Dahanayake, 1991: 8).
While maximum use of local materials is the national policy, the
building industry continues to import a large proportion of materials, with
the exception of PNG Forest Products in Bulolo, Lae, that produces
competitively priced timber kit houses using local materials. Housing costs
can be reduced by adopting and using appropriate local materials and
techniques instead of imported prefabricated materials. The self-help
informal sector could benefit from a greater availability of locally produced
low cost chemicals that make materials more durable and extend the useful
lives of houses. There is no building research institute in the country and
even though the NHC pledged to set up such an institution it does not
have the resources to turn that aim into reality. 
According to the UNCHS (1993: 63), the Department of Works
disseminates information on good building practice throughout the country.
The Department did in fact put out a proposal to develop appropriate
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building materials. The Department operates at all levels nation-wide, so this
work could have had extensive impact; but the only form of government
intervention in the building industry has been in the direct provision of soft
loans for building materials for housing under the Self-help Housing
Scheme. The building materials loan scheme was introduced in 1974 under
the Self-help Housing Scheme. It provided interest-free loans for the
purchase of building materials up to a certain limit for low cost housing.
Despite good intentions the scheme had limited success due to very low
rates of recovery (27 per cent) and financial mismanagement. The scheme
was eventually abolished in 1985 (Dahanayake, 1991). 
The high cost of housing production is partly reflected in high
rents. Rented housing is limited in supply, and most private sector rental
housing is rented by employers for their workers. 
It is very uncommon for a householder to rent a house from a
private owner, simply because most wages would not permit it. Even a
highly paid expatriate employee, earning twice the salary of a Papua New
Guinean counterpart (K1400–K1600 per month), would not be able to
afford to pay the market rent for a medium cost three bedroom house
(Dahanayake, 1991: 2). 
A study done on citizen middle-class urban housing showed that
two thirds of the respondents live in employer-provided, subsidised
housing, paying an average of K46.00 per month. On the basis of a market
rent of K350 per week (K1400 per month) for an average three bedroom
house (the most common house size found in Dahanayake’s study), this
represents a subsidy of more than 90 per cent (Dahanayake, 1991: 2–3). 
A comparison of formal sector housing rents in Papua New
Guinea showed that by Third World standards, the housing costs in Papua
New Guinea are extremely high. It was argued that rents at that time were
comparable to those in many developed countries. In 1991 the average
weekly rent for a three bedroom house in a residential suburb in Sydney
was about K155 (A$200) while in Port Moresby, Lae, Mt. Hagen or
Madang it was over K350 (Dahanayake, 1991: 3). 
ZONING AND PLANNING REGULATIONS
In a paper on the effects of zoning and socio-economic differentiation, King
(1987: 139) argues that the colonial principle of provision of housing by
employers was that the area and quality of housing came to be related to the
educational level, income earning capacity and occupation of the employee.
This person, the head of the household, became part of a newly created elite
system even though the other members of his household unit did not neces-
sarily share the same educational or occupational characteristics. Early
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colonial towns were characterised by a separation of the population in
divisions between the expatriate population, existing native villages on
customary land, and areas set aside for migrant labourers and skilled
workers. In this way zoning was originally a separation of different classes of
the population and this set the pace for the basic division of the towns into
high, medium and low cost housing areas and self-help housing areas. 
Several problems have emerged from the practice of zoning
towns. First, urban populations have grown faster than commerce and
industry and this has led to a shortage of residential land, while the land
set aside for the latter purposes is underused. Second, town boundaries
have been artificially drawn and most boundaries exclude large sections of
the population living on customary land adjacent to town centres. The
third problem is the creation of exclusive residential areas that separate the
population into socio-economic groups. Most informal housing areas are
ethnically homogeneous while formal housing areas are divided into high,
medium and low cost areas, dividing the population in formal housing
into homogeneous occupation, income and education groups. Customary
villages and informal housing lie on the periphery of this arrangement.
All of the large cities and towns of Papua New Guinea conform
to the same residential pattern (King, 1987: 140).
The variety of self-help and informal housing is considerable,
but zoning creates the impression of a stratification, an exclusiveness of
residential areas that separates people into high cost, low cost and self-help
etc. at the bottom of the scale. Inevitably, it is the characteristics related to
occupational status that are most closely related to housing type. Activity,
education and type of occupation most closely follow the patterns of
housing type. Thus each town gives a superficial impression of having
distinct socio-economic areas that have been fixed by the establishment of
zones of different residential areas (King, 1987: 141–2) .
The immediate visual image of the organisation and layout of
most towns transmits to the newcomer that there is a distinct separation of
the people into exclusive residential enclaves marked by socio-economic
characteristics. This has largely led to a stereotyped image of settlement
areas as being areas of social breakdown, infested with unemployed and
notorious rapists, drug addicts and criminals. The physical separation of
the wealthy and the poor through zoning of residential areas is resented by
many marginalised, out of school and unemployed youth. Most of these
youths live in settlements. Housing and other property of the wealthy
become targets of breaking and entering, robbery and physical attack by
those who are considered to be or who view themselves as disadvantaged
(Dinnen, 1992). 
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INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION
Provision and maintenance of basic infrastructure is essential. Some settle-
ments are initially provided with minimum infrastructure. The problem
lies in ensuring that facilities such as roads, stormwater drainage and
bridges are adequately maintained because they deteriorate very quickly in
constant hot and wet conditions. In planned settlements, provision is
made for people to connect electricity to their houses if and when incomes
improve, but many low incomes do not permit this. Free water supply to
many settlements was enjoyed by settlement dwellers in Port Moresby
until the mid 1990s when the responsibility for water was taken over by a
Malaysian commercial firm (Eda Ranu). Since the takeover, meters have
been installed to every house with a water tap and this means that low
income people have to pay for water at market rates.
Many settlements are not adequately provided with basic
services. Because of this settlement dwellers have to travel to distant
locations for health, education and employment and that entails extra costs.
Benton (1987: 176) notes that the colonial legacy of separating housing
from urban planning functions has given rise to a situation in which many
residential developments are in reality dormitory settlements, with little or
none of the basic services and facilities that are necessary for a satisfactorily
balanced community. It is essential that any new residential development
for low cost housing make provision for schools, churches, transport,
clinics, social and cultural centres and recreation and leisure areas. 
Planning and provision for income-generating and employment
activities such as markets, shops and art and craft is also a crucial element
for people who are either unemployed or on low and/or irregular incomes.
When people set up their own markets, shops and service centres, these are
considered an infringement of planning and zoning regulations. They
become the target for harassment by town authorities for street vending,
selling where they are not supposed to, or conducting illegal businesses.
Most residents of both planned and unplanned settlements make their
living solely or partly through informal sector activities. With high costs of
urban living, even those in secure employment and housing find it a neces-
sity to engage in informal economic activities to supplement their
incomes, but authorities tend to outlaw such informal sector initiatives in
the interests of hygiene and tidiness (Norwood, 1984: 18; Kopel, 1996).
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFUSION
Interagency links and relationships between relevant public sector organi-
sations that are required to implement housing policies are either missing
or very poor. The process of acquiring land is time consuming and too
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complex for the average citizen. The UNCHS (1993: 58) suggested that,
to overcome the lengthy and complex process of developing and releasing
urban land, some of the cumbersome land development processes should
be deregulated to increase and encourage the role that customary land
owners could play in mobilising their land for urban development without
the necessity for all transactions to go through the government. Similarly,
writing six years before the UNCHS research, Doherty (1987: 161)
recommended that the stamp duty and transfer fees on low cost houses be
abolished. She suggested that the responsibility for processing the transfer
of land titles be decentralised away from Port Moresby and the state should
issue a simple transfer of land title document to avoid unnecessary lengthy
delays in processing title documents. To date, none of these changes have
been considered as many good ideas hardly get a chance to struggle through
the many bureaucratic channels to reach the level of the top management
and the advisers of political and administrative decision makers. 
CONCLUSION
Public policy has tried to address some of the key constraints in the formal
housing market: the limited availability of mortgage finance, problems in
land tenure, constraints due to cumbersome allocation procedures, lack of
customary land mobilisation, lack of a home ownership tradition and
inappropriate high housing construction standards. But these efforts have
achieved very little. State initiatives to curb urban housing problems have
operated just as well as making a dog without teeth bite or a bird without
wings fly. The major government initiatives to review urban housing, the
Morgan Committee (1979), the Home Ownership Policy and the
National Task Force on Shelter Policy and Planning (1989) which led to
the establishment of the National Housing Corporation have failed to
address crucial issues of tackling problems of housing affordability and
finance, issues of land tenure and the development of durable materials at
affordable costs (UNCHS, 1993: 35). The social and cultural attitudes
and aspirations that influence human settlements in the Melanesian
context have also been ignored, and housing has been taken out of context
and treated as a separate entity rather than through a holistic approach to
planning appropriate urban settlements suitable for Melanesians based on
local values and culture.
It is ironic that important policy initiatives are adopted without
proper consultation with the general public for whom policies are made
for. The limited income from formal employment or informal sector activ-
ities is not sufficient and often cannot stretch far enough to make
sufficient savings towards housing costs. The people who had and
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continue to access urban home ownership or formal sector rental houses
are the better off sections of the urban community. The policy of urban
home ownership remains to be a dream in utopia for the vast majority of
people.
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